St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica

(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

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Question: 89 [ << | >> ]

OF VENIAL SIN IN ITSELF (SIX ARTICLES)

Deinde considerandum est de peccato veniali secundum se. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. We must now consider venial sin in itself, and under this head there are six points of inquiry:
Primo, utrum peccatum veniale causet maculam in anima. (1) Whether venial sin causes a stain in the soul?
Secundo, de distinctione peccati venialis, prout figuratur per lignum, faenum et stipulam, I Cor. III. (2) Of the different kinds of venial sin, as denoted by "wood," "hay," "stubble" (1 Cor. 3:12);
Tertio, utrum homo in statu innocentiae potuerit peccare venialiter. (3) Whether man could sin venially in the state of innocence?
Quarto, utrum Angelus bonus vel malus possit peccare venialiter. (4) Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?
Quinto, utrum primi motus infidelium sint peccata venialia. (5) Whether the movements of unbelievers are venial sins?
Sexto, utrum peccatum veniale possit esse in aliquo simul cum solo peccato originali. (6) Whether venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone?

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Question: 89 [ << | >> ]
Article: 1  [ << | >> ]

Whether venial sin causes a stain on the soul?

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum veniale causet maculam in anima. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Poenit., quod peccata venialia, si multiplicentur, decorem nostrum ita exterminant, ut a caelestis sponsi amplexibus nos separent. Sed nihil aliud est macula quam detrimentum decoris. Ergo peccata venialia causant maculam in anima. Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin causes a stain in the soul. For Augustine says (De Poenit.) [*Hom. 50, inter. L., 2], that if venial sins be multiplied, they destroy the beauty of our souls so as to deprive us of the embraces of our heavenly spouse. But the stain of sin is nothing else but the loss of the soul's beauty. Therefore venial sins cause a stain in the soul.
Praeterea, peccatum mortale causat maculam in anima propter inordinationem actus et affectus ipsius peccantis. Sed in peccato veniali est quaedam deordinatio actus et affectus. Ergo peccatum veniale causat maculam in anima. Objection 2: Further, mortal sin causes a stain in the soul, on account of the inordinateness of the act and of the sinner's affections. But, in venial sin, there is an inordinateness of the act and of the affections. Therefore venial sin causes a stain in the soul.
Praeterea, macula animae causatur ex contactu rei temporalis per amorem, ut supra dictum est. Sed in peccato veniali anima inordinato amore contingit rem temporalem. Ergo peccatum veniale inducit maculam in anima. Objection 3: Further, the stain on the soul is caused by contact with a temporal thing, through love thereof as stated above (Question [86], Article [1]). But, in venial sin, the soul is in contact with a temporal thing through inordinate love. therefore, venial sin brings a stain on the soul.
Sed contra est quod dicitur Ephes. V, ut exhiberet ipse sibi gloriosam Ecclesiam non habentem maculam; Glossa, idest aliquod peccatum criminale. Ergo proprium peccati mortalis esse videtur quod maculam in anima causet. On the contrary, it is written, (Eph. 5:27): "That He might present it to Himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle," on which the gloss says: "i.e., some grievous sin." Therefore it seems proper to mortal sin to cause a stain on the soul.
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, macula importat detrimentum nitoris ex aliquo contactu, sicut in corporalibus patet, ex quibus per similitudinem nomen maculae ad animam transfertur. Sicut autem in corpore est duplex nitor, unus quidem ex intrinseca dispositione membrorum et coloris, alius autem ex exteriori claritate superveniente; ita etiam in anima est duplex nitor, unus quidem habitualis, quasi intrinsecus, alius autem actualis, quasi exterior fulgor. Peccatum autem veniale impedit quidem nitorem actualem, non tamen habitualem, quia non excludit neque diminuit habitum caritatis et aliarum virtutum, ut infra patebit, sed solum impedit earum actum. Macula autem importat aliquid manens in re maculata, unde magis videtur pertinere ad detrimentum habitualis nitoris quam actualis. Unde, proprie loquendo, peccatum veniale non causat maculam in anima. Et si alicubi dicatur maculam inducere, hoc est secundum quid, inquantum impedit nitorem qui est ex actibus virtutum. I answer that as stated above (Question [86], Article [1]), a stain denotes a loss of comeliness due to contact with something, as may be seen in corporeal matters, from which the term has been transferred to the soul, by way of similitude. Now, just as in the body there is a twofold comeliness, one resulting from the inward disposition of the members and colors, the other resulting from outward refulgence supervening, so too, in the soul, there is a twofold comeliness, one habitual and, so to speak, intrinsic, the other actual like an outward flash of light. Now venial sin is a hindrance to actual comeliness, but not to habitual comeliness, because it neither destroys nor diminishes the habit of charity and of the other virtues, as we shall show further on (SS, Question [24], Article [10]; Question [133], Article [1], ad 2), but only hinders their acts. On the other hand a stain denotes something permanent in the thing stained, wherefore it seems in the nature of a loss of habitual rather than of actual comeliness. Therefore, properly speaking, venial sin does not cause a stain in the soul. If, however, we find it stated anywhere that it does induce a stain, this is in a restricted sense, in so far as it hinders the comeliness that results from acts of virtue.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur in eo casu in quo multa peccata venialia dispositive inducunt ad mortale. Aliter enim non separarent ab amplexu caelestis sponsi. Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of the case in which many venial sins lead to mortal sin dispositively: because otherwise they would not sever the soul from its heavenly spouse.
Ad secundum dicendum quod inordinatio actus in peccato mortali corrumpit habitum virtutis, non autem in peccato veniali. Reply to Objection 2: In mortal sin the inordinateness of the act destroys the habit of virtue, but not in venial sin.
Ad tertium dicendum quod in peccato mortali anima per amorem contingit rem temporalem quasi finem, et per hoc totaliter impeditur influxus splendoris gratiae, qui provenit in eos qui Deo adhaerent ut ultimo fini per caritatem. Sed in peccato veniali non adhaeret homo creaturae tanquam fini ultimo. Unde non est simile. Reply to Objection 3: In mortal sin the soul comes into contact with a temporal thing as its end, so that the shedding of the light of grace, which accrues to those who, by charity, cleave to God as their last end, is entirely cut off. On the contrary, in venial sin, man does not cleave to a creature as his last end: hence there is no comparison.

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Question: 89 [ << | >> ]
Article: 2  [ << | >> ]

Whether venial sins are suitably designated as "wood, hay, and stubble"?

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter peccata venialia per lignum, faenum et stipulam designentur. Lignum enim, faenum et stipula dicuntur superaedificari spirituali fundamento. Sed peccata venialia sunt praeter spirituale aedificium, sicut etiam quaelibet falsae opiniones sunt praeter scientiam. Ergo peccata venialia non convenienter designantur per lignum, faenum et stipulam. Objection 1: It would seem that venial sins are unsuitably designated as "wood," "hay," and "stubble." Because wood hay and stubble are said (1 Cor. 3:12) to be built on a spiritual foundation. Now venial sins are something outside a spiritual foundation, even as false opinions are outside the pale of science. Therefore, venial sins are not suitably designated as wood, hay and stubble.
Praeterea, ille qui aedificat lignum, faenum et stipulam, sic salvus erit quasi per ignem. Sed quandoque ille qui committit peccata venialia, non erit salvus etiam per ignem, puta cum peccata venialia inveniuntur in eo qui decedit cum peccato mortali. Ergo inconvenienter per lignum, faenum et stipulam peccata venialia designantur. Objection 2: Further, he who builds wood, hay and stubble, "shall be saved yet so as by fire" (1 Cor. 3:15). But sometimes the man who commits a venial sin, will not be saved, even by fire, e.g. when a man dies in mortal sin to which venial sins are attached. Therefore, venial sins are unsuitably designated by wood, hay, and stubble.
Praeterea, secundum apostolum, alii sunt qui aedificant aurum, argentum, lapides pretiosos, idest amorem Dei et proximi et bona opera; et alii qui aedificant lignum, faenum et stipulam. Sed peccata venialia committunt etiam illi qui diligunt Deum et proximum, et bona opera faciunt, dicitur enim I Ioan. I, si dixerimus quia peccatum non habemus, nosipsos seducimus. Ergo non convenienter designantur peccata venialia per ista tria. Objection 3: Further, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 3:12) those who build "gold, silver, precious stones," i.e. love of God and our neighbor, and good works, are others from those who build wood, hay, and stubble. But those even who love God and their neighbor, and do good works, commit venial sins: for it is written (1 Jn. 1:8): "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Therefore venial sins are not suitably designated by these three.
Praeterea, multo plures differentiae et gradus sunt peccatorum venialium quam tres. Ergo inconvenienter sub his tribus comprehenduntur. Objection 4: Further, there are many more than three differences and degrees of venial sins. Therefore they are unsuitably comprised under these three.
Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit de eo qui superaedificat lignum, faenum et stipulam, quod salvus erit quasi per ignem, et sic patietur poenam, sed non aeternam. Reatus autem poenae temporalis proprie pertinet ad peccatum veniale, ut dictum est. Ergo per illa tria significantur peccata venialia. On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:15) that the man who builds up wood, hay and stubble, "shall be saved yet so as by fire," so that he will suffer punishment, but not everlasting. Now the debt of temporal punishment belongs properly to venial sin, as stated above (Question [87], Article [5]). Therefore these three signify venial sins.
Respondeo dicendum quod quidam intellexerunt fundamentum esse fidem informem, super quam aliqui aedificant bona opera, quae significantur per aurum, argentum et lapides pretiosos; quidam vero peccata etiam mortalia, quae significantur, secundum eos, per lignum, faenum et stipulam. Sed hanc expositionem improbat Augustinus, in libro de fide et operibus, quia, ut apostolus dicit, ad Gal. V, qui opera carnis facit, regnum Dei non consequetur, quod est salvum fieri; apostolus autem dicit quod ille qui aedificat lignum, faenum et stipulam, salvus erit quasi per ignem. Unde non potest intelligi quod per lignum, faenum et stipulam peccata mortalia designentur. I answer that, Some have understood the "foundation" to be dead faith, upon which some build good works, signified by gold, silver, and precious stones, while others build mortal sins, which according to them are designated by wood, hay and stubble. But Augustine disapproves of this explanation (De Fide et Oper. xv), because, as the Apostle says (Gal. 5:21), he who does the works of the flesh, "shall not obtain the kingdom of God," which signifies to be saved; whereas the Apostle says that he who builds wood, hay, and stubble "shall be saved yet so as by fire." Consequently wood, hay, stubble cannot be understood to denote mortal sins.
Quidam vero dicunt quod per lignum, faenum et stipulam significantur opera bona, quae superaedificantur quidem spirituali aedificio, sed tamen commiscent se eis peccata venialia sicut, cum aliquis habet curam rei familiaris, quod bonum est, commiscet se superfluus amor vel uxoris vel filiorum vel possessionum, sub Deo tamen, ita scilicet quod pro his homo nihil vellet facere contra Deum. Sed hoc iterum non videtur convenienter dici. Manifestum est enim quod omnia opera bona referuntur ad caritatem Dei et proximi, unde pertinent ad aurum, argentum et lapides pretiosos. Non ergo ad lignum, faenum et stipulam. Others say that wood, hay, stubble designate good works, which are indeed built upon the spiritual edifice, but are mixed with venial sins: as, when a man is charged with the care of a family, which is a good thing, excessive love of his wife or of his children or of his possessions insinuates itself into his life, under God however, so that, to wit, for the sake of these things he would be unwilling to do anything in opposition to God. But neither does this seem to be reasonable. For it is evident that all good works are referred to the love of God, and one's neighbor, wherefore they are designated by "gold," "silver," and "precious stones," and consequently not by "wood," "hay," and "stubble."
Et ideo dicendum est quod ipsa peccata venialia quae admiscent se procurantibus terrena, significantur per lignum, faenum et stipulam. Sicut enim huiusmodi congregantur in domo, et non pertinent ad substantiam aedificii, et possunt comburi aedificio remanente; ita etiam peccata venialia multiplicantur in homine, manente spirituali aedificio; et pro istis patitur ignem vel temporalis tribulationis in hac vita, vel Purgatorii post hanc vitam; et tamen salutem consequitur aeternam. We must therefore say that the very venial sins that insinuate themselves into those who have a care for earthly things, are designated by wood, hay, and stubble. For just as these are stored in a house, without belonging to the substance of the house, and can be burnt, while the house is saved, so also venial sins are multiplied in a man, while the spiritual edifice remains, and for them, man suffers fire, either of temporal trials in this life, or of purgatory after this life, and yet he is saved for ever.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod peccata venialia non dicuntur superaedificari spirituali fundamento quasi directe supra ipsum posita, sed quia ponuntur iuxta ipsum; sicut accipitur ibi, super flumina Babylonis, idest iuxta. Quia peccata venialia non destruunt spirituale aedificium, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 1: Venial sins are not said to be built upon the spiritual foundation, as though they were laid directly upon it, but because they are laid beside it; in the same sense as it is written (Ps. 136:1): "Upon the waters of Babylon," i.e. "beside the waters": because venial sins do not destroy the edifice.
Ad secundum dicendum quod non dicitur de quocumque aedificante lignum, faenum et stipulam, quod salvus sit quasi per ignem, sed solum de eo qui aedificat supra fundamentum. Quod quidem non est fides informis, ut quidam aestimabant, sed fides formata caritate, secundum illud Ephes. III, in caritate radicati et fundati. Ille ergo qui decedit cum peccato mortali et venialibus, habet quidem lignum, faenum et stipulam, sed non superaedificata supra fundamentum spirituale. Et ideo non erit salvus sic quasi per ignem. Reply to Objection 2: It is not said that everyone who builds wood, hay and stubble, shall be saved as by fire, but only those who build "upon" the "foundation." And this foundation is not dead faith, as some have esteemed, but faith quickened by charity, according to Eph. 3:17: "Rooted and founded in charity." Accordingly, he that dies in mortal sin with venial sins, has indeed wood, hay, and stubble, but not built upon the spiritual edifice; and consequently he will not be saved so as by fire.
Ad tertium dicendum quod illi qui sunt abstracti a cura temporalium rerum, etsi aliquando venialiter peccent, tamen levia peccata venialia committunt, et frequentissime per fervorem caritatis purgantur. Unde tales non superaedificant venialia, quia in eis modicum manent. Sed peccata venialia ipsorum qui circa terrena occupantur, diutius manent, quia non ita frequenter recurrere possunt ad huiusmodi peccata delenda per caritatis fervorem. Reply to Objection 3: Although those who are withdrawn from the care of temporal things, sin venially sometimes, yet they commit but slight venial sins, and in most cases they are cleansed by the fervor of charity: wherefore they do not build up venial sins, because these do not remain long in them. But the venial sins of those who are busy about earthly remain longer, because they are unable to have such frequent recourse to the fervor of charity in order to remove them.
Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in I de caelo, omnia tribus includuntur, scilicet principio, medio et fine. Et secundum hoc, omnes gradus venialium peccatorum ad tria reducuntur, scilicet ad lignum, quod diutius manet in igne; ad stipulam, quae citissime expeditur; ad faenum, quod medio modo se habet. Secundum enim quod peccata venialia sunt maioris vel minoris adhaerentiae vel gravitatis, citius vel tardius per ignem purgantur. Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (De Coelo i, text. 2), "all things are comprised under three, the beginning, the middle, the end." Accordingly all degrees of venial sins are reduced to three, viz. to "wood," which remains longer in the fire; "stubble," which is burnt up at once; and "hay," which is between these two: because venial sins are removed by fire, quickly or slowly, according as man is more or less attached to them.

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Question: 89 [ << | >> ]
Article: 3  [ << | >> ]

Whether man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence?

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo in statu innocentiae potuerit peccare venialiter. Quia super illud I ad Tim. II, Adam non est seductus, dicit Glossa, inexpertus divinae severitatis, in eo falli potuit, ut crederet veniale esse commissum. Sed hoc non credidisset, nisi venialiter peccare potuisset. Ergo venialiter peccare potuit, non peccando mortaliter. Objection 1: It would seem that man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence. Because on 1 Tim. 2:14, "Adam was not seduced," a gloss says: "Having had no experience of God's severity, it was possible for him to be so mistaken as to think that what he had done was a venial sin." But he would not have thought this unless he could have committed a venial sin. Therefore he could commit a venial sin without sinning mortally.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XI super Gen. ad Litt., non est arbitrandum quod esset hominem deiecturus tentator, nisi praecessisset in anima hominis quaedam elatio comprimenda. Elatio autem deiectionem praecedens, quae facta est per peccatum mortale, non potuit esse nisi peccatum veniale. Similiter etiam in eodem Augustinus dicit quod virum sollicitavit aliqua experiendi cupiditas, cum mulierem videret, sumpto vetito pomo, non esse mortuam. Videtur etiam in Eva fuisse aliquis infidelitatis motus, in hoc quod de verbis domini dubitavit, ut patet per hoc quod dixit, ne forte moriamur, ut habetur Gen. III. Haec autem videntur esse venialia peccata. Ergo homo potuit venialiter peccare, antequam mortaliter peccaret. Objection 2: Further Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5): "We must not suppose that the tempter would have overcome man, unless first of all there had arisen in man's soul a movement of vainglory which should have been checked." Now the vainglory which preceded man's defeat, which was accomplished through his falling into mortal sin, could be nothing more than a venial sin. In like manner, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5) that "man was allured by a certain desire of making the experiment, when he saw that the woman did not die when she had taken the forbidden fruit." Again there seems to have been a certain movement of unbelief in Eve, since she doubted what the Lord had said, as appears from her saying (Gn. 3:3): "Lest perhaps we die." Now these apparently were venial sins. Therefore man could commit a venial sin before he committed a mortal sin.
Praeterea, peccatum mortale magis opponitur integritati primi status quam peccatum veniale. Sed homo potuit peccare mortaliter, non obstante integritate primi status. Ergo etiam potuit peccare venialiter. Objection 3: Further, mortal sin is more opposed to the integrity of the original state, than venial sin is. Now man could sin mortally notwithstanding the integrity of the original state. Therefore he could also sin venially.
Sed contra est quod cuilibet peccato debetur aliqua poena. Sed nihil poenale esse potuit in statu innocentiae, ut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei. Ergo non potuit peccare aliquo peccato quo non eiiceretur ab illo integritatis statu. Sed peccatum veniale non mutat statum hominis. Ergo non potuit peccare venialiter. On the contrary, Every sin deserves some punishment. But nothing penal was possible in the state of innocence, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10). Therefore he could commit a sin that would not deprive him of that state of integrity. But venial sin does not change man's state. Therefore he could not sin venially.
Respondeo dicendum quod communiter ponitur quod homo in statu innocentiae non potuit venialiter peccare. Hoc autem non est sic intelligendum, quasi id quod nobis est veniale, si ipse committeret, esset sibi mortale, propter altitudinem sui status. Dignitas enim personae est quaedam circumstantia aggravans peccatum, non tamen transfert in aliam speciem, nisi forte superveniente deformitate inobedientiae vel voti, vel alicuius huiusmodi, quod in proposito dici non potest. Unde id quod est de se veniale, non potuit transferri in mortale, propter dignitatem primi status. Sic ergo intelligendum est quod non potuit peccare venialiter, quia non potuit esse ut committeret aliquid quod esset de se veniale, antequam integritatem primi status amitteret peccando mortaliter. I answer that, It is generally admitted that man could not commit a venial sin in the state of innocence. This, however, is not to be understood as though on account of the perfection of his state, the sin which is venial for us would have been mortal for him, if he had committed it. Because the dignity of a person is circumstance that aggravates a sin, but it does not transfer it to another species, unless there be an additional deformity by reason of disobedience, or vow or the like, which does not apply to the question in point. Consequently what is venial in itself could not be changed into mortal by reason of the excellence of the original state. We must therefore understand this to mean that he could not sin venially, because it was impossible for him to commit a sin which was venial in itself, before losing the integrity of the original state by sinning mortally.
Cuius ratio est quia peccatum veniale in nobis contingit vel propter imperfectionem actus, sicut subiti motus in genere peccatorum mortalium, vel propter inordinationem existentem circa ea quae sunt ad finem, servato debito ordine ad finem. Utrumque autem horum contingit propter quendam defectum ordinis, ex eo quod inferius non continetur firmiter sub superiori. Quod enim in nobis insurgat subitus motus sensualitatis, contingit ex hoc quod sensualitas non est omnino subdita rationi. Quod vero insurgat subitus motus in ratione ipsa, provenit in nobis ex hoc quod ipsa executio actus rationis non subditur deliberationi quae est ex altiori bono, ut supra dictum est. Quod vero humanus animus inordinetur circa ea quae sunt ad finem, servato debito ordine ad finem, provenit ex hoc quod ea quae sunt ad finem non ordinantur infallibiliter sub fine, qui tenet summum locum, quasi principium in appetibilibus, ut supra dictum est. In statu autem innocentiae, ut in primo habitum est, erat infallibilis ordinis firmitas, ut semper inferius contineretur sub superiori, quandiu summum hominis contineretur sub Deo, ut etiam Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei. Et ideo oportebat quod inordinatio in homine non esset, nisi inciperet ab hoc quod summum hominis non subderetur Deo; quod fit per peccatum mortale. Ex quo patet quod homo in statu innocentiae non potuit peccare venialiter, antequam peccaret mortaliter. The reason for this is because venial sin occurs in us, either through the imperfection of the act, as in the case of sudden movements, in a genus of mortal sin or through some inordinateness in respect of things referred to the end, the due order of the end being safeguarded. Now each of these happens on account of some defect of order, by reason of the lower powers not being checked by the higher. Because the sudden rising of a movement of the sensuality in us is due to the sensuality not being perfectly subject to reason: and the sudden rising of a movement of reason itself is due, in us, to the fact that the execution of the act of reason is not subject to the act of deliberation which proceeds from a higher good, as stated above (Question [74], Article [10]); and that the human mind be out of order as regards things directed to the end, the due order of the end being safeguarded, is due to the fact that the things referred to the end are not infallibly directed under the end, which holds the highest place, being the beginning, as it were, in matters concerning the appetite, as stated above (Question [10], Articles [1],2, ad 3; Question [72], Article [5]). Now, in the state of innocence, as stated in the FP, Question [95], Article [1], there was an unerring stability of order, so that the lower powers were always subjected to the higher, so long as man remained subject to God, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13). Hence there can be no inordinateness in man, unless first of all the highest part of man were not subject to God, which constitutes a mortal sin. From this it is evident that, in the state of innocence, man could not commit a venial sin, before committing a mortal sin.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod veniale non sumitur ibi secundum quod nunc de veniali loquimur, sed dicitur veniale quod est facile remissibile. Reply to Objection 1: In the passage quoted, venial is not taken in the same sense as we take it now; but by venial sin we mean that which is easily forgiven.
Ad secundum dicendum quod illa elatio quae praecessit in animo hominis, fuit primum hominis peccatum mortale, dicitur autem praecessisse deiectionem eius in exteriorem actum peccati. Huiusmodi autem elationem subsecuta est et experiendi cupiditas in viro, et dubitatio in muliere; quae ex hoc solo in quandam elationem prorupit, quod praecepti mentionem a serpente audivit, quasi nollet sub praecepto contineri. Reply to Objection 2: This vainglory which preceded man's downfall, was his first mortal sin, for it is stated to have preceded his downfall into the outward act of sin. This vainglory was followed, in the man, by the desire to make and experiment, and in the woman, by doubt, for she gave way to vainglory, merely through hearing the serpent mention the precept, as though she refused to be held in check by the precept.
Ad tertium dicendum quod peccatum mortale intantum opponitur integritati primi status, quod corrumpit ipsum, quod peccatum veniale facere non potest. Et quia non potest simul esse quaecumque inordinatio cum integritate primi status, consequens est quod primus homo non potuerit peccare venialiter, antequam peccaret mortaliter. Reply to Objection 3: Mortal sin is opposed to the integrity of the original state in the fact of its destroying that state: this a venial sin cannot do. And because the integrity of the primitive state is incompatible with any inordinateness whatever, the result is that the first man could not sin venially, before committing a mortal sin.

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Question: 89 [ << | >> ]
Article: 4  [ << | >> ]

Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus bonus vel malus possit peccare venialiter. Homo enim cum Angelis convenit in superiori animae parte, quae mens vocatur; secundum illud Gregorii, in Homil., homo intelligit cum Angelis. Sed homo secundum superiorem partem animae potest peccare venialiter. Ergo et Angelus. Objection 1: It seems that a good or wicked angel can sin venially. Because man agrees with the angels in the higher part of his soul which is called the mind, according to Gregory, who says (Hom. xxix in Evang.) that "man understands in common with the angels." But man can commit a venial sin in the higher part of his soul. Therefore an angel can commit a venial sin also.
Praeterea, quicumque potest quod est plus, potest etiam quod est minus. Sed Angelus potuit diligere bonum creatum plus quam Deum, quod fecit peccando mortaliter. Ergo etiam potuit bonum creatum diligere infra Deum inordinate, venialiter peccando. Objection 2: Further, He that can do more can do less. But an angel could love a created good more than God, and he did, by sinning mortally. Therefore he could also love a creature less than God inordinately, by sinning venially.
Praeterea, Angeli mali videntur aliqua facere quae sunt ex genere suo venialia peccata, provocando homines ad risum, et ad alias huiusmodi levitates. Sed circumstantia personae non facit de veniali mortale, ut dictum est, nisi speciali prohibitione superveniente, quod non est in proposito. Ergo Angelus potest peccare venialiter. Objection 3: Further, wicked angels seem to do things which are venial sins generically, by provoking men to laughter, and other like frivolities. Now the circumstance of the person does not make a mortal sin to be venial as stated above (Article [3]), unless there is a special prohibition, which is not the case in point. Therefore an angel can sin venially.
Sed contra est quod maior est perfectio Angeli quam perfectio hominis in primo statu. Sed homo in primo statu non potuit peccare venialiter. Ergo multo minus Angelus. On the contrary, The perfection of an angel is greater than that of man in the primitive state. But man could not sin venially in the primitive state, and much less, therefore, can an angel.
Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus Angeli, sicut in primo dictum est, non est discursivus, ut scilicet procedat a principiis in conclusiones, seorsum utrumque intelligens, sicut in nobis contingit. Unde oportet quod quandocumque considerat conclusiones, consideret eas prout sunt in principiis. In appetibilibus autem, sicut multoties dictum est, fines sunt sicut principia; ea vero quae sunt ad finem, sunt sicut conclusiones. Unde mens Angeli non fertur in ea quae sunt ad finem, nisi secundum quod constant sub ordine finis. Propter hoc ex natura sua habent quod non possit in eis esse deordinatio circa ea quae sunt ad finem, nisi simul sit deordinatio circa finem ipsum, quod est per peccatum mortale. Sed Angeli boni non moventur in ea quae sunt ad finem, nisi in ordine ad finem debitum, qui est Deus. Et propter hoc omnes eorum actus sunt actus caritatis. Et sic in eis non potest esse peccatum veniale. Angeli vero mali in nihil moventur nisi in ordine ad finem peccati superbiae ipsorum. Et ideo in omnibus peccant mortaliter, quaecumque propria voluntate agunt. Secus autem est de appetitu naturalis boni qui est in eis, ut in primo dictum est. I answer that, An angel's intellect, as stated above in the FP, Question [58], Article [3]; FP, Question [79], Article [8], is not discursive, i.e. it does not proceed from principles to conclusions, so as to understand both separately, as we do. Consequently, whenever the angelic intellect considers a conclusion, it must, of necessity, consider it in its principles. Now in matters of appetite, as we have often stated (Question [8], Article [2]; Question [10], Article [1]; Question [72], Article [5]), ends are like principles, while the means are like conclusions. Wherefore, an angel's mind is not directed to the means, except as they stand under the order to the end. Consequently, from their very nature, they can have no inordinateness in respect of the means, unless at the same time they have an inordinateness in respect of the end, and this is a mortal sin. Now good angels are not moved to the means, except in subordination to the due end which is God: wherefore all their acts are acts of charity, so that no venial sin can be in them. On the other hand, wicked angels are moved to nothing except in subordination to the end which is their sin of pride. Therefore they sin mortally in everything that they do of their own will. This does not apply to the appetite for the natural good, which appetite we have stated to be in them (FP, Question [63], Article [4]; Question [64], Article [2], ad 5).
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo convenit quidem cum Angelis in mente, sive in intellectu; sed differt in modo intelligendi, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 1: Man does indeed agree with the angels in the mind or intellect, but he differs in his mode of understanding, as stated above.
Ad secundum dicendum quod Angelus non potuit minus diligere creaturam quam Deum, nisi simul referens eam in Deum, sicut in ultimum finem, vel aliquem finem inordinatum, ratione iam dicta. Reply to Objection 2: An angel could not love a creature less than God, without, at the same time, either referring it to God, as the last end, or to some inordinate end, for the reason given above.
Ad tertium dicendum quod omnia illa quae videntur esse venialia, Daemones procurant ut homines ad sui familiaritatem attrahant, et sic deducant eos in peccatum mortale. Unde in omnibus talibus mortaliter peccant, propter intentionem finis. Reply to Objection 3: The demons incite man to all such things which seem venial, that he may become used to them, so as to lead him on to mortal sin. Consequently in all such things they sin mortally, on account of the end they have in view.

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Whether the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sin?

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod primi motus sensualitatis in infidelibus sint peccata mortalia. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. VIII, quod nihil est damnationis his qui sunt in Christo Iesu, qui non secundum carnem ambulant, et loquitur ibi de concupiscentia sensualitatis, ut ex praemissis apparet. Haec ergo causa est quare concupiscere non sit damnabile his qui non secundum carnem ambulant, consentiendo scilicet concupiscentiae, quia sunt in Christo Iesu. Sed infideles non sunt in Christo Iesu. Ergo in infidelibus est damnabile. Primi igitur motus infidelium sunt peccata mortalia. Objection 1: It would seem that the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sins. For the Apostle says (Rm. 8:1) that "there is... no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not according to the flesh": and he is speaking there of the concupiscence of the sensuality, as appears from the context (Rm. 7). Therefore the reason why concupiscence is not a matter of condemnation to those who walk not according to the flesh, i.e. by consenting to concupiscence, is because they are in Christ Jesus. But unbelievers are not in Christ Jesus. Therefore in unbelievers this is a matter of condemnation. Therefore the first movements of unbelievers are mortal sins.
Praeterea, Anselmus dicit, in libro de gratia et Lib. Arb., qui non sunt in Christo, sentientes carnem, sequuntur damnationem, etiam si non secundum carnem ambulant. Sed damnatio non debetur nisi peccato mortali. Ergo, cum homo sentiat carnem secundum primum motum concupiscentiae, videtur quod primus motus concupiscentiae in infidelibus sit peccatum mortale. Objection 2: Further Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): "Those who are not in Christ, when they feel the sting of the flesh, follow the road of damnation, even if they walk not according to the flesh." But damnation is not due save to mortal sin. Therefore, since man feels the sting of the flesh in the first movements of the concupiscence, it seems that the first movements of concupiscence in unbelievers are mortal sins.
Praeterea, Anselmus dicit, in eodem libro, sic factus est homo, ut concupiscentiam sentire non deberet. Hoc autem debitum videtur homini remissum per gratiam baptismalem, quam infideles non habent. Ergo quandocumque infidelis concupiscit, etiam si non consentiat, peccat mortaliter, contra debitum faciens. Objection 3: Further, Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): "Man was so made that he was not liable to feel concupiscence." Now this liability seems to be remitted to man by the grace of Baptism, which the unbeliever has not. Therefore every act of concupiscence in an unbeliever, even without his consent, is a mortal sin, because he acts against his duty.
Sed contra est quod dicitur Act. X, non est personarum acceptor Deus. Quod ergo uni non imputat ad damnationem, nec alteri. Sed primos motus fidelibus non imputat ad damnationem. Ergo etiam nec infidelibus. On the contrary, It is stated in Acts 10:34 that "God is not a respecter of persons." Therefore he does not impute to one unto condemnation, what He does not impute to another. But he does not impute first movements to believers, unto condemnation. Neither therefore does He impute them to unbelievers.
Respondeo dicendum quod irrationabiliter dicitur quod primi motus infidelium sint peccata mortalia, si eis non consentiatur. Et hoc patet dupliciter. Primo quidem, quia ipsa sensualitas non potest esse subiectum peccati mortalis, ut supra habitum est. Est autem eadem natura sensualitatis in infidelibus et fidelibus. Unde non potest esse quod solus motus sensualitatis in infidelibus sit peccatum mortale. Alio modo, ex statu ipsius peccantis. Nunquam enim dignitas personae diminuit peccatum, sed magis auget, ut ex supra dictis patet. Unde nec peccatum est minus in fideli quam in infideli, sed multo maius. Nam et infidelium peccata magis merentur veniam, propter ignorantiam, secundum illud I ad Tim. I, misericordiam Dei consecutus sum, quia ignorans feci in incredulitate mea; et peccata fidelium aggravantur propter gratiae sacramenta, secundum illud Heb. X, quanto magis putatis deteriora mereri supplicia, qui sanguinem testamenti, in quo sanctificatus est, pollutum duxerit? I answer that, It is unreasonable to say that the first movements of unbelievers are mortal sins, when they do not consent to them. This is evident for two reasons. First, because the sensuality itself could not be the subject of mortal sin, as stated above (Question [79], Article [4]). Now the sensuality has the same nature in unbelievers as in believers. Therefore it is not possible for the mere movements of the sensuality in unbelievers, to be mortal sins. Secondly, from the state of the sinner. Because excellence of the person of the person never diminishes sin, but, on the contrary, increases it, as stated above (Question [73], Article [10]). Therefore a sin is not less grievous in a believer than in an unbeliever, but much more so. For the sins of an unbeliever are more deserving of forgiveness, on account of their ignorance, according to 1 Tim. 1:13: "I obtained the mercy of God, because I did it ignorantly in my unbelief": whereas the sins of believers are more grievous on account of the sacraments of grace, according to Heb. 10:29: "How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments... who hath esteemed the blood of the testament unclean, by which he was sanctified?"
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apostolus loquitur de damnatione debita peccato originali, quae aufertur per gratiam Iesu Christi, quamvis maneat concupiscentiae fomes. Unde hoc quod fideles concupiscunt, non est in eis signum damnationis originalis peccati, sicut est in infidelibus. Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is speaking of the condemnation due to original sin, which condemnation is remitted by the grace of Jesus Christ, although the "fomes" of concupiscence remain. Wherefore the fact that believers are subject to concupiscence is not in them a sign of the condemnation due to original sin, as it is in unbelievers.
Et hoc etiam modo intelligendum est dictum Anselmi. Unde patet solutio ad secundum. In this way also is to be understood the saying of Anselm, wherefore the Reply to the Second Objection is evident.
Ad tertium dicendum quod illud debitum non concupiscendi erat per originalem iustitiam. Unde id quod opponitur tali debito, non pertinet ad peccatum actuale, sed ad peccatum originale. Reply to Objection 3: This freedom from liability to concupiscence was a result of original justice. Wherefore that which is opposed to such liability pertains, not to actual but to original sin.

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Whether venial sin can be in anyone with original sin alone?

Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum veniale possit esse in aliquo cum solo originali. Dispositio enim praecedit habitum. Sed veniale est dispositio ad mortale, ut supra dictum est. Ergo veniale in infideli, cui non remittitur originale, invenitur ante mortale. Et sic quandoque infideles habent peccata venialia cum originali, sine mortalibus. Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone. For disposition precedes habit. Now venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin, as stated above (Question [88], Article [3]). Therefore in an unbeliever, in whom original sin is not remitted, venial sin exists before mortal sin: and so sometimes unbelievers have venial together with original sin, and without mortal sins.
Praeterea, minus habet de connexione et convenientia veniale cum mortali, quam mortale peccatum cum mortali. Sed infidelis subiectus originali peccato, potest committere unum peccatum mortale et non aliud. Ergo etiam potest committere peccatum veniale, et non mortale. Objection 2: Further, venial sin has less in common, and less connection with mortal sin, than one mortal sin has with another. But an unbeliever in the state of original sin, can commit one mortal sin without committing another. Therefore he can also commit a venial sin without committing a mortal sin.
Praeterea, determinari potest tempus in quo puer primo potest esse actor peccati actualis. Ad quod tempus cum pervenerit, potest ad minus per aliquod breve spatium stare, quin peccet mortaliter, quia hoc etiam in maximis sceleratis contingit. In illo autem spatio, quantumcumque brevi, potest peccare venialiter. Ergo peccatum veniale potest esse in aliquo cum originali peccato, absque mortali. Objection 3: Further, it is possible to fix the time at which a child is first able to commit an actual sin: and when the child comes to that time, it can stay a short time at least, without committing a mortal sin, because this happens in the worst criminals. Now it is possible for the child to sin venially during that space of time, however short it may be. Therefore venial sin can be in anyone with original sin alone and without mortal sin.
Sed contra est quia pro peccato originali puniuntur homines in Limbo puerorum, ubi non est poena sensus, ut infra dicetur. In Inferno autem detruduntur homines propter solum peccatum mortale. Ergo non erit locus in quo possit puniri ille qui habet peccatum veniale cum originali solo. On the contrary, Man is punished for original sin in the children's limbo, where there is no pain of sense as we shall state further on (SS, Question [69], Article [6]): whereas men are punished in hell for no other than mortal sin. Therefore there will be no place where a man can be punished for venial sin with no other than original sin.
Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est quod peccatum veniale sit in aliquo cum originali peccato, absque mortali. Cuius ratio est quia antequam ad annos discretionis perveniat, defectus aetatis, prohibens usum rationis, excusat eum a peccato mortali, unde multo magis excusat eum a peccato veniali, si committat aliquid quod sit ex genere suo tale. Cum vero usum rationis habere inceperit, non omnino excusatur a culpa venialis et mortalis peccati. Sed primum quod tunc homini cogitandum occurrit, est deliberare de seipso. Et si quidem seipsum ordinaverit ad debitum finem, per gratiam consequetur remissionem originalis peccati. Si vero non ordinet seipsum ad debitum finem, secundum quod in illa aetate est capax discretionis, peccabit mortaliter, non faciens quod in se est. Et ex tunc non erit in eo peccatum veniale sine mortali, nisi postquam totum fuerit sibi per gratiam remissum. I answer that, It is impossible for venial sin to be in anyone with original sin alone, and without mortal sin. The reason for this is because before a man comes to the age of discretion, the lack of years hinders the use of reason and excuses him from mortal sin, wherefore, much more does it excuse him from venial sin, if he does anything which is such generically. But when he begins to have the use of reason, he is not entirely excused from the guilt of venial or mortal sin. Now the first thing that occurs to a man to think about then, is to deliberate about himself. And if he then direct himself to the due end, he will, by means of grace, receive the remission of original sin: whereas if he does not then direct himself to the due end, and as far as he is capable of discretion at that particular age, he will sin mortally, for through not doing that which is in his power to do. Accordingly thenceforward there cannot be venial sin in him without mortal, until afterwards all sin shall have been remitted to him through grace.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod veniale non est dispositio ex necessitate praecedens mortale, sed contingenter, sicut labor disponit quandoque ad febrem, non autem sicut calor disponit ad formam ignis. Reply to Objection 1: Venial sin always precedes mortal sin not as a necessary, but as a contingent disposition, just as work sometimes disposes to fever, but not as heat disposes to the form of fire.
Ad secundum dicendum quod non impeditur peccatum veniale esse simul cum solo originali propter distantiam eius vel convenientiam; sed propter defectum usus rationis, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 2: Venial sin is prevented from being with original sin alone, not on account of its want of connection or likeness, but on account of the lack of use of reason, as stated above.
Ad tertium dicendum quod ab aliis peccatis mortalibus potest puer incipiens habere usum rationis, per aliquod tempus abstinere, sed a peccato omissionis praedictae non liberatur, nisi quam cito potest, se convertat ad Deum. Primum enim quod occurrit homini discretionem habenti est quod de seipso cogitet, ad quem alia ordinet sicut ad finem, finis enim est prior in intentione. Et ideo hoc est tempus pro quo obligatur ex Dei praecepto affirmativo, quo dominus dicit, convertimini ad me, et ego convertar ad vos, Zachariae I. Reply to Objection 3: The child that is beginning to have the use of reason can refrain from other mortal sins for a time, but it is not free from the aforesaid sin of omission, unless it turns to God as soon as possible. For the first thing that occurs to a man who has discretion, is to think of himself, and to direct other things to himself as to their end, since the end is the first thing in the intention. Therefore this is the time when man is bound by God's affirmative precept, which the Lord expressed by saying (Zach. 1:3): "Turn ye to Me... and I will turn to you."

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