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| Deinde considerandum est de causa gratiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. | We must now consider the cause of grace; and under this head there are five points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum solus Deus sit causa efficiens gratiae. | (1) Whether God alone is the efficient cause of grace? |
| Secundo, utrum requiratur aliqua dispositio ad gratiam ex parte recipientis ipsam, per actum liberi arbitrii. |
(2) Whether any disposition towards grace is needed on the part of the recipient, by an act of free-will? |
| Tertio, utrum talis dispositio possit esse necessitas ad gratiam. | (3) Whether such a disposition can make grace follow of necessity? |
| Quarto, utrum gratia sit aequalis in omnibus. | (4) Whether grace is equal in all? |
| Quinto, utrum aliquis possit scire se habere gratiam. | (5) Whether anyone may know that he has grace? |
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Article: 1 [ << | >> ]
| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non solus Deus sit causa gratiae. Dicitur enim Ioan. I, gratia et veritas per Iesum Christum facta est. Sed in nomine Iesu Christi intelligitur non solum natura divina assumens, sed etiam natura creata assumpta. Ergo aliqua creatura potest esse causa gratiae. |
Objection 1: It would seem that God alone is not the cause of grace. For it is written (Jn. 1:17): "Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." Now, by the name of Jesus Christ is understood not merely the Divine Nature assuming, but the created nature assumed. Therefore a creature may be the cause of grace. |
| Praeterea, ista differentia ponitur inter sacramenta novae legis et veteris, quod sacramenta novae legis causant gratiam, quam sacramenta veteris legis solum significant. Sed sacramenta novae legis sunt quaedam visibilia elementa. Ergo non solus Deus est causa gratiae. | Objection 2: Further, there is this difference between the sacraments of the New Law and those of the Old, that the sacraments of the New Law cause grace, whereas the sacraments of the Old Law merely signify it. Now the sacraments of the New Law are certain visible elements. Therefore God is not the only cause of grace. |
| Praeterea, secundum Dionysium, in libro Cael. Hier., Angeli purgant et illuminant et perficiunt et Angelos inferiores et etiam homines. Sed rationalis creatura purgatur, illuminatur et perficitur per gratiam. Ergo non solus Deus est causa gratiae. | Objection 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iii, iv, vii, viii), "Angels cleanse, enlighten, and perfect both lesser angels and men." Now the rational creature is cleansed, enlightened, and perfected by grace. Therefore God is not the only cause of grace. |
| Sed contra est quod in Psalmo LXXXIII dicitur, gratiam et gloriam dabit dominus. |
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 83:12): "The Lord will give grace and glory." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod nulla res agere potest ultra suam speciem, quia semper oportet quod causa potior sit effectu. Donum autem gratiae excedit omnem facultatem naturae creatae, cum nihil aliud sit quam quaedam participatio divinae naturae, quae excedit omnem aliam naturam. Et ideo impossibile est quod aliqua creatura gratiam causet. Sic enim necesse est quod solus Deus deificet, communicando consortium divinae naturae per quandam similitudinis participationem, sicut impossibile est quod aliquid igniat nisi solus ignis. | I answer that, Nothing can act beyond its species, since the cause must always be more powerful than its effect. Now the gift of grace surpasses every capability of created nature, since it is nothing short of a partaking of the Divine Nature, which exceeds every other nature. And thus it is impossible that any creature should cause grace. For it is as necessary that God alone should deify, bestowing a partaking of the Divine Nature by a participated likeness, as it is impossible that anything save fire should enkindle. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod humanitas Christi est sicut quoddam organum divinitatis eius; ut Damascenus dicit, in III libro. Instrumentum autem non agit actionem agentis principalis propria virtute, sed virtute principalis agentis. Et ideo humanitas Christi non causat gratiam propria virtute, sed virtute divinitatis adiunctae, ex qua actiones humanitatis Christi sunt salutares. | Reply to Objection 1: Christ's humanity is an "organ of His Godhead," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 19). Now an instrument does not bring forth the action of the principal agent by its own power, but in virtue of the principal agent. Hence Christ's humanity does not cause grace by its own power, but by virtue of the Divine Nature joined to it, whereby the actions of Christ's humanity are saving actions. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut in ipsa persona Christi humanitas causat salutem nostram per gratiam, virtute divina principaliter operante; ita etiam in sacramentis novae legis, quae derivantur a Christo, causatur gratia instrumentaliter quidem per ipsa sacramenta, sed principaliter per virtutem spiritus sancti in sacramentis operantis; secundum illud Ioan. III, nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et spiritu sancto, et cetera. | Reply to Objection 2: As in the person of Christ the humanity causes our salvation by grace, the Divine power being the principal agent, so likewise in the sacraments of the New Law, which are derived from Christ, grace is instrumentally caused by the sacraments, and principally by the power of the Holy Ghost working in the sacraments, according to Jn. 3:5: "Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod Angelus purgat, illuminat et perficit Angelum vel hominem, per modum instructionis cuiusdam, non autem iustificando per gratiam. Unde Dionysius dicit, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod huiusmodi purgatio, illuminatio et perfectio nihil est aliud quam divinae scientiae assumptio. | Reply to Objection 3: Angels cleanse, enlighten, and perfect angels or men, by instruction, and not by justifying them through grace. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that "this cleansing and enlightenment and perfecting is nothing else than the assumption of Divine knowledge." |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non requiratur aliqua praeparatio sive dispositio ad gratiam ex parte hominis. Quia ut apostolus dicit, Rom. IV, ei qui operatur, merces non imputatur secundum gratiam, sed secundum debitum. Sed praeparatio hominis per liberum arbitrium non est nisi per aliquam operationem. Ergo tolleretur ratio gratiae. |
Objection 1: It would seem that no preparation or disposition for grace is required on man's part, since, as the Apostle says (Rm. 4:4), "To him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt." Now a man's preparation by free-will can only be through some operation. Hence it would do away with the notion of grace. |
| Praeterea, ille qui in peccato progreditur, non se praeparat ad gratiam habendam. Sed aliquibus in peccato progredientibus data est gratia, sicut patet de Paulo, qui gratiam consecutus est dum esset spirans minarum et caedis in discipulos domini, ut dicitur Act. IX. Ergo nulla praeparatio ad gratiam requiritur ex parte hominis. | Objection 2: Further, whoever is going on sinning, is not preparing himself to have grace. But to some who are going on sinning grace is given, as is clear in the case of Paul, who received grace whilst he was "breathing our threatenings and slaughter against the disciples of the Lord" (Act 9:1). Hence no preparation for grace is required on man's part. |
| Praeterea, agens infinitae virtutis non requirit dispositionem in materia, cum nec ipsam materiam requirat, sicut in creatione apparet; cui collatio gratiae comparatur, quae dicitur nova creatura, ad Gal. ult. Sed solus Deus, qui est infinitae virtutis, gratiam causat, ut dictum est. Ergo nulla praeparatio requiritur ex parte hominis ad gratiam consequendam. | Objection 3: Further, an agent of infinite power needs no disposition in matter, since it does not even require matter, as appears in creation, to which grace is compared, which is called "a new creature" (Gal. 6:15). But only God, Who has infinite power, causes grace, as stated above (Article [1]). Hence no preparation is required on man's part to obtain grace. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Amos IV, praeparare in occursum Dei tui, Israel. Et I Reg. VII dicitur, praeparate corda vestra domino. |
On the contrary, It is written (Amos 4:12): "Be prepared to meet thy God, O Israel," and (1 Kgs. 7:3): "Prepare your hearts unto the Lord." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, gratia dupliciter dicitur, quandoque quidem ipsum habituale donum Dei; quandoque autem ipsum auxilium Dei moventis animam ad bonum. Primo igitur modo accipiendo gratiam, praeexigitur ad gratiam aliqua gratiae praeparatio, quia nulla forma potest esse nisi in materia disposita. Sed si loquamur de gratia secundum quod significat auxilium Dei moventis ad bonum, sic nulla praeparatio requiritur ex parte hominis quasi praeveniens divinum auxilium, sed potius quaecumque praeparatio in homine esse potest, est ex auxilio Dei moventis animam ad bonum. Et secundum hoc, ipse bonus motus liberi arbitrii quo quis praeparatur ad donum gratiae suscipiendum, est actus liberi arbitrii moti a Deo, et quantum ad hoc, dicitur homo se praeparare, secundum illud Prov. XVI, hominis est praeparare animum. Et est principaliter a Deo movente liberum arbitrium, et secundum hoc, dicitur a Deo voluntas hominis praeparari, et a domino gressus hominis dirigi. |
I answer that, As stated above (Question [111], Article [2]), grace is taken in two ways: first, as a habitual gift of God. Secondly, as a help from God, Who moves the soul to good. Now taking grace in the first sense, a certain preparation of grace is required for it, since a form can only be in disposed matter. But if we speak of grace as it signifies a help from God to move us to good, no preparation is required on man's part, that, as it were, anticipates the Divine help, but rather, every preparation in man must be by the help of God moving the soul to good. And thus even the good movement of the free-will, whereby anyone is prepared for receiving the gift of grace is an act of the free-will moved by God. And thus man is said to prepare himself, according to Prov. 16:1: "It is the part of man to prepare the soul"; yet it is principally from God, Who moves the free-will. Hence it is said that man's will is prepared by God, and that man's steps are guided by God. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praeparatio hominis ad gratiam habendam, quaedam est simul cum ipsa infusione gratiae. Et talis operatio est quidem meritoria; sed non gratiae, quae iam habetur, sed gloriae, quae nondum habetur. Est autem alia praeparatio gratiae imperfecta, quae aliquando praecedit donum gratiae gratum facientis, quae tamen est a Deo movente. Sed ista non sufficit ad meritum, nondum homine per gratiam iustificato, quia nullum meritum potest esse nisi ex gratia, ut infra dicetur. |
Reply to Objection 1: A certain preparation of man for grace is simultaneous with the infusion of grace; and this operation is meritorious, not indeed of grace, which is already possessed—but of glory which is not yet possessed. But there is another imperfect preparation, which sometimes precedes the gift of sanctifying grace, and yet it is from God's motion. But it does not suffice for merit, since man is not yet justified by grace, and merit can only arise from grace, as will be seen further on (Question [114], Article [2]). |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum homo ad gratiam se praeparare non possit nisi Deo eum praeveniente et movente ad bonum, non refert utrum subito vel paulatim aliquis ad perfectam praeparationem perveniat, dicitur enim Eccli. XI, quod facile est in oculis Dei subito honestare pauperem. Contingit autem quandoque quod Deus movet hominem ad aliquod bonum, non tamen perfectum, et talis praeparatio praecedit gratiam. Sed quandoque statim perfecte movet ipsum ad bonum, et subito homo gratiam accipit; secundum illud Ioan. VI, omnis qui audivit a patre et didicit, venit ad me. Et ita contigit Paulo, quia subito, cum esset in progressu peccati, perfecte motum est cor eius a Deo, audiendo et addiscendo et veniendo; et ideo subito est gratiam consecutus. | Reply to Objection 2: Since a man cannot prepare himself for grace unless God prevent and move him to good, it is of no account whether anyone arrive at perfect preparation instantaneously, or step by step. For it is written (Ecclus. 11:23): "It is easy in the eyes of God on a sudden to make the poor man rich." Now it sometimes happens that God moves a man to good, but not perfect good, and this preparation precedes grace. But He sometimes moves him suddenly and perfectly to good, and man receives grace suddenly, according to Jn. 6:45: "Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me." And thus it happened to Paul, since, suddenly when he was in the midst of sin, his heart was perfectly moved by God to hear, to learn, to come; and hence he received grace suddenly. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod agens infinitae virtutis non exigit materiam, vel dispositionem materiae, quasi praesuppositam ex alterius causae actione. Sed tamen oportet quod, secundum conditionem rei causandae, in ipsa re causet et materiam et dispositionem debitam ad formam. Et similiter ad hoc quod Deus gratiam infundat animae, nulla praeparatio exigitur quam ipse non faciat. | Reply to Objection 3: An agent of infinite power needs no matter or disposition of matter, brought about by the action of something else; and yet, looking to the condition of the thing caused, it must cause, in the thing caused, both the matter and the due disposition for the form. So likewise, when God infuses grace into a soul, no preparation is required which He Himself does not bring about. |
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Article: 3 [ << | >> ]
| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod ex necessitate detur gratia se praeparanti ad gratiam, vel facienti quod in se est. Quia super illud Rom. V, iustificati ex fide pacem habeamus etc., dicit Glossa, Deus recipit eum qui ad se confugit, aliter esset in eo iniquitas. Sed impossibile est in Deo iniquitatem esse. Ergo impossibile est quod Deus non recipiat eum qui ad se confugit. Ex necessitate igitur gratiam assequitur. | Objection 1: It would seem that grace is necessarily given to whoever prepares himself for grace, or to whoever does what he can, because, on Rm. 5:1, "Being justified... by faith, let us have peace," etc. the gloss says: "God welcomes whoever flies to Him, otherwise there would be injustice with Him." But it is impossible for injustice to be with God. Therefore it is impossible for God not to welcome whoever flies to Him. Hence he receives grace of necessity. |
| Praeterea, Anselmus dicit, in libro de casu Diaboli, quod ista est causa quare Deus non concedit Diabolo gratiam, quia ipse non voluit accipere, nec paratus fuit. Sed remota causa, necesse est removeri effectum. Ergo si aliquis velit accipere gratiam, necesse est quod ei detur. | Objection 2: Further, Anselm says (De Casu Diaboli. iii) that the reason why God does not bestow grace on the devil, is that he did not wish, nor was he prepared, to receive it. But if the cause be removed, the effect must needs be removed also. Therefore, if anyone is willing to receive grace it is bestowed on them of necessity. |
| Praeterea, bonum est communicativum sui; ut patet per Dionysium, in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed bonum gratiae est melius quam bonum naturae. Cum igitur forma naturalis ex necessitate adveniat materiae dispositae, videtur quod multo magis gratia ex necessitate detur praeparanti se ad gratiam. | Objection 3: Further, good is diffusive of itself, as appears from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Now the good of grace is better than the good of nature. Hence, since natural forms necessarily come to disposed matter, much more does it seem that grace is necessarily bestowed on whoever prepares himself for grace. |
| Sed contra est quod homo comparatur ad Deum sicut lutum ad figulum; secundum illud Ierem. XVIII, sicut lutum in manu figuli, sic vos in manu mea. Sed lutum non ex necessitate accipit formam a figulo, quantumcumque sit praeparatum. Ergo neque homo recipit ex necessitate gratiam a Deo, quantumcumque se praeparet. | On the contrary, Man is compared to God as clay to the potter, according to Jer. 18:6: "As clay is in the hand of the potter, so are you in My hand." But however much the clay is prepared, it does not necessarily receive its shape from the potter. Hence, however much a man prepares himself, he does not necessarily receive grace from God. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, praeparatio ad hominis gratiam est a Deo sicut a movente, a libero autem arbitrio sicut a moto. Potest igitur praeparatio dupliciter considerari. Uno quidem modo, secundum quod est a libero arbitrio. Et secundum hoc, nullam necessitatem habet ad gratiae consecutionem, quia donum gratiae excedit omnem praeparationem virtutis humanae. Alio modo potest considerari secundum quod est a Deo movente. Et tunc habet necessitatem ad id ad quod ordinatur a Deo, non quidem coactionis, sed infallibilitatis, quia intentio Dei deficere non potest; secundum quod et Augustinus dicit, in libro de Praedest. Sanct., quod per beneficia Dei certissime liberantur quicumque liberantur. Unde si ex intentione Dei moventis est quod homo cuius cor movet, gratiam consequatur, infallibiliter ipsam consequitur; secundum illud Ioan. VI, omnis qui audivit a patre et didicit, venit ad me. |
I answer that, As stated above (Article [2]), man's preparation for grace is from God, as Mover, and from the free-will, as moved. Hence the preparation may be looked at in two ways: first, as it is from free-will, and thus there is no necessity that it should obtain grace, since the gift of grace exceeds every preparation of human power. But it may be considered, secondly, as it is from God the Mover, and thus it has a necessity—not indeed of coercion, but of infallibility—as regards what it is ordained to by God, since God's intention cannot fail, according to the saying of Augustine in his book on the Predestination of the Saints (De Dono Persev. xiv) that "by God's good gifts whoever is liberated, is most certainly liberated." Hence if God intends, while moving, that the one whose heart He moves should attain to grace, he will infallibly attain to it, according to Jn. 6:45: "Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Glossa illa loquitur de illo qui confugit ad Deum per actum meritorium liberi arbitrii iam per gratiam informati, quem si non reciperet, esset contra iustitiam quam ipse statuit. Vel si referatur ad motum liberi arbitrii ante gratiam, loquitur secundum quod ipsum confugium hominis ad Deum est per motionem divinam, quam iustum est non deficere. | Reply to Objection 1: This gloss is speaking of such as fly to God by a meritorious act of their free-will, already "informed" with grace; for if they did not receive grace, it would be against the justice which He Himself established. Or if it refers to the movement of free-will before grace, it is speaking in the sense that man's flight to God is by a Divine motion, which ought not, in justice, to fail. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod defectus gratiae prima causa est ex nobis, sed collationis gratiae prima causa est a Deo; secundum illud Osee XIII, perditio tua, Israel, tantummodo ex me auxilium tuum. | Reply to Objection 2: The first cause of the defect of grace is on our part; but the first cause of the bestowal of grace is on God's according to Osee 13:9: "Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in Me." |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam in rebus naturalibus dispositio materiae non ex necessitate consequitur formam, nisi per virtutem agentis qui dispositionem causat. | Reply to Objection 3: Even in natural things, the form does not necessarily ensue the disposition of the matter, except by the power of the agent that causes the disposition. |
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Article: 4 [ << | >> ]
| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gratia non sit maior in uno quam in alio. Gratia enim causatur in nobis ex dilectione divina, ut dictum est. Sed Sap. VI dicitur, pusillum et magnum ipse fecit, et aequaliter est illi cura de omnibus. Ergo omnes aequaliter gratiam ab eo consequuntur. |
Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not greater in one than in another. For grace is caused in us by the Divine love, as stated above (Question [110], Article [1]). Now it is written (Wis. 6:8): "He made the little and the great and He hath equally care of all." Therefore all obtain grace from Him equally. |
| Praeterea, ea quae in summo dicuntur, non recipiunt magis et minus. Sed gratia in summo dicitur, quia coniungit ultimo fini. Ergo non recipit magis et minus. Non ergo est maior in uno quam in alio. | Objection 2: Further, whatever is the greatest possible, cannot be more or less. But grace is the greatest possible, since it joins us with our last end. Therefore there is no greater or less in it. Hence it is not greater in one than in another. |
| Praeterea, gratia est vita animae, ut supra dictum est. Sed vivere non dicitur secundum magis et minus. Ergo etiam neque gratia. |
Objection 3: Further, grace is the soul's life, as stated above (Question [110], Article [1], ad 2). But there is no greater or less in life. Hence, neither is there in grace. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur ad Ephes. IV, unicuique data est gratia secundum mensuram donationis Christi. Quod autem mensurate datur, non omnibus aequaliter datur. Ergo non omnes aequalem gratiam habent. |
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 4:7): "But to every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ." Now what is given in measure, is not given to all equally. Hence all have not an equal grace. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus duplicem magnitudinem habere potest, unam ex parte finis vel obiecti, secundum quod dicitur una virtus alia nobilior inquantum ad maius bonum ordinatur; aliam vero ex parte subiecti, quod magis vel minus participat habitum inhaerentem. |
I answer that, As stated above (Question [52], Articles [1],2; Question [56], Articles [1],2), habits can have a double magnitude: one, as regards the end or object, as when a virtue is said to be more noble through being ordained to a greater good; the other on the part of the subject, which more or less participates in the habit inhering to it. |
| Secundum igitur primam magnitudinem, gratia gratum faciens non potest esse maior et minor, quia gratia secundum sui rationem coniungit hominem summo bono, quod est Deus. Sed ex parte subiecti, gratia potest suscipere magis vel minus, prout scilicet unus perfectius illustratur a lumine gratiae quam alius. Cuius diversitatis ratio quidem est aliqua ex parte praeparantis se ad gratiam, qui enim se magis ad gratiam praeparat, pleniorem gratiam accipit. Sed ex hac parte non potest accipi prima ratio huius diversitatis, quia praeparatio ad gratiam non est hominis nisi inquantum liberum arbitrium eius praeparatur a Deo. Unde prima causa huius diversitatis accipienda est ex parte ipsius Dei, qui diversimode suae gratiae dona dispensat, ad hoc quod ex diversis gradibus pulchritudo et perfectio Ecclesiae consurgat, sicut etiam diversos gradus rerum instituit ut esset universum perfectum. Unde apostolus, ad Ephes. IV, postquam dixerat, unicuique data est gratia secundum mensuram donationis Christi, enumeratis diversis gratiis, subiungit, ad consummationem sanctorum, in aedificationem corporis Christi. |
Now as regards the first magnitude, sanctifying grace cannot be greater or less, since, of its nature, grace joins man to the Highest Good, which is God. But as regards the subject, grace can receive more or less, inasmuch as one may be more perfectly enlightened by grace than another. And a certain reason for this is on the part of him who prepares himself for grace; since he who is better prepared for grace, receives more grace. Yet it is not here that we must seek the first cause of this diversity, since man prepares himself, only inasmuch as his free-will is prepared by God. Hence the first cause of this diversity is to be sought on the part of the God, Who dispenses His gifts of grace variously, in order that the beauty and perfection of the Church may result from these various degree; even as He instituted the various conditions of things, that the universe might be perfect. Hence after the Apostle had said (Eph. 4:7): "To every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ," having enumerated the various graces, he adds (Eph. 4:12): "For the perfecting of the saints... for the edifying of the body of Christ." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod cura divina dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo, quantum ad ipsum divinum actum, qui est simplex et uniformis. Et secundum hoc, aequaliter se habet eius cura ad omnes, quia scilicet uno actu et simplici et maiora et minora dispensat. Alio modo potest considerari ex parte eorum quae in creaturis ex divina cura proveniunt. Et secundum hoc invenitur inaequalitas, inquantum scilicet Deus sua cura quibusdam maiora, quibusdam minora providet dona. | Reply to Objection 1: The Divine care may be looked at in two ways: first, as regards the Divine act, which is simple and uniform; and thus His care looks equally to all, since by one simple act He administers great things and little. But, "secondly," it may be considered in those things which come to be considered by the Divine care; and thus, inequality is found, inasmuch as God by His care provides greater gifts to some, and lesser gifts for others. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit secundum primum modum magnitudinis gratiae. Non enim potest gratia secundum hoc maior esse, quod ad maius bonum ordinet, sed ex eo quod magis vel minus ordinat ad idem bonum magis vel minus participandum. Potest enim esse diversitas intensionis et remissionis secundum participationem subiecti, et in ipsa gratia et in finali gloria. | Reply to Objection 2: This objection is based on the first kind of magnitude of grace; since grace cannot be greater by ordaining to a greater good, but inasmuch as it more or less ordains to a greater or less participation of the same good. For there may be diversity of intensity and remissness, both in grace and in final glory as regards the subjects' participation. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod vita naturalis pertinet ad substantiam hominis, et ideo non recipit magis et minus. Sed vitam gratiae participat homo accidentaliter, et ideo eam potest homo magis vel minus habere. | Reply to Objection 3: Natural life pertains to man's substance, and hence cannot be more or less; but man partakes of the life of grace accidentally, and hence man may possess it more or less. |
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Article: 5 [ << | >> ]
| Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo possit scire se habere gratiam. Gratia enim est in anima per sui essentiam. Sed certissima cognitio animae est eorum quae sunt in anima per sui essentiam; ut patet per Augustinum, XII super Gen. ad Litt. Ergo gratia certissime potest cognosci a Deo qui gratiam habet. | Objection 1: It would seem that man can know that he has grace. For grace by its physical reality is in the soul. Now the soul has most certain knowledge of those things that are in it by their physical reality, as appears from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 31). Hence grace may be known most certainly by one who has grace. |
| Praeterea, sicut scientia est donum Dei, ita et gratia. Sed qui a Deo scientiam accipit, scit se scientiam habere; secundum illud Sap. VII, dominus dedit mihi horum quae sunt veram scientiam. Ergo pari ratione qui accipit gratiam a Deo, scit se gratiam habere. | Objection 2: Further, as knowledge is a gift of God, so is grace. But whoever receives knowledge from God, knows that he has knowledge, according to Wis. 7:17: The Lord "hath given me the true knowledge of the things that are." Hence, with equal reason, whoever receives grace from God, knows that he has grace. |
| Praeterea, lumen est magis cognoscibile quam tenebra, quia secundum apostolum, ad Ephes. V, omne quod manifestatur, lumen est. Sed peccatum, quod est spiritualis tenebra, per certitudinem potest sciri ab eo qui habet peccatum. Ergo multo magis gratia, quae est spirituale lumen. |
Objection 3: Further, light is more knowable than darkness, since, according to the Apostle (Eph. 5:13), "all that is made manifest is light," Now sin, which is spiritual darkness, may be known with certainty by one that is in sin. Much more, therefore, may grace, which is spiritual light, be known. |
| Praeterea, apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. II, nos autem non spiritum huius mundi accepimus, sed spiritum qui a Deo est, ut sciamus quae a Deo donata sunt nobis. Sed gratia est praecipuum donum Dei. Ergo homo qui accepit gratiam per spiritum sanctum, per eundem spiritum scit gratiam esse sibi datam. |
Objection 4: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:12): "Now we have received not the Spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God; that we may know the things that are given us from God." Now grace is God's first gift. Hence, the man who receives grace by the Holy Spirit, by the same Holy Spirit knows the grace given to him. |
| Praeterea, Gen. XXII, ex persona domini dicitur ad Abraham, nunc cognovi quod timeas dominum, idest, cognoscere te feci. Loquitur autem ibi de timore casto, qui non est sine gratia. Ergo homo potest cognoscere se habere gratiam. |
Objection 5: Further, it was said by the Lord to Abraham (Gn. 22:12): "Now I know that thou fearest God," i.e. "I have made thee know." Now He is speaking there of chaste fear, which is not apart from grace. Hence a man may know that he has grace. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccle. IX, nemo scit utrum sit dignus odio vel amore. Sed gratia gratum faciens facit hominem dignum Dei amore. Ergo nullus potest scire utrum habeat gratiam gratum facientem. |
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 9:1): "Man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred." Now sanctifying grace maketh a man worthy of God's love. Therefore no one can know whether he has sanctifying grace. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod tripliciter aliquid cognosci potest. Uno modo, per revelationem. Et hoc modo potest aliquis scire se habere gratiam. Revelat enim Deus hoc aliquando aliquibus ex speciali privilegio, ut securitatis gaudium etiam in hac vita in eis incipiat, et confidentius et fortius magnifica opera prosequantur, et mala praesentis vitae sustineant, sicut Paulo dictum est, II ad Cor. XII, sufficit tibi gratia mea. |
I answer that, There are three ways of knowing a thing: first, by revelation, and thus anyone may know that he has grace, for God by a special privilege reveals this at times to some, in order that the joy of safety may begin in them even in this life, and that they may carry on toilsome works with greater trust and greater energy, and may bear the evils of this present life, as when it was said to Paul (2 Cor. 12:9): "My grace is sufficient for thee." |
| Alio modo homo cognoscit aliquid per seipsum, et hoc certitudinaliter. Et sic nullus potest scire se habere gratiam. Certitudo enim non potest haberi de aliquo, nisi possit diiudicari per proprium principium, sic enim certitudo habetur de conclusionibus demonstrativis per indemonstrabilia universalia principia; nullus autem posset scire se habere scientiam alicuius conclusionis, si principium ignoraret. Principium autem gratiae, et obiectum eius, est ipse Deus, qui propter sui excellentiam est nobis ignotus; secundum illud Iob XXXVI, ecce, Deus magnus, vincens scientiam nostram. Et ideo eius praesentia in nobis vel absentia per certitudinem cognosci non potest; secundum illud Iob IX, si venerit ad me, non videbo eum, si autem abierit, non intelligam. Et ideo homo non potest per certitudinem diiudicare utrum ipse habeat gratiam; secundum illud I ad Cor. IV, sed neque meipsum iudico, qui autem iudicat me, dominus est. |
Secondly, a man may, of himself, know something, and with certainty; and in this way no one can know that he has grace. For certitude about a thing can only be had when we may judge of it by its proper principle. Thus it is by undemonstrable universal principles that certitude is obtained concerning demonstrative conclusions. Now no one can know he has the knowledge of a conclusion if he does not know its principle. But the principle of grace and its object is God, Who by reason of His very excellence is unknown to us, according to Job 36:26: "Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge." And hence His presence in us and His absence cannot be known with certainty, according to Job 9:11: "If He come to me, I shall not see Him; if He depart I shall not understand." And hence man cannot judge with certainty that he has grace, according to 1 Cor. 4:3,4: "But neither do I judge my own self... but He that judgeth me is the Lord." |
| Tertio modo cognoscitur aliquid coniecturaliter per aliqua signa. Et hoc modo aliquis cognoscere potest se habere gratiam, inquantum scilicet percipit se delectari in Deo, et contemnere res mundanas; et inquantum homo non est conscius sibi alicuius peccati mortalis. Secundum quem modum potest intelligi quod habetur Apoc. II, vincenti dabo manna absconditum, quod nemo novit nisi qui accipit, quia scilicet ille qui accipit, per quandam experientiam dulcedinis novit, quam non experitur ille qui non accipit. Ista tamen cognitio imperfecta est. Unde apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. IV, nihil mihi conscius sum, sed non in hoc iustificatus sum. Quia ut dicitur in Psalmo XVIII, delicta quis intelligit? Ab occultis meis munda me, domine. |
Thirdly, things are known conjecturally by signs; and thus anyone may know he has grace, when he is conscious of delighting in God, and of despising worldly things, and inasmuch as a man is not conscious of any mortal sin. And thus it is written (Apoc. 2:17): "To him that overcometh I will give the hidden manna... which no man knoweth, but he that receiveth it," because whoever receives it knows, by experiencing a certain sweetness, which he who does not receive it, does not experience. Yet this knowledge is imperfect; hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:4): "I am not conscious to myself of anything, yet am I not hereby justified," since, according to Ps. 18:13: "Who can understand sins? From my secret ones cleanse me, O Lord, and from those of others spare Thy servant." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa quae sunt per essentiam sui in anima, cognoscuntur experimentali cognitione, inquantum homo experitur per actus principia intrinseca, sicut voluntatem percipimus volendo, et vitam in operibus vitae. | Reply to Objection 1: Those things which are in the soul by their physical reality, are known through experimental knowledge; in so far as through acts man has experience of their inward principles: thus when we wish, we perceive that we have a will; and when we exercise the functions of life, we observe that there is life in us. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod de ratione scientiae est quod homo certitudinem habeat de his quorum habet scientiam, et similiter de ratione fidei est quod homo sit certus de his quorum habet fidem. Et hoc ideo, quia certitudo pertinet ad perfectionem intellectus, in quo praedicta dona existunt. Et ideo quicumque habet scientiam vel fidem, certus est se habere. Non est autem similis ratio de gratia et caritate et aliis huiusmodi, quae perficiunt vim appetitivam. | Reply to Objection 2: It is an essential condition of knowledge that a man should have certitude of the objects of knowledge; and again, it is an essential condition of faith that a man should be certain of the things of faith, and this, because certitude belongs to the perfection of the intellect, wherein these gifts exist. Hence, whoever has knowledge or faith is certain that he has them. But it is otherwise with grace and charity and such like, which perfect the appetitive faculty. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod peccatum habet pro principio et pro obiecto bonum commutabile, quod nobis est notum. Obiectum autem vel finis gratiae est nobis ignotum, propter sui luminis immensitatem; secundum illud I ad Tim. ult., lucem habitat inaccessibilem. | Reply to Objection 3: Sin has for its principal object commutable good, which is known to us. But the object or end of grace is unknown to us on account of the greatness of its light, according to 1 Tim. 6:16: "Who... inhabiteth light inaccessible." |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod apostolus ibi loquitur de donis gloriae, quae sunt nobis data in spe, quae certissime cognoscimus per fidem; licet non cognoscamus per certitudinem nos habere gratiam, per quam nos possumus ea promereri. Vel potest dici quod loquitur de notitia privilegiata, quae est per revelationem. Unde subdit, nobis autem revelavit Deus per spiritum sanctum. |
Reply to Objection 4: The Apostle is here speaking of the gifts of glory, which have been given to us in hope, and these we know most certainly by faith, although we do not know for certain that we have grace to enable us to merit them. Or it may be said that he is speaking of the privileged knowledge, which comes of revelation. Hence he adds (1 Cor. 2:10): "But to us God hath revealed them by His Spirit." |
| Ad quintum dicendum quod illud etiam verbum Abrahae dictum, potest referri ad notitiam experimentalem, quae est per exhibitionem operis. In opere enim illo quod fecerat Abraham, cognoscere potuit experimentaliter se Dei timorem habere. Vel potest etiam ad revelationem referri. | Reply to Objection 5: What was said to Abraham may refer to experimental knowledge which springs from deeds of which we are cognizant. For in the deed that Abraham had just wrought, he could know experimentally that he had the fear of God. Or it may refer to a revelation. |