St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica

(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

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Question: 46 [ << | >> ]

OF ANGER, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Deinde considerandum est de ira.
  • Et primo, de ira secundum se;
  • secundo, de causa factiva irae, et remedio eius;
  • tertio, de effectu eius.
We must now consider anger: and
  • (1) anger in itself;
  • (2) the cause of anger and its remedy;
  • (3) the effect of anger.
Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
Primo, utrum ira sit passio specialis. (1) Whether anger is a special passion?
Secundo, utrum obiectum irae sit bonum, an malum. (2) Whether the object of anger is good or evil?
Tertio, utrum ira sit in concupiscibili. (3) Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?
Quarto, utrum ira sit cum ratione. (4) Whether anger is accompanied by an act of reason?
Quinto, utrum ira sit naturalior quam concupiscentia. (5) Whether anger is more natural than desire?
Sexto, utrum ira sit gravior quam odium. (6) Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?
Septimo, utrum ira solum sit ad illos ad quos est iustitia. (7) Whether anger is only towards those with whom we have a relation of justice?
Octavo, de speciebus irae. (8) Of the species of anger.

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Question: 46 [ << | >> ]
Article: 1  [ << | >> ]

Whether anger is a special passion?

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non sit passio specialis. Ab ira enim denominatur potentia irascibilis. Sed huius potentiae non est una tantum passio, sed multae. Ergo ira non est una passio specialis. Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not a special passion. For the irascible power takes its name from anger [ira]. But there are several passions in this power, not only one. Therefore anger is not one special passion.
Praeterea, cuilibet passioni speciali est aliquid contrarium; ut patet inducenti per singula. Sed irae non est aliqua passio contraria, ut supra dictum est. Ergo ira non est passio specialis. Objection 2: Further, to every special passion there is a contrary passion; as is evident by going through them one by one. But no passion is contrary to anger, as stated above (Question [23], Article [3]). Therefore anger is not a special passion.
Praeterea, una specialis passio non includit aliam. Sed ira includit multas passiones, est enim cum tristitia, et cum delectatione, et cum spe, ut patet per philosophum, in II Rhetoric. Ergo ira non est passio specialis. Objection 3: Further, one special passion does not include another. But anger includes several passions: since it accompanies sorrow, pleasure, and hope, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2). Therefore anger is not a special passion.
Sed contra est quod Damascenus ponit iram specialem passionem. Et similiter Tullius, IV de Tusculanis quaest. On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) calls anger a special passion: and so does Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 7).
Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid dicitur generale dupliciter. Uno modo, per praedicationem, sicut animal est generale ad omnia animalia. Alio modo, per causam, sicut sol est causa generalis omnium quae generantur in his inferioribus, secundum Dionysium, in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sicut enim genus continet multas differentias potestate, secundum similitudinem materiae; ita causa agens continet multos effectus secundum virtutem activam. Contingit autem aliquem effectum ex concursu diversarum causarum produci, et quia omnis causa aliquo modo in effectu manet, potest etiam dici, tertio modo, quod effectus ex congregatione multarum causarum productus, habet quandam generalitatem, inquantum continet multas causas quodammodo in actu. I answer that, A thing is said to be general in two ways. First, by predication; thus "animal" is general in respect of all animals. Secondly, by causality; thus the sun is the general cause of all things generated here below, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Because just as a genus contains potentially many differences, according to a likeness of matter; so an efficient cause contains many effects according to its active power. Now it happens that an effect is produced by the concurrence of various causes; and since every cause remains somewhat in its effect, we may say that, in yet a third way, an effect which is due to the concurrence of several causes, has a certain generality, inasmuch as several causes are, in a fashion, actually existing therein.
Primo ergo modo, ira non est passio generalis, sed condivisa aliis passionibus, ut supra dictum est. Similiter autem nec secundo modo. Non est enim causa aliarum passionum, sed per hunc modum potest dici generalis passio amor, ut patet per Augustinum, in XIV libro de Civ. Dei; amor enim est prima radix omnium passionum, ut supra dictum est. Sed tertio modo potest ira dici passio generalis, inquantum ex concursu multarum passionum causatur. Non enim insurgit motus irae nisi propter aliquam tristitiam illatam et nisi adsit desiderium et spes ulciscendi, quia, ut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., iratus habet spem puniendi; appetit enim vindictam ut sibi possibilem. Unde si fuerit multum excellens persona quae nocumentum intulit, non sequitur ira, sed solum tristitia, ut Avicenna dicit, in libro de anima. Accordingly in the first way, anger is not a general passion but is condivided with the other passions, as stated above (Question [23], Article [4]). In like manner, neither is it in the second way: since it is not a cause of the other passions. But in this way, love may be called a general passion, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), because love is the primary root of all the other passions, as stated above (Question [27], Article [4]). But, in a third way, anger may be called a general passion, inasmuch as it is caused by a concurrence of several passions. Because the movement of anger does not arise save on account of some pain inflicted, and unless there be desire and hope of revenge: for, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2), "the angry man hopes to punish; since he craves for revenge as being possible." Consequently if the person, who inflicted the injury, excel very much, anger does not ensue, but only sorrow, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv, 6).
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, vis irascibilis denominatur ab ira, non quia omnis motus huius potentiae sit ira, sed quia ad iram terminantur omnes motus huius potentiae; et inter alios eius motus, iste est manifestior. Reply to Objection 1: The irascible power takes its name from "ira" [anger], not because every movement of that power is one of anger; but because all its movements terminate in anger; and because, of all these movements, anger is the most patent.
Ad secundum dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod ira causatur ex contrariis passionibus, scilicet a spe, quae est boni, et a tristitia, quae est mali, includit in seipsa contrarietatem, et ideo non habet contrarium extra se. Sicut etiam in mediis coloribus non invenitur contrarietas, nisi quae est simplicium colorum, ex quibus causantur. Reply to Objection 2: From the very fact that anger is caused by contrary passions, i.e. by hope, which is of good, and by sorrow, which is of evil, it includes in itself contrariety: and consequently it has no contrary outside itself. Thus also in mixed colors there is no contrariety, except that of the simple colors from which they are made.
Ad tertium dicendum quod ira includit multas passiones, non quidem sicut genus species, sed magis secundum continentiam causae et effectus. Reply to Objection 3: Anger includes several passions, not indeed as a genus includes several species; but rather according to the inclusion of cause and effect.

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Question: 46 [ << | >> ]
Article: 2  [ << | >> ]

Whether the object of anger is good or evil?

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod obiectum irae sit malum. Dicit enim Gregorius Nyssenus quod ira est quasi armigera concupiscentiae, inquantum scilicet impugnat id quod concupiscentiam impedit. Sed omne impedimentum habet rationem mali. Ergo ira respicit malum tanquam obiectum. Objection 1: It would seem that the object of anger is evil. For Gregory of Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] that anger is "the sword-bearer of desire," inasmuch, to wit, as it assails whatever obstacle stands in the way of desire. But an obstacle has the character of evil. Therefore anger regards evil as its object.
Praeterea, ira et odium conveniunt in effectu, utriusque enim est inferre nocumentum alteri. Sed odium respicit malum tanquam obiectum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo etiam et ira. Objection 2: Further, anger and hatred agree in their effect, since each seeks to inflict harm on another. But hatred regards evil as its object, as stated above (Question [29], Article [1]). Therefore anger does also.
Praeterea, ira causatur ex tristitia, unde philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod ira operatur cum tristitia. Sed tristitiae obiectum est malum. Ergo et irae. Objection 3: Further, anger arises from sorrow; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 6) that "anger acts with sorrow." But evil is the object of sorrow. Therefore it is also the object of anger.
Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in II Confess., quod ira appetit vindictam. Sed appetitus vindictae est appetitus boni, cum vindicta ad iustitiam pertineat. Ergo obiectum irae est bonum. On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "anger craves for revenge." But the desire for revenge is a desire for something good: since revenge belongs to justice. Therefore the object of anger is good.
Praeterea, ira semper est cum spe, unde et delectationem causat, ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Sed spei et delectationis obiectum est bonum. Ergo et irae. Moreover, anger is always accompanied by hope, wherefore it causes pleasure, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2). But the object of hope and of pleasure is good. Therefore good is also the object of anger.
Respondeo dicendum quod motus appetitivae virtutis sequitur actum virtutis apprehensivae. Vis autem apprehensiva dupliciter aliquid apprehendit, uno modo, per modum incomplexi, sicut cum intelligimus quid est homo; alio modo, per modum complexi, sicut cum intelligimus album inesse homini. Unde utroque modo vis appetitiva potest tendere in bonum et malum. Per modum quidem simplicis et incomplexi, cum appetitus simpliciter sequitur vel inhaeret bono, vel refugit malum. Et tales motus sunt desiderium et spes, delectatio et tristitia, et alia huiusmodi. Per modum autem complexi, sicut cum appetitus fertur in hoc quod aliquod bonum vel malum insit vel fiat circa alterum, vel tendendo in hoc, vel refugiendo ab hoc. Sicut manifeste apparet in amore et odio, amamus enim aliquem, inquantum volumus ei inesse aliquod bonum; odimus autem aliquem, inquantum volumus ei inesse aliquod malum. Et similiter est in ira, quicumque enim irascitur, quaerit vindicari de aliquo. Et sic motus irae tendit in duo, scilicet in ipsam vindictam, quam appetit et sperat sicut quoddam bonum, unde et de ipsa delectatur, tendit etiam in illum de quo quaerit vindictam, sicut in contrarium et nocivum, quod pertinet ad rationem mali. I answer that, The movement of the appetitive power follows an act of the apprehensive power. Now the apprehensive power apprehends a thing in two ways. First, by way of an incomplex object, as when we understand what a man is; secondly, by way of a complex object, as when we understand that whiteness is in a man. Consequently in each of these ways the appetitive power can tend to both good and evil: by way of a simple and incomplex object, when the appetite simply follows and adheres to good, or recoils from evil: and such movements are desire, hope, pleasure, sorrow, and so forth: by way of a complex object, as when the appetite is concerned with some good or evil being in, or being done to, another, either seeking this or recoiling from it. This is evident in the case of love and hatred: for we love someone, in so far as we wish some good to be in him; and we hate someone, in so far as we wish some evil to be in him. It is the same with anger; for when a man is angry, he wishes to be avenged on someone. Hence the movement of anger has a twofold tendency: viz. to vengeance itself, which it desires and hopes for as being a good, wherefore it takes pleasure in it; and to the person on whom it seeks vengeance, as to something contrary and hurtful, which bears the character of evil.
Est tamen duplex differentia attendenda circa hoc, irae ad odium et ad amorem. Quarum prima est, quod ira semper respicit duo obiecta, amor vero et odium quandoque respiciunt unum obiectum tantum, sicut cum dicitur aliquis amare vinum vel aliquid huiusmodi, aut etiam odire. Secunda est, quia utrumque obiectorum quod respicit amor, est bonum, vult enim amans bonum alicui, tanquam sibi convenienti. Utrumque vero eorum quae respicit odium, habet rationem mali, vult enim odiens malum alicui, tamquam cuidam inconvenienti. Sed ira respicit unum obiectum secundum rationem boni, scilicet vindictam, quam appetit, et aliud secundum rationem mali, scilicet hominem nocivum, de quo vult vindicari. Et ideo est passio quodammodo composita ex contrariis passionibus. We must, however, observe a twofold difference in this respect, between anger on the one side, and hatred and love on the other. The first difference is that anger always regards two objects: whereas love and hatred sometimes regard but one object, as when a man is said to love wine or something of the kind, or to hate it. The second difference is, that both the objects of love are good: since the lover wishes good to someone, as to something agreeable to himself: while both the objects of hatred bear the character of evil: for the man who hates, wishes evil to someone, as to something disagreeable to him. Whereas anger regards one object under the aspect of evil, viz. the noxious person, on whom it seeks to be avenged. Consequently it is a passion somewhat made up of contrary passions.
Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

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Question: 46 [ << | >> ]
Article: 3  [ << | >> ]

Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira sit in concupiscibili. Dicit enim Tullius, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., quod ira est libido quaedam. Sed libido est in concupiscibili. Ergo et ira. Objection 1: It would seem that anger is in the concupiscible faculty. For Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that anger is a kind of "desire." But desire is in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore anger is too.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in regula, quod ira crescit in odium. Et Tullius dicit, in eodem libro, quod odium est ira inveterata. Sed odium est in concupiscibili, sicut amor. Ergo ira est in concupiscibili. Objection 2: Further, Augustine says in his Rule, that "anger grows into hatred": and Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that "hatred is inveterate anger." But hatred, like love, is a concupiscible passion. Therefore anger is in the concupiscible faculty.
Praeterea, Damascenus et Gregorius Nyssenus dicunt quod ira componitur ex tristitia et desiderio. Sed utrumque horum est in concupiscibili. Ergo ira est in concupiscibili. Objection 3: Further, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] say that "anger is made up of sorrow and desire." Both of these are in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore anger is a concupiscible passion.
Sed contra, vis concupiscibilis est alia ab irascibili. Si igitur ira esset in concupiscibili, non denominaretur ab ea vis irascibilis. On the contrary, The concupiscible is distinct from the irascible faculty. If, therefore, anger were in the concupiscible power, the irascible would not take its name from it.
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, passiones irascibilis in hoc differunt a passionibus concupiscibilis, quod obiecta passionum concupiscibilis sunt bonum et malum absolute; obiecta autem passionum irascibilis sunt bonum et malum cum quadam elevatione vel arduitate. Dictum est autem quod ira respicit duo obiecta, scilicet vindictam, quam appetit; et eum de quo vindictam quaerit. Et circa utrumque quandam arduitatem ira requirit, non enim insurgit motus irae, nisi aliqua magnitudine circa utrumque existente; quaecumque enim nihil sunt, aut modica valde nullo digna aestimamus, ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Unde manifestum est quod ira non est in concupiscibili, sed in irascibili. I answer that, As stated above (Question [23], Article [1]), the passions of the irascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible faculty, in that the objects of the concupiscible passions are good and evil absolutely considered, whereas the objects of the irascible passions are good and evil in a certain elevation or arduousness. Now it has been stated (Article [2]) that anger regards two objects: viz. the vengeance that it seeks; and the person on whom it seeks vengeance; and in respect of both, anger requires a certain arduousness: for the movement of anger does not arise, unless there be some magnitude about both these objects; since "we make no ado about things that are naught or very minute," as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 2). It is therefore evident that anger is not in the concupiscible, but in the irascible faculty.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Tullius libidinem nominat appetitum cuiuscumque boni futuri non habita discretione ardui vel non ardui. Et secundum hoc, ponit iram sub libidine, inquantum est appetitus vindictae. Sic autem libido communis est ad irascibilem et concupiscibilem. Reply to Objection 1: Cicero gives the name of desire to any kind of craving for a future good, without discriminating between that which is arduous and that which is not. Accordingly he reckons anger as a kind of desire, inasmuch as it is a desire of vengeance. In this sense, however, desire is common to the irascible and concupiscible faculties.
Ad secundum dicendum quod ira dicitur crescere in odium, non quod eadem numero passio quae prius fuit ira, postmodum fiat odium per quandam inveterationem, sed per quandam causalitatem. Ira enim, per diuturnitatem, causat odium. Reply to Objection 2: Anger is said to grow into hatred, not as though the same passion which at first was anger, afterwards becomes hatred by becoming inveterate; but by a process of causality. For anger when it lasts a long time engenders hatred.
Ad tertium dicendum quod ira dicitur componi ex tristitia et desiderio, non sicut ex partibus, sed sicut ex causis. Dictum est autem supra quod passiones concupiscibilis sunt causae passionum irascibilis. Reply to Objection 3: Anger is said to be composed of sorrow and desire, not as though they were its parts, but because they are its causes: and it has been said above (Question [25], Article [2]) that the concupiscible passions are the causes of the irascible passions.

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Question: 46 [ << | >> ]
Article: 4  [ << | >> ]

Whether anger requires an act of reason?

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non sit cum ratione. Ira enim, cum sit passio quaedam, est in appetitu sensitivo. Sed appetitus sensitivus non sequitur rationis apprehensionem, sed sensitivae partis. Ergo ira non est cum ratione. Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not require an act of reason. For, since anger is a passion, it is in the sensitive appetite. But the sensitive appetite follows an apprehension, not of reason, but of the sensitive faculty. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.
Praeterea, animalia bruta carent ratione. Et tamen in eis invenitur ira. Ergo ira non est cum ratione. Objection 2: Further, dumb animals are devoid of reason: and yet they are seen to be angry. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.
Praeterea, ebrietas ligat rationem. Adiuvat autem ad iram. Ergo ira non est cum ratione. Objection 3: Further, drunkenness fetters the reason; whereas it is conducive to anger. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.
Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod ira consequitur rationem aliqualiter. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger listens to reason somewhat."
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ira est appetitus vindictae. Haec autem collationem importat poenae infligendae ad nocumentum sibi illatum, unde, in VII Ethic., dicit philosophus quod syllogizans quoniam oportet talem oppugnare, irascitur confestim. Conferre autem et syllogizare est rationis. Et ideo ira est quodammodo cum ratione. I answer that, As stated above (Article [2]), anger is a desire for vengeance. Now vengeance implies a comparison between the punishment to be inflicted and the hurt done; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger, as if it had drawn the inference that it ought to quarrel with such a person, is therefore immediately exasperated." Now to compare and to draw an inference is an act of reason. Therefore anger, in a fashion, requires an act of reason.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod motus appetitivae virtutis potest esse cum ratione dupliciter. Uno modo, cum ratione praecipiente, et sic voluntas est cum ratione; unde et dicitur appetitus rationalis. Alio modo, cum ratione denuntiante, et sic ira est cum ratione. Dicit enim philosophus, in libro de Problemat., quod ira est cum ratione, non sicut praecipiente ratione, sed ut manifestante iniuriam. Appetitus enim sensitivus immediate rationi non obedit, sed mediante voluntate. Reply to Objection 1: The movement of the appetitive power may follow an act of reason in two ways. In the first way, it follows the reason in so far as the reason commands: and thus the will follows reason, wherefore it is called the rational appetite. In another way, it follows reason in so far as the reason denounces, and thus anger follows reason. For the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxviii, 3) that "anger follows reason, not in obedience to reason's command, but as a result of reason's denouncing the injury." Because the sensitive appetite is subject to the reason, not immediately but through the will.
Ad secundum dicendum quod bruta animalia habent instinctum naturalem ex divina ratione eis inditum, per quem habent motus interiores et exteriores similes motibus rationis, sicut supra dictum est. Reply to Objection 2: Dumb animals have a natural instinct imparted to them by the Divine Reason, in virtue of which they are gifted with movements, both internal and external, like unto rational movements, as stated above (Question [40], Article [3]).
Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in VII Ethic., ira audit aliqualiter rationem, sicut nuntiantem quod iniuriatum est ei, sed non perfecte audit, quia non observat regulam rationis in rependendo vindictam. Ad iram ergo requiritur aliquis actus rationis; et additur impedimentum rationis. Unde philosophus dicit, in libro de Problemat., quod illi qui sunt multum ebrii, tanquam nihil habentes de iudicio rationis, non irascuntur, sed quando sunt parum ebrii, irascuntur, tanquam habentes iudicium rationis, sed impeditum. Reply to Objection 3: As stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "anger listens somewhat to reason" in so far as reason denounces the injury inflicted, "but listens not perfectly," because it does not observe the rule of reason as to the measure of vengeance. Anger, therefore, requires an act of reason; and yet proves a hindrance to reason. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Problem. iii, 2,27) that whose who are very drunk, so as to be incapable of the use of reason, do not get angry: but those who are slightly drunk, do get angry, through being still able, though hampered, to form a judgment of reason.

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Question: 46 [ << | >> ]
Article: 5  [ << | >> ]

Whether anger is more natural than desire?

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non sit naturalior quam concupiscentia. Proprium enim hominis dicitur quod sit animal mansuetum natura. Sed mansuetudo opponitur irae, ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Ergo ira non est naturalior quam concupiscentia, sed omnino videtur esse contra hominis naturam. Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not more natural than desire. Because it is proper to man to be by nature a gentle animal. But "gentleness is contrary to anger," as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore anger is no more natural than desire, in fact it seems to be altogether unnatural to man.
Praeterea, ratio contra naturam dividitur, ea enim quae secundum rationem agunt, non dicimus secundum naturam agere. Sed ira est cum ratione, concupiscentia autem sine ratione, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Ergo concupiscentia est naturalior quam ira. Objection 2: Further, reason is contrasted with nature: since those things that act according to reason, are not said to act according to nature. Now "anger requires an act of reason, but desire does not," as stated in Ethic. vii, 6. Therefore desire is more natural than anger.
Praeterea, ira est appetitus vindictae, concupiscentia autem maxime est appetitus delectabilium secundum tactum, scilicet ciborum et venereorum. Haec autem sunt magis naturalia homini quam vindicta. Ergo concupiscentia est naturalior quam ira. Objection 3: Further, anger is a craving for vengeance: while desire is a craving for those things especially which are pleasant to the touch, viz. for pleasures of the table and for sexual pleasures. But these things are more natural to man than vengeance. Therefore desire is more natural than anger.
Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod ira est naturalior quam concupiscentia. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger is more natural than desire."
Respondeo dicendum quod naturale dicitur illud quod causatur a natura, ut patet in II Physic. Unde utrum aliqua passio sit magis vel minus naturalis, considerari non potest nisi ex causa sua. Causa autem passionis, ut supra dictum est, dupliciter accipi potest, uno modo, ex parte obiecti; alio modo, ex parte subiecti. Si ergo consideretur causa irae et concupiscentiae ex parte obiecti, sic concupiscentia, et maxime ciborum et venereorum, naturalior est quam ira, inquantum ista sunt magis naturalia quam vindicta. I answer that, By "natural" we mean that which is caused by nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. Consequently the question as to whether a particular passion is more or less natural cannot be decided without reference to the cause of that passion. Now the cause of a passion, as stated above (Question [36], Article [2]), may be considered in two ways: first, on the part of the object; secondly, on the part of the subject. If then we consider the cause of anger and of desire, on the part of the object, thus desire, especially of pleasures of the table, and of sexual pleasures, is more natural than anger; in so far as these pleasures are more natural to man than vengeance.
Si autem consideretur causa irae ex parte subiecti, sic quodammodo ira est naturalior, et quodammodo concupiscentia. Potest enim natura alicuius hominis considerari vel secundum naturam generis, vel secundum naturam speciei, vel secundum complexionem propriam individui. Si igitur consideretur natura generis, quae est natura huius hominis inquantum est animal; sic naturalior est concupiscentia quam ira, quia ex ipsa natura communi habet homo quandam inclinationem ad appetendum ea quae sunt conservativa vitae, vel secundum speciem vel secundum individuum. Si autem consideremus naturam hominis ex parte speciei, scilicet inquantum est rationalis; sic ira est magis naturalis homini quam concupiscentia, inquantum ira est cum ratione magis quam concupiscentia. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod humanius est punire, quod pertinet ad iram, quam mansuetum esse, unumquodque enim naturaliter insurgit contra contraria et nociva. Si vero consideretur natura huius individui secundum propriam complexionem, sic ira naturalior est quam concupiscentia, quia scilicet habitudinem naturalem ad irascendum, quae est ex complexione, magis de facili sequitur ira, quam concupiscentia vel aliqua alia passio. Est enim homo dispositus ad irascendum, secundum quod habet cholericam complexionem, cholera autem, inter alios humores, citius movetur; assimilatur enim igni. Et ideo magis est in promptu ut ille qui est dispositus secundum naturalem complexionem ad iram, irascatur; quam de eo qui est dispositus ad concupiscendum, quod concupiscat. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod ira magis traducitur a parentibus in filios, quam concupiscentia. If, however, we consider the cause of anger on the part of the subject, thus anger, in a manner, is more natural; and, in a manner, desire is more natural. Because the nature of an individual man may be considered either as to the generic, or as to the specific nature, or again as to the particular temperament of the individual. If then we consider the generic nature, i.e. the nature of this man considered as an animal; thus desire is more natural than anger; because it is from this very generic nature that man is inclined to desire those things which tend to preserve in him the life both of the species and of the individual. If, however, we consider the specific nature, i.e. the nature of this man as a rational being; then anger is more natural to man than desire, in so far as anger follows reason more than desire does. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "revenge" which pertains to anger "is more natural to man than meekness": for it is natural to everything to rise up against things contrary and hurtful. And if we consider the nature of the individual, in respect of his particular temperament, thus anger is more natural than desire; for the reason that anger is prone to ensue from the natural tendency to anger, more than desire, or any other passion, is to ensue from a natural tendency to desire, which tendencies result from a man's individual temperament. Because disposition to anger is due to a bilious temperament; and of all the humors, the bile moves quickest; for it is like fire. Consequently he that is temperamentally disposed to anger is sooner incensed with anger, than he that is temperamentally disposed to desire, is inflamed with desire: and for this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that a disposition to anger is more liable to be transmitted from parent to child, than a disposition to desire.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in homine considerari potest et naturalis complexio ex parte corporis, quae est temperata; et ipsa ratio. Ex parte igitur complexionis corporalis, naturaliter homo, secundum suam speciem, est non habens superexcellentiam neque irae neque alicuius alterius passionis, propter temperamentum suae complexionis. Alia vero animalia, secundum quod recedunt ab hac qualitate complexionis ad dispositionem alicuius complexionis extremae, secundum hoc etiam naturaliter disponuntur ad excessum alicuius passionis, ut leo ad audaciam, canis ad iram, lepus ad timorem, et sic de aliis. Ex parte vero rationis, est naturale homini et irasci et mansuetum esse, secundum quod ratio quodammodo causat iram, inquantum nuntiat causam irae; et quodammodo sedat iram, inquantum iratus non totaliter audit imperium rationis, ut supra dictum est. Reply to Objection 1: We may consider in man both the natural temperament on the part of the body, and the reason. On the part of the bodily temperament, a man, considered specifically, does not naturally excel others either in anger or in any other passion, on account of the moderation of his temperament. But other animals, for as much as their temperament recedes from this moderation and approaches to an extreme disposition, are naturally disposed to some excess of passion, such as the lion in daring, the hound in anger, the hare in fear, and so forth. On the part of reason, however, it is natural to man, both to be angry and to be gentle: in so far as reason somewhat causes anger, by denouncing the injury which causes anger; and somewhat appeases anger, in so far as the angry man "does not listen perfectly to the command of reason," as stated above (Article [4], ad 3).
Ad secundum dicendum quod ipsa ratio pertinet ad naturam hominis. Unde ex hoc ipso quod ira est cum ratione, sequitur quod secundum aliquem modum sit homini naturalis. Reply to Objection 2: Reason itself belongs to the nature of man: wherefore from the very fact that anger requires an act of reason, it follows that it is, in a manner, natural to man.
Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de ira et concupiscentia, ex parte obiecti. Reply to Objection 3: This argument regards anger and desire on the part of the object.

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Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?

Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira sit gravior quam odium. Dicitur enim Prov. XXVII, quod ira non habet misericordiam, nec erumpens furor. Odium autem quandoque habet misericordiam. Ergo ira est gravior quam odium. Objection 1: It would seem that anger is more grievous than hatred. For it is written (Prov. 27:4) that "anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth." But hatred sometimes has mercy. Therefore anger is more grievous than hatred.
Praeterea, maius est pati malum et de malo dolere, quam simpliciter pati. Sed illi qui habet aliquem odio, sufficit quod ille quem odit, patiatur malum, irato autem non sufficit, sed quaerit quod cognoscat illud et de illo doleat, ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Ergo ira est gravior quam odium. Objection 2: Further, it is worse to suffer evil and to grieve for it, than merely to suffer it. But when a man hates, he is contented if the object of his hatred suffer evil: whereas the angry man is not satisfied unless the object of his anger know it and be aggrieved thereby, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4). Therefore, anger is more grievous than hatred.
Praeterea, quanto ad constitutionem alicuius plura concurrunt, tanto videtur esse stabilius, sicut habitus permanentior est qui ex pluribus actibus causatur. Sed ira causatur ex concursu plurium passionum, ut supra dictum est, non autem odium. Ergo ira est stabilior et gravior quam odium. Objection 3: Further, a thing seems to be so much the more firm according as more things concur to set it up: thus a habit is all the more settled through being caused by several acts. But anger is caused by the concurrence of several passions, as stated above (Article [1]): whereas hatred is not. Therefore anger is more settled and more grievous than hatred.
Sed contra est quod Augustinus, in regula, odium comparat trabi, iram vero festucae. On the contrary, Augustine, in his Rule, compares hatred to "a beam," but anger to "a mote."
Respondeo dicendum quod species passionis, et ratio ipsius, ex obiecto pensatur. Est autem obiectum irae et odii idem subiecto, nam sicut odiens appetit malum ei quem odit, ita iratus ei contra quem irascitur. Sed non eadem ratione, sed odiens appetit malum inimici, inquantum est malum; iratus autem appetit malum eius contra quem irascitur, non inquantum est malum, sed inquantum habet quandam rationem boni, scilicet prout aestimat illud esse iustum, inquantum est vindicativum. Unde etiam supra dictum est quod odium est per applicationem mali ad malum; ira autem per applicationem boni ad malum. Manifestum est autem quod appetere malum sub ratione iusti, minus habet de ratione mali quam velle malum alicuius simpliciter. Velle enim malum alicuius sub ratione iusti, potest esse etiam secundum virtutem iustitiae, si praecepto rationis obtemperetur, sed ira in hoc solum deficit, quod non obedit rationis praecepto in ulciscendo. Unde manifestum est quod odium est multo deterius et gravius quam ira. I answer that, The species and nature of a passion are taken from its object. Now the object of anger is the same in substance as the object of hatred; since, just as the hater wishes evil to him whom he hates, so does the angry man wish evil to him with whom he is angry. But there is a difference of aspect: for the hater wishes evil to his enemy, as evil, whereas the angry man wishes evil to him with whom he is angry, not as evil but in so far as it has an aspect of good, that is, in so far as he reckons it as just, since it is a means of vengeance. Wherefore also it has been said above (Article [2]) that hatred implies application of evil to evil, whereas anger denotes application of good to evil. Now it is evident that to seek evil under the aspect of justice, is a lesser evil, than simply to seek evil to someone. Because to wish evil to someone under the aspect of justice, may be according to the virtue of justice, if it be in conformity with the order of reason; and anger fails only in this, that it does not obey the precept of reason in taking vengeance. Consequently it is evident that hatred is far worse and graver than anger.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in ira et odio duo possunt considerari, scilicet ipsum quod desideratur, et intensio desiderii. Quantum igitur ad id quod desideratur, ira habet magis misericordiam quam odium. Quia enim odium appetit malum alterius secundum se, nulla mensura mali satiatur, ea enim quae secundum se appetuntur, sine mensura appetuntur, ut philosophus dicit I Politic., sicut avarus divitias. Unde dicitur Eccli. XII, inimicus si invenerit tempus, non satiabitur sanguine. Sed ira non appetit malum nisi sub ratione iusti vindicativi. Unde quando malum illatum excedit mensuram iustitiae, secundum aestimationem irascentis, tunc miseretur. Unde philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod iratus, si fiant multa, miserebitur, odiens autem pro nullo. Reply to Objection 1: In anger and hatred two points may be considered: namely, the thing desired, and the intensity of the desire. As to the thing desired, anger has more mercy than hatred has. For since hatred desires another's evil for evil's sake, it is satisfied with no particular measure of evil: because those things that are desired for their own sake, are desired without measure, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3), instancing a miser with regard to riches. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 12:16): "An enemy... if he find an opportunity, will not be satisfied with blood." Anger, on the other hand, seeks evil only under the aspect of a just means of vengeance. Consequently when the evil inflicted goes beyond the measure of justice according to the estimate of the angry man, then he has mercy. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "the angry man is appeased if many evils befall, whereas the hater is never appeased."
Quantum vero ad intensionem desiderii, ira magis excludit misericordiam quam odium, quia motus irae est impetuosior, propter cholerae inflammationem. Unde statim subditur, impetum concitati spiritus ferre quis poterit? As to the intensity of the desire, anger excludes mercy more than hatred does; because the movement of anger is more impetuous, through the heating of the bile. Hence the passage quoted continues: "Who can bear the violence of one provoked?"
Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, iratus appetit malum alicuius, inquantum habet rationem iusti vindicativi. Vindicta autem fit per illationem poenae. Est autem de ratione poenae quod sit contraria voluntati, et quod sit afflictiva, et quod pro aliqua culpa inferatur. Et ideo iratus hoc appetit, ut ille cui nocumentum infert, percipiat, et doleat, et quod cognoscat propter iniuriam illatam sibi hoc provenire. Sed odiens de hoc nihil curat, quia appetit malum alterius inquantum huiusmodi. Non est autem verum quod id de quo quis tristatur, sit peius, iniustitia enim et imprudentia, cum sint mala, quia tamen sunt voluntaria, non contristant eos quibus insunt, ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, an angry man wishes evil to someone, in so far as this evil is a means of just vengeance. Now vengeance is wrought by the infliction of a punishment: and the nature of punishment consists in being contrary to the will, painful, and inflicted for some fault. Consequently an angry man desires this, that the person whom he is hurting, may feel it and be in pain, and know that this has befallen him on account of the harm he has done the other. The hater, on the other hand, cares not for all this, since he desires another's evil as such. It is not true, however, that an evil is worse through giving pain: because "injustice and imprudence, although evil," yet, being voluntary, "do not grieve those in whom they are," as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 4).
Ad tertium dicendum quod id quod ex pluribus causis causatur, tunc est stabilius, quando causae accipiuntur unius rationis, sed una causa potest praevalere multis aliis. Odium autem provenit ex permanentiori causa quam ira. Nam ira provenit ex aliqua commotione animi propter laesionem illatam, sed odium procedit ex aliqua dispositione hominis, secundum quam reputat sibi contrarium et nocivum id quod odit. Et ideo sicut passio citius transit quam dispositio vel habitus, ita ira citius transit quam odium; quamvis etiam odium sit passio ex tali dispositione proveniens. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod odium est magis insanabile quam ira Reply to Objection 3: That which proceeds from several causes, is more settled when these causes are of one kind: but it may be that one cause prevails over many others. Now hatred ensues from a more lasting cause than anger does. Because anger arises from an emotion of the soul due to the wrong inflicted; whereas hatred ensues from a disposition in a man, by reason of which he considers that which he hates to be contrary and hurtful to him. Consequently, as passion is more transitory than disposition or habit, so anger is less lasting than hatred; although hatred itself is a passion ensuing from this disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "hatred is more incurable than anger."

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Whether anger is only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice?

Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non solum sit ad illos ad quos est iustitia. Non enim est iustitia hominis ad res irrationales. Sed tamen homo quandoque irascitur rebus irrationalibus, puta cum scriptor ex ira proiicit pennam, vel eques percutit equum. Ergo ira non solum est ad illos ad quos est iustitia Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice. For there is no justice between man and irrational beings. And yet sometimes one is angry with irrational beings; thus, out of anger, a writer throws away his pen, or a rider strikes his horse. Therefore anger is not only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice.
Praeterea, non est iustitia hominis ad seipsum, nec ad ea quae sui ipsius sunt, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Sed homo quandoque sibi ipsi irascitur, sicut poenitens propter peccatum, unde dicitur in Psalmo IV, irascimini, et nolite peccare. Ergo ira non solum est ad quos est iustitia. Objection 2: Further, "there is no justice towards oneself... nor is there justice towards one's own" (Ethic. v, 6). But sometimes a man is angry with himself; for instance, a penitent, on account of his sin; hence it is written (Ps. 4:5): "Be ye angry and sin not." Therefore anger is not only towards those with whom one has a relation of justice.
Praeterea, iustitia et iniustitia potest esse alicuius ad totum aliquod genus, vel ad totam aliquam communitatem, puta cum civitas aliquem laesit. Sed ira non est ad aliquod genus, sed solum ad aliquod singularium, ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Ergo ira non proprie est ad quos est iustitia et iniustitia. Objection 3: Further, justice and injustice can be of one man towards an entire class, or a whole community: for instance, when the state injures an individual. But anger is not towards a class but only towards an individual, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4). Therefore properly speaking, anger is not towards those with whom one is in relation of justice or injustice.
Sed contrarium accipi potest a philosopho in II Rhetoric. The contrary, however, may be gathered from the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2,3).
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ira appetit malum, inquantum habet rationem iusti vindicativi. Et ideo ad eosdem est ira, ad quos est iustitia et iniustitia. Nam inferre vindictam ad iustitiam pertinet, laedere autem aliquem pertinet ad iniustitiam. Unde tam ex parte causae, quae est laesio illata ab altero; quam etiam ex parte vindictae, quam appetit iratus; manifestum est quod ad eosdem pertinet ira, ad quos iustitia et iniustitia. I answer that, As stated above (Article [6]), anger desires evil as being a means of just vengeance. Consequently, anger is towards those to whom we are just or unjust: since vengeance is an act of justice, and wrong-doing is an act of injustice. Therefore both on the part of the cause, viz. the harm done by another, and on the part of the vengeance sought by the angry man, it is evident that anger concerns those to whom one is just or unjust.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ira, quamvis sit cum ratione, potest tamen etiam esse in brutis animalibus, quae ratione carent, inquantum naturali instinctu per imaginationem moventur ad aliquid simile operibus rationis. Sic igitur, cum in homine sit et ratio et imaginatio, dupliciter in homine potest motus irae insurgere. Uno modo, ex sola imaginatione nuntiante laesionem. Et sic insurgit aliquis motus irae etiam ad res irrationales et inanimatas, secundum similitudinem illius motus qui est in animalibus contra quodlibet nocivum. Alio modo, ex ratione nuntiante laesionem. Et sic, ut philosophus dicit II Rhetoric., nullo modo potest esse ira ad res insensibiles, neque ad mortuos. Tum quia non dolent, quod maxime quaerunt irati in eis quibus irascuntur. Tum etiam quia non est ad eos vindicta, cum eorum non sit iniuriam facere. Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Article [4], ad 2), anger, though it follows an act of reason, can nevertheless be in dumb animals that are devoid of reason, in so far as through their natural instinct they are moved by their imagination to something like rational action. Since then in man there is both reason and imagination, the movement of anger can be aroused in man in two ways. First, when only his imagination denounces the injury: and, in this way, man is aroused to a movement of anger even against irrational and inanimate beings, which movement is like that which occurs in animals against anything that injures them. Secondly, by the reason denouncing the injury: and thus, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 3), "it is impossible to be angry with insensible things, or with the dead": both because they feel no pain, which is, above all, what the angry man seeks in those with whom he is angry: and because there is no question of vengeance on them, since they can do us no harm.
Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in V Ethic., quaedam metaphorica iustitia et iniustitia est hominis ad seipsum, inquantum scilicet ratio regit irascibilem et concupiscibilem. Et secundum hoc etiam homo dicitur de seipso vindictam facere, et per consequens sibi ipsi irasci. Proprie autem et per se, non contingit aliquem sibi ipsi irasci. Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 11), "metaphorically speaking there is a certain justice and injustice between a man and himself," in so far as the reason rules the irascible and concupiscible parts of the soul. And in this sense a man is said to be avenged on himself, and consequently, to be angry with himself. But properly, and in accordance with the nature of things, a man is never angry with himself.
Ad tertium dicendum quod philosophus, in II Rhetoric., assignat unam differentiam inter odium et iram, quod odium potest esse ad aliquod genus, sicut habemus odio omne latronum genus, sed ira non est nisi ad aliquod singulare. Cuius ratio est, quia odium causatur ex hoc quod qualitas alicuius rei apprehenditur ut dissonans nostrae dispositioni, et hoc potest esse vel in universali, vel in particulari. Sed ira causatur ex hoc quod aliquis nos laesit per suum actum. Actus autem omnes sunt singularium. Et ideo ira semper est circa aliquod singulare. Cum autem tota civitas nos laeserit, tota civitas computatur sicut unum singulare. Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) assigns as one difference between hatred and anger, that "hatred may be felt towards a class, as we hate the entire class of thieves; whereas anger is directed only towards an individual." The reason is that hatred arises from our considering a quality as disagreeing with our disposition; and this may refer to a thing in general or in particular. Anger, on the other hand, ensues from someone having injured us by his action. Now all actions are the deeds of individuals: and consequently anger is always pointed at an individual. When the whole state hurts us, the whole state is reckoned as one individual [*Cf. Question [29], Article [6]].

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Whether the species of anger are suitably assigned?

Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Damascenus inconvenienter assignet tres species irae, scilicet fel, maniam et furorem. Nullius enim generis species diversificantur secundum aliquod accidens. Sed ista tria diversificantur secundum aliquod accidens, principium enim motus irae fel vocatur; ira autem permanens dicitur mania; furor autem est ira observans tempus in vindictam. Ergo non sunt diversae species irae. Objection 1: It would seem that Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) unsuitably assigns three species of anger—"wrath," "ill-will" and "rancor." For no genus derives its specific differences from accidents. But these three are diversified in respect of an accident: because "the beginning of the movement of anger is called wrath {cholos}, if anger continue it is called ill-will {menis}; while rancor {kotos} is anger waiting for an opportunity of vengeance." Therefore these are not different species of anger.
Praeterea, Tullius, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., dicit quod excandescentia Graece dicitur thymosis; et est ira modo nascens et modo desistens. Thymosis autem secundum Damascenum, est idem quod furor. Non ergo furor tempus quaerit ad vindictam, sed tempore deficit. Objection 2: Further, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that "excandescentia [irascibility] is what the Greeks call {thymosis}, and is a kind of anger that arises and subsides intermittently"; while according to Damascene {thymosis}, is the same as the Greek {kotos} [rancor]. Therefore {kotos} does not bide its time for taking vengeance, but in course of time spends itself.
Praeterea, Gregorius, XXI Moral., ponit tres gradus irae, scilicet iram sine voce, et iram cum voce, et iram cum verbo expresso, secundum illa tria quae dominus ponit Matth. V, qui irascitur fratri suo, ubi tangitur ira sine voce; et postea subdit, qui dixerit fratri suo, raca, ubi tangitur ira cum voce, sed necdum pleno verbo formata; et postea dicit, qui autem dixerit fratri suo, fatue, ubi expletur vox perfectione sermonis. Ergo insufficienter divisit Damascenus iram, nihil ponens ex parte vocis. Objection 3: Further, Gregory (Moral. xxi, 4) gives three degrees of anger, namely, "anger without utterance, anger with utterance, and anger with perfection of speech," corresponding to the three degrees mentioned by Our Lord (Mt. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his brother" [thus implying "anger without utterance"], and then, "whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Raca'" [implying "anger with utterance yet without full expression"], and lastly, "whosoever shall say 'Thou fool'" [where we have "perfection of speech"]. Therefore Damascene's division is imperfect, since it takes no account of utterance.
Sed contra est auctoritas Damasceni et Gregorii Nysseni. On the contrary, stands the authority of Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.].
Respondeo dicendum quod tres species irae quas Damascenus ponit, et etiam Gregorius Nyssenus, sumuntur secundum ea quae dant irae aliquod augmentum. Quod quidem contingit tripliciter. Uno modo, ex facilitate ipsius motus, et talem iram vocat fel, quia cito accenditur. Alio modo, ex parte tristitiae causantis iram, quae diu in memoria manet, et haec pertinet ad maniam, quae a manendo dicitur. Tertio, ex parte eius quod iratus appetit, scilicet vindictae, et haec pertinet ad furorem, qui nunquam quiescit donec puniat. Unde philosophus, in IV Ethic., quosdam irascentium vocat acutos, quia cito irascuntur; quosdam amaros, quia diu retinent iram; quosdam difficiles, quia nunquam quiescunt nisi puniant. I answer that, The species of anger given by Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa are taken from those things which give increase to anger. This happens in three ways. First from facility of the movement itself, and he calls this kind of anger {cholos} [bile] because it quickly aroused. Secondly, on the part of the grief that causes anger, and which dwells some time in the memory; this belongs to {menis} [ill-will] which is derived from {menein} [to dwell]. Thirdly, on the part of that which the angry man seeks, viz. vengeance; and this pertains to {kotos} [rancor] which never rests until it is avenged [*Eph. 4:31: "Let all bitterness and anger and indignation... be put away from you."]. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) calls some angry persons {akrocholoi} [choleric], because they are easily angered; some he calls {pikroi} [bitter], because they retain their anger for a long time; and some he calls {chalepoi} [ill-tempered], because they never rest until they have retaliated [*Cf. SS, Question [158], Article [5]].
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnia illa per quae ira recipit aliquam perfectionem, non omnino per accidens se habent ad iram. Et ideo nihil prohibet secundum ea species irae assignari. Reply to Objection 1: All those things which give anger some kind of perfection are not altogether accidental to anger; and consequently nothing prevents them from causing a certain specific difference thereof.
Ad secundum dicendum quod excandescentia, quam Tullius ponit, magis videtur pertinere ad primam speciem irae, quae perficitur secundum velocitatem irae, quam ad furorem. Nihil autem prohibet ut thymosis Graece, quod Latine furor dicitur, utrumque importet, et velocitatem ad irascendum et firmitatem propositi ad puniendum. Reply to Objection 2: Irascibility, which Cicero mentions, seems to pertain to the first species of anger, which consists in a certain quickness of temper, rather than to rancor [furor]. And there is no reason why the Greek {thymosis}, which is denoted by the Latin "furor," should not signify both quickness to anger, and firmness of purpose in being avenged.
Ad tertium dicendum quod gradus illi irae distinguuntur secundum effectum irae, non autem secundum diversam perfectionem ipsius motus irae. Reply to Objection 3: These degrees are distinguished according to various effects of anger; and not according to degrees of perfection in the very movement of anger.

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