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Deinde considerandum est de coassumptis a filio Dei in humana natura.
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We must now consider such things as were co-assumed by the Son of God in human nature;
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Circa primum consideranda sunt tria,
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Concerning the first, there are three points of consideration:
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De gratia autem Christi considerandum est dupliciter,
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With regard to His grace we must consider two things:
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| Circa primum quaeruntur tredecim. | Under the first head there are thirteen points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum in anima Christi sit aliqua gratia habitualis. | (1) Whether in the soul of Christ there was any habitual grace? |
| Secundo, utrum in Christo fuerint virtutes. | (2) Whether in Christ there were virtues? |
| Tertio, utrum in eo fuerit fides. | (3) Whether He had faith? |
| Quarto, utrum fuerit in eo spes. | (4) Whether He had hope? |
| Quinto, utrum in Christo fuerint dona. | (5) Whether in Christ there were the gifts? |
| Sexto, utrum in Christo fuerit timoris donum. | (6) Whether in Christ there was the gift of fear? |
| Septimo, utrum in Christo fuerint gratiae gratis datae. | (7) Whether in Christ there were any gratuitous graces? |
| Octavo, utrum in Christo fuerit prophetia. | (8) Whether in Christ there was prophecy? |
| Nono, utrum in eo fuerit plenitudo gratiae. | (9) Whether there was the fulness of grace in Him? |
| Decimo, utrum talis plenitudo sit propria Christi. | (10) Whether such fulness was proper to Christ? |
| Undecimo, utrum Christi gratia sit infinita. | (11) Whether the grace of Christ was infinite? |
| Duodecimo, utrum potuerit augeri. | (12) Whether it could have been increased? |
| Tertiodecimo, qualiter haec gratia se habeat ad unionem. | (13) How this grace stood towards the union? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in anima assumpta a verbo non fuerit gratia habitualis. Gratia enim est quaedam participatio divinitatis in creatura rationali, secundum illud II Pet. I, per quem magna et pretiosa nobis promissa donavit, ut divinae simus consortes naturae. Christus autem Deus est non participative, sed secundum veritatem. Ergo in eo non fuit gratia habitualis. | Objection 1: It would seem there was no habitual grace in the soul assumed by the Word. For grace is a certain partaking of the Godhead by the rational creature, according to 2 Pt. 1:4: "By Whom He hath given us most great and precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature." Now Christ is God not by participation, but in truth. Therefore there was no habitual grace in Him. |
| Praeterea, gratia ad hoc est necessaria homini ut per eam bene operetur, secundum illud I Cor. XV, abundantius omnibus laboravi, non autem ego, sed gratia Dei mecum; et etiam ad hoc quod homo consequatur vitam aeternam, secundum illud Rom. VI, gratia Dei vita aeterna. Sed Christo, ex hoc solo quod erat naturalis filius Dei, debebatur hereditas vitae aeterna. Ex hoc etiam quod erat verbum, per quod facta sunt omnia, aderat ei facultas omnia bona operandi. Non igitur secundum humanam naturam indigebat alia gratia nisi unione ad verbum. | Objection 2: Further, grace is necessary to man, that he may operate well, according to 1 Cor. 15:10: "I have labored more abundantly than all they; yet not I, but the grace of God with me"; and in order that he may reach eternal life, according to Rm. 6:23: "The grace of God (is) life everlasting." Now the inheritance of everlasting life was due to Christ by the mere fact of His being the natural Son of God; and by the fact of His being the Word, by Whom all things were made, He had the power of doing all things well. Therefore His human nature needed no further grace beyond union with the Word. |
| Praeterea, illud quod operatur per modum instrumenti, non indiget habitu ad proprias operationes, sed habitus fundatur in principali agente. Humana autem natura in Christo fuit sicut instrumentum deitatis, ut dicit Damascenus, in III libro. Ergo in Christo non debuit esse aliqua gratia habitualis. | Objection 3: Further, what operates as an instrument does not need a habit for its own operations, since habits are rooted in the principal agent. Now the human nature in Christ was "as the instrument of the Godhead," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 15). Therefore there was no need of habitual grace in Christ. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae XI, requiescet super eum spiritus domini, qui quidem esse in homine dicitur per gratiam habitualem, ut in prima parte dictum est. Ergo in Christo fuit gratia habitualis. |
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): "The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him"---which (Spirit), indeed, is said to be in man by habitual grace, as was said above (FP, Question [8], Article [3]; FP, Question [43], Articles [3],6). Therefore there was habitual grace in Christ. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere in Christo gratiam habitualem, propter tria. Primo quidem, propter unionem animae illius ad verbum Dei. Quanto enim aliquod receptivum propinquius est causae influenti, tanto magis participat de influentia ipsius. Influxus autem gratiae est a Deo, secundum illud Psalmi, gratiam et gloriam dabit dominus. Et ideo maxime fuit conveniens ut anima illa reciperet influxum divinae gratiae. Secundo, propter nobilitatem illius animae, cuius operationes oportebat propinquissime attingere ad Deum per cognitionem et amorem. Ad quod necesse est elevari humanam naturam per gratiam. Tertio, propter habitudinem ipsius Christi ad genus humanum. Christus enim, inquantum homo, est mediator Dei et hominum, ut dicitur I Tim. II. Et ideo oportebat quod haberet gratiam etiam in alios redundantem, secundum illud Ioan. I, de plenitudine eius omnes accepimus, gratiam pro gratia. | I answer that, It is necessary to suppose habitual grace in Christ for three reasons. First, on account of the union of His soul with the Word of God. For the nearer any recipient is to an inflowing cause, the more does it partake of its influence. Now the influx of grace is from God, according to Ps. 83:12: "The Lord will give grace and glory." And hence it was most fitting that His soul should receive the influx of Divine grace. Secondly, on account of the dignity of this soul, whose operations were to attain so closely to God by knowledge and love, to which it is necessary for human nature to be raised by grace. Thirdly, on account of the relation of Christ to the human race. For Christ, as man, is the "Mediator of God and men," as is written, 1 Tim. 2:5; and hence it behooved Him to have grace which would overflow upon others, according to Jn. 1:16: "And of His fulness we have all received, and grace for grace." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus est verus Deus secundum personam et naturam divinam. Sed quia cum unitate personae remanet distinctio naturarum, ut ex supra dictis patet, anima Christi non est per suam essentiam divina. Unde oportet quod fiat divina per participationem, quae est secundum gratiam. |
Reply to Objection 1: Christ is the true God in Divine Person and Nature. Yet because together with unity of person there remains distinction of natures, as stated above (Question [2], Articles [1],2), the soul of Christ. is not essentially Divine. Hence it behooves it to be Divine by participation, which is by grace. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod Christo, secundum quod est naturalis filius Dei, debetur hereditas aeterna, quae est ipsa beatitudo increata, per increatum actum cognitionis et amoris Dei, eundem scilicet quo pater cognoscit et amat seipsum. Cuius actus anima capax non erat, propter differentiam naturae. Unde oportebat quod attingeret ad Deum per actum fruitionis creatum. Qui quidem esse non potest nisi per gratiam. Similiter etiam, inquantum est verbum Dei, habuit facultatem omnia bene operandi operatione divina. Sed quia, praeter operationem divinam, oportet ponere operationem humanam, ut infra patebit; oportuit in eo esse habitualem gratiam, per quam huiusmodi operatio in eo esset perfecta. |
Reply to Objection 2: To Christ, inasmuch as He is the natural Son of God, is due an eternal inheritance, which is the uncreated beatitude through the uncreated act of knowledge and love of God, i.e. the same whereby the Father knows and loves Himself. Now the soul was not capable of this act, on account of the difference of natures. Hence it behooved it to attain to God by a created act of fruition which could not be without grace. Likewise, inasmuch as He was the Word of God, He had the power of doing all things well by the Divine operation. And because it is necessary to admit a human operation, distinct from the Divine operation, as will be shown (Question [19], Article [1]), it was necessary for Him to have habitual grace, whereby this operation might be perfect in Him. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod humanitas Christi est instrumentum divinitatis, non quidem sicut instrumentum inanimatum, quod nullo modo agit sed solum agitur, sed tanquam instrumentum animatum anima rationali, quod ita agit quod etiam agitur. Et ideo, ad convenientiam actionis, oportuit eum habere gratiam habitualem. | Reply to Objection 3: The humanity of Christ is the instrument of the Godhead---not, indeed, an inanimate instrument, which nowise acts, but is merely acted upon; but an instrument animated by a rational soul, which is so acted upon as to act. And hence the nature of the action demanded that he should have habitual grace. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerint virtutes. Christus enim habuit abundantiam gratiae. Sed gratia sufficit ad omnia recte agendum, secundum illud II Cor. XII, sufficit tibi gratia mea. Ergo in Christo non fuerunt virtutes. | Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there were no virtues. For Christ had the plenitude of grace. Now grace is sufficient for every good act, according to 2 Cor. 12:9: "My grace is sufficient for thee." Therefore there were no virtues in Christ. |
| Praeterea, secundum philosophum, VII Ethic., virtus dividitur contra quendam heroicum sive divinum habitum, qui attribuitur hominibus divinis. Hoc autem maxime convenit Christo. Ergo Christus non habuit virtutes, sed aliquid altius virtute. | Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1), virtue is contrasted with a "certain heroic or godlike habit" which is attributed to godlike men. But this belongs chiefly to Christ. Therefore Christ had not virtues, but something higher than virtue. |
| Praeterea, sicut in secunda parte dictum est, virtutes omnes simul habentur. Sed Christo non fuit conveniens habere simul omnes virtutes, sicut patet de liberalitate et magnificentia, quae habent actum suum circa divitias, quas Christus contempsit, secundum illud Matth. VIII, filius hominis non habet ubi caput suum reclinet. Temperantia etiam et continentia sunt circa concupiscentias pravas, quae in Christo non fuerunt. Ergo Christus non habuit virtutes. |
Objection 3: Further, as was said above (FS, Question [65], Articles [1],2), all the virtues are bound together. But it was not becoming for Christ to have all the virtues, as is clear in the case of liberality and magnificence, for these have to do with riches, which Christ spurned, according to Mt. 8:20: "The Son of man hath not where to lay His head." Temperance and continence also regard wicked desires, from which Christ was free. Therefore Christ had not the virtues. |
| Sed contra est quod super illud Psalmi, sed in lege domini voluntas eius, dicit Glossa, hic ostenditur Christus plenus omni bono. Sed bona qualitas mentis est virtus. Ergo Christus fuit plenus omni virtute. | On the contrary, on Ps. 1:2, "But His will is in the law of the Lord," a gloss says: "This refers to Christ, Who is full of all good." But a good quality of the mind is a virtue. Therefore Christ was full of all virtue. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in secunda parte habitum est, sicut gratia respicit essentiam animae, ita virtus respicit eius potentiam. Unde oportet quod, sicut potentiae animae derivantur ab eius essentia, ita virtutes sunt quaedam derivationes gratiae. Quanto autem aliquod principium est perfectius, tanto magis imprimit suos effectus. Unde, cum gratia Christi fuerit perfectissima, consequens est quod ex ipsa processerint virtutes ad perficiendum singulas potentias animae, quantum ad omnes animae actus. Et ita Christus habuit omnes virtutes. |
I answer that, As was said above (FS, Question [110], Articles [3],4), as grace regards the essence of the soul, so does virtue regard its power. Hence it is necessary that as the powers of the soul flow from its essence, so do the virtues flow from grace. Now the more perfect a principle is, the more it impresses its effects. Hence, since the grace of Christ was most perfect, there flowed from it, in consequence, the virtues which perfect the several powers of the soul for all the soul's acts; and thus Christ had all the virtues. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod gratia sufficit homini quantum ad omnia quibus ordinatur ad beatitudinem. Horum tamen quaedam perficit gratia immediate per seipsam, sicut gratum facere Deo, et alia huiusmodi, quaedam autem mediantibus virtutibus, quae ex gratia procedunt. | Reply to Objection 1: Grace suffices a man for all whereby he is ordained to beatitude; nevertheless, it effects some of these by itself---as to make him pleasing to God, and the like; and some others through the medium of the virtues which proceed from grace. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod habitus ille heroicus vel divinus non differt a virtute communiter dicta nisi secundum perfectiorem modum, inquantum scilicet aliquis est dispositus ad bonum quodam altiori modo quam communiter omnibus competat. Unde per hoc non ostenditur quod Christus non habuit virtutes, sed quod habuit eas perfectissime, ultra communem modum. Sicut etiam Plotinus posuit quendam sublimem modum virtutum, quas esse dixit purgati animi. | Reply to Objection 2: A heroic or godlike habit only differs from virtue commonly so called by a more perfect mode, inasmuch as one is disposed to good in a higher way than is common to all. Hence it is not hereby proved that Christ had not the virtues, but that He had them most perfectly beyond the common mode. In this sense Plotinus gave to a certain sublime degree of virtue the name of "virtue of the purified soul" (cf. FS, Question [61], Article [5]). |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod liberalitas et magnificentia commendantur circa divitias inquantum aliquis non tantum appretiatur divitias quod velit eas retinere praetermittendo id quod fieri oportet. Ille autem minime divitias appretiatur qui penitus eas contemnit et abiicit propter perfectionis amorem. Et ideo in hoc ipso quod Christus omnes divitias contempsit, ostendit in se summum gradum liberalitatis et magnificentiae. Licet etiam liberalitatis actum exercuerit, secundum quod sibi conveniens erat faciendo pauperibus erogari quae sibi dabantur, unde, cum dominus dixit Iudae, Ioan. XIII, quod facis, fac citius, discipuli intellexerunt dominum mandasse quod egenis aliquid daret. Concupiscentias autem pravas Christus omnino non habuit, sicut infra patebit. Propter hoc tamen non excluditur quin habuerit temperantiam, quae tanto perfectior est in homine quanto magis pravis concupiscentiis caret. Unde, secundum philosophum, in VII Ethic., temperatus in hoc differt a continente, quod temperatus non habet pravas concupiscentias, quas continens patitur. Unde, sic accipiendo continentiam sicut philosophus accipit, ex hoc ipso quod Christus habuit omnem virtutem, non habuit continentiam, quae non est virtus, sed aliquid minus virtute. |
Reply to Objection 3: Liberality and magnificence are praiseworthy in regard to riches, inasmuch as anyone does not esteem wealth to the extent of wishing to retain it, so as to forego what ought to be done. But he esteems them least who wholly despises them, and casts them aside for love of perfection. And hence by altogether contemning all riches, Christ showed the highest kind of liberality and magnificence; although He also performed the act of liberality, as far as it became Him, by causing to be distributed to the poor what was given to Himself. Hence, when our Lord said to Judas (Jn. 13:21), "That which thou dost do quickly," the disciples understood our Lord to have ordered him to give something to the poor. But Christ had no evil desires whatever, as will be shown (Question [15], Articles [1],2); yet He was not thereby prevented from having temperance, which is the more perfect in man, as he is without evil desires. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9), the temperate man differs from the continent in this---that the temperate has not the evil desires which the continent suffers. Hence, taking continence in this sense, as the Philosopher takes it, Christ, from the very fact that He had all virtue, had not continence, since it is not a virtue, but something less than virtue. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo fuerit fides. Fides enim est nobilior virtus quam virtutes morales, puta temperantia et liberalitas. Huiusmodi autem virtutes fuerunt in Christo, ut dictum est. Multum ergo magis fuit in eo fides. |
Objection 1: It would seem that there was faith in Christ. For faith is a nobler virtue than the moral virtues, e.g. temperance and liberality. Now these were in Christ, as stated above (Article [2]). Much more, therefore, was there faith in Him. |
| Praeterea, Christus non docuit virtutes quas ipse non habuit, secundum illud Act. I, coepit Iesus facere et docere. Sed de Christo dicitur, Heb. XII, quod est auctor et consummator fidei. Ergo in eo maxime fuit fides. |
Objection 2: Further, Christ did not teach virtues which He had not Himself, according to Acts 1:1: "Jesus began to do and to teach." But of Christ it is said (Heb. 12:2) that He is "the author and finisher of our faith." Therefore there was faith in Him before all others. |
| Praeterea, quidquid est imperfectionis excluditur a beatis. Sed in beatis est fides, nam super illud Rom. I, iustitia Dei revelatur in eo ex fide in fidem, dicit Glossa, de fide verborum et spei in fidem rerum et speciei. Ergo videtur quod etiam in Christo fuerit fides, cum nihil imperfectionis importet. | Objection 3: Further, everything imperfect is excluded from the blessed. But in the blessed there is faith; for on Rm. 1:17, "the justice of God is revealed therein from faith to faith," a gloss says: "From the faith of words and hope to the faith of things and sight." Therefore it would seem that in Christ also there was faith, since it implies nothing imperfect. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Heb. XI, quod fides est argumentum non apparentium. Sed Christo nihil fuit non apparens, secundum illud quod dixit ei Petrus, Ioan. ult., tu omnia nosti. Ergo in Christo non fuit fides. | On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:1): "Faith is the evidence of things that appear not." But there was nothing that did not appear to Christ, according to what Peter said to Him (Jn. 21:17): "Thou knowest all things." Therefore there was no faith in Christ. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in secunda parte dictum est, obiectum fidei est res divina non visa. Habitus autem virtutis, sicut et quilibet alius, recipit speciem ab obiecto. Et ideo, excluso quod res divina non sit visa, excluditur ratio fidei. Christus autem in primo instanti suae conceptionis plene vidit Deum per essentiam, ut infra patebit. Unde fides in eo esse non potuit. |
I answer that, As was said above (SS, Question [1], Article [4]), the object of faith is a Divine thing not seen. Now the habit of virtue, as every other habit, takes its species from the object. Hence, if we deny that the Divine thing was not seen, we exclude the very essence of faith. Now from the first moment of His conception Christ saw God's Essence fully, as will be made clear (Question [34], Article [1]). Hence there could be no faith in Him. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod fides est nobilior virtutibus moralibus, quia est circa nobiliorem materiam, sed tamen importat quendam defectum in comparatione ad illam materiam, qui defectus in Christo non fuit. Et ideo non potuit in eo esse fides, licet fuerint in eo virtutes morales, quae in sui ratione huiusmodi defectum non important per comparationem ad suas materias. | Reply to Objection 1: Faith is a nobler virtue than the moral virtues, seeing that it has to do with nobler matter; nevertheless, it implies a certain defect with regard to that matter; and this defect was not in Christ. And hence there could be no faith in Him, although the moral virtues were in Him, since in their nature they imply no defect with regard to their matter. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod meritum fidei consistit in hoc quod homo, ex obedientia Dei, assentit istis quae non videt, secundum illud Rom. I, ad obediendum fidei in omnibus gentibus pro nomine eius. Obedientiam autem ad Deum plenissime habuit Christus, secundum illud Philipp. II, factus est obediens usque ad mortem. Et sic nihil ad meritum pertinens docuit quod ipse excellentius non impleret. | Reply to Objection 2: The merit of faith consists in this---that man through obedience assents to what things he does not see, according to Rm. 1:5: "For obedience to the faith in all nations for His name." Now Christ had most perfect obedience to God, according to Phil. 2:8: "Becoming obedient unto death." And hence He taught nothing pertaining to merit which He did not fulfil more perfectly Himself. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Glossa ibidem dicit, fides proprie est qua creduntur quae non videntur. Sed fides quae est rerum visarum, improprie dicitur, et secundum quandam similitudinem, quantum ad certitudinem aut firmitatem adhaesionis. | Reply to Objection 3: As a gloss says in the same place, faith is that "whereby such things as are not seen are believed." But faith in things seen is improperly so called, and only after a certain similitude with regard to the certainty and firmness of the assent. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo fuerit spes. Dicitur enim in Psalmo ex persona Christi, secundum Glossam, in te, domine, speravi. Sed virtus spei est qua homo sperat in Deum. Ergo virtus spei fuit in Christo. |
Objection 1: It would seem that there was hope in Christ. For it is said in the Person of Christ (Ps. 30:1): "In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped." But the virtue of hope is that whereby a man hopes in God. Therefore the virtue of hope was in Christ. |
| Praeterea, spes est expectatio futurae beatitudinis, ut in secunda parte habitum est. Sed Christus aliquid expectabat ad beatitudinem pertinens, videlicet gloriam corporis. Ergo videtur quod in eo fuit spes. |
Objection 2: Further, hope is the expectation of the bliss to come, as was shown above (SS, Question [17], Article [5], ad 3). But Christ awaited something pertaining to bliss, viz. the glorifying of His body. Therefore it seems there was hope in Him. |
| Praeterea, unusquisque potest sperare id quod ad eius perfectionem pertinet, si sit futurum. Sed aliquid erat futurum quod ad perfectionem Christi pertinet, secundum illud Ephes. IV, ad consummationem sanctorum, in opus ministerii, in aedificationem corporis Christi. Ergo videtur quod Christo competebat habere spem. | Objection 3: Further, everyone may hope for what pertains to his perfection, if it has yet to come. But there was something still to come pertaining to Christ's perfection, according to Eph. 4:12: "For the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the building up [Douay: 'edifying'] of the body of Christ." Hence it seems that it befitted Christ to have hope. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. VIII, quod videt quis, quid sperat? Et sic patet quod, sicut fides est de non visis, ita et spes. Sed fides non fuit in Christo, sicut dictum est. Ergo nec spes. |
On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 8:24): "What a man seeth, why doth he hope for?" Thus it is clear that as faith is of the unseen, so also is hope. But there was no faith in Christ, as was said above (Article [1]): neither, consequently, was there hope. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut de ratione fidei est quod aliquis assentiat his quae non videt, ita de ratione spei est quod aliquis expectet id quod nondum habet. Et sicut fides, inquantum est virtus theologica, non est de quocumque non viso, sed solum de Deo, ita etiam spes, inquantum est virtus theologica, habet pro obiecto ipsam Dei fruitionem, quam principaliter homo expectat per spei virtutem. Sed ex consequenti ille qui habet virtutem spei, potest etiam in aliis divinum auxilium expectare, sicut et ille qui habet virtutem fidei, non solum credit Deo de rebus divinis, sed de quibuscumque aliis sibi divinitus revelatis. Christus autem a principio suae conceptionis plene habuit fruitionem divinam, ut infra dicetur. Et ideo virtutem spei non habuit. Habuit tamen spem respectu aliquorum quae nondum erat adeptus, licet non habuit fidem respectu quorumcumque. Quia, licet plene cognosceret omnia, per quod totaliter fides excludebatur ab eo, non tamen adhuc plene habebat omnia quae ad eius perfectionem pertinebant, puta immortalitatem et gloriam corporis, quam poterat sperare. |
I answer that, As it is of the nature of faith that one assents to what one sees not, so is it of the nature of hope that one expects what as yet one has not; and as faith, forasmuch as it is a theological virtue, does not regard everything unseen, but only God; so likewise hope, as a theological virtue, has God Himself for its object, the fruition of Whom man chiefly expects by the virtue of hope; yet, in consequence, whoever has the virtue of hope may expect the Divine aid in other things, even as he who has the virtue of faith believes God not only in Divine things, but even in whatsoever is divinely revealed. Now from the beginning of His conception Christ had the Divine fruition fully, as will be shown (Question [34], Article [4]), and hence he had not the virtue of hope. Nevertheless He had hope as regards such things as He did not yet possess, although He had not faith with regard to anything; because, although He knew all things fully, wherefore faith was altogether wanting to Him, nevertheless He did not as yet fully possess all that pertained to His perfection, viz. immortality and glory of the body, which He could hope for. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc non dicitur de Christo secundum spem quae est virtus theologica, sed eo quod quaedam alia speravit nondum habita, sicut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 1: This is said of Christ with reference to hope, not as a theological virtue, but inasmuch as He hoped for some other things not yet possessed, as was said above. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod gloria corporis non pertinet ad beatitudinem sicut in quo principaliter beatitudo consistat, sed per quandam redundantiam a gloria animae, ut in secunda parte dictum est. Unde spes, secundum quod est virtus theologica, non respicit beatitudinem corporis, sed beatitudinem animae, quae in divina fruitione consistit. |
Reply to Objection 2: The glory of the body does not pertain to beatitude as being that in which beatitude principally consists, but by a certain outpouring from the soul's glory, as was said above (FS, Question [4], Article [6]). Hence hope, as a theological virtue, does not regard the bliss of the body but the soul's bliss, which consists in the Divine fruition. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod aedificatio Ecclesiae per conversionem fidelium non pertinet ad perfectionem Christi qua in se perfectus est, sed secundum quod alios ad participationem suae perfectionis inducit. Et quia spes dicitur proprie respectu alicuius quod expectatur ab ipso sperante habendum, non proprie potest dici quod virtus spei Christo conveniat ratione inducta. | Reply to Objection 3: The building up of the church by the conversion of the faithful does not pertain to the perfection of Christ, whereby He is perfect in Himself, but inasmuch as it leads others to a share of His perfection. And because hope properly regards what is expected by him who hopes, the virtue of hope cannot properly be said to be in Christ, because of the aforesaid reason. |
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| Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerint dona. Sicut enim communiter dicitur, dona dantur in adiutorium virtutum. Sed id quod est in se perfectum, non indiget exteriori auxilio. Cum igitur in Christo fuerint virtutes perfectae, videtur quod in eo non fuerunt dona. | Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts were not in Christ. For, as is commonly said, the gifts are given to help the virtues. But what is perfect in itself does not need an exterior help. Therefore, since the virtues of Christ were perfect, it seems there were no gifts in Him. |
| Praeterea, non videtur esse eiusdem dare dona et recipere, quia dare est habentis, accipere autem non habentis. Sed Christo convenit dare dona, secundum illud Psalmi, dedit dona hominibus. Ergo Christo non convenit accipere dona spiritus sancti. | Objection 2: Further, to give and to receive gifts would not seem to belong to the same; since to give pertains to one who has, and to receive pertains to one who has not. But it belongs to Christ to give gifts according to Ps. 67:19. "Thou hast given gifts to men [Vulg.: 'Thou hast received gifts in men']." Therefore it was not becoming that Christ should receive gifts of the Holy Ghost. |
| Praeterea, quatuor dona videntur pertinere ad contemplationem viae scilicet sapientia, scientia, intellectus et consilium, quod pertinet ad prudentiam, unde et philosophus, in VI Ethic., numerat ista inter virtutes intellectuales. Sed Christus habuit contemplationem patriae. Ergo non habuit huiusmodi dona. | Objection 3: Further, four gifts would seem to pertain to the contemplation of earth, viz. wisdom, knowledge, understanding, and counsel which pertains to prudence; hence the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3) enumerates these with the intellectual virtues. But Christ had the contemplation of heaven. Therefore He had not these gifts. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae IV, apprehendent septem mulieres virum unum, Glossa, idest, septem dona spiritus sancti Christum. |
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 4:1): "Seven women shall take hold of one man": on which a gloss says: "That is, the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost shall take hold of Christ." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in secunda parte dictum est, dona proprie sunt quaedam perfectiones potentiarum animae secundum quod sunt natae moveri a spiritu sancto. Manifestum est autem quod anima Christi perfectissime a spiritu sancto movebatur secundum illud Luc. IV, Iesus, plenus spiritu sancto, regressus est a Iordane, et agebatur a spiritu in desertum. Unde manifestum est quod in Christo fuerunt excellentissime dona. |
I answer that, As was said above (FS, Question [68], Article [1]), the gifts, properly, are certain perfections of the soul's powers, inasmuch a[9] these have a natural aptitude to be moved by the Holy Ghost, according to Luke 4:1: "And Jesus, being full of the Holy Ghost, returned from the Jordan, and was led by the Spirit into the desert." Hence it is manifest that in Christ the gifts were in a pre-eminent degree. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illud quod est perfectum secundum ordinem suae naturae, indiget adiuvari ab eo quod est altioris naturae, sicut homo, quantumcumque perfectus, indiget adiuvari a Deo. Et hoc modo virtutes indigent adiuvari per dona, quae perficiunt potentias animae secundum quod sunt motae a spiritu sancto. | Reply to Objection 1: What is perfect in the order of its nature needs to be helped by something of a higher nature; as man, however perfect, needs to be helped by God. And in this way the virtues, which perfect the powers of the soul, as they are controlled by reason, no matter how perfect they are, need to be helped by the gifts, which perfect the soul's powers, inasmuch as these are moved by the Holy Ghost. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus non secundum idem est recipiens et dans dona spiritus sancti, sed dat secundum quod Deus, et accipit secundum quod homo. Unde Gregorius dicit, in II Moral., quod spiritus sanctus humanitatem Christi nunquam deseruit, ex cuius divinitate procedit. | Reply to Objection 2: Christ is not a recipient and a giver of the gifts of the Holy Ghost, in the same respect; for He gives them as God and receives them as man. Hence Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "the Holy Ghost never quitted the human nature of Christ, from Whose Divine nature He proceedeth." |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod in Christo non solum fuit cognitio patriae, sed etiam cognitio viae, ut infra dicetur. Et tamen etiam in patria sunt per aliquem modum dona spiritus sancti, ut in secunda parte habitum est. |
Reply to Objection 3: In Christ there was not only heavenly knowledge, but also earthly knowledge, as will be said (Question [15], Article [10]). And yet even in heaven the gifts of the Holy Ghost will still exist, in a certain manner, as was said above (FS, Question [68], Article [6]). |
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| Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuit donum timoris. Spes enim potior videtur quam timor, nam spei obiectum est bonum, timoris vero malum, ut in secunda parte habitum est. Sed in Christo non fuit virtus spei, ut supra habitum est. Ergo etiam non fuit in eo donum timoris. |
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was not the gift of fear. For hope would seem to be stronger than fear; since the object of hope is goodness, and of fear, evil. as was said above (FS, Question [40], Article [1]; FS, Question [42], Article [1]). But in Christ there was not the virtue of hope, as was said above (Article [4]). Hence, likewise, there was not the gift of fear in Him. |
| Praeterea, dono timoris timet aliquis vel separationem a Deo, quod pertinet ad timorem castum; vel puniri ab ipso, quod pertinet ad timorem servilem; ut Augustinus dicit, super canonicam Ioan. Sed Christus non timuit separari a Deo per peccatum, neque puniri ab eo propter culpam suam, quia impossibile erat eum peccare, ut infra dicetur; timor autem non est de impossibili. Ergo in Christo non fuit donum timoris. | Objection 2: Further, by the gift of fear we fear either to be separated from God, which pertains to "chaste" fear---or to be punished by Him, which pertains to "servile" fear, as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. ix). But Christ did not fear being separated from God by sin, nor being punished by Him on account of a fault, since it was impossible for Him to sin, as will be said (Question [15], Articles [1],2). Now fear is not of the impossible. Therefore in Christ there was not the gift of fear. |
| Praeterea, I Ioan. IV dicitur, perfecta caritas foras mittit timorem. Sed in Christo fuit perfectissima caritas, secundum illud Ephes. III, supereminentem scientiae caritatem Christi. Ergo in Christo non fuit donum timoris. |
Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Jn. 4:18) that "perfect charity casteth out fear." But in Christ there was most perfect charity, according to Eph. 3:19: "The charity of Christ which surpasseth all knowledge." Therefore in Christ there was not the gift of fear. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae XI, replebit eum spiritus timoris domini. |
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:3): "And He shall be filled with the spirit of the fear of the Lord." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in secunda parte dictum est, timor respicit duo obiecta, quorum unum est malum terribile; aliud est ille cuius potestate malum potest inferri, sicut aliquis timet regem inquantum habet potestatem occidendi. Non autem timeretur ille qui habet potestatem, nisi haberet quandam eminentiam potestatis, cui de facili resisti non possit, ea enim quae in promptu habemus repellere, non timemus. Et sic patet quod aliquis non timetur nisi propter suam eminentiam. Sic igitur dicendum est quod in Christo fuit timor Dei, non quidem secundum quod respicit malum separationis a Deo per culpam; nec secundum quod respicit malum punitionis pro culpa; sed secundum quod respicit ipsam divinam eminentiam, prout scilicet anima Christi quodam affectu reverentiae movebatur in Deum, a spiritu sancto acta. Unde Heb. V dicitur quod in omnibus exauditus est pro sua reverentia. Hunc enim affectum reverentiae ad Deum Christus, secundum quod homo, prae ceteris habuit pleniorem. Et ideo ei attribuit Scriptura plenitudinem timoris domini. |
I answer that, As was said above (FS, Question [42], Article [1]), fear regards two objects, one of which is an evil causing terror; the other is that by whose power an evil can be inflicted, as we fear the king inasmuch as he has the power of putting to death. Now whoever can hurt would not be feared unless he had a certain greatness of might, to which resistance could not easily be offered; for what we easily repel we do not fear. And hence it is plain that no one is feared except for some pre-eminence. And in this way it is said that in Christ there was the fear of God, not indeed as it regards the evil of separation from God by fault, nor as it regards the evil of punishment for fault; but inasmuch as it regards the Divine pre-eminence, on account of which the soul of Christ, led by the Holy Spirit, was borne towards God in an act of reverence. Hence it is said (Heb. 5:7) that in all things "he was heard for his reverence." For Christ as man had this act of reverence towards God in a fuller sense and beyond all others. And hence Scripture attributes to Him the fulness of the fear of the Lord. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod habitus virtutum et donorum proprie et per se respiciunt bonum, malum autem ex consequenti, pertinet enim ad rationem virtutis ut opus bonum reddat, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Et ideo de ratione doni timoris non est illud malum quod respicit timor, sed eminentia illius boni, scilicet divini, cuius potestate aliquod malum infligi potest. Spes autem, secundum quod est virtus, respicit non solum actorem boni, sed etiam ipsum bonum inquantum est non habitum. Et ideo Christo, quia iam habebat perfectum beatitudinis bonum, non attribuitur virtus spei, sed donum timoris. | Reply to Objection 1: The habits of virtues and gifts regard goodness properly and of themselves; but evil, consequently; since it pertains to the nature of virtue to render acts good, as is said Ethic. ii, 6. And hence the nature of the gift of fear regards not that evil which fear is concerned with, but the pre-eminence of that goodness, viz. of God, by Whose power evil may be inflicted. on the other hand, hope, as a virtue, regards not only the author of good, but even the good itself, as far as it is not yet possessed. And hence to Christ, Who already possessed the perfect good of beatitude, we do not attribute the virtue of hope, but we do attribute the gift of fear. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de timore secundum quod respicit obiectum quod est malum. | Reply to Objection 2: This reason is based on fear in so far as it regards the evil object. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod perfecta caritas foras mittit timorem servilem, qui respicit principaliter poenam. Sic autem timor non fuit in Christo. | Reply to Objection 3: Perfect charity casts out servile fear, which principally regards punishment. But this kind of fear was not in Christ. |
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| Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerint gratiae gratis datae. Ei enim qui habet aliquid secundum plenitudinem, non competit illud habere secundum participationem. Sed Christus habuit gratiam secundum plenitudinem, secundum illud Ioan. I, plenum gratiae et veritatis. Gratiae autem gratis datae videntur esse quaedam participationes divisim et particulariter diversis attributae, secundum illud I Cor. XII, divisiones gratiarum sunt. Ergo videtur quod in Christo non fuerint gratiae gratis datae. | Objection 1: It would seem that the gratuitous graces were not in Christ. For whoever has anything in its fulness, to him it does not pertain to have it by participation. Now Christ has grace in its fulness, according to Jn. 1:14: "Full of grace and truth." But the gratuitous graces would seem to be certain participations, bestowed distributively and particularly upon divers subjects, according to 1 Cor. 12:4: "Now there are diversities of graces." Therefore it would seem that there were no gratuitous graces in Christ. |
| Praeterea, quod debetur alicui, non videtur esse gratis ei datum. Sed debitum erat homini Christo quod sermone sapientiae et scientiae abundaret, et potens esset in virtutibus faciendis, et alia huiusmodi quae pertinent ad gratias gratis datas, cum ipse sit Dei virtus et Dei sapientia, ut dicitur I Cor. I. Ergo Christo non fuit conveniens habere gratias gratis datas. | Objection 2: Further, what is due to anyone would not seem to be gratuitously bestowed on him. But it was due to the man Christ that He should abound in the word of wisdom and knowledge, and to be mighty in doing wonderful works and the like, all of which pertain to gratuitous graces: since He is "the power of God and the wisdom of God," as is written 1 Cor. 1:24. Therefore it was not fitting for Christ to have the gratuitous graces. |
| Praeterea, gratiae gratis datae ordinantur ad utilitatem fidelium, secundum illud I Cor. XII, unicuique datur manifestatio spiritus ad utilitatem. Non autem videtur ad utilitatem pertinere habitus, aut quaecumque dispositio, si homo non utatur, secundum illud Eccli. XX, sapientia abscondita, et thesaurus invisus, quae utilitas in utrisque? Christus autem non legitur usus fuisse omnibus gratiis gratis datis, praesertim quantum ad genera linguarum. Non ergo in Christo fuerunt omnes gratiae gratis datae. | Objection 3: Further, gratuitous graces are ordained to the benefit of the faithful. But it does not seem that a habit which a man does not use is for the benefit of others, according to Ecclus. 20:32: "Wisdom that is hid and treasure that is not seen: what profit is there in them both?" Now we do not read that Christ made use of these gratuitously given graces, especially as regards the gift of tongues. Therefore not all the gratuitous graces were in Christ. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Dardanum, quod sicut in capite sunt omnes sensus, ita in Christo fuerunt omnes gratiae. | On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Dardan. cclxxxvii) that "as in the head are all the senses, so in Christ were all the graces." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in secunda parte habitum est, gratiae gratis datae ordinantur ad fidei et spiritualis doctrinae manifestationem. Oportet autem eum qui docet, habere ea per quae sua doctrina manifestetur, aliter sua doctrina esset inutilis. Spiritualis autem doctrinae et fidei primus et principalis doctor est Christus, secundum illud Heb. II, cum initium accepisset enuntiari a domino, per eos qui audierunt in nos confirmata est, contestante Deo signis et prodigiis, et cetera. Unde manifestum est quod in Christo fuerunt excellentissime omnes gratiae gratis datae, sicut in primo et principali doctore fidei. |
I answer that, As was said above (FS, Question [3], Articles [1],4), the gratuitous graces are ordained for the manifestation of faith and spiritual doctrine. For it behooves him who teaches to have the means of making his doctrine clear; otherwise his doctrine would be useless. Now Christ is the first and chief teacher of spiritual doctrine and faith, according to Heb. 2:3,4: "Which having begun to be declared by the Lord was confirmed unto us by them that heard Him, God also bearing them witness by signs and wonders." Hence it is clear that all the gratuitous graces were most excellently in Christ, as in the first and chief teacher of the faith. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut gratia gratum faciens ordinatur ad actus meritorios tam interiores quam exteriores, ita gratia gratis data ordinatur ad quosdam actus exteriores fidei manifestativos, sicut est operatio miraculorum, et alia huiusmodi. In utraque autem gratia Christus plenitudinem habuit, inquantum enim divinitati unita erat eius anima, plenam efficaciam habebat ad omnes praedictos actus perficiendos. Sed alii sancti, qui moventur a Deo sicut instrumenta non unita, sed separata particulariter efficaciam recipiunt ad hos vel illos actus perficiendos. Et ideo in aliis sanctis huiusmodi gratiae dividuntur, non autem in Christo. | Reply to Objection 1: As sanctifying grace is ordained to meritorious acts both interior and exterior, so likewise gratuitous grace is ordained to certain exterior acts manifestive of the faith, as the working of miracles, and the like. Now of both these graces Christ had the fulness. since inasmuch as His soul was united to the Godhead, He had the perfect power of effecting all these acts. But other saints who are moved by God as separated and not united instruments, receive power in a particular manner in order to bring about this or that act. And hence in other saints these graces are divided, but not in Christ. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus dicitur Dei virtus et Dei sapientia, inquantum est aeternus Dei filius. Sic autem non competit sibi habere gratiam, sed potius esse gratiae largitorem. Competit autem sibi gratiam habere secundum humanam naturam. | Reply to Objection 2: Christ is said to be the power of God and the wisdom of God, inasmuch as He is the Eternal Son of God. But in this respect it does not pertain to Him to have grace, but rather to be the bestower of grace. but it pertains to Him in His human nature to have grace. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod donum linguarum datum est apostolis quia mittebantur ad docendas omnes gentes. Christus autem in una sola Iudaeorum gente voluit personaliter praedicare, secundum quod ipse dicit, Matth. XV, non sum missus nisi ad oves quae perierunt domus Israel; et apostolus dicit, Rom. XV, dico Iesum Christum ministrum fuisse circumcisionis. Et ideo non oportuit quod loqueretur pluribus linguis. Nec tamen defuit ei omnium linguarum notitia, cum etiam occulta cordium non essent ei abscondita, ut infra dicetur, quorum voces quaecumque sunt signa. Nec tamen inutiliter hanc notitiam habuit, sicut non inutiliter habet habitum qui eo non utitur quando non est opportunum. |
Reply to Objection 3: The gift of tongues was bestowed on the apostles, because they were sent to teach all nations; but Christ wished to preach personally only in the one nation of the Jews, as He Himself says (Mt. 15:24): "I was not sent but to the sheep that are lost of the house of Israel"; and the Apostle says (Rm. 15:8): "I say that Christ Jesus was minister of the circumcision." And hence it was not necessary for Him to speak several languages. Yet was a knowledge of all languages not wanting to Him, since even the secrets of hearts, of which all words are signs, were not hidden from Him, as will be shown (Question [10], Article [2]). Nor was this knowledge uselessly possessed. just as it is not useless to have a habit, which we do not use when there is no occasion. |
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| Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerit prophetia. Prophetia enim importat quandam obscuram et imperfectam notitiam, secundum illud Num. XII, si quis fuerit inter vos propheta domini, per somnium aut in visione loquar ad eum. Sed Christus habuit plenam et perfectam notitiam, multo magis quam Moyses, de quo ibi subditur quod palam, et non per aenigmata Deum vidit. Non ergo debet in Christo poni prophetia. |
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was not the gift of prophecy. For prophecy implies a certain obscure and imperfect knowledge, according to Num. 12:6: "If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream." But Christ had full and unveiled knowledge, much more than Moses, of whom it is subjoined that "plainly and not by riddles and figures doth he see God" (Num. 6:8). Therefore we ought not to admit prophecy in Christ. |
| Praeterea, sicut fides est eorum quae non videntur, et spes eorum quae non habentur, ita prophetia est eorum quae non sunt praesentia, sed distant, nam propheta dicitur quasi procul fans. Sed in Christo non ponitur fides neque spes, ut supra dictum est. Ergo etiam prophetia non debet poni in Christo. |
Objection 2: Further, as faith has to do with what is not seen, and hope with what is not possessed, so prophecy has to do with what is not present, but distant; for a prophet means, as it were, a teller of far-off things. But in Christ there could be neither faith nor hope, as was said above (Articles [3],4). Hence prophecy also ought not to be admitted in Christ. |
| Praeterea, propheta est inferioris ordinis quam Angelus, unde et de Moyse, qui fuit supremus prophetarum, ut dictum est in secunda parte, Act. VII dicitur quod locutus est cum Angelo in solitudine. Sed Christus non est minoratus ab Angelis secundum notitiam animae, sed solum secundum corporis passionem, ut dicitur Heb. II. Ergo videtur quod Christus non fuit propheta. |
Objection 3: Further, a prophet is in an inferior order to an angel; hence Moses, who was the greatest of the prophets, as was said above (SS, Question [174], Article [4]) is said (Acts 7:38) to have spoken with an angel in the desert. But Christ was "made lower than the angels," not as to the knowledge of His soul, but only as regards the sufferings of His body, as is shown Heb. 2:9. Therefore it seems that Christ was not a prophet. |
| Sed contra est quod de eo dicitur, Deut. XVIII, prophetam suscitabit vobis Deus de fratribus vestris. Et ipse de se dicit, Matth. XIII et Ioan. IV, non est propheta sine honore nisi in patria sua. |
On the contrary, It is written of Him (Dt. 18:15): "Thy God will raise up to thee a prophet of thy nation and of thy brethren," and He says of Himself (Mt. 13:57; Jn. 4:44): "A prophet is not without honor, save in his own country." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod propheta dicitur quasi procul fans, vel procul videns, inquantum scilicet cognoscit et loquitur ea quae sunt procul ab hominum sensibus; sicut etiam Augustinus dicit, XVI contra Faustum. Est autem considerandum quod non potest dici aliquis propheta ex hoc quod cognoscit et annuntiat ea quae sunt aliis procul, cum quibus ipse non est. Et hoc manifestum est secundum locum et secundum tempus. Si enim aliquis in Gallia existens cognosceret et annuntiaret aliis in Gallia existentibus ea quae tunc in Syria agerentur, propheticum esset, sicut Elisaeus ad Giezi dixit IV Reg. V, quomodo vir descenderat de curru et occurrerat ei. Si vero aliquis in Syria existens ea quae sunt ibi annuntiaret non esset hoc propheticum. Et idem apparet secundum tempus. Propheticum enim fuit quod Isaias praenuntiavit quod Cyrus, Persarum rex, templum Dei esset reaedificaturus, ut patet Isaiae XLIV, non autem fuit propheticum quod Esdras hoc scripsit, cuius tempore factum est. Si igitur Deus aut Angeli, vel etiam beati, cognoscunt et annuntiant ea quae sunt procul a nostra notitia, non pertinet ad prophetiam, quia in nullo nostrum statum attingunt. Christus autem ante passionem nostrum statum attingebat, inquantum non solum erat comprehensor, sed etiam viator. Et ideo propheticum erat quod ea quae erant procul ab aliorum viatorum notitia, et cognoscebat et annuntiabat. Et hac ratione dicitur in eo fuisse prophetia. |
I answer that, A prophet means, as it were, a teller or seer of far-off things, inasmuch as he knows and announces what things are far from men's senses, as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xvi, 18). Now we must bear in mind that no one can be called a prophet for knowing and announcing what is distant from others, with whom he is not. And this is clear in regard to place and time. For if anyone living in France were to know and announce to others living in France what things were transpiring in Syria, it would be prophetical, as Eliseus told Giezi (4 Kgs. 5:26) how the man had leaped down from his chariot to meet him. But if anyone living in Syria were to announce what things were there, it would not be prophetical. And the same appears in regard to time. For it was prophetical of Isaias to announce that Cyrus, King of the Persians, would rebuild the temple of God, as is clear from Is. 44:28. But it was not prophetical of Esdras to write it, in whose time it took place. Hence if God or angels, or even the blessed, know and announce what is beyond our knowing, this does not pertain to prophecy, since they nowise touch our state. Now Christ before His passion touched our state, inasmuch as He was not merely a "comprehensor," but a "wayfarer." Hence it was prophetical in Him to know and announce what was beyond the knowledge of other "wayfarers": and for this reason He is called a prophet. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per illa verba non ostenditur esse de ratione prophetiae aenigmatica cognitio, quae scilicet est per somnium et in visione, sed ostenditur comparatio aliorum prophetarum, qui per somnium et in visione perceperunt divina, ad Moysen, qui palam et non per aenigmata Deum vidit; qui tamen propheta est dictus, secundum illud Deut. ult., non surrexit ultra propheta in Israel sicut Moyses. Potest tamen dici quod, etsi Christus habuit plenam et apertam notitiam quantum ad partem intellectivam, habuit tamen in parte imaginativa quasdam similitudines, in quibus etiam poterat speculari divina, inquantum non solum erat comprehensor, sed etiam viator. | Reply to Objection 1: These words do not prove that enigmatical knowledge, viz. by dream and vision, belongs to the nature of prophecy; but the comparison is drawn between other prophets, who saw Divine things in dreams and visions, and Moses, who saw God plainly and not by riddles, and who yet is called a prophet, according to Dt. 24:10: "And there arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses." Nevertheless it may be said that although Christ had full and unveiled knowledge as regards the intellective part, yet in the imaginative part He had certain similitudes, in which Divine things could be viewed, inasmuch as He was not only a "comprehensor," but a "wayfarer." |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod fides est eorum quae non videntur ab ipso credente. Similiter spes est eorum quae non habentur ab ipso sperante. Sed prophetia est eorum quae sunt procul a communi hominum sensu, cum quibus propheta conversatur et communicat in statu viae. Et ideo fides et spes repugnant perfectioni beatitudinis Christi, non autem prophetia. | Reply to Objection 2: Faith regards such things as are unseen by him who believes; and hope, too, is of such things as are not possessed by the one who hopes; but prophecy is of such things as are beyond the sense of men, with whom the prophet dwells and converses in this state of life. And hence faith and hope are repugnant to the perfection of Christ's beatitude; but prophecy is not. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod Angelus, cum sit comprehensor, est supra prophetam qui est purus viator, non autem supra Christum, qui simul fuit viator et comprehensor. | Reply to Objection 3: Angels, being "comprehensors," are above prophets, who are merely "wayfarers"; but not above Christ, Who was both a "comprehensor" and a "wayfarer." |
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| Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit in Christo gratiae plenitudo. A gratia enim derivantur virtutes, ut in secunda parte dictum est. Sed in Christo non fuerunt omnes virtutes, non enim fuit in eo fides neque spes, ut ostensum est. Ergo in Christo non fuit gratiae plenitudo. |
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was not the fulness of grace. For the virtues flow from grace, as was said above (FS, Question [110], Article [4]). But in Christ there were not all the virtues; for there was neither faith nor hope in Him, as was shown above (Articles [3],4). Therefore in Christ there was not the fulness of grace. |
| Praeterea, sicut patet ex his quae in secunda parte dicta sunt, gratia dividitur in operantem et cooperantem. Operans autem gratia dicitur per quam iustificatur impius. Quod quidem non habuit locum in Christo, qui nunquam subiacuit alicui peccato. Ergo in Christo non fuit plenitudo gratiae. |
Objection 2: Further, as is plain from what was said above (FS, Question [111], Article [2]), grace is divided into operating and cooperating. Now operating grace signifies that whereby the ungodly is justified, which has no place in Christ, Who never lay under any sin. Therefore in Christ there was not the fulness of grace. |
| Praeterea, Iac. I dicitur, omne datum optimum, et omne donum perfectum, de sursum est, descendens a patre luminum. Sed quod descendit, habetur particulariter, et non plene. Ergo nulla creatura, nec etiam anima Christi, potest habere plenitudinem donorum gratiae. |
Objection 3: Further, it is written (James 1:17): "Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights." But what comes thus is possessed partially, and not fully. Therefore no creature, not even the soul of Christ, can have the fulness of the gifts of grace. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. I, vidimus eum plenum gratiae et veritatis. |
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:14): "We saw Him [Vulg.: 'His glory'] full of grace and truth." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod plene dicitur haberi quod totaliter et perfecte habetur. Totalitas autem et perfectio potest attendi dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad quantitatem eius intensivam, puta si dicam aliquem plene habere albedinem, si habeat eam quantumcumque nata est haberi. Alio modo, secundum virtutem, puta si aliquis dicatur plene habere vitam, quia habet eam secundum omnes effectus vel opera vitae. Et sic plene habet vitam homo, non autem brutum animal, vel planta. Utroque autem modo Christus habuit gratiae plenitudinem. Primo quidem, quia habuit eam in summo, secundum perfectissimum modum qui potest haberi. Et hoc quidem apparet primo, ex propinquitate animae Christi ad causam gratiae. Dictum est enim quod, quanto aliquod receptivum propinquius est causae influenti, abundantius recipit. Et ideo anima Christi, quae propinquius coniungitur Deo inter omnes creaturas rationales, recipit maximam influentiam gratiae eius. Secundo, ex comparatione eius ad effectum. Sic enim recipiebat anima Christi gratiam ut ex ea quodammodo transfunderetur in alios. Et ideo oportuit quod haberet maximam gratiam, sicut ignis, qui est causa caloris in omnibus calidis, est maxime calidus. |
I answer that, To have fully is to have wholly and perfectly. Now totality and perfection can be taken in two ways: First as regards their "intensive" quantity; for instance, I may say that some man has whiteness fully, because he has as much of it as can naturally be in him; secondly, "as regards power"; for instance, if anyone be said to have life fully, inasmuch as he has it in all the effects or works of life; and thus man has life fully, but senseless animals or plants have not. Now in both these ways Christ has the fulness of grace. First, since He has grace in its highest degree, in the most perfect way it can be had. And this appears, first, from the nearness of Christ's soul to the cause of grace. For it was said above (Article [1]) that the nearer a recipient is to the inflowing cause, the more it receives. And hence the soul of Christ, which is more closely united to God than all other rational creatures, receives the greatest outpouring of His grace. Secondly, in His relation to the effect. For the soul of Christ so received grace, that, in a manner, it is poured out from it upon others. And hence it behooved Him to have the greatest grace; as fire which is the cause of heat in other hot things, is of all things the hottest. |
| Similiter etiam quantum ad virtutem gratiae, plene habuit gratiam, quia habuit eam ad omnes operationes vel effectus gratiae. Et hoc ideo, quia conferebatur ei gratia tanquam cuidam universali principio in genere habentium gratias. Virtus autem primi principii alicuius generis universaliter se extendit ad omnes effectus illius generis, sicut sol, qui est universalis causa generationis, ut dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., eius virtus se extendit ad omnia quae sub generatione cadunt. Et sic secunda plenitudo gratiae attenditur in Christo, inquantum se extendit eius gratia ad omnes gratiae effectus, qui sunt virtutes et dona et alia huiusmodi. | Likewise, as regards the "virtue" of grace, He had grace fully, since He had it for all the operations and effects of grace; and this, because grace was bestowed on Him, as upon a universal principle in the genus of such as have grace. Now the virtue of the first principle of a genus universally extends itself to all the effects of that genus; thus the force of the sun, which is the universal cause of generation, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), extends to all things that come under generation. Hence the second fulness of grace is seen in Christ inasmuch as His grace extends to all the effects of grace, which are the virtues, gifts, and the like. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod fides et spes nominant effectus gratiae cum quodam defectu qui est ex parte recipientis gratiam, inquantum scilicet fides est de non visis, et spes de non habitis. Unde non oportet quod in Christo, qui est auctor gratiae, fuerint defectus quos important fides et spes. Sed quidquid est perfectionis in fide et spe, est in Christo multo perfectius. Sicut in igne non sunt omnes modi caloris defectivi ex defectu subiecti, sed quidquid pertinet ad perfectionem caloris. | Reply to Objection 1: Faith and hope signify effects of grace with certain defects on the part of the recipient of grace, inasmuch as faith is of the unseen, and hope of what is not yet possessed. Hence it was not necessary that in Christ, Who is the author of grace, there should be any defects such as faith and hope imply; but whatever perfection is in faith and hope was in Christ most perfectly; as in fire there are not all the modes of heat which are defective by the subject's defect, but whatever belongs to the perfection of heat. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ad gratiam operantem per se pertinet facere iustum, sed quod iustum faciat ex impio, hoc accidit ei ex parte subiecti, in quo peccatum invenitur. Anima Christi igitur iustificata est per gratiam operantem, inquantum per eam facta est iusta et sancta a principio suae conceptionis, non quod ante fuerit peccatrix, aut etiam non iusta. | Reply to Objection 2: It pertains essentially to operating grace to justify; but that it makes the ungodly to be just is accidental to it on the part of the subject, in which sin is found. Therefore the soul of Christ was justified by operating grace, inasmuch as it was rendered just and holy by it from the beginning of His conception; not that it was until then sinful, or even not just. |
| [Dicendum quod plenitudo gratiae attribuitur animae Christi secundum capacitatem creaturae, nonautem per comparationem ad plenitudinem infinitam bonitatis divinae.] | Reply to Objection 3: The fulness of grace is attributed to the soul of Christ according to the capacity of the creature and not by comparison with the infinite fulness of the Divine goodness. |
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| Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod plenitudo gratiae non sit propria Christi. Quod enim est proprium alicui, sibi soli convenit. Sed esse plenum gratia quibusdam aliis attribuitur, dicitur enim, Luc. I, beatae virgini, ave, gratia plena, dominus tecum; dicitur etiam, Act. VI, Stephanus autem plenus gratia et fortitudine. Ergo plenitudo gratiae non est propria Christi. |
Objection 1: It would seem that the fulness of grace is not proper to Christ. For what is proper to anyone belongs to him alone. But to be full of grace is attributed to some others; for it was said to the Blessed Virgin (Lk. 1:28): "Hail, full of grace"; and again it is written (Acts 6:8): "Stephen, full of grace and fortitude." Therefore the fulness of grace is not proper to Christ. |
| Praeterea, id quod potest communicari aliis per Christum, non videtur proprium Christo. Sed plenitudo gratiae potest communicari per Christum aliis, dicit enim apostolus, Ephes. III, ut impleamini in omnem plenitudinem Dei. Ergo plenitudo gratiae non est propria Christo. |
Objection 2: Further, what can be communicated to others through Christ does not seem to be proper to Christ. But the fulness of grace can be communicated to others through Christ, since the Apostle says (Eph. 3:19): "That you may be filled unto all the fulness of God." Therefore the fulness of grace is not proper to Christ. |
| Praeterea, status viae videtur proportionari statui patriae. Sed in statu patriae erit quaedam plenitudo, quia in illa caelesti patria, ubi est plenitudo omnis boni, licet quaedam data sint excellenter, nihil tamen possidetur singulariter ut patet per Gregorium, in homilia de centum ovibus. Ergo in statu viae gratiae plenitudo habetur a singulis hominibus. Et ita plenitudo gratiae non est propria Christo. | Objection 3: Further, the state of the wayfarer seems to be proportioned to the state of the comprehensor. But in the state of the comprehensor there will be a certain fulness, since "in our heavenly country with its fulness of all good, although some things are bestowed in a pre-eminent way, yet nothing is possessed singularly," as is clear from Gregory (Hom. De Cent. Ovib.; xxxiv in Ev.). Therefore in the state of the comprehensor the fulness of grace is possessed by everyone, and hence the fulness of grace is not proper to Christ. |
| Sed contra est quod plenitudo gratiae attribuitur Christo inquantum est unigenitus a patre, secundum illud Ioan. I, vidimus eum, quasi unigenitum a patre, plenum gratiae et veritatis. Sed esse unigenitum a patre est proprium Christo. Ergo et sibi proprium est esse plenum gratiae et veritatis. | On the contrary, The fulness of grace is attributed to Christ inasmuch as He is the only-begotten of the Father, according to Jn. 1:14: "We saw Him [Vulg.: 'His glory'] as it were... the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth." But to be the Only-begotten of the Father is proper to Christ. Therefore it is proper to Him to be full of grace and truth. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod plenitudo gratiae potest attendi dupliciter, uno modo, ex parte ipsius gratiae; alio modo, ex parte habentis gratiam. Ex parte quidem ipsius gratiae, dicitur esse plenitudo ex eo quod aliquis pertingit ad summum gratiae et quantum ad essentiam et quantum ad virtutem, quia scilicet habet gratiam et in maxima excellentia qua potest haberi, et in maxima extensione ad omnes gratiae effectus. Et talis gratiae plenitudo est propria Christo. Ex parte vero subiecti, dicitur gratiae plenitudo quando aliquis habet plene gratiam secundum suam conditionem, sive secundum intensionem, prout in eo est intensa gratia usque ad terminum praefixum ei a Deo, secundum illud Ephes. IV, unicuique nostrum data est gratia secundum mensuram donationis Christi; sive etiam secundum virtutem, inquantum scilicet habet facultatem gratiae ad omnia quae pertinent ad suum statum sive officium, sicut apostolus dicebat, Ephes. III, mihi autem, omnium sanctorum minimo, data est gratia haec, illuminare homines, et cetera. Et talis gratiae plenitudo non est propria Christo, sed communicatur aliis per Christum. |
I answer that, The fulness of grace may be taken in two ways: First, on the part of grace itself, or secondly on the part of the one who has grace. Now on the part of grace itself there is said to be the fulness of grace when the limit of grace is attained, as to essence and power, inasmuch as grace is possessed in its highest possible excellence and in its greatest possible extension to all its effects. And this fulness of grace is proper to Christ. But on the part of the subject there is said to be the fulness of grace when anyone fully possesses grace according to his condition---whether as regards intensity, by reason of grace being intense in him, to the limit assigned by God, according to Eph. 4:1: "But to every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ"---or "as regards power," by reason of a man having the help of grace for all that belongs to his office or state, as the Apostle says (Eph. 3:8): "To me, the least of all the saints, is given this grace... to enlighten all men." And this fulness of grace is not proper to Christ, but is communicated to others by Christ. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod beata virgo dicitur gratia plena, non ex parte ipsius gratiae, quia non habuit gratiam in summa excellentia qua potest haberi, nec ad omnes effectus gratiae, sed dicitur fuisse plena gratiae per comparationem ad ipsam, quia scilicet habebat gratiam sufficientem ad statum illum ad quem erat electa a Deo, ut scilicet esset mater Dei. Et similiter Stephanus dicitur plenus gratia, quia habebat gratiam sufficientem ad hoc quod esset idoneus minister et testis Dei, ad quod erat electus. Et eadem ratione dicendum est de aliis. Harum tamen plenitudinum una est plenior alia, secundum quod aliquis est divinitus praeordinatus ad altiorem vel inferiorem statum. | Reply to Objection 1: The Blessed Virgin is said to be full of grace, not on the part of grace itself---since she had not grace in its greatest possible excellence---nor for all the effects of grace; but she is said to be full of grace in reference to herself, i.e. inasmuch as she had sufficient grace for the state to which God had chosen her, i.e. to be the mother of His Only-begotten. So, too, Stephen is said to be full of grace, since he had sufficient grace to be a fit minister and witness of God, to which office he had been called. And the same must be said of others. Of these fulnesses one is greater than another, according as one is divinely pre-ordained to a higher or lower state. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod apostolus ibi loquitur de illa plenitudine gratiae quae accipitur ex parte subiecti, in comparatione ad id ad quod homo est divinitus praeordinatus. Quod quidem est vel aliquid commune, ad quod praeordinantur omnes sancti, vel aliquid speciale, quod pertinet ad excellentiam aliquorum. Et secundum hoc, quaedam plenitudo gratiae est omnibus sanctis communis, ut scilicet habeant gratiam sufficientem ad merendum vitam aeternam, quae in plena Dei fruitione consistit. Et hanc plenitudinem optat apostolus fidelibus quibus scribit. | Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle is there speaking of that fulness which has reference to the subject, in comparison with what man is divinely pre-ordained to; and this is either something in common, to which all the saints are pre-ordained, or something special, which pertains to the pre-eminence of some. And in this manner a certain fulness of grace is common to all the saints, viz. to have grace enough to merit eternal life, which consists in the enjoyment of God. And this is the fulness of grace which the Apostle desires for the faithful to whom he writes. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod illa dona quae sunt communia in patria, scilicet visio, comprehensio et fruitio, et alia huiusmodi, habent quaedam dona sibi correspondentia in statu viae, quae etiam sunt communia sanctis. Sunt tamen quaedam praerogativae sanctorum, in patria et in via, quae non habentur ab omnibus. | Reply to Objection 3: These gifts which are in common in heaven, viz.: vision, possession and fruition, and the like, have certain gifts corresponding to them in this life which are also common to all the saints. Yet there are certain prerogatives of saints, both in heaven and on earth, which are not possessed by all. |
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| Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gratia Christi sit infinita. Omne enim immensum est infinitum. Sed gratia Christi est immensa, dicitur enim Ioan. III, non enim ad mensuram dat Deus spiritum, scilicet Christo. Ergo gratia Christi est infinita. |
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's grace is infinite. For everything immeasurable is infinite. But the grace of Christ is immeasurable; since it is written (Jn. 3:34): "For God doth not give the Spirit by measure to His Son [*'To His Son' is lacking in the Vulgate], namely Christ." Therefore the grace of Christ is infinite. |
| Praeterea, effectus infinitus demonstrat virtutem infinitam, quae non potest fundari nisi in essentia infinita. Sed effectus gratiae Christi est infinitus, extendit enim se ad salutem totius humani generis; ipse enim est propitiatio pro peccatis totius mundi, ut dicitur I Ioan. II. Ergo gratia Christi est infinita. |
Objection 2: Further, an infinite effect betokens an infinite power which can only spring from an infinite essence. But the effect of Christ's grace is infinite, since it extends to the salvation of the whole human race; for He is the propitiation for our sins... and for those of the whole world, as is said (1 Jn. 2:2). Therefore the grace of Christ is infinite. |
| Praeterea, omne finitum per additionem potest pervenire ad quantitatem cuiuscumque rei finitae. Si ergo gratia Christi est finita, posset alterius hominis gratia tantum crescere quod perveniret ad aequalitatem gratiae Christi. Contra quod dicitur Iob XXVIII, non adaequabitur ei aurum vel vitrum, secundum quod Gregorius ibi exponit. Ergo gratia Christi est infinita. |
Objection 3: Further, every finite thing by addition can attain to the quantity of any other finite thing. Therefore if the grace of Christ is finite the grace of any other man could increase to such an extent as to reach to an equality with Christ's grace, against what is written (Job 28:17): "Gold nor crystal cannot equal it," as Gregory expounds it (Moral. xviii). Therefore the grace of Christ is infinite. |
| Sed contra est quod gratia Christi est quiddam creatum in anima. Sed omne creatum est finitum, secundum illud Sap. XI, omnia in numero, pondere et mensura disposuisti. Ergo gratia Christi non est infinita. | On the contrary, Grace is something created in the soul. But every created thing is finite, according to Wis. 11:21: "Thou hast ordered all things in measure and number and weight." Therefore the grace of Christ is not infinite. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, in Christo potest duplex gratia considerari. Una quidem est gratia unionis quae, sicut supra dictum est, est ipsum uniri personaliter filio Dei, quod est gratis concessum humanae naturae. Et hanc gratiam constat esse infinitam, secundum quod ipsa persona verbi est infinita. Alia vero est gratia habitualis. Quae quidem potest dupliciter considerari. Uno modo, secundum quod est quoddam ens. Et sic necesse est quod sit ens finitum. Est enim in anima Christi sicut in subiecto. Anima autem Christi est creatura quaedam, habens capacitatem finitam. Unde esse gratiae, cum non excedat suum subiectum, non potest esse infinitum. Alio modo potest considerari secundum propriam rationem gratiae. Et sic gratia ipsa potest dici infinita, eo quod non limitatur, quia scilicet habet quidquid potest pertinere ad rationem gratiae, et non datur ei secundum aliquam certam mensuram id quod ad rationem gratiae pertinet; eo quod, secundum propositum gratiae Dei, cuius est gratiam mensurare, gratia confertur animae Christi sicut cuidam universali principio gratificationis in humana natura, secundum illud Ephes. I, gratificavit nos in dilecto filio suo. Sicut si dicamus lucem solis esse infinitam, non quidem secundum suum esse, sed secundum rationem lucis, quia habet quidquid potest ad rationem lucis pertinere. |
I answer that, As was made clear above (Question [2], Article [10]), a twofold grace may be considered in Christ; the first being the grace of union, which, as was said (Question [6], Article [6]), is for Him to be personally united to the Son of God, which union has been bestowed gratis on the human nature; and it is clear that this grace is infinite, as the Person of God is infinite. The second is habitual grace; which may be taken in two ways: first as a being, and in this way it must be a finite being, since it is in the soul of Christ, as in a subject, and Christ's soul is a creature having a finite capacity; hence the being of grace cannot be infinite, since it cannot exceed its subject. Secondly it may be viewed in its specific nature of grace; and thus the grace of Christ can be termed infinite, since it is not limited, i.e. it has whatsoever can pertain to the nature of grace, and what pertains to the nature of grace is not bestowed on Him in a fixed measure; seeing that "according to the purpose" of God to Whom it pertains to measure grace, it is bestowed on Christ's soul as on a universal principle for bestowing grace on human nature, according to Eph. 1:5,6, "He hath graced us in His beloved Son"; thus we might say that the light of the sun is infinite, not indeed in being, but in the nature of light, as having whatever can pertain to the nature of light. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod id quod dicitur, pater non ad mensuram dat spiritum filio, uno modo exponitur de dono quod Deus pater ab aeterno dedit filio, scilicet divinam naturam, quae est donum infinitum. Unde quaedam Glossa dicit, ibidem, ut tantus sit filius quantus et pater. Alio modo, potest referri ad donum quod datum est humanae naturae, ut uniatur divinae personae, quod est donum infinitum. Unde Glossa dicit ibidem, sicut pater plenum et perfectum genuit verbum, sic plenum et perfectum est unitum humanae naturae. Tertio modo, potest referri ad gratiam habitualem, inquantum gratia Christi se extendit ad omnia quae sunt gratiae. Unde Augustinus, hoc exponens, dicit, mensura quaedam divisio donorum est, alii enim datur per spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae. Sed Christus, qui dat, non ad mensuram accepit. | Reply to Objection 1: When it is said that the Father "doth not give the Spirit by measure," it may be expounded of the gift which God the Father from all eternity gave the Son, viz. the Divine Nature, which is an infinite gift. Hence the comment of a certain gloss: "So that the Son may be as great as the Father is." Or again, it may be referred to the gift which is given the human nature, to be united to the Divine Person, and this also is an infinite gift. Hence a gloss says on this text: "As the Father begot a full and perfect Word, it is united thus full and perfect to human nature." Thirdly, it may be referred to habitual grace, inasmuch as the grace of Christ extends to whatever belongs to grace. Hence Augustine expounding this (Tract. xiv in Joan.) says: "The division of the gifts is a measurement. For to one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge." But Christ the giver does not receive by measure. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod gratia Christi habet infinitum effectum tum propter infinitatem praedictam gratiae; tum propter unitatem divinae personae, cui anima Christi est unita. | Reply to Objection 2: The grace of Christ has an infinite effect, both because of the aforesaid infinity of grace, and because of the unity [*Perhaps we should read 'infinity'---Ed.] of the Divine Person, to Whom Christ's soul is united. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod minus per augmentum potest pervenire ad quantitatem maioris in his quae habent quantitatem unius rationis. Sed gratia alterius hominis comparatur ad gratiam Christi sicut quaedam virtus particularis ad universalem. Unde sicut virtus ignis, quantumcumque crescat, non potest adaequari virtuti solis; ita gratia alterius hominis, quantumcumque crescat, non potest adaequari gratiae Christi. | Reply to Objection 3: The lesser can attain by augment to the quantity of the greater, when both have the same kind of quantity. But the grace of any man is compared to the grace of Christ as a particular to a universal power; hence as the force of fire, no matter how much it increases, can never equal the sun's strength, so the grace of a man, no matter how much it increases, can never equal the grace of Christ. |
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| Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gratia Christi potuerit augeri. Omni enim finito potest fieri additio. Sed gratia Christi finita fuit, ut dictum est. Ergo potuit augeri. | Objection 1: It would seem that the grace of Christ could increase. For to every finite thing addition can be made. But the grace of Christ was finite. Therefore it could increase. |
| Praeterea, augmentum gratiae fit per virtutem divinam, secundum illud II Cor. IX, potens est Deus omnem gratiam abundare facere in vobis. Sed virtus divina, cum sit infinita, nullo termino coarctatur. Ergo videtur quod gratia Christi potuerit esse maior. | Objection 2: Further, it is by Divine power that grace is increased, according to 2 Cor. 9:8: "And God is able to make all grace abound in you." But the Divine power, being infinite, is confined by no limits. Therefore it seems that the grace of Christ could have been greater. |
| Praeterea, Luc. II dicitur quod puer Iesus proficiebat aetate, sapientia et gratia apud Deum et homines. Ergo gratia Christi potuit augeri. |
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Lk. 2:52) that the child "Jesus advanced in wisdom and age and grace with God and men." Therefore the grace of Christ could increase. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. I, vidimus eum, quasi unigenitum a patre, plenum gratiae et veritatis. Sed nihil potest esse aut intelligi maius quam quod aliquis sit unigenitus a patre. Ergo non potest esse, vel etiam intelligi, maior gratia quam illa qua Christus fuit plenus. |
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:14): "We saw Him [Vulg.: 'His glory'] as it were... the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth." But nothing can be or can be thought greater than that anyone should be the Only-begotten of the Father. Therefore no greater grace can be or can be thought than that of which Christ was full. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod aliquam formam non posse augeri contingit dupliciter, uno modo, ex parte ipsius subiecti; alio modo, ex parte illius formae. Ex parte quidem subiecti, quando subiectum attingit ad ultimum in participatione ipsius formae secundum suum modum sicut si dicatur quod aer non potest crescere in caliditate, quando pertingit ad ultimum gradum caloris qui potest salvari in natura aeris; licet possit esse maior calor in rerum natura, qui est calor ignis. Ex parte autem formae excluditur possibilitas augmenti quando aliquod subiectum attingit ad ultimam perfectionem qua potest talis forma haberi, sicut si dicamus quod calor ignis non potest augeri, quia non potest esse perfectior gradus caloris quam ille ad quem pertingit ignis. Sicut autem aliarum formarum est ex divina sapientia determinata propria mensura, ita et gratiae, secundum illud Sap. XI, omnia in numero, pondere et mensura disposuisti. Mensura autem unicuique formae praefigitur per comparationem ad suum finem, sicut non est maior gravitas quam gravitas terrae, quia non potest esse inferior locus loco terrae. Finis autem gratiae est unio creaturae rationalis ad Deum. Non potest autem esse, nec intelligi, maior unio creaturae rationalis ad Deum quam quae est in persona. Et ideo gratia Christi pertingit usque ad summam mensuram gratiae. Sic ergo manifestum est quod gratia Christi non potuit augeri ex parte ipsius gratiae. Sed neque ex parte ipsius subiecti. Quia Christus, secundum quod homo, a primo instanti suae conceptionis fuit verus et plenus comprehensor. Unde in eo non potuit esse gratiae augmentum, sicut nec in aliis beatis, quorum gratia augeri non potest, eo quod sunt in termino. Hominum vero qui sunt pure viatores, gratia potest augeri et ex parte formae, quia non attingunt summum gratiae gradum, et ex parte subiecti, quia nondum pervenerunt ad terminum. | I answer that, For a form to be incapable of increase happens in two ways: First on the part of the subject; secondly, on the part of the form itself. On the part of the subject, indeed, when the subject reaches the utmost limit wherein it partakes of this form, after its own manner, e.g. if we say that air cannot increase in heat, when it has reached the utmost limit of heat which can exist in the nature of air, although there may be greater heat in actual existence, viz. the heat of fire. But on the part of the form, the possibility of increase is excluded when a subject reaches the utmost perfection which this form can have by nature, e.g. if we say the heat of fire cannot be increased because there cannot be a more perfect grade of heat than that to which fire attains. Now the proper measure of grace, like that of other forms, is determined by the Divine wisdom, according to Wis. 11:21: "Thou hast ordered all things in number, weight and measure." And it is with reference to its end that a measure is set to every form. as there is no greater gravity than that of the earth, because there is no lower place than that of the earth. Now the end of grace is the union of the rational creature with God. But there can neither be nor be thought a greater union of the rational creature with God than that which is in the Person. And hence the grace of Christ reached the highest measure of grace. Hence it is clear that the grace of Christ cannot be increased on the part of grace. But neither can it be increased on the part of the subject, since Christ as man was a true and full comprehensor from the first instant of His conception. Hence there could have been no increase of grace in Him, as there could be none in the rest of the blessed, whose grace could not increase, seeing that they have reached their last end. But as regards men who are wholly wayfarers, their grace can be increased not merely on the part of the form, since they have not attained the highest degree of grace, but also on the part of the subject, since they have not yet attained their end. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si loquamur de quantitatibus mathematicae, cuilibet finitae quantitati potest fieri additio, quia ex parte quantitatis finitae non est aliquid quod repugnet additioni. Si vero loquamur de quantitate naturali, sic potest esse repugnantia ex parte formae, cui debetur determinata quantitas, sicut et alia accidentia determinata. Unde philosophus dicit II de anima, quod omnium natura constantium est terminus et ratio magnitudinis et augmenti. Et inde est quod quantitati totius caeli non potest fieri additio. Multo igitur magis in ipsis formis consideratur aliquis terminus, ultra quem non transgrediuntur. Et propter hoc, non oportuit quod gratiae Christi posset fieri additio, quamvis sit finita secundum sui essentiam. | Reply to Objection 1: If we speak of mathematical quantity, addition can be made to any finite quantity, since there is nothing on the part of finite quantity which is repugnant to addition. But if we speak of natural quantity, there may be repugnance on the part of the form to which a determined quantity is due, even as other accidents are determined. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 41) that "there is naturally a term of all things, and a fixed limit of magnitude and increase." And hence to the quantity of the whole there can be no addition. And still more must we suppose a term in the forms themselves, beyond which they may not go. Hence it is not necessary that addition should be capable of being made to Christ's grace, although it is finite in its essence. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet virtus divina posset facere aliquid maius et melius quam sit habitualis gratia Christi, non tamen posset facere quod ordinaretur ad aliquid maius quam sit unio personalis ad filium unigenitum a patre, cui unioni sufficienter correspondet talis mensura gratiae secundum definitionem divinae sapientiae. | Reply to Objection 2: Although the Divine power can make something greater and better than the habitual grace of Christ, yet it could not make it to be ordained to anything greater than the personal union with the Only-begotten Son of the Father; and to this union, by the purpose of the Divine wisdom, the measure of grace is sufficient. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod in sapientia et gratia aliquis potest proficere dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum ipsos habitus sapientiae et gratiae augmentatos. Et sic Christus in eis non proficiebat. Alio modo, secundum effectus, inquantum scilicet aliquis sapientiora et virtuosiora opera facit. Et sic Christus proficiebat sapientia et gratia, sicut et aetate, quia secundum processum aetatis perfectiora opera faciebat, ut se verum hominem demonstraret, et in his quae sunt ad Deum et in his quae sunt ad homines. | Reply to Objection 3: Anyone may increase in wisdom and grace in two ways. First inasmuch as the very habits of wisdom and grace are increased; and in this way Christ did not increase. Secondly, as regards the effects, i.e. inasmuch as they do wiser and greater works; and in this way Christ increased in wisdom and grace even as in age, since in the course of time He did more perfect works, to prove Himself true man, both in the things of God, and in the things of man. |
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| Ad decimumtertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod gratia habitualis in Christo non subsequatur unionem. Idem enim non sequitur ad seipsum. Sed haec gratia habitualis videtur eadem esse cum gratia unionis, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Praedest. sanctorum, ea gratia fit ab initio fidei suae homo quicumque Christianus, qua gratia homo ille ab initio suo factus est Christus; quorum duorum primum pertinet ad gratiam habitualem, secundum ad gratiam unionis. Ergo videtur quod gratia habitualis non subsequatur unionem. | Objection 1: It would seem that the habitual grace did not follow after the union. For nothing follows itself. But this habitual grace seems to be the same as the grace of union; for Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv): "Every man becomes a Christian from the beginning of his belief, by the same grace whereby this Man from His beginning became Christ"; and of these two the first pertains to habitual grace and the second to the grace of union. Therefore it would seem that habitual grace did not follow upon the union. |
| Praeterea, dispositio praecedit perfectionem tempore, vel saltem intellectu. Sed gratia habitualis videtur esse sicut quaedam dispositio humanae naturae ad unionem personalem. Ergo videtur quod gratia habitualis non subsequatur unionem, sed magis praecedat. | Objection 2: Further, disposition precedes perfection, if not in time, at least in thought. But the habitual grace seems to be a disposition in human nature for the personal union. Therefore it seems that the habitual grace did not follow but rather preceded the union. |
| Praeterea, commune est prius proprio. Sed gratia habitualis est communis Christo et aliis hominibus, gratia autem unionis est propria Christo. Ergo prior est, secundum intellectum, gratia habitualis quam ipsa unio. Non ergo sequitur eam. | Objection 3: Further, the common precedes the proper. But habitual grace is common to Christ and other men; and the grace of union is proper to Christ. Therefore habitual grace is prior in thought to the union. Therefore it does not follow it. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae XLII, ecce servus meus, suscipiam eum, et postea sequitur, dedi spiritum meum super eum, quod quidem ad donum gratiae habitualis pertinet. Unde relinquitur quod susceptio naturae humanae in unione personae praecedat gratiam habitualem in Christo. |
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 42:1): "Behold my servant, I will uphold Him... "and farther on: "I have given My Spirit upon Him"; and this pertains to the gift of habitual grace. Hence it remains that the assumption of human nature to the unity of the Person preceded the habitual grace of Christ. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod unio humanae naturae ad divinam personam, quam supra diximus esse ipsam gratiam unionis, praecedit gratiam habitualem in Christo, non ordine temporis, sed naturae et intellectus. Et hoc triplici ratione. Primo quidem, secundum ordinem principiorum utriusque. Principium enim unionis est persona filii assumens humanam naturam, quae secundum hoc dicitur missa esse in mundum quod humanam naturam assumpsit. Principium autem gratiae habitualis, quae cum caritate datur, est spiritus sanctus, qui secundum hoc dicitur mitti quod per caritatem mentem inhabitat. Missio autem filii, secundum ordinem naturae, prior est missione spiritus sancti, sicut ordine naturae spiritus sanctus procedit a filio et a patre dilectio. Unde et unio personalis, secundum quam intelligitur missio filii, est prior, ordine naturae, gratia habituali, secundum quam intelligitur missio spiritus sancti. Secundo, accipitur ratio huius ordinis ex habitudine gratiae ad suam causam. Gratia enim causatur in homine ex praesentia divinitatis, sicut lumen in aere ex praesentia solis, unde dicitur Ezech. XLIII, gloria Dei Israel ingrediebatur per viam Orientalem, et terra splendebat a maiestate eius. Praesentia autem Dei in Christo intelligitur secundum unionem humanae naturae ad divinam personam. Unde gratia habitualis Christi intelligitur ut consequens hanc unionem, sicut splendor solem. Tertia ratio huius ordinis assumi potest ex fine gratiae. Ordinatur enim ad bene agendum. Actiones autem sunt suppositorum et individuorum. Unde actio, et per consequens gratia ad ipsam ordinans, praesupponit hypostasim operantem. Hypostasis autem non praesupponitur in humana natura ante unionem, ut ex supra dictis patet. Et ideo gratia unionis, secundum intellectum, praecedit gratiam habitualem. |
I answer that, The union of the human nature with the Divine Person, which, as we have said above (Question [2], Article [10]; Question [6], Article [6]), is the grace of union, precedes the habitual grace of Christ, not in order of time, but by nature and in thought; and this for a triple reason: First, with reference to the order of the principles of both. For the principle of the union is the Person of the Son assuming human nature, Who is said to be sent into the world, inasmuch as He assumed human nature; but the principle of habitual grace, which is given with charity, is the Holy Ghost, Who is said to be sent inasmuch as He dwells in the mind by charity. Now the mission of the Son is prior, in the order of nature, to the mission of the Holy Ghost, even as in the order of nature the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son, and love from wisdom. Hence the personal union, according to which the mission of the Son took place, is prior in the order of nature to habitual grace, according to which the mission of the Holy Ghost takes place. Secondly, the reason of this order may be taken from the relation of grace to its cause. For grace is caused in man by the presence of the Godhead, as light in the air by the presence of the sun. Hence it is written (Ezech. 43:2): "The glory of the God of Israel came in by the way of the east... and the earth shone with His majesty." But the presence of God in Christ is by the union of human nature with the Divine Person. Hence the habitual grace of Christ is understood to follow this union, as light follows the sun. Thirdly, the reason of this union can be taken from the end of grace, since it is ordained to acting rightly, and action belongs to the suppositum and the individual. Hence action and, in consequence, grace ordaining thereto, presuppose the hypostasis which operates. Now the hypostasis did not exist in the human nature before the union, as is clear from Question [4], Article [2]. Therefore the grace of union precedes, in thought, habitual grace. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus ibi gratiam nominat gratuitam Dei voluntatem gratis beneficia largientem. Et propter hoc eadem gratia dicit hominem quemcumque fieri Christianum qua gratia factus est Christus homo, quia utrumque gratuita Dei voluntate, absque meritis, factum est. | Reply to Objection 1: Augustine here means by grace the gratuitous will of God, bestowing benefits gratis; and hence every man is said to be made a Christian by the same grace whereby a Man became Christ, since both take place by the gratuitous will of God without merits. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dispositio in via generationis praecedit perfectionem ad quam disposuit in his quae successive perficiuntur, ita naturaliter perfectionem sequitur quam aliquis iam consecutus est, sicut calor, qui fuit dispositio ad formam ignis, est effectus profluens a forma ignis iam praeexistentis. Humana autem natura in Christo unita est personae verbi a principio absque successione. Unde gratia habitualis non intelligitur ut praecedens unionem, sed ut consequens eam, sicut quaedam proprietas naturalis. Unde et Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod gratia est quodammodo Christo homini naturalis. | Reply to Objection 2: As disposition in the order of generation precedes the perfection to which it disposes, in such things as are gradually perfected; so it naturally follows the perfection which one has already obtained; as heat, which was a disposition to the form of fire, is an effect flowing from the form of already existing fire. Now the human nature in Christ is united to the Person of the Word from the beginning without succession. Hence habitual grace is not understood to have preceded the union, but to have followed it; as a natural property. Hence, as Augustine says (Enchiridion xl): "Grace is in a manner natural to the Man Christ." |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod commune est prius proprio si utrumque sit unius generis, sed in his quae sunt diversorum generum, nihil prohibet proprium prius esse communi. Gratia autem unionis non est in genere gratiae habitualis, sed est super omne genus, sicut et ipsa divina persona. Unde hoc proprium nihil prohibet esse prius communi, quia non se habet per additionem ad commune, sed potius est principium et origo eius quod commune est. | Reply to Objection 3: The common precedes the proper, when both are of the same genus; but when they are of divers genera, there is nothing to prevent the proper being prior to the common. Now the grace of union is not in the same genus as habitual grace; but is above all genera even as the Divine Person Himself. Hence there is nothing to prevent this proper from being before the common since it does not result from something being added to the common, but is rather the principle and source of that which is common. |