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| Deinde considerandum est de causa effectiva irae, et de remediis eius. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. | We must now consider the cause that provokes anger, and its remedies. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum semper motivum irae sit aliquid factum contra eum qui irascitur. |
(1) Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is angry? |
| Secundo, utrum sola parvipensio vel despectio sit motivum irae. | (2) Whether slight or contempt is the sole motive of anger? |
| Tertio, de causa irae ex parte irascentis. | (3) Of the cause of anger on the part of the angry person; |
| Quarto, de causa irae ex parte eius contra quem aliquis irascitur. |
(4) Of the cause of anger on the part of the person with whom one is angry. |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non semper aliquis irascatur propter aliquid contra se factum. Homo enim, peccando, nihil contra Deum facere potest, dicitur enim Iob XXXV, si multiplicatae fuerint iniquitates tuae, quid facies contra illum? Dicitur tamen Deus irasci contra homines propter peccata; secundum illud Psalmi CV, iratus est furore dominus in populum suum. Ergo non semper aliquis irascitur propter aliquid contra se factum. |
Objection 1: It would seem that the motive of anger is not always something done against the one who is angry. Because man, by sinning, can do nothing against God; since it is written (Job 35:6): "If thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him?" And yet God is spoken of as being angry with man on account of sin, according to Ps. 105:40: "The Lord was exceedingly angry with His people." Therefore it is not always on account of something done against him, that a man is angry. |
| Praeterea, ira est appetitus vindictae. Sed aliquis appetit vindictam facere etiam de his quae contra alios fiunt. Ergo non semper motivum irae est aliquid contra nos factum. | Objection 2: Further, anger is a desire for vengeance. But one may desire vengeance for things done against others. Therefore we are not always angry on account of something done against us. |
| Praeterea, sicut philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., homines irascuntur praecipue contra eos qui despiciunt ea circa quae ipsi maxime student, sicut qui student in philosophia, irascuntur contra eos qui philosophiam despiciunt, et simile est in aliis. Sed despicere philosophiam non est nocere ipsi studenti. Non ergo semper irascimur propter id quod contra nos fit. | Objection 3: Further, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) man is angry especially with those "who despise what he takes a great interest in; thus men who study philosophy are angry with those who despise philosophy," and so forth. But contempt of philosophy does not harm the philosopher. Therefore it is not always a harm done to us that makes us angry. |
| Praeterea, ille qui tacet contra contumeliantem, magis ipsum ad iram provocat, ut dicit Chrysostomus. Sed in hoc contra ipsum nihil agit, quod tacet. Ergo non semper ira alicuius provocatur propter aliquid quod contra ipsum fit. | Objection 4: Further, he that holds his tongue when another insults him, provokes him to greater anger, as Chrysostom observes (Hom. xxii, in Ep. ad Rom.). But by holding his tongue he does the other no harm. Therefore a man is not always provoked to anger by something done against him. |
| Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod ira fit semper ex his quae ad seipsum. Inimicitia autem et sine his quae ad ipsum, si enim putemus talem esse odimus. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is always due to something done to oneself: whereas hatred may arise without anything being done to us, for we hate a man simply because we think him such." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ira est appetitus nocendi alteri sub ratione iusti vindicativi. Vindicta autem locum non habet nisi ubi praecessit iniuria. Nec iniuria omnis ad vindictam provocat, sed illa sola quae ad eum pertinet qui appetit vindictam, sicut enim unumquodque naturaliter appetit proprium bonum, ita etiam naturaliter repellit proprium malum. Iniuria autem ab aliquo facta non pertinet ad aliquem, nisi aliquid fecerit quod aliquo modo sit contra ipsum. Unde sequitur quod motivum irae alicuius semper sit aliquid contra ipsum factum. |
I answer that, As stated above (Question [46], Article [6]), anger is the desire to hurt another for the purpose of just vengeance. Now unless some injury has been done, there is no question of vengeance: nor does any injury provoke one to vengeance, but only that which is done to the person who seeks vengeance: for just as everything naturally seeks its own good, so does it naturally repel its own evil. But injury done by anyone does not affect a man unless in some way it be something done against him. Consequently the motive of a man's anger is always something done against him. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ira non dicitur in Deo secundum passionem animi, sed secundum iudicium iustitiae, prout vult vindictam facere de peccato. Peccator enim, peccando, Deo nihil nocere effective potest, tamen ex parte sua dupliciter contra Deum agit. Primo quidem, inquantum eum in suis mandatis contemnit. Secundo, inquantum nocumentum aliquod infert alicui, vel sibi vel alteri, quod ad Deum pertinet, prout ille cui nocumentum infertur, sub Dei providentia et tutela continetur. | Reply to Objection 1: We speak of anger in God, not as of a passion of the soul but as of judgment of justice, inasmuch as He wills to take vengeance on sin. Because the sinner, by sinning, cannot do God any actual harm: but so far as he himself is concerned, he acts against God in two ways. First, in so far as he despises God in His commandments. Secondly, in so far as he harms himself or another; which injury redounds to God, inasmuch as the person injured is an object of God's providence and protection. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod irascimur contra illos qui aliis nocent et vindictam appetimus, inquantum illi quibus nocetur, aliquo modo ad nos pertinent, vel per aliquam affinitatem, vel per amicitiam, vel saltem per communionem naturae. | Reply to Objection 2: If we are angry with those who harm others, and seek to be avenged on them, it is because those who are injured belong in some way to us: either by some kinship or friendship, or at least because of the nature we have in common. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod id in quo maxime studemus, reputamus esse bonum nostrum. Et ideo, cum illud despicitur, reputamus nos quoque despici, et arbitramur nos laesos. | Reply to Objection 3: When we take a very great interest in a thing, we look upon it as our own good; so that if anyone despise it, it seems as though we ourselves were despised and injured. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod tunc aliquis tacens ad iram provocat iniuriantem, quando videtur ex contemptu tacere, quasi parvipendat alterius iram. Ipsa autem parvipensio quidam actus est. | Reply to Objection 4: Silence provokes the insulter to anger when he thinks it is due to contempt, as though his anger were slighted: and a slight is an action. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sola parvipensio vel despectio sit motivum irae. Dicit enim Damascenus quod iniuriam passi, vel aestimantes pati, irascimur. Sed homo potest iniuriam pati etiam absque despectu vel parvipensione. Ergo non sola parvipensio est irae motivum. | Objection 1: It would seem that slight or contempt is not the sole motive of anger. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that we are angry "when we suffer, or think that we are suffering, an injury." But one may suffer an injury without being despised or slighted. Therefore a slight is not the only motive of anger. |
| Praeterea, eiusdem est appetere honorem, et contristari de parvipensione. Sed bruta animalia non appetunt honorem. Ergo non contristantur de parvipensione. Et tamen in eis provocatur ira propter hoc quod vulnerantur, ut dicit philosophus, in III Ethic. Ergo non sola parvipensio videtur esse motivum irae. | Objection 2: Further, desire for honor and grief for a slight belong to the same subject. But dumb animals do not desire honor. Therefore they are not grieved by being slighted. And yet "they are roused to anger, when wounded," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8). Therefore a slight is not the sole motive of anger. |
| Praeterea, philosophus, in II Rhetoric., ponit multas alias causas irae, puta oblivionem, et exultationem in infortuniis, denuntiationem malorum, impedimentum consequendae propriae voluntatis. Non ergo sola parvipensio est provocativum irae. | Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2) gives many other causes of anger, for instance, "being forgotten by others; that others should rejoice in our misfortunes; that they should make known our evils; being hindered from doing as we like." Therefore being slighted is not the only motive for being angry. |
| Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod ira est appetitus cum tristitia punitionis, propter apparentem parvipensionem non convenienter factam. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that anger is "a desire, with sorrow, for vengeance, on account of a seeming slight done unbecomingly." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod omnes causae irae reducuntur ad parvipensionem. Sunt enim tres species parvipensionis, ut dicitur in II Rhetoric., scilicet despectus, epereasmus, idest impedimentum voluntatis implendae, et contumeliatio, et ad haec tria omnia motiva irae reducuntur. Cuius ratio potest accipi duplex. Prima est, quia ira appetit nocumentum alterius, inquantum habet rationem iusti vindicativi, et ideo intantum quaerit vindictam, inquantum videtur esse iusta. Iusta autem vindicta non fit nisi de eo quod est iniuste factum, et ideo provocativum ad iram semper est aliquid sub ratione iniusti. Unde dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric., quod si homines putaverint eos qui laeserunt, esse iuste passos, non irascuntur, non enim fit ira ad iustum. Contingit autem tripliciter nocumentum alicui inferri, scilicet ex ignorantia, ex passione, et ex electione. Tunc autem aliquis maxime iniustum facit, quando ex electione vel industria, vel ex certa malitia nocumentum infert, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Et ideo maxime irascimur contra illos quos putamus ex industria nobis nocuisse. Si enim putemus aliquos vel per ignorantiam, vel ex passione nobis intulisse iniuriam, vel non irascimur contra eos, vel multo minus, agere enim aliquid ex ignorantia vel ex passione, diminuit rationem iniuriae, et est quodammodo provocativum misericordiae et veniae. Illi autem qui ex industria nocumentum inferunt, ex contemptu peccare videntur, et ideo contra eos maxime irascimur. Unde philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod his qui propter iram aliquid fecerunt, aut non irascimur, aut minus irascimur, non enim propter parvipensionem videntur egisse. | I answer that, All the causes of anger are reduced to slight. For slight is of three kinds, as stated in Rhet. ii, 2, viz. "contempt," "despiteful treatment," i.e. hindering one from doing one's will, and "insolence": and all motives of anger are reduced to these three. Two reasons may be assigned for this. First, because anger seeks another's hurt as being a means of just vengeance: wherefore it seeks vengeance in so far as it seems just. Now just vengeance is taken only for that which is done unjustly; hence that which provokes anger is always something considered in the light of an injustice. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "men are not angry—if they think they have wronged some one and are suffering justly on that account; because there is no anger at what is just." Now injury is done to another in three ways: namely, through ignorance, through passion, and through choice. Then, most of all, a man does an injustice, when he does an injury from choice, on purpose, or from deliberate malice, as stated in Ethic. v, 8. Wherefore we are most of all angry with those who, in our opinion, have hurt us on purpose. For if we think that some one has done us an injury through ignorance or through passion, either we are not angry with them at all, or very much less: since to do anything through ignorance or through passion takes away from the notion of injury, and to a certain extent calls for mercy and forgiveness. Those, on the other hand, who do an injury on purpose, seem to sin from contempt; wherefore we are angry with them most of all. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "we are either not angry at all, or not very angry with those who have acted through anger, because they do not seem to have acted slightingly." |
| Secunda ratio est, quia parvipensio excellentiae hominis opponitur, quae enim homines putant nullo digna esse, parvipendunt, ut dicitur in II Rhetoric. Ex omnibus autem bonis nostris aliquam excellentiam quaerimus. Et ideo quodcumque nocumentum nobis inferatur, inquantum excellentiae derogat, videtur ad parvipensionem pertinere. | The second reason is because a slight is opposed to a man's excellence: because "men think little of things that are not worth much ado" (Rhet. ii, 2). Now we seek for some kind of excellence from all our goods. Consequently whatever injury is inflicted on us, in so far as it is derogatory to our excellence, seems to savor of a slight. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex quacumque alia causa aliquis iniuriam patiatur quam ex contemptu, illa causa minuit rationem iniuriae. Sed solus contemptus, vel parvipensio, rationem irae auget. Et ideo est per se causa irascendi. | Reply to Objection 1: Any other cause, besides contempt, through which a man suffers an injury, takes away from the notion of injury: contempt or slight alone adds to the motive of anger, and consequently is of itself the cause of anger. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet animal brutum non appetat honorem sub ratione honoris, appetit tamen naturaliter quandam excellentiam, et irascitur contra ea quae illi excellentiae derogant. | Reply to Objection 2: Although a dumb animal does not seek honor as such, yet it naturally seeks a certain superiority, and is angry with anything derogatory thereto. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod omnes illae causae ad quandam parvipensionem reducuntur. Oblivio enim parvipensionis est evidens signum, ea enim quae magna aestimamus, magis memoriae infigimus. Similiter ex quadam parvipensione est quod aliquis non vereatur contristare aliquem, denuntiando sibi aliqua tristia. Qui etiam in infortuniis alicuius hilaritatis signa ostendit, videtur parum curare de bono vel malo eius. Similiter etiam qui impedit aliquem a sui propositi assecutione, non propter aliquam utilitatem sibi inde provenientem, non videtur multum curare de amicitia eius. Et ideo omnia talia, inquantum sunt signa contemptus, sunt provocativa irae.. | Reply to Objection 3: Each of those causes amounts to some kind of slight. Thus forgetfulness is a clear sign of slight esteem, for the more we think of a thing the more is it fixed in our memory. Again if a man does not hesitate by his remarks to give pain to another, this seems to show that he thinks little of him: and those too who show signs of hilarity when another is in misfortune, seem to care little about his good or evil. Again he that hinders another from carrying out his will, without deriving thereby any profit to himself, seems not to care much for his friendship. Consequently all those things, in so far as they are signs of contempt, provoke anger. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod excellentia alicuius non sit causa quod facilius irascatur. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric., quod maxime aliqui irascuntur cum tristantur, ut infirmi, et egentes, et qui non habent id quod concupiscunt. Sed omnia ista ad defectum pertinere videntur. Ergo magis facit pronum ad iram defectus quam excellentia. | Objection 1: It would seem that a man's excellence is not the cause of his being more easily angry. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "some are angry especially when they are grieved, for instance, the sick, the poor, and those who are disappointed." But these things seem to pertain to defect. Therefore defect rather than excellence makes one prone to anger. |
| Praeterea, philosophus dicit ibidem quod tunc aliqui maxime irascuntur, quando in eis despicitur id de quo potest esse suspicio quod vel non insit eis, vel quod insit eis debiliter, sed cum putant se multum excellere in illis in quibus despiciuntur, non curant. Sed praedicta suspicio ex defectu provenit. Ergo defectus est magis causa quod aliquis irascatur, quam excellentia. | Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "some are very much inclined to be angry when they are despised for some failing or weakness of the existence of which there are grounds for suspicion; but if they think they excel in those points, they do not trouble." But a suspicion of this kind is due to some defect. Therefore defect rather than excellence is a cause of a man being angry. |
| Praeterea, ea quae ad excellentiam pertinent, maxime faciunt homines iucundos et bonae spei esse. Sed philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod in ludo, in risu, in festo, in prosperitate, in consummatione operum, in delectatione non turpi, et in spe optima, homines non irascuntur. Ergo excellentia non est causa irae. | Objection 3: Further, whatever savors of excellence makes a man agreeable and hopeful. But the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "men are not angry when they play, make jokes, or take part in a feast, nor when they are prosperous or successful, nor in moderate pleasures and well-founded hope." Therefore excellence is not a cause of anger. |
| Sed contra est quod philosophus, in eodem libro, dicit quod homines propter excellentiam indignantur. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9) that excellence makes men prone to anger. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod causa irae in eo qui irascitur, dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo, secundum habitudinem ad motivum irae. Et sic excellentia est causa ut aliquis de facili irascatur. Est enim motivum irae iniusta parvipensio, ut dictum est. Constat autem quod quanto aliquis est excellentior, iniustius parvipenditur in hoc in quo excellit. Et ideo illi qui sunt in aliqua excellentia, maxime irascuntur, si parvipendantur, puta si dives parvipenditur in pecunia, et rhetor in loquendo, et sic de aliis. |
I answer that, The cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be taken in two ways. First in respect of the motive of anger: and thus excellence is the cause of a man being easily angered. Because the motive of anger is an unjust slight, as stated above (Article [2]). Now it is evident that the more excellent a man is, the more unjust is a slight offered him in the matter in which he excels. Consequently those who excel in any matter, are most of all angry, if they be slighted in that matter; for instance, a wealthy man in his riches, or an orator in his eloquence, and so forth. |
| Alio modo potest considerari causa irae in eo qui irascitur, ex parte dispositionis quae in eo relinquitur ex tali motivo. Manifestum est autem quod nihil movet ad iram, nisi nocumentum quod contristat. Ea autem quae ad defectum pertinent, maxime sunt contristantia, quia homines defectibus subiacentes facilius laeduntur. Et ista est causa quare homines qui sunt infirmi, vel in aliis defectibus, facilius irascuntur, quia facilius contristantur. | Secondly, the cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be considered on the part of the disposition produced in him by the motive aforesaid. Now it is evident that nothing moves a man to anger except a hurt that grieves him: while whatever savors of defect is above all a cause of grief; since men who suffer from some defect are more easily hurt. And this is why men who are weak, or subject to some other defect, are more easily angered, since they are more easily grieved. |
| Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum. | This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ille qui despicitur in eo in quo manifeste multum excellit, non reputat se aliquam iacturam pati, et ideo non contristatur, et ex hac parte minus irascitur. Sed ex alia parte, inquantum indignius despicitur, habet maiorem rationem irascendi. Nisi forte reputet se non invideri vel subsannari propter despectum; sed propter ignorantiam, vel propter aliud huiusmodi. | Reply to Objection 2: If a man be despised in a matter in which he evidently excels greatly, he does not consider himself the loser thereby, and therefore is not grieved: and in this respect he is less angered. But in another respect, in so far as he is more undeservedly despised, he has more reason for being angry: unless perhaps he thinks that he is envied or insulted not through contempt but through ignorance, or some other like cause. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod omnia illa impediunt iram, inquantum impediunt tristitiam. Sed ex alia parte, nata sunt provocare iram, secundum quod faciunt hominem inconvenientius despici. | Reply to Objection 3: All these things hinder anger in so far as they hinder sorrow. But in another respect they are naturally apt to provoke anger, because they make it more unseemly to insult anyone. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod defectus alicuius non sit causa ut contra ipsum facilius irascamur. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric., quod his qui confitentur et poenitent et humiliantur, non irascimur, sed magis ad eos mitescimus. Unde et canes non mordent eos qui resident. Sed haec pertinent ad parvitatem et defectum. Ergo parvitas alicuius est causa ut ei minus irascamur. | Objection 1: It would seem that a person's defect is not a reason for being more easily angry with him. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "we are not angry with those who confess and repent and humble themselves; on the contrary, we are gentle with them. Wherefore dogs bite not those who sit down." But these things savor of littleness and defect. Therefore littleness of a person is a reason for being less angry with him. |
| Praeterea, nullus est maior defectus quam mortis. Sed ad mortuos desinit ira. Ergo defectus alicuius non est causa provocativa irae contra ipsum. | Objection 2: Further, there is no greater defect than death. But anger ceases at the sight of death. Therefore defect of a person does not provoke anger against him. |
| Praeterea, nullus aestimat aliquem parvum ex hoc quod est sibi amicus. Sed ad amicos, si nos offenderint, vel si non iuverint, magis offendimur, unde dicitur in Psalmo LIV, si inimicus meus maledixisset mihi, sustinuissem utique. Ergo defectus alicuius non est causa ut contra ipsum facilius irascamur. |
Objection 3: Further, no one thinks little of a man through his being friendly towards him. But we are more angry with friends, if they offend us or refuse to help us; hence it is written (Ps. 54:13): "If my enemy had reviled me I would verily have borne with it." Therefore a person's defect is not a reason for being more easily angry with him. |
| Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod dives irascitur contra pauperem, si eum despiciat; et principans contra subiectum. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "the rich man is angry with the poor man, if the latter despise him; and in like manner the prince is angry with his subject." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, indigna despectio est maxime provocativa irae. Defectus igitur vel parvitas eius contra quem irascimur, facit ad augmentum irae, inquantum auget indignam despectionem. Sicut enim quanto aliquis est maior, tanto indignius despicitur; ita quanto aliquis est minor, tanto indignius despicit. Et ideo nobiles irascuntur si despiciantur a rusticis, vel sapientes ab insipientibus, vel domini a servis. |
I answer that, As stated above (Articles [2],3) unmerited contempt more than anything else is a provocative of anger. Consequently deficiency or littleness in the person with whom we are angry, tends to increase our anger, in so far as it adds to the unmeritedness of being despised. For just as the higher a man's position is, the more undeservedly he is despised; so the lower it is, the less reason he has for despising. Thus a nobleman is angry if he be insulted by a peasant; a wise man, if by a fool; a master, if by a servant. |
| Si vero parvitas vel defectus diminuat despectionem indignam, talis parvitas non auget, sed diminuit iram. Et hoc modo illi qui poenitent de iniuriis factis, et confitentur se male fecisse, et humiliantur et veniam petunt, mitigant iram, secundum illud Prov. XV, responsio mollis frangit iram, inquantum scilicet tales videntur non despicere, sed magis magnipendere eos quibus se humiliant. | If, however, the littleness or deficiency lessens the unmerited contempt, then it does not increase but lessens anger. In this way those who repent of their ill-deeds, and confess that they have done wrong, who humble themselves and ask pardon, mitigate anger, according to Prov. 15:1: "A mild answer breaketh wrath": because, to wit, they seem not to despise, but rather to think much of those before whom they humble themselves. |
| Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum. | This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod duplex est causa quare ad mortuos cessat ira. Una, quia non possunt dolere et sentire, quod maxime quaerunt irati in his quibus irascuntur. Alio modo, quia iam videntur ad ultimum malorum pervenisse. Unde etiam ad quoscumque graviter laesos cessat ira, inquantum eorum malum excedit mensuram iustae retributionis. | Reply to Objection 2: There are two reasons why anger ceases at the sight of death. One is because the dead are incapable of sorrow and sensation; and this is chiefly what the angry seek in those with whom they are angered. Another reason is because the dead seem to have attained to the limit of evils. Hence anger ceases in regard to all who are grievously hurt, in so far as this hurt surpasses the measure of just retaliation. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam despectio quae est ab amicis, videtur esse magis indigna. Et ideo ex simili causa magis irascimur contra eos, si despiciant, vel nocendo vel non iuvando, sicut et contra minores. | Reply to Objection 3: To be despised by one's friends seems also a greater indignity. Consequently if they despise us by hurting or by failing to help, we are angry with them for the same reason for which we are angry with those who are beneath us. |