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| Deinde considerandum est de defectibus pertinentibus ad animam. Et circa hoc quaeruntur decem. | We must now consider the defects pertaining to the soul; and under this head there are ten points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum in Christo fuerit peccatum. | (1) Whether there was sin in Christ? |
| Secundo, utrum in eo fuerit fomes peccati. | (2) Whether there was the "fomes" of sin in Him? |
| Tertio, utrum in eo fuerit ignorantia. | (3) Whether there was ignorance? |
| Quarto, utrum anima eius fuerit passibilis. | (4) Whether His soul was passible? |
| Quinto, utrum in eo fuerit dolor sensibilis. | (5) Whether in Him there was sensible pain? |
| Sexto, utrum in eo fuerit tristitia. | (6) Whether there was sorrow? |
| Septimo, utrum in eo fuerit timor. | (7) Whether there was fear? |
| Octavo, utrum in eo fuerit admiratio. | (8) Whether there was wonder? |
| Nono, utrum in eo fuerit ira. | (9) Whether there was anger? |
| Decimo, utrum simul fuerit viator et comprehensor. | (10) Whether He was at once wayfarer and comprehensor? |
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Question: 15 [ << | >> ]
Article: 1 [ << | >> ]
| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo fuerit peccatum. Dicitur enim in Psalmo, Deus, Deus meus, ut quid dereliquisti? Longe a salute mea verba delictorum meorum. Haec autem verba dicuntur ex persona ipsius Christi, ut patet ex hoc quod ipse ea in cruce protulit. Ergo videtur quod in Christo fuerint delicta. |
Objection 1: It would seem that there was sin in Christ. For it is written (Ps. 21:2): "O God, My God... why hast Thou forsaken Me? Far from My salvation are the words of My sins." Now these words are said in the person of Christ Himself, as appears from His having uttered them on the cross. Therefore it would seem that in Christ there were sins. |
| Praeterea, Rom. V dicit apostolus quod in Adam omnes peccaverunt, scilicet quia in eo originaliter fuerunt. Sed etiam Christus originaliter fuit in Adam. Ergo in eo peccavit. |
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rm. 5:12) that "in Adam all have sinned"---namely, because all were in Adam by origin. Now Christ also was in Adam by origin. Therefore He sinned in him. |
| Praeterea, apostolus dicit, Heb. II, quod in eo in quo Christus passus est et tentatus, potens est et his qui tentantur auxiliari. Sed maxime indigebamus auxilio eius contra peccatum. Ergo videtur quod in eo fuerit peccatum. |
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Heb. 2:18) that "in that, wherein He Himself hath suffered and been tempted, He is able to succor them also that are tempted." Now above all do we require His help against sin. Therefore it seems that there was sin in Him. |
| Praeterea, II Cor. V dicitur quod Deus eum qui non noverat peccatum, scilicet Christum, pro nobis fecit peccatum. Sed illud vere est quod a Deo factum est. Ergo in Christo vere fuit peccatum. |
Objection 4: Further, it is written (2 Cor. 5:21) that "Him that knew no sin" (i.e. Christ), "for us" God "hath made sin." But that really is, which has been made by God. Therefore there was really sin in Christ. |
| Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de agone Christiano, in homine Christo se nobis ad exemplum praebuit filius Dei. Sed homo indiget exemplo non solum ad recte vivendum, sed etiam ad hoc quod poeniteat de peccatis. Ergo videtur quod in Christo debuit esse peccatum, ut, de peccatis poenitendo, poenitentiae nobis daret exemplum. | Objection 5: Further, as Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xi), "in the man Christ the Son of God gave Himself to us as a pattern of living." Now man needs a pattern not merely of right living, but also of repentance for sin. Therefore it seems that in Christ there ought to have been sin, that He might repent of His sin, and thus afford us a pattern of repentance. |
| Sed contra est quod ipse dicit, Ioan. VIII, quis ex vobis arguet me de peccato? |
On the contrary, He Himself says (Jn. 8:46): "Which of you shall convince Me of sin?" |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Christus suscepit defectus nostros ut pro nobis satisfaceret; et veritatem humanae naturae comprobaret; et ut nobis exemplum virtutis fieret. Secundum quae tria manifestum est quod defectum peccati assumere non debuit. Primo enim, peccatum nihil operatur ad satisfactionem, quinimmo virtutem satisfactionis impedit; quia, ut dicitur Eccli. XXXIV, dona iniquorum non probat altissimus. Similiter etiam ex peccato non demonstratur veritas humanae naturae, quia peccatum non pertinet ad humanam naturam, cuius Deus est causa; sed magis est contra naturam per seminationem Diaboli introductum, ut Damascenus dicit. Tertio, peccando exempla virtutum praebere non potuit, cum peccatum contrarietur virtuti. Et ideo Christus nullo modo assumpsit defectum peccati, nec originalis nec actualis, secundum illud quod dicitur I Pet. II, qui peccatum non fecit, nec inventus est dolus in ore eius. |
I answer that, As was said above (Question [14], Article [1]), Christ assumed our defects that He might satisfy for us, that He might prove the truth of His human nature, and that He might become an example of virtue to us. Now it is plain that by reason of these three things He ought not to have assumed the defect of sin. First, because sin nowise works our satisfaction; rather, it impedes the power of satisfying, since, as it is written (Ecclus. 34:23), "The Most High approveth not the gifts of the wicked." Secondly, the truth of His human nature is not proved by sin, since sin does not belong to human nature, whereof God is the cause; but rather has been sown in it against its nature by the devil, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 20). Thirdly, because by sinning He could afford no example of virtue, since sin is opposed to virtue. Hence Christ nowise assumed the defect of sin---either original or actual---according to what is written (1 Pt. 2:22): "Who did no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Damascenus dicit, in III libro, dicitur aliquid de Christo, uno modo, secundum proprietatem naturalem et hypostaticam, sicut dicitur quod factus est homo, et quod pro nobis passus est; alio modo, secundum proprietatem personalem et habitudinalem, prout scilicet aliqua dicuntur de ipso in persona nostra quae sibi secundum se nullo modo conveniunt. Unde et inter septem regulas Tichonii, quas ponit Augustinus in III de Doct. Christ., prima ponitur de domino et eius corpore, cum scilicet Christi et Ecclesiae una persona aestimatur. Et secundum hoc, Christus ex persona membrorum suorum loquens dicit, verba delictorum meorum, non quod in ipso capite delicta fuerint. |
Reply to Objection 1: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 25), things are said of Christ, first, with reference to His natural and hypostatic property, as when it is said that God became man, and that He suffered for us; secondly, with reference to His personal and relative property, when things are said of Him in our person which nowise belong to Him of Himself. Hence, in the seven rules of Tichonius which Augustine quotes in De Doctr. Christ. iii, 31, the first regards "Our Lord and His Body," since "Christ and His Church are taken as one person." And thus Christ, speaking in the person of His members, says (Ps. 21:2): "The words of My sins"---not that there were any sins in the Head. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, X super Gen. ad Litt., non omni modo Christus fuit in Adam, et in aliis patribus, quo nos ibi fuimus. Nos enim fuimus in Adam secundum rationem seminalem, et secundum corpulentam substantiam, quia scilicet, ut ipse ibidem dicit, cum sit in semine et visibilis corpulentia et invisibilis ratio, utrumque cucurrit ex Adam. Sed Christus visibilem carnis substantiam de carne virginis sumpsit, ratio vero conceptionis eius non a semine virili, sed longe aliter, ac desuper venit. Unde non fuit in Adam secundum seminalem rationem, sed solum secundum corpulentam substantiam. Et ideo Christus non accepit active ab Adam naturam humanam, sed solum materialiter, active vero a spiritu sancto, sicut et ipse Adam materialiter sumpsit corpus ex limo terrae, active autem a Deo. Et propter hoc Christus non peccavit in Adam, in quo fuit solum secundum materiam. | Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x, 20), Christ was in Adam and the other fathers not altogether as we were. For we were in Adam as regards both seminal virtue and bodily substance, since, as he goes on to say: "As in the seed there is a visible bulk and an invisible virtue, both have come from Adam. Now Christ took the visible substance of His flesh from the Virgin's flesh; but the virtue of His conception did not spring from the seed of man, but far otherwise---from on high." Hence He was not in Adam according to seminal virtue, but only according to bodily substance. And therefore Christ did not receive human nature from Adam actively, but only materially---and from the Holy Ghost actively; even as Adam received his body materially from the slime of the earth---actively from God. And thus Christ did not sin in Adam, in whom He was only as regards His matter. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus sua tentatione et passione nobis auxilium tulit pro nobis satisfaciendo. Sed peccatum non cooperatur ad satisfactionem, sed magis ipsam impedit, ut dictum est. Et ideo non oportuit ut peccatum in se haberet, sed quod omnino esset purus a peccato, alioquin, poena quam sustinuit fuisset sibi debita pro peccato proprio. | Reply to Objection 3: In His temptation and passion Christ has succored us by satisfying for us. Now sin does not further satisfaction, but hinders it, as has been said. Hence, it behooved Him not to have sin, but to be wholly free from sin; otherwise the punishment He bore would have been due to Him for His own sin. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod Deus fecit Christum peccatum, non quidem ut in se peccatum haberet, sed quia fecit eum hostiam pro peccato, sicut Osee IV dicitur, peccata populi mei comedent, scilicet sacerdotes, qui secundum legem comedebant hostias pro peccato oblatas. Et secundum hunc modum dicitur Isaiae LIII, quod dominus posuit in eo iniquitates omnium nostrum, quia scilicet eum tradidit ut esset hostia pro peccatis omnium hominum. Vel, fecit eum peccatum, idest, habentem similitudinem carnis peccati, ut dicitur Rom. VIII. Et hoc propter corpus passibile et mortale quod assumpsit. |
Reply to Objection 4: God "made Christ sin"---not, indeed, in such sort that He had sin, but that He made Him a sacrifice for sin: even as it is written (Osee 4:8): "They shall eat the sins of My people"---they, i.e. the priests, who by the law ate the sacrifices offered for sin. And in that way it is written (Is. 53:6) that "the Lord hath laid on Him the iniquity of us all" (i.e. He gave Him up to be a victim for the sins of all men); or "He made Him sin" (i.e. made Him to have "the likeness of sinful flesh"), as is written (Rm. 8:3), and this on account of the passible and mortal body He assumed. |
| Ad quintum dicendum quod poenitens laudabile exemplum dare potest, non ex eo quod peccavit, sed in hoc quod voluntarie poenam sustinet pro peccato. Unde Christus dedit maximum exemplum poenitentibus, dum non pro peccato proprio, sed pro peccatis aliorum voluit poenam subire. | Reply to Objection 5: A penitent can give a praiseworthy example, not by having sinned, but by freely bearing the punishment of sin. And hence Christ set the highest example to penitents, since He willingly bore the punishment, not of His own sin, but of the sins of others. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo fuerit fomes peccati. Ab eodem enim principio derivatur fomes peccati, et passibilitas corporis sive mortalitas, scilicet ex subtractione originalis iustitiae, per quam simul inferiores vires animae subdebantur rationi, et corpus animae. Sed in Christo fuit passibilitas corporis et mortalitas. Ergo etiam in eo fuit fomes peccati. | Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was the "fomes" of sin. For the "fomes" of sin, and the passibility and mortality of the body spring from the same principle, to wit, from the withdrawal of original justice, whereby the inferior powers of the soul were subject to the reason, and the body to the soul. Now passibility and mortality of body were in Christ. Therefore there was also the "fomes" of sin. |
| Praeterea, sicut Damascenus dicit, in III libro, beneplacito divinae voluntatis permittebatur caro Christi pati et operari quae propria. Sed proprium est carni ut concupiscat delectabilia sibi. Cum ergo nihil aliud sit fomes quam concupiscentia, ut dicitur in Glossa, Rom. VII, videtur quod in Christo fuerit fomes peccati. | Objection 2: Further, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 19), "it was by consent of the Divine will that the flesh of Christ was allowed to suffer and do what belonged to it." But it is proper to the flesh to lust after its pleasures. Now since the "fomes" of sin is nothing more than concupiscence, as the gloss says on Rm. 7:8, it seems that in Christ there was the "fomes" of sin. |
| Praeterea, ratione fomitis caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, ut dicitur Galat. V. Sed tanto spiritus ostenditur esse fortior et magis dignus corona, quanto magis super hostem, scilicet concupiscentiam carnis, dominatur, secundum illud II Tim. II, non coronabitur nisi qui legitime certaverit. Christus autem habuit fortissimum et victoriosissimum spiritum, et maxime dignum corona, secundum illud Apoc. VI, data est ei corona, et exivit vincens, ut vinceret. Videtur ergo quod in Christo debuerit esse maxime fomes peccati. |
Objection 3: Further, it is by reason of the "fomes" of sin that "the flesh lusteth against the spirit," as is written (Gal. 5:17). But the spirit is shown to be so much the stronger and worthier to be crowned according as the more completely it overcomes its enemy---to wit, the concupiscence of the flesh, according to 2 Tim. 2:5, he "is not crowned except he strive lawfully." Now Christ had a most valiant and conquering spirit, and one most worthy of a crown, according to Apoc. 6:2: "There was a crown given Him, and He went forth conquering that He might conquer." Therefore it would especially seem that the "fomes" of sin ought to have been in Christ. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. I, quod in ea natum est, de spiritu sancto est. Sed spiritus sanctus excludit peccatum, et inclinationem peccati, quae importatur nomine fomitis. Ergo in Christo non fuit fomes peccati. |
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 1:20): "That which is conceived in her is of the Holy Ghost." Now the Holy Ghost drives out sin and the inclination to sin, which is implied in the word "fomes." Therefore in Christ there ought not to have been the "fomes" of sin. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Christus perfectissime habuit gratiam et omnes virtutes. Virtus autem moralis quae est in irrationali parte animae, eam facit rationi esse subiectam, et tanto magis quanto perfectior fuerit virtus, sicut temperantia concupiscibilem, et fortitudo et mansuetudo irascibilem, ut in secunda parte dictum est. Ad rationem autem fomitis pertinet inclinatio sensualis appetitus in id quod est contra rationem. Sic igitur patet quod, quanto virtus fuerit magis in aliquo perfecta, tanto magis debilitatur in eo vis fomitis. Cum igitur in Christo fuerit virtus secundum perfectissimum gradum, consequens est quod in eo fomes peccati non fuerit, cum etiam iste defectus non sit ordinabilis ad satisfaciendum, sed potius inclinat ad contrarium satisfactioni. |
I answer that, As was said above (Question [7], Articles [2],9), Christ had grace and all the virtues most perfectly. Now moral virtues, which are in the irrational part of the soul, make it subject to reason, and so much the more as the virtue is more perfect; thus, temperance controls the concupiscible appetite, fortitude and meekness the irascible appetite, as was said in the FS, Question [56], Article [4]. But there belongs to the very nature of the "fomes" of sin an inclination of the sensual appetite to what is contrary to reason. And hence it is plain that the more perfect the virtues are in any man, the weaker the "fomes" of sin becomes in him. Hence, since in Christ the virtues were in their highest degree, the "fomes" of sin was nowise in Him; inasmuch, also, as this defect cannot be ordained to satisfaction, but rather inclined to what is contrary to satisfaction. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod inferiores vires pertinentes ad sensibilem appetitum, naturaliter sunt obedibiles rationi, non autem vires corporales, vel humorum corporalium, vel etiam ipsius animae vegetabilis, ut patet in I Ethic. Et ideo perfectio virtutis, quae est secundum rationem rectam, non excludit passibilitatem corporis, excludit autem fomitem peccati, cuius ratio consistit in resistentia sensibilis appetitus ad rationem. | Reply to Objection 1: The inferior powers pertaining to the sensitive appetite have a natural capacity to be obedient to reason; but not the bodily powers, nor those of the bodily humors, nor those of the vegetative soul, as is made plain Ethic. i, 13. And hence perfection of virtue, which is in accordance with right reason, does not exclude passibility of body; yet it excludes the "fomes" of sin, the nature of which consists in the resistance of the sensitive appetite to reason. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod caro naturaliter concupiscit id quod est sibi delectabile, concupiscentia appetitus sensitivi, sed caro hominis, qui est animal rationale, hoc concupiscit secundum modum et ordinem rationis. Et hoc modo caro Christi, concupiscentia appetitus sensitivi, naturaliter appetebat escam et potum et somnum, et alia huiusmodi quae secundum rationem rectam appetuntur, ut patet per Damascenum, in III libro. Ex hoc autem non sequitur quod in Christo fuerit fomes peccati, qui importat concupiscentiam delectabilium praeter ordinem rationis. | Reply to Objection 2: The flesh naturally seeks what is pleasing to it by the concupiscence of the sensitive appetite; but the flesh of man, who is a rational animal, seeks this after the manner and order of reason. And thus with the concupiscence of the sensitive appetite Christ's flesh naturally sought food, drink, and sleep, and all else that is sought in right reason, as is plain from Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 14). Yet it does not therefore follow that in Christ there was the "fomes" of sin, for this implies the lust after pleasurable things against the order of reason. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod fortitudo spiritus aliqualis ostenditur ex hoc quod resistit concupiscentiae carnis sibi contrariantis, sed maior fortitudo spiritus ostenditur si per eius virtutem totaliter comprimatur, ne contra spiritum concupiscere possit. Et ideo hoc competebat Christo, cuius spiritus summum gradum fortitudinis attigerat. Et licet non sustinuerit impugnationem interiorem ex parte fomitis, sustinuit tamen exteriorem impugnationem ex parte mundi et Diaboli, quos superando victoriae coronam promeruit. | Reply to Objection 3: The spirit gives evidence of fortitude to some extent by resisting that concupiscence of the flesh which is opposed to it; yet a greater fortitude of spirit is shown, if by its strength the flesh is thoroughly overcome, so as to be incapable of lusting against the spirit. And hence this belonged to Christ, whose spirit reached the highest degree of fortitude. And although He suffered no internal assault on the part of the "fomes" of sin, He sustained an external assault on the part of the world and the devil, and won the crown of victory by overcoming them. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo fuerit ignorantia. Illud enim vere fuit in Christo quod sibi competit secundum humanam naturam, licet non competat secundum divinam, sicut passio et mors. Sed ignorantia convenit Christo secundum humanam naturam, dicit enim Damascenus, in III libro, quod ignorantem et servilem assumpsit naturam. Ergo ignorantia vere fuit in Christo. | Objection 1: It would seem that there was ignorance in Christ. For that is truly in Christ which belongs to Him in His human nature, although it does not belong to Him in His Divine Nature, as suffering and death. But ignorance belongs to Christ in His human nature; for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 21) that "He assumed an ignorant and enslaved nature." Therefore ignorance was truly in Christ. |
| Praeterea, aliquis dicitur ignorans per notitiae defectum. Sed aliqua notitia defuit Christo, dicit enim apostolus, II Cor. V, eum qui non novit peccatum, pro nobis peccatum fecit. Ergo in Christo fuit ignorantia. | Objection 2: Further, one is said to be ignorant through defect of knowledge. Now some kind of knowledge was wanting to Christ, for the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:21) "Him that knew no sin, for us He hath made sin." Therefore there was ignorance in Christ. |
| Praeterea, Isaiae VIII dicitur, antequam sciat puer vocare patrem suum et matrem suam, auferetur fortitudo Damasci. Puer autem ille est Christus. Ergo in Christo fuit aliquarum rerum ignorantia. |
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Is. 8:4): "For before the child know to call his Father and his mother, the strength of Damascus... shall be taken away." Therefore in Christ there was ignorance of certain things. |
| Sed contra, ignorantia per ignorantiam non tollitur. Christus autem ad hoc venit ut ignorantias nostras auferret, venit enim ut illuminaret his qui in tenebris et in umbra mortis sedent. Ergo in Christo ignorantia non fuit. |
On the contrary, Ignorance is not taken away by ignorance. But Christ came to take away our ignorance; for "He came to enlighten them that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death" (Lk. 1:79). Therefore there was no ignorance in Christ. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in Christo fuit plenitudo gratiae et virtutis, ita in ipso fuit plenitudo omnis scientiae, ut ex praemissis patet. Sicut autem in Christo plenitudo gratiae et virtutis excludit peccati fomitem, ita plenitudo scientiae excludit ignorantiam, quae scientiae opponitur. Unde, sicut in Christo non fuit fomes peccati, ita non fuit in eo ignorantia. |
I answer that, As there was the fulness of grace and virtue in Christ, so too there was the fulness of all knowledge, as is plain from what has been said above (Question [7], Article [9]; Question [9]). Now as the fulness of grace and virtue in Christ excluded the "fomes" of sin, so the fulness of knowledge excluded ignorance, which is opposed to knowledge. Hence, even as the "fomes" of sin was not in Christ, neither was there ignorance in Him. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod natura a Christo assumpta potest dupliciter considerari. Uno modo, secundum rationem suae speciei. Et secundum hoc dicit Damascenus eam esse ignorantem et servilem. Unde subdit, nam serva est quidem hominis natura eius qui fecit ipsam, Dei, et non habet futurorum cognitionem. Alio modo potest considerari secundum illud quod habet ex unione ad hypostasim divinam, ex qua habet plenitudinem scientiae et gratiae, secundum illud Ioan. I, vidimus eum, quasi unigenitum a patre, plenum gratiae et veritatis. Et hoc modo natura humana in Christo ignorantiam non habuit. | Reply to Objection 1: The nature assumed by Christ may be viewed in two ways. First, in its specific nature, and thus Damascene calls it "ignorant and enslaved"; hence he adds: "For man's nature is a slave of Him" (i.e. God) "Who made it; and it has no knowledge of future things." Secondly, it may be considered with regard to what it has from its union with the Divine hypostasis, from which it has the fulness of knowledge and grace, according to Jn. 1:14: "We saw Him [Vulg.: 'His glory'] as it were the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth"; and in this way the human nature in Christ was not affected with ignorance. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus dicitur non novisse peccatum, quia nescivit per experientiam. Scivit autem per simplicem notitiam. | Reply to Objection 2: Christ is said not to have known sin, because He did not know it by experience; but He knew it by simple cognition. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod propheta ibi loquitur de humana Christi scientia. Dicit ergo, antequam sciat puer, scilicet secundum humanitatem, vocare patrem suum, Ioseph, qui pater fuit putative, et matrem suam, scilicet Mariam, auferetur fortitudo Damasci. Quod non est sic intelligendum quasi aliquando fuerit homo et hoc nesciverit, sed, antequam sciat, idest, antequam fiat homo scientiam habens humanam, auferetur vel, ad litteram, fortitudo Damasci et spolia Samariae, per regem Assyriorum; vel, spiritualiter, quia, nondum natus, populum suum sola invocatione salvabit, ut Glossa Hieronymi exponit. Augustinus tamen, in sermone de Epiph., dicit hoc esse completum in adoratione magorum. Ait enim, antequam per humanam carnem humana verba proferret, accepit virtutem Damasci, scilicet divitias, in quibus Damascus praesumebat in divitiis autem principatus auro defertur. Spolia vero Samariae iidem ipsi erant. Samaria namque pro idololatria ponitur, illic enim populus ad idola colenda conversus est. Haec ergo prima spolia puer idololatriae detraxit. Et secundum hoc intelligitur, antequam sciat puer, idest, antequam ostendat se scire. | Reply to Objection 3: The prophet is speaking in this passage of the human knowledge of Christ; thus he says: "Before the Child" (i.e. in His human nature) "know to call His father" (i.e. Joseph, who was His reputed father), "and His mother" (i.e. Mary), "the strength of Damascus... shall be taken away." Nor are we to understand this as if He had been some time a man without knowing it; but "before He know" (i.e. before He is a man having human knowledge)---literally, "the strength of Damascus and the spoils of Samaria shall be taken away by the King of the Assyrians"---or spiritually, "before His birth He will save His people solely by invocation," as a gloss expounds it. Augustine however (Serm. xxxii de Temp.) says that this was fulfilled in the adoration of the Magi. For he says: "Before He uttered human words in human flesh, He received the strength of Damascus, i.e. the riches which Damascus vaunted (for in riches the first place is given to gold). They themselves were the spoils of Samaria. Because Samaria is taken to signify idolatry; since this people, having turned away from the Lord, turned to the worship of idols. Hence these were the first spoils which the child took from the domination of idolatry." And in this way "before the child know" may be taken to mean "before he show himself to know." |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima Christi non fuerit passibilis. Nihil enim patitur nisi a fortiori, quia agens est praestantius patiente, ut patet per Augustinum, XII super Gen. ad Litt.; et per philosophum, in III de anima. Sed nulla creatura fuit praestantior quam anima Christi. Ergo anima Christi non potuit ab aliqua creatura pati. Et ita non fuit passibilis, frustra enim fuisset in eo potentia patiendi, si a nullo pati potuisset. | Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ was not passible. For nothing suffers except by reason of something stronger; since "the agent is greater than the patient," as is clear from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16), and from the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5). Now no creature was stronger than Christ's soul. Therefore Christ's soul could not suffer at the hands of any creature; and hence it was not passible; for its capability of suffering would have been to no purpose if it could not have suffered at the hands of anything. |
| Praeterea, Tullius in libro de Tusculan. quaest., dicit quod passiones animae sunt quaedam aegritudines. Sed in anima Christi non fuit aliqua aegritudo, nam aegritudo animae sequitur peccatum, ut patet per illud Psalmi, sana animam meam, quia peccavi tibi. Ergo in Christo non fuerunt animae passiones. | Objection 2: Further, Tully (De Tusc. Quaes. iii) says that the soul's passions are ailments [*Cf. FS, Question [24], Article [2]]. But Christ's soul had no ailment; for the soul's ailment results from sin, as is plain from Ps. 40:5: "Heal my soul, for I have sinned against Thee." Therefore in Christ's soul there were no passions. |
| Praeterea, passiones animae videntur idem esse cum fomite peccati, unde apostolus, Rom. VII, vocat eas passiones peccatorum. Sed in Christo non fuit fomes peccati, ut supra dictum est. Ergo videtur quod non fuerint in eo animae passiones. Et ita anima Christi non fuit passibilis. |
Objection 3: Further, the soul's passions would seem to be the same as the "fomes" of sin, hence the Apostle (Rm. 7:5) calls them the "passions of sins." Now the "fomes" of sin was not in Christ, as was said Article [2]. Therefore it seems that there were no passions in His soul; and hence His soul was not passible. |
| Sed contra est quod in Psalmo dicitur ex persona Christi, repleta est malis anima mea, non quidem peccatis, sed humanis malis, idest doloribus, ut Glossa ibidem exponit. Sic igitur anima Christi fuit passibilis. |
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 87:4) in the person of Christ: "My soul is filled with evils"---not sins, indeed, but human evils, i.e. "pains," as a gloss expounds it. Hence the soul of Christ was passible. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod animam in corpore constitutam contingit pati dupliciter, uno modo passione corporali; alio modo, passione animali. Passione quidem corporali patitur per corporis laesionem. Cum enim anima sit forma corporis, consequens est quod unum sit esse animae et corporis, et ideo, corpore perturbato per aliquam corpoream passionem, necesse est quod anima per accidens perturbetur, scilicet quantum ad esse quod habet in corpore. Quia igitur corpus Christi fuit passibile et mortale, ut supra habitum est, necesse fuit ut etiam anima eius hoc modo passibilis esset. Passione autem animali pati dicitur anima secundum operationem quae vel est propria animae, vel est principalius animae quam corporis. Et quamvis etiam secundum intelligere et sentire dicatur hoc modo anima aliquid pati, tamen, sicut in secunda parte dictum est, propriissime dicuntur passiones animae affectiones appetitus sensitivi, quae in Christo fuerunt, sicut et cetera quae ad naturam hominis pertinent. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, ipse dominus, in forma servi agere vitam dignatus, humanitus adhibuit eas, ubi adhibendas esse iudicavit. Neque enim in quo verum erat hominis corpus et verus hominis animus, falsus erat humanus affectus. |
I answer that, A soul placed in a body may suffer in two ways: first with a bodily passion; secondly, with an animal passion. It suffers with a bodily passion through bodily hurt; for since the soul is the form of the body, soul and body have but one being; and hence, when the body is disturbed by any bodily passion, the soul, too, must be disturbed, i.e. in the being which it has in the body. Therefore, since Christ's body was passible and mortal, as was said above (Question [14], Article [2]), His soul also was of necessity passible in like manner. But the soul suffers with an animal passion, in its operations---either in such as are proper to the soul, or in such as are of the soul more than of the body. And although the soul is said to suffer in this way through sensation and intelligence, as was said in the FS, Question [22], Article [3]; FS, Question [41], Article [1]; nevertheless the affections of the sensitive appetite are most properly called passions of the soul. Now these were in Christ, even as all else pertaining to man's nature. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9): "Our Lord having deigned to live in the form of a servant, took these upon Himself whenever He judged they ought to be assumed; for there was no false human affection in Him Who had a true body and a true human soul." |
| Sciendum tamen quod huiusmodi passiones aliter fuerunt in Christo quam in nobis, quantum ad tria. Primo quidem, quantum ad obiectum. Quia in nobis plerumque huiusmodi passiones feruntur ad illicita, quod in Christo non fuit. Secundo, quantum ad principium. Quia huiusmodi passiones frequenter in nobis praeveniunt iudicium rationis, sed in Christo omnes motus sensitivi appetitus oriebantur secundum dispositionem rationis. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod hos motus, certissimae dispensationis gratia, ita cum voluit Christus suscepit animo humano, sicut cum voluit factus est homo. Tertio, quantum ad effectum. Quia in nobis quandoque huiusmodi motus non sistunt in appetitu sensitivo, sed trahunt rationem. Quod in Christo non fuit, quia motus naturaliter humanae carni convenientes sic ex eius dispositione in appetitu sensitivo manebant quod ratio ex his nullo modo impediebatur facere quae conveniebant. Unde Hieronymus dicit, super Matth., quod dominus noster, ut veritatem assumpti probaret hominis, vere quidem contristatus est, sed, ne passio in animo illius dominaretur, per propassionem dicitur quod coepit contristari, ut passio perfecta intelligatur quando animo, idest rationi, dominatur; propassio autem, quando est inchoata in appetitu sensitivo, sed ulterius non se extendit. | Nevertheless we must know that the passions were in Christ otherwise than in us, in three ways. First, as regards the object, since in us these passions very often tend towards what is unlawful, but not so in Christ. Secondly, as regards the principle, since these passions in us frequently forestall the judgment of reason; but in Christ all movements of the sensitive appetite sprang from the disposition of the reason. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9), that "Christ assumed these movements, in His human soul, by an unfailing dispensation, when He willed; even as He became man when He willed." Thirdly, as regards the effect, because in us these movements, at times, do not remain in the sensitive appetite, but deflect the reason; but not so in Christ, since by His disposition the movements that are naturally becoming to human flesh so remained in the sensitive appetite that the reason was nowise hindered in doing what was right. Hence Jerome says (on Mt. 26:37) that "Our Lord, in order to prove the reality of the assumed manhood, 'was sorrowful' in very deed; yet lest a passion should hold sway over His soul, it is by a propassion that He is said to have 'begun to grow sorrowful and to be sad'"; so that it is a perfect "passion" when it dominates the soul, i.e. the reason; and a "propassion" when it has its beginning in the sensitive appetite, but goes no further. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod anima Christi poterat quidem resistere passionibus, ut non ei supervenirent, praesertim virtute divina. Sed propria voluntate se passionibus subiiciebat, tam corporalibus quam animalibus. | Reply to Objection 1: The soul of Christ could have prevented these passions from coming upon it, and especially by the Divine power; yet of His own will He subjected Himself to these corporeal and animal passions. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod Tullius ibi loquitur secundum opinionem Stoicorum, qui non vocabant passiones quoscumque motus appetitus sensitivi, sed solum inordinatos. Tales autem passiones manifestum est in Christo non fuisse. | Reply to Objection 2: Tully is speaking there according to the opinions of the Stoics, who did not give the name of passions to all, but only to the disorderly movements of the sensitive appetite. Now, it is manifest that passions like these were not in Christ. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod passiones peccatorum sunt motus appetitus sensitivi in illicita tendentes. Quod non fuit in Christo, sicut nec fomes peccati. | Reply to Objection 3: The "passions of sins" are movements of the sensitive appetite that tend to unlawful things; and these were not in Christ, as neither was the "fomes" of sin. |
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| Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerit verus dolor sensibilis. Dicit enim Hilarius, in X de Trin., cum pro Christo mori vita sit, quid ipse in mortis sacramento doluisse aestimandus est, qui pro se morientibus vitam rependit? Et infra dicit, unigenitus Deus hominem verum, non deficiens a se Deo, sumpsit, in quo, quamvis aut ictus incideret, aut vulnus descenderet, aut nodi concurrerent, aut suspensio elevaret, afferrent quidem haec impetum passionis, non tamen dolorem inferrent. Non igitur in Christo fuit verus dolor. | Objection 1: It would seem that there was no true sensible pain in Christ. For Hilary says (De Trin. x): "Since with Christ to die was life, what pain may He be supposed to have suffered in the mystery of His death, Who bestows life on such as die for Him?" And further on he says: "The Only-begotten assumed human nature, not ceasing to be God; and although blows struck Him and wounds were inflicted on Him, and scourges fell upon Him, and the cross lifted Him up, yet these wrought in deed the vehemence of the passion, but brought no pain; as a dart piercing the water." Hence there was no true pain in Christ. |
| Praeterea, hoc proprium videtur esse carni in peccato conceptae, quod necessitati doloris subiaceat. Sed caro Christi non est cum peccato concepta, sed ex spiritu sancto in utero virginali. Non ergo subiacuit necessitati patiendi dolorem. | Objection 2: Further, it would seem to be proper to flesh conceived in original sin, to be subject to the necessity of pain. But the flesh of Christ was not conceived in sin, but of the Holy Ghost in the Virgin's womb. Therefore it lay under no necessity of suffering pain. |
| Praeterea, delectatio contemplationis divinorum diminuit sensum doloris, unde et martyres in passionibus suis tolerabilius dolorem sustinuerunt ex consideratione divini amoris. Sed anima Christi summe delectabatur in contemplatione Dei, quem per essentiam videbat, ut supra dictum est. Non ergo poterat sentire aliquem dolorem. |
Objection 3: Further, the delight of the contemplation of Divine things dulls the sense of pain; hence the martyrs in their passions bore up more bravely by thinking of the Divine love. But Christ's soul was in the perfect enjoyment of contemplating God, Whom He saw in essence, as was said above (Question [9], Article [2]). Therefore He could feel no pain. |
| Sed contra est quod Isaiae LIII dicitur, vere languores nostros ipse tulit, et dolores nostros ipse portavit. |
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 53:4): "Surely He hath borne our infirmities and carried our sorrows." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut patet ex his quae in secunda parte dicta sunt, ad veritatem doloris sensibilis requiritur laesio corporis et sensus laesionis. Corpus autem Christi laedi poterat, quia erat passibile et mortale, ut supra habitum est. Nec defuit ei sensus laesionis, cum anima Christi perfecte haberet omnes potentias naturales. Unde nulli dubium debet esse quin in Christo fuerit verus dolor. |
I answer that, As is plain from what has been said in the FS, Question [35], Article [7], for true bodily pain are required bodily hurt and the sense of hurt. Now Christ's body was able to be hurt, since it was passible and mortal, as above stated (Question [14], Articles [1],2); neither was the sense of hurt wanting to it, since Christ's soul possessed perfectly all natural powers. Therefore no one should doubt but that in Christ there was true pain. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in omnibus illis verbis, et similibus Hilarius a carne Christi non veritatem doloris, sed necessitatem excludere intendit. Unde post praemissa verba subdit, neque enim, cum sitivit aut esurivit aut flevit, bibisse dominus aut manducasse aut doluisse monstratus est, sed ad demonstrandam corporis veritatem corporis consuetudo suscepta est, ita ut, naturae nostrae consuetudine, consuetudini sit corporis satisfactum. Vel, cum potum aut cibum accepit, non se necessitati corporis, sed consuetudini tribuit. Et accepit necessitatem per comparationem ad causam primam horum defectuum, quae est peccatum, ut supra dictum est, ut scilicet ea ratione dicatur caro Christi non subiacuisse necessitati horum defectuum, quia non fuit in ea peccatum. Unde subdit, habuit enim, scilicet Christus, corpus, sed originis suae proprium, neque ex vitiis humanae conceptionis existens, sed in formam corporis nostri, virtutis suae potestate, subsistens. Quantum tamen ad causam propinquam horum defectuum, quae est compositio contrariorum, caro Christi subiacuit necessitati horum defectuum, ut supra habitum est. | Reply to Objection 1: In all these and similar words, Hilary does not intend to exclude the reality of the pain, but the necessity of it. Hence after the foregoing he adds: "Nor, when He thirsted, or hungered, or wept, was the Lord seen to drink, or eat, or grieve. But in order to prove the reality of the body, the body's customs were assumed, so that the custom of our body was atoned for by the custom of our nature. Or when He took drink or food, He acceded, not to the body's necessity, but to its custom." And he uses the word "necessity" in reference to the first cause of these defects, which is sin, as above stated (Question [14], Articles [1],3), so that Christ's flesh is said not to have lain under the necessity of these defects, in the sense that there was no sin in it. Hence he adds: "For He" (i.e. Christ) "had a body---one proper to His origin, which did not exist through the unholiness of our conception, but subsisted in the form of our body by the strength of His power." But as regards the proximate cause of these defects, which is composition of contraries, the flesh of Christ lay under the necessity of these defects, as was said above (Question [14], Article [2]). |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod caro in peccato concepta subiacet dolori non solum ex necessitate naturalium principiorum, sed etiam ex necessitate reatus peccati. Quae quidem necessitas in Christo non fuit, sed solum necessitas naturalium principiorum. | Reply to Objection 2: Flesh conceived in sin is subject to pain, not merely on account of the necessity of its natural principles, but from the necessity of the guilt of sin. Now this necessity was not in Christ; but only the necessity of natural principles. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtute divinitatis Christi dispensative sic beatitudo in anima continebatur quod non derivabatur ad corpus, ut eius passibilitas et mortalitas tolleretur. Et, eadem ratione, delectatio contemplationis sic continebatur in mente quod non derivabatur ad vires sensibiles, ut per hoc dolor sensibilis excluderetur. |
Reply to Objection 3: As was said above (Question [14], Article [1], ad 2), by the power of the Godhead of Christ the beatitude was economically kept in the soul, so as not to overflow into the body, lest His passibility and mortality should be taken away; and for the same reason the delight of contemplation was so kept in the mind as not to overflow into the sensitive powers, lest sensible pain should thereby be prevented. |
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| Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerit tristitia. Dicitur enim de Christo, Isaiae XLII, non erit tristis neque turbulentus. |
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no sorrow. For it is written of Christ (Is. 42:4): "He shall not be sad nor troublesome." |
| Praeterea, Proverb. XII dicitur, non contristabit iustum quidquid ei acciderit. Et huius rationem Stoici assignabant, quia nullus tristatur nisi de amissione bonorum suorum, iustus autem non reputat bona sua nisi iustitiam et virtutem, quas non potest amittere. Alioquin, subiaceret iustus fortunae, si pro amissione bonorum fortunae tristaretur. Sed Christus fuit maxime iustus, secundum illud Ierem. XXIII. Hoc est nomen quod vocabunt eum, dominus iustus noster. Ergo in eo non fuit tristitia. |
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 12:21): "Whatever shall befall the just man, it shall not make him sad." And the reason of this the Stoics asserted to be that no one is saddened save by the loss of his goods. Now the just man esteems only justice and virtue as his goods, and these he cannot lose; otherwise the just man would be subject to fortune if he was saddened by the loss of the goods fortune has given him. But Christ was most just, according to Jer. 23:6: "This is the name that they shall call Him: The Lord, our just one." Therefore there was no sorrow in Him. |
| Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod omnis tristitia est malum et fugiendum. Sed nullum malum vel fugiendum fuit in Christo. Ergo in Christo non fuit tristitia. | Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 13,14) that all sorrow is "evil, and to be shunned." But in Christ there was no evil to be shunned. Therefore there was no sorrow in Christ. |
| Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, tristitia est de his quae nobis nolentibus accidunt. Sed nihil passus est Christus contra suam voluntatem, dicitur enim Isaiae LIII, oblatus est quia ipse voluit. Ergo in Christo non fuit tristitia. |
Objection 4: Furthermore, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6): "Sorrow regards the things we suffer unwillingly." But Christ suffered nothing against His will, for it is written (Is. 53:7): "He was offered because it was His own will." Hence there was no sorrow in Christ. |
| Sed contra est quod dicit dominus, Matth. XXVI, tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem. Et Ambrosius dicit, II de Trin., ut homo, tristitiam habuit, suscepit enim tristitiam meam. Confidenter tristitiam nomino, qui crucem praedico. |
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mt. 26:38): "My soul is sorrowful even unto death." And Ambrose says (De Trin. ii.) that "as a man He had sorrow; for He bore my sorrow. I call it sorrow, fearlessly, since I preach the cross." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, delectatio divinae contemplationis ita per dispensationem divinae virtutis retinebatur in mente Christi quod non derivabatur ad vires sensitivas, ut per hoc dolor sensibilis excluderetur. Sicut autem dolor sensibilis est in appetitu sensitivo, ita et tristitia, sed est differentia secundum motivum, sive obiectum. Nam obiectum et motivum doloris est laesio sensu tactus percepta, sicut cum aliquis vulneratur. Obiectum autem et motivum tristitiae est nocivum seu malum interius apprehensum, sive per rationem sive per imaginationem, sicut in secunda parte habitum est, sicut cum aliquis tristatur de amissione gratiae vel pecuniae. Potuit autem anima Christi interius apprehendere aliquid ut nocivum, et quantum ad se, sicut passio et mors eius fuit, et quantum ad alios, sicut peccatum discipulorum, vel etiam Iudaeorum occidentium ipsum. Et ideo, sicut in Christo potuit esse verus dolor, ita in eo potuit esse vera tristitia, alio tamen modo quam in nobis est, secundum illa tria quae sunt assignata supra, cum communiter de Christi passione loqueremur. |
I answer that, As was said above (Article [5], ad 3), by Divine dispensation the joy of contemplation remained in Christ's mind so as not to overflow into the sensitive powers, and thereby shut out sensible pain. Now even as sensible pain is in the sensitive appetite, so also is sorrow. But there is a difference of motive or object; for the object and motive of pain is hurt perceived by the sense of touch, as when anyone is wounded; but the object and motive of sorrow is anything hurtful or evil interiorly, apprehended by the reason or the imagination, as was said in the FS, Question [35], Articles [2],7, as when anyone grieves over the loss of grace or money. Now Christ's soul could apprehend things as hurtful either to Himself, as His passion and death---or to others, as the sin of His disciples, or of the Jews that killed Him. And hence, as there could be true pain in Christ, so too could there be true sorrow; otherwise, indeed, than in us, in the three ways above stated (Article [4]), when we were speaking of the passions of Christ's soul in general. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod tristitia removetur a Christo secundum passionem perfectam, fuit tamen in eo initiata, secundum propassionem. Unde dicitur Matth. XXVI, coepit contristari et moestus esse. Aliud enim est contristari, aliud incipere contristari, ut Hieronymus ibidem dicit. |
Reply to Objection 1: Sorrow was not in Christ, as a perfect passion; yet it was inchoatively in Him as a "propassion." Hence it is written (Mt. 26:37): "He began to grow sorrowful and to be sad." For "it is one thing to be sorrowful and another to grow sorrowful," as Jerome says, on this text. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, pro tribus perturbationibus, scilicet cupiditate, laetitia et timore, Stoici tres eupathias, idest bonas passiones, in anima sapientis posuerunt, scilicet pro cupiditate voluntatem, pro laetitia gaudium, pro metu cautionem. Sed pro tristitia negaverunt aliquid posse esse in animo sapientis, quia tristitia est de malo quod iam accidit; nullum autem malum aestimant posse accidere sapienti. Et hoc ideo est quia non credebant aliquid esse bonum nisi honestum, quod homines bonos facit; nec aliquid esse malum nisi inhonestum, per quod homines mali fiunt. Quamvis autem honestum sit principale hominis bonum, et inhonestum principale hominis malum, quia haec pertinent ad ipsam rationem, quae est principalis in homine; sunt tamen quaedam secundaria hominis bona, quae pertinent ad ipsum corpus, vel ad exteriores res corpori deservientes. Et secundum hoc, potest in animo sapientis esse tristitia, quantum ad appetitum sensitivum, secundum apprehensionem huiusmodi malorum, non tamen ita quod ista tristitia perturbet rationem. Et secundum hoc etiam intelligitur quod non contristabit iustum quidquid ei acciderit, quia scilicet ex nullo accidente eius ratio perturbatur. Et secundum hoc tristitia fuit in Christo, secundum propassionem, non secundum passionem. | Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8), "for the three passions"---desire, joy, and fear---the Stoics held three {eupatheias} i.e. good passions, in the soul of the wise man, viz. for desire, will---for joy, delight---for fear, caution. But as regards sorrow, they denied it could be in the soul of the wise man, for sorrow regards evil already present, and they thought that no evil could befall a wise man; and for this reason, because they believed that only the virtuous is good, since it makes men good, and that nothing is evil, except what is sinful, whereby men become wicked. Now although what is virtuous is man's chief good, and what is sinful is man's chief evil, since these pertain to reason which is supreme in man, yet there are certain secondary goods of man, which pertain to the body, or to the exterior things that minister to the body. And hence in the soul of the wise man there may be sorrow in the sensitive appetite by his apprehending these evils; without this sorrow disturbing the reason. And in this way are we to understand that "whatsoever shall befall the just man, it shall not make him sad," because his reason is troubled by no misfortune. And thus Christ's sorrow was a propassion, and not a passion. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod omnis tristitia est malum poenae, non tamen semper est malum culpae, sed solum quando ex inordinato affectu procedit. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, cum rectam rationem sequantur istae affectiones, et quando et ubi oportet adhibentur, quis eas tunc morbidas aut vitiosas passiones audeat dicere? | Reply to Objection 3: All sorrow is an evil of punishment; but it is not always an evil of fault, except only when it proceeds from an inordinate affection. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9): "Whenever these affections follow reason, and are caused when and where needed, who will dare to call them diseases or vicious passions?" |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse contrarium voluntati secundum se quod tamen est volitum ratione finis ad quem ordinatur, sicut medicina amara non est secundum se volita, sed solum secundum quod ordinatur ad sanitatem. Et hoc modo mors Christi et eius passio fuit, secundum se considerata, involuntaria et tristitiam causans, licet fuerit voluntaria in ordine ad finem, qui est redemptio humani generis. | Reply to Objection 4: There is no reason why a thing may not of itself be contrary to the will, and yet be willed by reason of the end, to which it is ordained, as bitter medicine is not of itself desired, but only as it is ordained to health. And thus Christ's death and passion were of themselves involuntary, and caused sorrow, although they were voluntary as ordained to the end, which is the redemption of the human race. |
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| Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerit timor. Dicitur enim Proverb. XXVII, iustus, quasi leo confidens, absque terrore erit. Sed Christus fuit maxime iustus. Ergo in Christo non fuit aliquis timor. |
Objection 1: It would seem that there was no fear in Christ. For it is written (Prov. 28:1): "The just, bold as a lion, shall be without dread." But Christ was most just. Therefore there was no fear in Christ. |
| Praeterea, Hilarius dicit, X de Trin., interrogo eos qui hoc existimant an ratione subsistat ut mori timuerit qui, omnem ab apostolis mortis timorem expellens, ad gloriam eos sit martyrii exhortatus. Non ergo in Christo rationabile est fuisse timorem. | Objection 2: Further, Hilary says (De Trin. x): "I ask those who think thus, does it stand to reason that He should dread to die, Who by expelling all dread of death from the Apostles, encouraged them to the glory of martyrdom?" Therefore it is unreasonable that there should be fear in Christ. |
| Praeterea, timor non videtur esse nisi de malo quod non potest homo vitare. Sed Christus poterat vitare et malum poenae, quod passus est; et malum culpae, quod aliis accidit. Ergo in Christo non fuit aliquis timor. | Objection 3: Further, fear seems only to regard what a man cannot avoid. Now Christ could have avoided both the evil of punishment which He endured, and the evil of fault which befell others. Therefore there was no fear in Christ. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Marc. XIV, coepit Iesus taedere et pavere. | On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 4:33): Jesus "began to fear and to be heavy." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut tristitia causatur ex apprehensione mali praesentis, ita etiam timor causatur ex apprehensione mali futuri. Apprehensio autem mali futuri, si omnimodam certitudinem habeat, non inducit timorem. Unde philosophus dicit, in II Rhet., quod timor non est nisi ubi est aliqua spes evadendi, nam quando nulla spes est evadendi, apprehenditur malum ut praesens; et sic magis causat tristitiam quam timorem. Sic igitur timor potest considerari quantum ad duo. Uno modo, quantum ad hoc quod appetitus sensitivus naturaliter refugit corporis laesionem, et per tristitiam, si sit praesens; et per timorem, si sit futura. Et hoc modo timor fuit in Christo, sicut et tristitia. Alio modo potest considerari secundum incertitudinem futuri adventus, sicut quando nocte timemus ex aliquo sonitu quasi ignorantes quid hoc sit. Et quantum ad hoc, timor non fuit in Christo, ut Damascenus dicit, in III libro. | I answer that, As sorrow is caused by the apprehension of a present evil, so also is fear caused by the apprehension of a future evil. Now the apprehension of a future evil, if the evil be quite certain, does not arouse fear. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that we do not fear a thing unless there is some hope of avoiding it. For when there is no hope of avoiding it the evil is considered present, and thus it causes sorrow rather than fear. Hence fear may be considered in two ways. First, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite naturally shrinks from bodily hurt, by sorrow if it is present, and by fear if it is future; and thus fear was in Christ, even as sorrow. Secondly, fear may be considered in the uncertainty of the future event, as when at night we are frightened at a sound, not knowing what it is; and in this way there was no fear in Christ, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23). |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod iustus dicitur esse absque terrore, secundum quod terror importat perfectam passionem, avertentem hominem a bono quod est rationis. Et sic timor non fuit in Christo sed solum secundum propassionem. Et ideo dicitur quod coepit Iesus pavere et taedere, quasi secundum propassionem, ut Hieronymus exponit. |
Reply to Objection 1: The just man is said to be "without dread," in so far as dread implies a perfect passion drawing man from what reason dictates. And thus fear was not in Christ, but only as a propassion. Hence it is said (Mk. 14:33) that Jesus "began to fear and to be heavy," with a propassion, as Jerome expounds (Mt. 26:37). |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod Hilarius eo modo excludit a Christo timorem quo excludit tristitiam, scilicet quoad necessitatem timendi. Sed tamen, ad comprobandam veritatem humanae naturae, voluntarie timorem assumpsit, sicut et tristitiam. | Reply to Objection 2: Hilary excludes fear from Christ in the same way that he excludes sorrow, i.e. as regards the necessity of fearing. And yet to show the reality of His human nature, He voluntarily assumed fear, even as sorrow. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet Christus potuerit vitare mala futura secundum virtutem divinitatis, erant tamen inevitabilia, vel non de facili vitabilia, secundum infirmitatem carnis. | Reply to Objection 3: Although Christ could have avoided future evils by the power of His Godhead, yet they were unavoidable, or not easily avoidable by the weakness of the flesh. |
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| Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerit admiratio. Dicit enim philosophus, in I Metaphys., quod admiratio causatur ex hoc quod aliquis videt effectum et ignorat causam, et sic admirari non est nisi ignorantis. Sed in Christo non fuit ignorantia, ut dictum est. Ergo in Christo non fuit admiratio. | Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no wonder. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2) that wonder results when we see an effect without knowing its cause; and thus wonder belongs only to the ignorant. Now there was no ignorance in Christ, as was said Article [3]. Therefore there was no wonder in Christ. |
| Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod admiratio est timor ex magna imaginatione, et ideo philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod magnanimus non est admirativus. Sed Christus fuit maxime magnanimus. Ergo in Christo non fuit admiratio. | Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that "wonder is fear springing from the imagination of something great"; and hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the "magnanimous man does not wonder." But Christ was most magnanimous. Therefore there was no wonder in Christ. |
| Praeterea, nullus admiratur de eo quod ipse facere potest. Sed Christus facere potuit quidquid magnum erat in rebus. Ergo videtur quod de nullo admirabatur. | Objection 3: Further, no man wonders at what he himself can do. Now Christ could do whatsoever was great. Therefore it seems that He wondered at nothing. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. VIII, audiens Iesus, scilicet verba centurionis, miratus est. |
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 8:10): "Jesus hearing this," i.e. the words of the centurion, "marveled." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod admiratio proprie est de novo aliquo insolito. In Christo autem non poterat esse aliquid novum et insolitum quantum ad scientiam divinam; neque etiam quantum ad scientiam humanam qua cognoscebat res in verbo; vel qua cognoscebat res per species inditas. Potuit tamen esse aliquid sibi novum et insolitum secundum scientiam experimentalem, secundum quam sibi poterant quotidie aliqua nova occurrere. Et ideo, si loquimur de Christo quantum ad scientiam divinam et scientiam beatam, vel etiam infusam, non fuit in Christo admiratio. Si autem loquamur de eo quantum ad scientiam experimentalem, sic admiratio in eo esse potuit. Et assumpsit hunc affectum ad nostram instructionem, ut scilicet doceat esse mirandum quod etiam ipse mirabatur. Unde Augustinus dicit, in I super Gen. contra Manich., quod miratur dominus, nobis mirandum esse significat, quibus adhuc opus est sic moveri. Omnes ergo tales motus eius non perturbati animi signa sunt, sed docentis magisterium. | I answer that, Wonder properly regards what is new and unwonted. Now there could be nothing new and unwonted as regards Christ's Divine knowledge, whereby He saw things in the Word; nor as regards the human knowledge, whereby He saw things by infused species. Yet things could be new and unwonted with regard to His empiric knowledge, in regard to which new things could occur to Him day by day. Hence, if we speak of Christ with respect to His Divine knowledge, and His beatific and even His infused knowledge, there was no wonder in Christ. But if we speak of Him with respect to empiric knowledge, wonder could be in Him; and He assumed this affection for our instruction, i.e. in order to teach us to wonder at what He Himself wondered at. Hence Augustine says (Super Gen. Cont. Manich. i, 8): "Our Lord wondered in order to show us that we, who still need to be so affected, must wonder. Hence all these emotions are not signs of a disturbed mind, but of a master teaching." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet Christus nihil ignoret, poterat tamen de novo aliquid occurrere experimentali eius scientiae, ex quo admiratio causaretur. | Reply to Objection 1: Although Christ was ignorant of nothing, yet new things might occur to His empiric knowledge, and thus wonder would be caused. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus admirabatur de fide centurionis non ea ratione quod esset magna quantum ad ipsum, sed quia erat magna quantum ad alios. | Reply to Objection 2: Christ did not marvel at the Centurion's faith as if it was great with respect to Himself, but because it was great with respect to others. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod ipse poterat facere omnia secundum virtutem divinam, secundum quam in eo admiratio non erat, sed solum secundum humanam scientiam experimentalem, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 3: He could do all things by the Divine power, for with respect to this there was no wonder in Him, but only with respect to His human empiric knowledge, as was said above. |
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| Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerit ira. Dicitur enim Iac. I, ira enim viri iustitiam Dei non operatur. Sed quidquid fuit in Christo ad iustitiam Dei pertinuit, ipse enim factus est nobis iustitia a Deo, ut dicitur I Cor. I. Ergo videtur quod in Christo non fuerit ira. |
Objection 1: It would seem that there was no anger in Christ. For it is written (James 1:20): "The anger of man worketh not the justice of God." Now whatever was in Christ pertained to the justice of God, since of Him it is written (1 Cor. 1:30): "For He [Vulg.: 'Who'] of God is made unto us... justice." Therefore it seems that there was no anger in Christ. |
| Praeterea, ira mansuetudini opponitur, ut patet in IV Ethic. Sed Christus fuit maxime mansuetus. Ergo in Christo non fuit ira. | Objection 2: Further, anger is opposed to meekness, as is plain from Ethic. iv, 5. But Christ was most meek. Therefore there was no anger in Him. |
| Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, in V Moral., quod ira per vitium excaecat oculum mentis; ira vero per zelum ipsum turbat. Sed in Christo mentis oculus non fuit neque excaecatus neque turbatus. Ergo in Christo non fuit ira per vitium, nec ira per zelum. | Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that "anger that comes of evil blinds the eye of the mind, but anger that comes of zeal disturbs it." Now the mind's eye in Christ was neither blinded nor disturbed. Therefore in Christ there was neither sinful anger nor zealous anger. |
| Sed contra est quod Ioan. II dicitur de eo esse impletum quod in Psalmo legitur, zelus domus tuae comedit me. |
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 2:17) that the words of Ps. 58:10, "the zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up," were fulfilled in Him. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in secunda parte dictum est, ira est effectus tristitiae. Ex tristitia enim alicui illata consequitur in eo, circa sensitivam partem, appetitus repellendi illatam iniuriam vel sibi vel aliis. Et sic ira est passio composita ex tristitia et appetitu vindictae. Dictum est autem quod in Christo tristitia esse potuit. Appetitus etiam vindictae quandoque est cum peccato, quando scilicet aliquis vindictam quaerit sibi absque ordine rationis. Et sic ira in Christo esse non potuit, hoc enim dicitur ira per vitium. Quandoque vero talis appetitus est sine peccato, immo est laudabilis, puta cum aliquis appetit vindictam secundum ordinem iustitiae. Et hoc vocatur ira per zelum, dicit enim Augustinus, super Ioan., quod zelo domus Dei comeditur qui omnia perversa quae videt cupit emendare; et, si emendare non possit, tolerat et gemit. Et talis ira fuit in Christo. |
I answer that, As was said in the FS, Question [46], Article [3], ad 3, and SS, Question [158], Article [2], ad 3, anger is an effect of sorrow. or when sorrow is inflicted upon someone, there arises within him a desire of the sensitive appetite to repel this injury brought upon himself or others. Hence anger is a passion composed of sorrow and the desire of revenge. Now it was said (Article [6]) that sorrow could be in Christ. As to the desire of revenge it is sometimes with sin, i.e. when anyone seeks revenge beyond the order of reason: and in this way anger could not be in Christ, for this kind of anger is sinful. Sometimes, however, this desire is without sin---nay, is praiseworthy, e.g. when anyone seeks revenge according to justice, and this is zealous anger. For Augustine says (on Jn. 2:17) that "he is eaten up by zeal for the house of God, who seeks to better whatever He sees to be evil in it, and if he cannot right it, bears with it and sighs." Such was the anger that was in Christ. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicit Gregorius, in V Moral., ira dupliciter se habet in homine. Quandoque enim praevenit rationem, et trahit eam secum ad operandum. Et tunc proprie ira dicitur operari, nam operatio attribuitur principali agenti. Et secundum hoc intelligitur quod ira viri iustitiam Dei non operatur. Quandoque vero ira sequitur rationem, et est quasi instrumentum ipsius. Et tunc operatio, quae est iustitiae, non attribuitur irae, sed rationi. | Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says (Moral. v), anger is in man in two ways---sometimes it forestalls reason, and causes it to operate, and in this way it is properly said to work, for operations are attributed to the principal agent. It is in this way that we must understand that "the anger of man worketh not the justice of God." Sometimes anger follows reason, and is, as it were, its instrument, and then the operation, which pertains to justice, is not attributed to anger but to reason. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ira quae transgreditur ordinem rationis mansuetudini opponitur, non autem ira quae est moderata, ad medium reducta per rationem. Nam mansuetudo medium tenet in ira. | Reply to Objection 2: It is the anger which outsteps the bounds of reason that is opposed to meekness, and not the anger which is controlled and brought within its proper bounds by reason, for meekness holds the mean in anger. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod in nobis, secundum naturalem ordinem, potentiae animae mutuo se impediunt, ita scilicet quod, cum unius potentiae operatio fuerit intensa, alterius operatio debilitetur. Et ex hoc procedit quod motus irae etiam si sit secundum rationem moderatus, utcumque impedit oculum animae contemplantis. Sed in Christo, per moderationem divinae virtutis, unicuique potentiae permittebatur agere quod erat ei proprium, ita quod una potentia ex alia non impediebatur. Et ideo, sicut delectatio mentis contemplantis non impediebat tristitiam vel dolorem inferioris partis, ita etiam e converso passiones inferioris partis in nullo impediebant actum rationis. | Reply to Objection 3: In us the natural order is that the soul's powers mutually impede each other, i.e. if the operation of one power is intense, the operation of the other is weakened. This is the reason why any movement whatsoever of anger, even if it be tempered by reason, dims the mind's eye of him who contemplates. But in Christ, by control of the Divine power, "every faculty was allowed to do what was proper to it," and one power was not impeded by another. Hence, as the joy of His mind in contemplation did not impede the sorrow or pain of the inferior part, so, conversely, the passions of the inferior part no-wise impeded the act of reason. |
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| Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non fuerit simul viator et comprehensor. Viatori enim competit moveri ad finem beatitudinis, comprehensori autem competit in fine quiescere. Sed non potest simul eidem convenire quod moveatur ad finem, et quod quiescat in fine. Ergo non potuit simul esse quod Christus esset viator et comprehensor. | Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not at once a wayfarer and a comprehensor. For it belongs to a wayfarer to be moving toward the end of beatitude, and to a comprehensor it belongs to be resting in the end. Now to be moving towards the end and to be resting in the end cannot belong to the same. Therefore Christ could not be at once wayfarer and comprehensor. |
| Praeterea, moveri ad beatitudinem, aut eam obtinere, non competit homini secundum corpus, sed secundum animam. Unde Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Dioscorum, quod ad inferiorem naturam, quae est corpus, redundat ab anima non beatitudo, quae propria est fruentis et intelligentis. Sed Christus, licet haberet corpus passibile, tamen secundum mentem plene Deo fruebatur. Non ergo Christus fuit viator, sed purus comprehensor. | Objection 2: Further, to tend to beatitude, or to obtain it, does not pertain to man's body, but to his soul; hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Dios. cxviii) that "upon the inferior nature, which is the body, there overflows, not indeed the beatitude which belongs to such as enjoy and understand, the fulness of health, i.e. the vigor of incorruption." Now although Christ had a passible body, He fully enjoyed God in His mind. Therefore Christ was not a wayfarer but a comprehensor. |
| Praeterea, sancti, quorum animae sunt in caelo et corpora in sepulcris, fruuntur quidem beatitudine secundum animam, quamvis eorum corpora morti subiaceant, et tamen non dicuntur viatores, sed solum comprehensores. Ergo, pari ratione, licet corpus Christi fuerit mortale, quia tamen mens eius Deo fruebatur, videtur quod fuerit purus comprehensor, et nullo modo viator. | Objection 3: Further, the Saints, whose souls are in heaven and whose bodies are in the tomb, enjoy beatitude in their souls, although their bodies are subject to death, yet they are called not wayfarers, but only comprehensors. Hence, with equal reason, would it seem that Christ was a pure comprehensor and nowise a wayfarer, since His mind enjoyed God although His body was mortal. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Ierem. XIV, quasi colonus futurus es in terra, et quasi viator declinans ad manendum. |
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 14:8): "Why wilt Thou be as a stranger in the land, and as a wayfaring man turning in to lodge?" |
| Respondeo dicendum quod aliquis dicitur viator ex eo quod tendit in beatitudinem, comprehensor autem dicitur ex hoc quod iam beatitudinem obtinet, secundum illud I Cor. IX, sic currite ut comprehendatis; et Philipp. III, sequor autem, si quo modo comprehendam. Hominis autem beatitudo perfecta consistit in anima et corpore, ut in secunda parte habitum est, in anima quidem, quantum ad id quod est ei proprium, secundum quod mens videt et fruitur Deo; in corpore vero, secundum quod corpus resurget spirituale, et in virtute et in gloria et in incorruptione, ut dicitur I Cor. XV. Christus autem, ante passionem, secundum mentem plene videbat Deum, et sic habebat beatitudinem quantum ad id quod est proprium animae. Sed quantum ad alia deerat ei beatitudo, quia et anima eius erat passibilis, et corpus passibile et mortale, ut ex supra dictis patet. Et ideo simul erat comprehensor, inquantum habebat beatitudinem animae propriam, et simul viator, inquantum tendebat in beatitudinem secundum id quod ei de beatitudine deerat. |
I answer that, A man is called a wayfarer from tending to beatitude, and a comprehensor from having already obtained beatitude, according to 1 Cor. 9:24: "So run that you may comprehend [Douay: 'obtain']"; and Phil. 3:12: "I follow after, if by any means I may comprehend [Douay: 'obtain']". Now man's perfect beatitude consists in both soul and body, as stated in the FS, Question [4], Article [6]. In the soul, as regards what is proper to it, inasmuch as the mind sees and enjoys God; in the body, inasmuch as the body "will rise spiritual in power and glory and incorruption," as is written 1 Cor. 15:42. Now before His passion Christ's mind saw God fully, and thus He had beatitude as far as it regards what is proper to the soul; but beatitude was wanting with regard to all else, since His soul was passible, and His body both passible and mortal, as is clear from the above (Article [4]; Question [14], Articles [1],2). Hence He was at once comprehensor, inasmuch as He had the beatitude proper to the soul, and at the same time wayfarer, inasmuch as He was tending to beatitude, as regards what was wanting to His beatitude. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod impossibile est moveri ad finem et quiescere in fine secundum idem. Sed secundum diversa nihil prohibet hoc, sicut aliquis homo simul est sciens quantum ad ea quae iam novit, et addiscens quantum ad ea quae nondum novit. | Reply to Objection 1: It is impossible to be moving towards the end and resting in the end, in the same respect; but there is nothing against this under a different respect---as when a man is at once acquainted with what he already knows, and yet is a learner with regard to what he does not know. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod beatitudo principaliter et proprie consistit in anima secundum mentem, secundario tamen, et quasi instrumentaliter, requiruntur ad beatitudinem corporis bona; sicut philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod exteriora bona organice deserviunt beatitudini. | Reply to Objection 2: Beatitude principally and properly belongs to the soul with regard to the mind, yet secondarily and, so to say, instrumentally, bodily goods are required for beatitude; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8), that exterior goods minister "organically" to beatitude. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod non est eadem ratio de animabus sanctorum defunctorum et de Christo, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia animae sanctorum non sunt passibiles, sicut fuit anima Christi. Secundo, quia corpora non agunt aliquid per quod in beatitudinem tendant, sicut Christus, secundum corporis passiones, in beatitudinem tendebat quantum ad gloriam corporis. | Reply to Objection 3: There is no parity between the soul of a saint and of Christ, for two reasons: first, because the souls of saints are not passible, as Christ's soul was; secondly, because their bodies do nothing by which they tend to beatitude, as Christ by His bodily sufferings tended to beatitude as regards the glory of His body. |