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| Deinde considerandum est de dono quod respondet fortitudini, quod est fortitudinis donum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. | We must next consider the gift corresponding to fortitude, and this is the gift of fortitude. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum fortitudo sit donum. | (1) Whether fortitude is a gift? |
| Secundo, quid respondeat ei in beatitudinibus et fructibus. | (2) Which among the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fortitudo non sit donum. Virtutes enim a donis differunt. Sed fortitudo est virtus. Ergo non debet poni donum. | Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a gift. For the virtues differ from the gifts: and fortitude is a virtue. Therefore it should not be reckoned a gift. |
| Praeterea, actus donorum manent in patria, ut supra habitum est. Sed actus fortitudinis non manent in patria, dicit enim Gregorius, in I Moral., quod fortitudo dat fiduciam trepidanti contra adversa; quae nulla erunt in patria. Ergo fortitudo non est donum. |
Objection 2: Further, the acts of the gift remain in heaven, as stated above (FS, Question [68], Article [6]). But the act of fortitude does not remain in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that "fortitude encourages the fainthearted against hardships, which will be altogether absent from heaven." Therefore fortitude is not a gift. |
| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in II de Doctr. Christ., quod fortitudinis est ab omni transeuntium mortifera iucunditate seipsum sequestrare. Sed circa noxias iucunditates seu delectationes magis consistit temperantia quam fortitudo. Ergo videtur quod fortitudo non sit donum respondens virtuti fortitudinis. | Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that "it is a sign of fortitude to cut oneself adrift from all the deadly pleasures of the passing show." Now noisome pleasures and delights are the concern of temperance rather than of fortitude. Therefore it seems that fortitude is not the gift corresponding to the virtue of fortitude. |
| Sed contra est quod Isaiae XI fortitudo inter alia dona spiritus sancti computatur. |
On the contrary, Fortitude is reckoned among the other gifts of the Holy Ghost (Is. 11:2). |
| Respondeo dicendum quod fortitudo importat quandam animi firmitatem, ut supra dictum est, et haec quidem firmitas animi requiritur et in bonis faciendis et in malis perferendis, et praecipue in arduis bonis vel malis. Homo autem secundum proprium et connaturalem sibi modum hanc firmitatem in utroque potest habere, ut non deficiat a bono propter difficultatem vel alicuius ardui operis implendi, vel alicuius gravis mali perferendi, et secundum hoc fortitudo ponitur virtus specialis vel generalis, ut supra dictum est. |
I answer that, Fortitude denotes a certain firmness of mind, as stated above (Question [123], Article [2]; FS, Question [61], Article [3]): and this firmness of mind is required both in doing good and in enduring evil, especially with regard to goods or evils that are difficult. Now man, according to his proper and connatural mode, is able to have this firmness in both these respects, so as not to forsake the good on account of difficulties, whether in accomplishing an arduous work, or in enduring grievous evil. In this sense fortitude denotes a special or general virtue, as stated above (Question [123], Article [2]). |
| Sed ulterius a spiritu sancto movetur animus hominis ad hoc quod perveniat ad finem cuiuslibet operis inchoati, et evadat quaecumque pericula imminentia. Quod quidem excedit naturam humanam, quandoque enim non subest potestati hominis ut consequatur finem sui operis, vel evadat mala seu pericula, cum quandoque opprimatur ab eis in mortem. Sed hoc operatur spiritus sanctus in homine, dum perducit eum ad vitam aeternam, quae est finis omnium bonorum operum et evasio omnium periculorum. Et huius rei infundit quandam fiduciam menti spiritus sanctus, contrarium timorem excludens. Et secundum hoc fortitudo donum spiritus sancti ponitur, dictum est enim supra quod dona respiciunt motionem animae a spiritu sancto. |
Yet furthermore man's mind is moved by the Holy Ghost, in order that he may attain the end of each work begun, and avoid whatever perils may threaten. This surpasses human nature: for sometimes it is not in a man's power to attain the end of his work, or to avoid evils or dangers, since these may happen to overwhelm him in death. But the Holy Ghost works this in man, by bringing him to everlasting life, which is the end of all good deeds, and the release from all perils. A certain confidence of this is infused into the mind by the Holy Ghost Who expels any fear of the contrary. It is in this sense that fortitude is reckoned a gift of the Holy Ghost. For it has been stated above (FS, Question [68], Articles [1],2) that the gifts regard the motion of the mind by the Holy Ghost. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod fortitudo quae est virtus perficit animam ad sustinendum quaecumque pericula, sed non sufficit dare fiduciam evadendi quaecumque pericula, sed hoc pertinet ad fortitudinem quae est donum spiritus sancti. | Reply to Objection 1: Fortitude, as a virtue, perfects the mind in the endurance of all perils whatever; but it does not go so far as to give confidence of overcoming all dangers: this belongs to the fortitude that is a gift of the Holy Ghost. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod dona non habent eosdem actus in patria quos habent in via, sed ibi habent actus circa perfruitionem finis. Unde actus fortitudinis ibi est perfrui plena securitate a laboribus et malis. | Reply to Objection 2: The gifts have not the same acts in heaven as on the way: for they exercise acts in connection with the enjoyment of the end. Hence the act of fortitude there is to enjoy full security from toil and evil. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod donum fortitudinis respicit virtutem fortitudinis non solum secundum quod consistit in sustinendo pericula, sed etiam secundum quod consistit in quocumque arduo opere faciendo. Et ideo donum fortitudinis dirigitur a dono consilii, quod videtur praecipue esse de melioribus bonis. | Reply to Objection 3: The gift of fortitude regards the virtue of fortitude not only because it consists in enduring dangers, but also inasmuch as it consists in accomplishing any difficult work. Wherefore the gift of fortitude is directed by the gift of counsel, which seems to be concerned chiefly with the greater goods. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod quarta beatitudo, scilicet beati qui esuriunt et sitiunt iustitiam, non respondeat dono fortitudinis. Donum enim fortitudinis non respondet virtuti iustitiae, sed potius donum pietatis. Sed esurire, et sitire iustitiam pertinet ad actum iustitiae. Ergo ista beatitudo magis pertinet ad donum pietatis quam ad donum fortitudinis. | Objection 1: It seems that the fourth beatitude, "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," does not correspond to the gift of fortitude. For the gift of piety and not the gift of fortitude corresponds to the virtue of justice. Now hungering and thirsting after justice pertain to the act of justice. Therefore this beatitude corresponds to the gift of piety rather than to the gift of fortitude. |
| Praeterea, esuries et sitis iustitiae importat desiderium boni. Sed hoc proprie pertinet ad caritatem, cui non respondet donum fortitudinis, sed magis donum sapientiae, ut supra habitum est. Ergo ista beatitudo non respondet dono fortitudinis, sed dono sapientiae. | Objection 2: Further, hunger and thirst after justice imply a desire for good. Now this belongs properly to charity, to which the gift of wisdom, and not the gift of fortitude, corresponds, as stated above (Question [45]). Therefore this beatitude corresponds, not to the gift of fortitude, but to the gift of wisdom. |
| Praeterea, fructus consequuntur ad beatitudines, quia de ratione beatitudinis est delectatio, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Sed in fructibus non videtur aliquid poni quod pertineat ad fortitudinem. Ergo neque aliqua beatitudo ei respondet. | Objection 3: Further, the fruits are consequent upon the beatitudes, since delight is essential to beatitude, according to Ethic. i, 8. Now the fruits, apparently, include none pertaining to fortitude. Therefore neither does any beatitude correspond to it. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, fortitudo congruit esurientibus, laborant enim, desiderantes gaudium de veris bonis, amorem a terrenis avertere cupientes. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): "Fortitude becomes the hungry and thirsty: since those who desire to enjoy true goods, and wish to avoid loving earthly and material things, must toil." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Augustinus attribuit beatitudines donis secundum ordinem enumerationis, considerata tamen aliqua convenientia. Et ideo quartam beatitudinem, scilicet de esurie et siti iustitiae, attribuit quarto dono, scilicet dono fortitudinis. |
I answer that, As stated above (Question [121], Article [2]), Augustine makes the beatitudes correspond to the gifts according to the order in which they are set forth, observing at the same time a certain fittingness between them. Wherefore he ascribes the fourth beatitude, concerning the hunger and thirst for justice, to the fourth gift, namely fortitude. |
| Est tamen ibi aliqua convenientia. Quia sicut dictum est, fortitudo in arduis consistit. Est autem valde arduum quod aliquis non solum opera virtuosa faciat, quae communiter dicuntur opera iustitiae; sed quod faciat ea cum insatiabili quodam desiderio, quod potest significari per famem et sitim iustitiae. |
Yet there is a certain congruity between them, because, as stated (Article [1]), fortitude is about difficult things. Now it is very difficult, not merely to do virtuous deeds, which receive the common designation of works of justice, but furthermore to do them with an unsatiable desire, which may be signified by hunger and thirst for justice. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., iustitia hic potest accipi non solum particularis, sed etiam universalis; quae se habet ad omnium virtutum opera, ut dicitur in V Ethic. In quibus arduum intendit fortitudo quae est donum. | Reply to Objection 1: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth.), we may understand here not only particular, but also universal justice, which is related to all virtuous deeds according to Ethic. v, 1, wherein whatever is hard is the object of that fortitude which is a gift. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod caritas est radix omnium donorum et virtutum, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo quidquid pertinet ad fortitudinem potest etiam ad caritatem pertinere. |
Reply to Objection 2: Charity is the root of all the virtues and gifts, as stated above (Question [23], Article [8], ad 3; FS, Question [68], Article [4], ad 3). Hence whatever pertains to fortitude may also be referred to charity. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod inter fructus ponuntur duo quae sufficienter correspondent dono fortitudinis, scilicet patientia, quae respicit sustinentiam malorum; et longanimitas, quae respicere potest diuturnam expectationem et operationem bonorum. | Reply to Objection 3: There are two of the fruits which correspond sufficiently to the gift of fortitude: namely, patience, which regards the enduring of evils: and longanimity, which may regard the long delay and accomplishment of goods. |