St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica

(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

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Consequenter considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad exitum Christi de mundo.
  • Et primo, de passione eius;
  • secundo, de morte;
  • tertio, de sepultura;
  • quarto, de descensu ad Inferos.
In proper sequence we have now to consider all that relates to Christ's leaving the world.
  • In the first place, His Passion;
  • secondly, His death;
  • thirdly, His burial; and,
  • fourthly, His descent into hell.
Circa passionem occurrit triplex consideratio,
  • prima, de ipsa passione;
  • secunda, de causa efficiente passionis;
  • tertia, de fructu passionis.
With regard to the Passion, there arises a threefold consideration:
  • (1) The Passion itself;
  • (2) the efficient cause of the Passion;
  • (3) the fruits of the Passion.
Circa primum quaeruntur duodecim. Under the first heading there are twelve points of inquiry:
Primo, utrum necesse fuerit Christum pati pro liberatione hominum. (1) Whether it was necessary for Christ to suffer for men's deliverance?
Secundo, utrum fuerit alius modus possibilis liberationis humanae. (2) Whether there was any other possible means of delivering men?
Tertio, utrum iste modus fuerit convenientior. (3) Whether this was the more suitable means?
Quarto, utrum fuerit conveniens quod in cruce pateretur. (4) Whether it was fitting for Christ to suffer on the cross?
Quinto, de generalitate passionis eius. (5) The extent of His sufferings;
Sexto, utrum dolor quem in passione sustinuit, fuerit maximus. (6) Whether the pain which He endured was the greatest?
Septimo, utrum tota anima eius pateretur. (7) Whether His entire soul suffered?
Octavo, utrum passio eius impediverit gaudium fruitionis. (8) Whether His Passion hindered the joy of fruition?
Nono, de tempore passionis. (9) The time of the Passion;
Decimo, de loco. (10) The place;
Undecimo, utrum conveniens fuerit ipsum cum latronibus crucifigi. (11) Whether it was fitting for Him to be crucified with robbers?
Duodecimo, utrum passio ipsius Christi sit divinitati attribuenda. (12) Whether Christ's Passion is to be attributed to the Godhead?

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Whether it was necessary for Christ to suffer for the deliverance of the human race?

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit necessarium Christum pati pro humani generis liberatione. Humanum enim genus liberari non poterat nisi a Deo, secundum illud Isaiae XLV, nunquid non ego dominus, et non est ultra Deus absque me? Deus iustus et salvans non est praeter me. In Deum autem non cadit aliqua necessitas, quia hoc repugnaret omnipotentiae ipsius. Ergo non fuit necessarium Christum pati. Objection 1: It would seem that it was not necessary for Christ to suffer for the deliverance of the human race. For the human race could not be delivered except by God, according to Is. 45:21: "Am not I the Lord, and there is no God else besides Me? A just God and a Saviour, there is none besides Me." But no necessity can compel God, for this would be repugnant to His omnipotence. Therefore it was not necessary for Christ to suffer.
Praeterea, necessarium voluntario opponitur. Sed Christus propria voluntate est passus, dicitur enim Isaiae LIII, oblatus est quia ipse voluit. Ergo non necessarium fuit eum pati. Objection 2: Further, what is necessary is opposed to what is voluntary. But Christ suffered of His own will; for it is written (Is. 53:7): "He was offered because it was His own will." Therefore it was not necessary for Him to suffer.
Praeterea, sicut in Psalmo dicitur, universae viae domini misericordia et veritas. Sed non videtur necessarium quod pateretur ex parte misericordiae divinae, quae, sicut gratis dona tribuit, ita videtur quod gratis debita relaxet, absque satisfactione. Neque etiam ex parte divinae iustitiae, secundum quam homo aeternam damnationem meruerat. Ergo videtur non fuisse necessarium quod Christus pro liberatione hominum pateretur. Objection 3: Further, as is written (Ps. 24:10): "All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth." But it does not seem necessary that He should suffer on the part of the Divine mercy, which, as it bestows gifts freely, so it appears to condone debts without satisfaction: nor, again, on the part of Divine justice, according to which man had deserved everlasting condemnation. Therefore it does not seem necessary that Christ should have suffered for man's deliverance.
Praeterea, angelica natura est excellentior quam humana, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed pro reparatione angelicae naturae, quae peccaverat, Christus non est passus. Ergo videtur quod nec etiam fuerit necessarium eum pati pro salute humani generis. Objection 4: Further, the angelic nature is more excellent than the human, as appears from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But Christ did not suffer to repair the angelic nature which had sinned. Therefore, apparently, neither was it necessary for Him to suffer for the salvation of the human race.
Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. III, sicut Moyses exaltavit serpentem in deserto, sic oportet exaltari filium hominis, ut omnis qui credit in eum non pereat, sed habeat vitam aeternam. Quod quidem de exaltatione in cruce intelligitur. Ergo videtur quod Christum oportuerit pati. On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 3:14): "As Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert, so must the Son of man be lifted up, that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but may have life everlasting."
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus docet in V Metaphys., necessarium multipliciter dicitur. Uno quidem modo, quod secundum sui naturam impossibile est aliter se habere. Et sic manifestum est quod non fuit necessarium Christum pati, neque ex parte Dei, neque ex parte hominis. Alio modo dicitur aliquid necessarium ex aliquo exteriori. Quod quidem si sit causa efficiens vel movens, facit necessitatem coactionis, utpote cum aliquis non potest ire propter violentiam detinentis ipsum. Si vero illud exterius quod necessitatem inducit, sit finis, dicetur aliquid necessarium ex suppositione finis, quando scilicet finis aliquis aut nullo modo potest esse, aut non potest esse convenienter, nisi tali fine praesupposito. Non fuit ergo necessarium Christum pati necessitate coactionis, neque ex parte Dei, qui Christum definivit pati; neque etiam ex parte ipsius Christi, qui voluntarie passus est. Fuit autem necessarium necessitate finis. Qui quidem potest tripliciter intelligi. Primo quidem, ex parte nostra, qui per eius passionem liberati sumus, secundum illud Ioan. III, oportet exaltari filium hominis, ut omnis qui credit in eum non pereat, sed habeat vitam aeternam. Secundo, ex parte ipsius Christi, qui per humilitatem passionis meruit gloriam exaltationis. Et ad hoc pertinet quod dicitur Luc. ult., haec oportuit Christum pati, et sic intrare in gloriam suam. Tertio, ex parte Dei, cuius definitio est circa passionem Christi praenuntiatam in Scripturis et praefiguratam in observantia veteris testamenti. Et hoc est quod dicitur Luc. XXII, filius hominis secundum quod definitum est vadit; et Luc. ult., haec sunt verba quae locutus sum ad vos cum adhuc essem vobiscum, quoniam necesse est impleri omnia quae scripta sunt in lege Moysi et prophetis et Psalmis de me; et, quoniam scriptum est quoniam oportebat Christum pati et resurgere a mortuis. I answer that, As the Philosopher teaches (Metaph. v), there are several acceptations of the word "necessary." In one way it means anything which of its nature cannot be otherwise; and in this way it is evident that it was not necessary either on the part of God or on the part of man for Christ to suffer. In another sense a thing may be necessary from some cause quite apart from itself; and should this be either an efficient or a moving cause then it brings about the necessity of compulsion; as, for instance, when a man cannot get away owing to the violence of someone else holding him. But if the external factor which induces necessity be an end, then it will be said to be necessary from presupposing such end---namely, when some particular end cannot exist at all, or not conveniently, except such end be presupposed. It was not necessary, then, for Christ to suffer from necessity of compulsion, either on God's part, who ruled that Christ should suffer, or on Christ's own part, who suffered voluntarily. Yet it was necessary from necessity of the end proposed; and this can be accepted in three ways. First of all, on our part, who have been delivered by His Passion, according to John (3:14): "The Son of man must be lifted up, that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but may have life everlasting." Secondly, on Christ's part, who merited the glory of being exalted, through the lowliness of His Passion: and to this must be referred Lk. 24:26: "Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and so to enter into His glory?" Thirdly, on God's part, whose determination regarding the Passion of Christ, foretold in the Scriptures and prefigured in the observances of the Old Testament, had to be fulfilled. And this is what St. Luke says (22:22): "The Son of man indeed goeth, according to that which is determined"; and (Lk. 24:44,46): "These are the words which I spoke to you while I was yet with you, that all things must needs be fulfilled which are written in the law of Moses, and in the prophets, and in the psalms concerning Me: for it is thus written, and thus it behooved Christ to suffer, and to rise again from the dead."
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de necessitate coactionis ex parte Dei. Reply to Objection 1: This argument is based on the necessity of compulsion on God's part.
Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de necessitate coactionis ex parte hominis Christi. Reply to Objection 2: This argument rests on the necessity of compulsion on the part of the man Christ.
Ad tertium dicendum quod hominem liberari per passionem Christi, conveniens fuit et misericordiae et iustitiae eius. Iustitiae quidem, quia per passionem suam Christus satisfecit pro peccato humani generis, et ita homo per iustitiam Christi liberatus est. Misericordiae vero, quia, cum homo per se satisfacere non posset pro peccato totius humanae naturae, ut supra habitum est, Deus ei satisfactorem dedit filium suum, secundum illud Rom. III, iustificati gratis per gratiam ipsius, per redemptionem quae est in Christo Iesu, quem proposuit Deus propitiatorem per fidem ipsius. Et hoc fuit abundantioris misericordiae quam si peccata absque satisfactione dimisisset. Unde dicitur Ephes. II, Deus, qui dives est in misericordia, propter nimiam caritatem qua dilexit nos, cum essemus mortui peccatis, convivificavit nos in Christo. Reply to Objection 3: That man should be delivered by Christ's Passion was in keeping with both His mercy and His justice. With His justice, because by His Passion Christ made satisfaction for the sin of the human race; and so man was set free by Christ's justice: and with His mercy, for since man of himself could not satisfy for the sin of all human nature, as was said above (Question [1], Article [2]), God gave him His Son to satisfy for him, according to Rm. 3:24,25: "Being justified freely by His grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His blood." And this came of more copious mercy than if He had forgiven sins without satisfaction. Hence it is said (Eph. 2:4): "God, who is rich in mercy, for His exceeding charity wherewith He loved us, even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together in Christ."
Ad quartum dicendum quod peccatum Angeli non fuit remediabile, sicut peccatum hominis, ut ex supra dictis in prima parte patet. Reply to Objection 4: The sin of the angels was irreparable; not so the sin of the first man (FP, Question [64], Article [2]).

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Article: 2  [ << | >> ]

Whether there was any other possible way of human deliverance besides the Passion of Christ?

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuit possibilis alius modus liberationis humanae naturae quam per passionem Christi. Dixit enim dominus, Ioan. XII, nisi granum frumenti cadens in terram mortuum fuerit, ipsum solum manet, si autem mortuum fuerit, multum fructum affert, ubi dicit Augustinus quod seipsum granum dicebat. Nisi ergo mortem passus esset, aliter fructum nostrae liberationis non fecisset. Objection 1: It would seem that there was no other possible way of human deliverance besides Christ's Passion. For our Lord says (Jn. 12:24): "Amen, amen I say to you, unless the grain of wheat falling into the ground dieth, itself remaineth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit." Upon this St. Augustine (Tract. li) observes that "Christ called Himself the seed." Consequently, unless He suffered death, He would not otherwise have produced the fruit of our redemption.
Praeterea, Matth. XXVI dominus dicit ad patrem, pater mi, si non potest iste calix transire nisi bibam illum, fiat voluntas tua. Loquitur autem ibi de calice passionis. Ergo passio Christi praeterire non poterat. Unde et Hilarius dicit, ideo calix transire non potest nisi illum bibat, quia reparari nisi ex eius passione non possumus. Objection 2: Further, our Lord addresses the Father (Mt. 26:42): "My Father, if this chalice may not pass away but I must drink it, Thy will be done." But He spoke there of the chalice of the Passion. Therefore Christ's Passion could not pass away; hence Hilary says (Comm. 31 in Matth.): "Therefore the chalice cannot pass except He drink of it, because we cannot be restored except through His Passion."
Praeterea, iustitia Dei exigebat ut homo a peccato liberaretur, Christo per passionem suam satisfaciente. Sed Christus suam iustitiam praeterire non potest. Dicitur enim II ad Tim. II, si non credimus, ille fidelis permanet, negare seipsum non potest. Seipsum autem negaret si iustitiam suam negaret, cum ipse sit iustitia. Ergo videtur quod non fuerit possibile alio modo hominem liberari quam per passionem Christi. Objection 3: Further, God's justice required that Christ should satisfy by the Passion in order that man might be delivered from sin. But Christ cannot let His justice pass; for it is written (2 Tim. 2:13): "If we believe not, He continueth faithful, He cannot deny Himself." But He would deny Himself were He to deny His justice, since He is justice itself. It seems impossible, then, for man to be delivered otherwise than by Christ's Passion.
Praeterea, fidei non potest subesse falsum. Sed antiqui patres crediderunt Christum passurum. Ergo videtur quod non potuerit esse quin Christus pateretur. Objection 4: Further, there can be no falsehood underlying faith. But the Fathers of old believed that Christ would suffer. Consequently, it seems that it had to be that Christ should suffer.
Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin., istum modum quo nos per mediatorem Dei et hominum, hominem Christum Iesum, Deus liberare dignatur, asserimus bonum et divinae dignitati congruum, verum etiam ostendamus alium modum possibilem Deo fuisse, cuius potestati cuncta aequaliter subiacent. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): "We assert that the way whereby God deigned to deliver us by the man Jesus Christ, who is mediator between God and man, is both good and befitting the Divine dignity; but let us also show that other possible means were not lacking on God's part, to whose power all things are equally subordinate."
Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid potest dici possibile vel impossibile dupliciter, uno modo, simpliciter et absolute; alio modo, ex suppositione. Simpliciter igitur et absolute loquendo, possibile fuit Deo alio modo hominem liberare quam per passionem Christi, quia non est impossibile apud Deum omne verbum, ut dicitur Luc. I. Sed ex aliqua suppositione facta, fuit impossibile. Quia enim impossibile est Dei praescientiam falli et eius voluntatem sive dispositionem cassari, supposita praescientia et praeordinatione Dei de passione Christi, non erat simul possibile Christum non pati, et hominem alio modo quam per eius passionem liberari. Et est eadem ratio de omnibus his quae sunt praescita et praeordinata a Deo, ut in prima parte habitum est. I answer that, A thing may be said to be possible or impossible in two ways: first of all, simply and absolutely; or secondly, from supposition. Therefore, speaking simply and absolutely, it was possible for God to deliver mankind otherwise than by the Passion of Christ, because "no word shall be impossible with God" (Lk. 1:37). Yet it was impossible if some supposition be made. For since it is impossible for God's foreknowledge to be deceived and His will or ordinance to be frustrated, then, supposing God's foreknowledge and ordinance regarding Christ's Passion, it was not possible at the same time for Christ not to suffer, and for mankind to be delivered otherwise than by Christ's Passion. And the same holds good of all things foreknown and preordained by God, as was laid down in the FP, Question [14], Article [13].
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus ibi loquitur supposita praescientia et praeordinatione Dei, secundum quam erat ordinatum ut fructus humanae salutis non sequeretur nisi Christo patiente. Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord is speaking there presupposing God's foreknowledge and predetermination, according to which it was resolved that the fruit of man's salvation should not follow unless Christ suffered.
Et similiter intelligendum est quod secundo obiicitur, si non potest hic calix transire nisi bibam illum, scilicet, propter hoc quod et tu ita disposuisti. Unde subdit, fiat voluntas tua. Reply to Objection 2: In the same way we must understand what is here objected to in the second instance: "If this chalice may not pass away but I must drink of it"---that is to say, because Thou hast so ordained it---hence He adds: "Thy will be done."
Ad tertium dicendum quod haec etiam iustitia dependet ex voluntate divina ab humano genere satisfactionem pro peccato exigente. Alioquin, si voluisset absque omni satisfactione hominem a peccato liberare, contra iustitiam non fecisset. Ille enim iudex non potest, salva iustitia, culpam sive poenam dimittere, qui habet punire culpam in alium commissam, puta vel in alium hominem, vel in totam rempublicam, sive in superiorem principem. Sed Deus non habet aliquem superiorem, sed ipse est supremum et commune bonum totius universi. Et ideo, si dimittat peccatum, quod habet rationem culpae ex eo quod contra ipsum committitur, nulli facit iniuriam, sicut quicumque homo remittit offensam in se commissam absque satisfactione, misericorditer, et non iniuste agit. Et ideo David, misericordiam petens, dicebat, tibi soli peccavi, quasi dicat, potes sine iniustitia mihi dimittere. Reply to Objection 3: Even this justice depends on the Divine will, requiring satisfaction for sin from the human race. But if He had willed to free man from sin without any satisfaction, He would not have acted against justice. For a judge, while preserving justice, cannot pardon fault without penalty, if he must visit fault committed against another---for instance, against another man, or against the State, or any Prince in higher authority. But God has no one higher than Himself, for He is the sovereign and common good of the whole universe. Consequently, if He forgive sin, which has the formality of fault in that it is committed against Himself, He wrongs no one: just as anyone else, overlooking a personal trespass, without satisfaction, acts mercifully and not unjustly. And so David exclaimed when he sought mercy: "To Thee only have I sinned" (Ps. 50:6), as if to say: "Thou canst pardon me without injustice."
Ad quartum dicendum quod fides humana, et etiam Scripturae divinae, quibus fides instruitur, innituntur praescientiae et ordinationi divinae. Et ideo eadem ratio est de necessitate quae provenit ex suppositione eorum, et de necessitate quae provenit ex praescientia et voluntate divina. Reply to Objection 4: Human faith, and even the Divine Scriptures upon which faith is based, are both based on the Divine foreknowledge and ordinance. And the same reason holds good of that necessity which comes of supposition, and of the necessity which arises of the Divine foreknowledge and will.

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Article: 3  [ << | >> ]

Whether there was any more suitable way of delivering the human race than by Christ's Passion?

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod alius modus convenientior fuisset liberationis humanae quam per passionem Christi. Natura enim in sua operatione imitatur opus divinum, utpote a Deo mota et regulata. Sed natura non facit per duo quod per unum potest facere. Cum ergo Deus potuerit hominem liberare sola propria voluntate, non videtur conveniens fuisse quod ad liberationem humani generis Christi passio adderetur. Objection 1: It would seem that there was some other more suitable way of delivering the human race besides Christ's Passion. For nature in its operation imitates the Divine work, since it is moved and regulated by God. But nature never employs two agents where one will suffice. Therefore, since God could have liberated mankind solely by His Divine will, it does not seem fitting that Christ's Passion should have been added for the deliverance of the human race.
Praeterea, ea quae fiunt per naturam, convenientius fiunt quam ea quae per violentiam fiunt, quia violentum est quaedam excisio, seu casus, ab eo quod est secundum naturam, ut dicitur in libro de caelo. Sed passio Christi mortem violentam induxit. Ergo convenientius fuisset quod Christus naturali morte moriendo hominem liberaret, quam quod pateretur. Objection 2: Further, natural actions are more suitably performed than deeds of violence, because violence is "a severance or lapse from what is according to nature," as is said in De Coelo ii. But Christ's Passion brought about His death by violence. Therefore it would have been more appropriate had Christ died a natural death rather than suffer for man's deliverance.
Praeterea, convenientissimum videtur quod ille qui violenter et iniuste detinet, per superioris potentiam spolietur, unde et Isaiae LII dicitur, gratis venundati estis, et sine argento redimemini. Sed Diabolus nullum ius in homine habebat, quem per fraudem deceperat, et per quandam violentiam servituti subiectum detinebat. Ergo videtur convenientissimum fuisse quod Christus Diabolum per solam potentiam spoliaret, absque sua passione. Objection 3: Further, it seems most fitting that whatsoever keeps something unjustly and by violence, should be deprived of it by some superior power; hence Isaias says (52:3): "You were sold gratis, and you shall be redeemed without money." But the devil possessed no right over man, whom he had deceived by guile, and whom he held subject in servitude by a sort of violence. Therefore it seems most suitable that Christ should have despoiled the devil solely by His power and without the Passion.
Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin., sanandae nostrae miseriae convenientior modus alius non fuit quam per Christi passionem. On the contrary, St. Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): "There was no other more suitable way of healing our misery" than by the Passion of Christ.
Respondeo dicendum quod tanto aliquis modus convenientior est ad assequendum finem, quanto per ipsum plura concurrunt quae sunt expedientia fini. Per hoc autem quod homo per Christi passionem est liberatus, multa occurrerunt ad salutem hominis pertinentia, praeter liberationem a peccato. Primo enim, per hoc homo cognoscit quantum Deus hominem diligat, et per hoc provocatur ad eum diligendum, in quo perfectio humanae salutis consistit. Unde apostolus dicit, Rom. V, commendat suam caritatem Deus in nobis, quoniam, cum inimici essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est. Secundo, quia per hoc dedit nobis exemplum obedientiae, humilitatis, constantiae, iustitiae, et ceterarum virtutum in passione Christi ostensarum, quae sunt necessariae ad humanam salutem. Unde dicitur I Pet. II, Christus passus est pro nobis, nobis relinquens exemplum, ut sequamur vestigia eius. Tertio, quia Christus per passionem suam non solum hominem a peccato liberavit, sed etiam gratiam iustificantem et gloriam beatitudinis ei promeruit, ut infra dicetur. Quarto, quia per hoc est homini indicta maior necessitas se immunem a peccato conservandi, secundum illud I Cor. VI, empti estis pretio magno, glorificate et portate Deum in corpore vestro. Quinto, quia hoc ad maiorem dignitatem cessit, ut, sicut homo victus fuerat et deceptus a Diabolo, ita etiam homo esset qui Diabolum vinceret; et sicut homo mortem meruit, ita homo moriendo mortem superaret; ut dicitur I Cor. XV, Deo gratias, qui dedit nobis victoriam per Iesum Christum. Et ideo convenientius fuit quod per passionem Christi liberaremur, quam per solam Dei voluntatem. I answer that, Among means to an end that one is the more suitable whereby the various concurring means employed are themselves helpful to such end. But in this that man was delivered by Christ's Passion, many other things besides deliverance from sin concurred for man's salvation. In the first place, man knows thereby how much God loves him, and is thereby stirred to love Him in return, and herein lies the perfection of human salvation; hence the Apostle says (Rm. 5:8): "God commendeth His charity towards us; for when as yet we were sinners... Christ died for us." Secondly, because thereby He set us an example of obedience, humility, constancy, justice, and the other virtues displayed in the Passion, which are requisite for man's salvation. Hence it is written (1 Pt. 2:21): "Christ also suffered for us, leaving you an example that you should follow in His steps." Thirdly, because Christ by His Passion not only delivered man from sin, but also merited justifying grace for him and the glory of bliss, as shall be shown later (Question [48], Article [1]; Question [49], Articles [1], 5). Fourthly, because by this man is all the more bound to refrain from sin, according to 1 Cor. 6:20: "You are bought with a great price: glorify and bear God in your body." Fifthly, because it redounded to man's greater dignity, that as man was overcome and deceived by the devil, so also it should be a man that should overthrow the devil; and as man deserved death, so a man by dying should vanquish death. Hence it is written (1 Cor. 15:57): "Thanks be to God who hath given us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ." It was accordingly more fitting that we should be delivered by Christ's Passion than simply by God's good-will.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod natura etiam, ut aliquid convenientius faciat, plura ad unum assumit, sicut duos oculos ad videndum. Et idem patet in aliis. Reply to Objection 1: Even nature uses several means to one intent, in order to do something more fittingly: as two eyes for seeing; and the same can be observed in other matters.
Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, Christus non sui mortem, quam non habebat, cum sit vita, sed hominum mortem venerat consumpturus. Unde non propria morte corpus deposuit, sed ab hominibus illatam sustinuit. Sed et, si aegrotavisset corpus eius et in conspectu omnium solveretur, inconveniens erat eum qui aliorum languores sanaret, habere proprium corpus affectum languoribus. Sed et, si absque aliquo morbo seorsum alicubi corpus deposuisset ac deinde se offerret, non crederetur ei de resurrectione disserenti. Quomodo enim pateret Christi in morte victoria, nisi, coram omnibus eam patiens, per incorruptionem corporis probasset extinctam? Reply to Objection 2: As Chrysostom [*Athanasius, Orat. De Incarn. Verb.] says: "Christ had come in order to destroy death, not His own, (for since He is life itself, death could not be His), but men's death. Hence it was not by reason of His being bound to die that He laid His body aside, but because the death He endured was inflicted on Him by men. But even if His body had sickened and dissolved in the sight of all men, it was not befitting Him who healed the infirmities of others to have his own body afflicted with the same. And even had He laid His body aside without any sickness, and had then appeared, men would not have believed Him when He spoke of His resurrection. For how could Christ's victory over death appear, unless He endured it in the sight of all men, and so proved that death was vanquished by the incorruption of His body?"
Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet Diabolus iniuste invaserit hominem, tamen homo propter peccatum iuste erat sub servitute Diaboli derelictus a Deo. Et ideo conveniens fuit ut per iustitiam homo a servitute Diaboli liberaretur, Christo satisfaciente pro ipso per suam passionem. Fuit etiam hoc conveniens ad vincendam superbiam Diaboli, qui est desertor iustitiae et amator potentiae, ut Christus Diabolum vinceret et hominem liberaret, non per solam potentiam divinitatis, sed etiam per iustitiam et humilitatem passionis, ut Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trinitate. Reply to Objection 3: Although the devil assailed man unjustly, nevertheless, on account of sin, man was justly left by God under the devil's bondage. And therefore it was fitting that through justice man should be delivered from the devil's bondage by Christ making satisfaction on his behalf in the Passion. This was also a fitting means of overthrowing the pride of the devil, "who is a deserter from justice, and covetous of sway"; in that Christ "should vanquish him and deliver man, not merely by the power of His Godhead, but likewise by the justice and lowliness of the Passion," as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii).

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Whether Christ ought to have suffered on the cross?

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non debuerit pati in cruce. Veritas enim debet respondere figurae. Sed in figuram Christi praecesserunt omnia sacrificia veteris testamenti, in quibus animalia gladio necabantur, et postmodum igni cremabantur. Ergo videtur quod Christus non debuerit pati in cruce, sed magis gladio vel igne. Objection 1: It would seem that Christ ought not to have suffered on the cross. For the truth ought to conform to the figure. But in all the sacrifices of the Old Testament which prefigured Christ the beasts were slain with a sword and afterwards consumed by fire. Therefore it seems that Christ ought not to have suffered on a cross, but rather by the sword or by fire.
Praeterea, Damascenus dicit quod Christus non debuit assumere detractibiles passiones. Sed mors crucis videtur maxime detractibilis et ignominiosa, unde dicitur Sap. II, morte turpissima condemnemus eum. Ergo videtur quod Christus non debuit pati mortem crucis. Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii) that Christ ought not to assume "dishonoring afflictions." But death on a cross was most dishonoring and ignominious; hence it is written (Wis. 2:20): "Let us condemn Him to a most shameful death." Therefore it seems that Christ ought not to have undergone the death of the cross.
Praeterea, de Christo dicitur, benedictus qui venit in nomine domini, ut patet Matth. XXI. Sed mors crucis erat mors maledictionis, secundum illud Deut. XXI, maledictus a Deo est qui pendet in ligno. Ergo videtur quod non fuit conveniens Christum crucifigi. Objection 3: Further, it was said of Christ (Mt. 21:9): "Blessed is He that cometh in the name of the Lord." But death upon the cross was a death of malediction, as we read Dt. 21:23: "He is accursed of God that hangeth on a tree." Therefore it does not seem fitting for Christ to be crucified.
Sed contra est quod dicitur Philipp. II, factus est obediens usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis. On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:8): "He became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross."
Respondeo dicendum quod convenientissimum fuit Christum pati mortem crucis. I answer that, It was most fitting that Christ should suffer the death of the cross.
Primo quidem, propter exemplum virtutis. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octogintatrium quaest., sapientia Dei hominem, ad exemplum quo recte viveremus, suscepit. Pertinet autem ad vitam rectam ea quae non sunt metuenda, non metuere. Sunt autem homines qui, quamvis mortem ipsam non timeant, genus tamen mortis horrescunt. Ut ergo nullum genus mortis recte viventi homini metuendum esset, illius hominis cruce ostendendum fuit, nihil enim erat, inter omnia genera mortis, illo genere execrabilius et formidabilius. First of all, as an example of virtue. For Augustine thus writes (Questions. lxxxiii, qu. 25): "God's Wisdom became man to give us an example in righteousness of living. But it is part of righteous living not to stand in fear of things which ought not to be feared. Now there are some men who, although they do not fear death in itself, are yet troubled over the manner of their death. In order, then, that no kind of death should trouble an upright man, the cross of this Man had to be set before him, because, among all kinds of death, none was more execrable, more fear-inspiring, than this."
Secundo, quia hoc genus mortis maxime conveniens erat satisfactioni pro peccato primi parentis, quod fuit ex eo quod, contra mandatum Dei, pomum ligni vetiti sumpsit. Et ideo conveniens fuit quod Christus, ad satisfaciendum pro peccato illo, seipsum pateretur ligno affigi, quasi restituens quod Adam sustulerat, secundum illud Psalmi, quae non rapui, tunc exsolvebam. Unde Augustinus dicit, in quodam sermone de passione, contemsit Adam praeceptum, accipiens ex arbore, sed quidquid Adam perdidit, Christus in cruce invenit. Secondly, because this kind of death was especially suitable in order to atone for the sin of our first parent, which was the plucking of the apple from the forbidden tree against God's command. And so, to atone for that sin, it was fitting that Christ should suffer by being fastened to a tree, as if restoring what Adam had purloined; according to Ps. 68:5: "Then did I pay that which I took not away." Hence Augustine says in a sermon on the Passion [*Cf. Serm. ci De Tempore]: "Adam despised the command, plucking the apple from the tree: but all that Adam lost, Christ found upon the cross."
Tertia ratio est quia, ut Chrysostomus dicit, in sermone de passione, in excelso ligno, et non sub tecto passus est, ut etiam ipsius aeris natura mundetur. Sed et ipsa terra simile beneficium sentiebat, decurrentis de latere sanguinis stillatione mundata. Et super illud Ioan. III, oportet exaltari filium hominis, exaltari audiens, suspensionem intelligas in altum, ut sanctificaret aerem qui sanctificaverat terram ambulando in ea. The third reason is because, as Chrysostom says in a sermon on the Passion (De Cruce et Latrone i, ii): "He suffered upon a high rood and not under a roof, in order that the nature of the air might be purified: and the earth felt a like benefit, for it was cleansed by the flowing of the blood from His side." And on Jn. 3:14: "The Son of man must be lifted up," Theophylact says: "When you hear that He was lifted up, understand His hanging on high, that He might sanctify the air who had sanctified the earth by walking upon it."
Quarta ratio est quia, per hoc quod in ea moritur, ascensum nobis parat in caelum, ut Chrysostomus dicit. Et inde est quod ipse dicit, Ioan. XII, ego, si exaltatus fuero a terra, omnia traham ad meipsum. The fourth reason is, because, by dying on it, He prepares for us an ascent into heaven, as Chrysostom [*Athanasius, vide A, III, ad 2] says. Hence it is that He says (Jn. 12:32): "If I be lifted up from the earth, I will draw all things to Myself."
Quinta ratio est quia hoc competit universali salvationi totius mundi. Unde Gregorius Nyssenus dicit quod figura crucis, a medio contactu in quatuor extrema partita, significat virtutem et providentiam eius qui in ea pependit, ubique diffusam. Chrysostomus etiam dicit quod in cruce, expansis manibus, moritur, ut altera manu veterem populum, altera eos qui ex gentibus sunt, trahat. The fifth reason is because it is befitting the universal salvation of the entire world. Hence Gregory of Nyssa observes (In Christ. Resurr., Orat. i) that "the shape of the cross extending out into four extremes from their central point of contact denotes the power and the providence diffused everywhere of Him who hung upon it." Chrysostom [*Athanasius, vide A. III, ad 2] also says that upon the cross "He dies with outstretched hands in order to draw with one hand the people of old, and with the other those who spring from the Gentiles."
Sexta ratio est quia per hoc genus mortis diversae virtutes designantur. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de gratia Vet. et novi Test., non frustra tale genus mortis elegit, ut latitudinis et altitudinis et longitudinis et profunditatis, de quibus apostolus loquitur, magister existeret. Nam latitudo est in eo ligno quod transversum desuper figitur; hoc ad bona opera pertinet, quia ibi extenduntur manus. Longitudo in eo quod ab ipso ligno usque ad terram conspicuum est, ibi enim quodammodo statur, idest, persistitur et perseveratur; quod longanimitati tribuitur. Altitudo est in ea ligni parte quae ab illa quae transversa figitur, sursum versus relinquitur, hoc est, ad caput crucifixi, quia bene sperantium superna expectatio est. Iam vero illud ex ligno quod fixum occultatur, unde totum illud exurgit, significat profunditatem gratuitae gratiae. Et, sicut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., lignum in quo fixa erant membra patientis, etiam cathedra fuit magistri docentis. The sixth reason is because of the various virtues denoted by this class of death. Hence Augustine in his book on the grace of the Old and New Testament (Ep. cxl) says: "Not without purpose did He choose this class of death, that He might be a teacher of that breadth, and height, and length, and depth," of which the Apostle speaks (Eph. 3:18): "For breadth is in the beam, which is fixed transversely above; this appertains to good works, since the hands are stretched out upon it. Length is the tree's extent from the beam to the ground; and there it is planted---that is, it stands and abides---which is the note of longanimity. Height is in that portion of the tree which remains over from the transverse beam upwards to the top, and this is at the head of the Crucified, because He is the supreme desire of souls of good hope. But that part of the tree which is hidden from view to hold it fixed, and from which the entire rood springs, denotes the depth of gratuitous grace." And, as Augustine says (Tract. cxix in Joan.): "The tree upon which were fixed the members of Him dying was even the chair of the Master teaching."
Septima ratio est quia hoc genus mortis plurimis figuris respondet. Ut enim Augustinus dicit, in sermone de passione, de diluvio aquarum humanum genus arca lignea liberavit; de Aegypto Dei populo recedente, Moyses mare virga divisit, et Pharaonem prostravit, et populum Dei redemit; idem Moyses lignum in aquam misit et amaram aquam in dulcedinem commutavit; ex lignea virga de spirituali petra salutaris unda profertur; et, ut Amalec vinceretur, contra virgam Moyses expansis manibus extenditur; et lex Dei arcae testamenti creditur ligneae; ut his omnibus ad lignum crucis, quasi per quosdam gradus, veniatur. The seventh reason is because this kind of death responds to very many figures. For, as Augustine says in a sermon on the Passion (Serm. ci De Tempore), an ark of wood preserved the human race from the waters of the Deluge; at the exodus of God's people from Egypt, Moses with a rod divided the sea, overthrew Pharaoh and saved the people of God. the same Moses dipped his rod into the water, changing it from bitter to sweet; at the touch of a wooden rod a salutary spring gushed forth from a spiritual rock; likewise, in order to overcome Amalec, Moses stretched forth his arms with rod in hand; lastly, God's law is entrusted to the wooden Ark of the Covenant; all of which are like steps by which we mount to the wood of the cross.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod altare holocaustorum, in quo sacrificia animalium offerebantur, erat factum de lignis, ut habetur Exod. XXVII, et quantum ad hoc veritas respondet figurae. Non autem oportet quod quantum, ad omnia, quia iam non esset similitudo, sed veritas, ut Damascenus dicit, in III libro. Specialiter tamen, ut Chrysostomus dicit, non caput ei amputatur, ut Ioanni; neque sectus est, ut Isaias, ut corpus integrum et indivisibile morti servet, et non fiat occasio volentibus Ecclesiam dividere. Loco autem materialis ignis, fuit in holocausto Christi ignis caritatis. Reply to Objection 1: The altar of holocausts, upon which the sacrifices of animals were immolated, was constructed of timbers, as is set forth Ex. 27:, and in this respect the truth answers to the figure; but "it is not necessary for it to be likened in every respect, otherwise it would not be a likeness," but the reality, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii). But. in particular, as Chrysostom [*Athanasius, vide A, III, ad 2] says: "His head is not cut off, as was done to John; nor was He sawn in twain, like Isaias, in order that His entire and indivisible body might obey death, and that there might be no excuse for them who want to divide the Church." While, instead of material fire, there was the spiritual fire of charity in Christ's holocaust.
Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus detractibiles passiones assumere renuit quae pertinebant ad defectum scientiae vel gratiae, aut etiam virtutis. Non autem illas quae pertinent ad iniuriam ab exteriori illatam, quinimmo, ut dicitur Heb. XII, sustinuit crucem confusione contempta. Reply to Objection 2: Christ refused to undergo dishonorable sufferings which are allied with defects of knowledge, or of grace, or even of virtue, but not those injuries inflicted from without---nay, more, as is written Heb. 12:2: "He endured the cross, despising the shame."
Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XIV contra Faustum, peccatum maledictum est et per consequens mors et mortalitas ex peccato proveniens, caro autem Christi mortalis fuit, similitudinem habens carnis peccati. Et propter hoc Moyses eam nominat maledictum, sicut et apostolus nominat eam peccatum, dicens, II Cor. V, eum qui non noverat peccatum, pro nobis peccatum fecit, scilicet per poenam peccati. Nec ideo maior invidia est, quia dixit, maledictus est a Deo. Nisi enim Deus peccatum odisset, non ad eam suscipiendam atque tollendam filium suum mitteret. Confitere ergo maledictum suscepisse pro nobis, quem confiteris mortuum esse pro nobis. Unde et Galat. III dicitur, Christus nos redemit de maledicto legis, factus pro nobis maledictum. Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xiv), sin is accursed, and, consequently, so is death, and mortality, which comes of sin. "But Christ's flesh was mortal, 'having the resemblance of the flesh of sin'"; and hence Moses calls it "accursed," just as the Apostle calls it "sin," saying (2 Cor. 5:21): "Him that knew no sin, for us He hath made sin"---namely, because of the penalty of sin. "Nor is there greater ignominy on that account, because he said: 'He is accursed of God.'" For, "unless God had hated sin, He would never have sent His Son to take upon Himself our death, and to destroy it. Acknowledge, then, that it was for us He took the curse upon Himself, whom you confess to have died for us." Hence it is written (Gal. 3:13): "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us."

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Whether Christ endured all suffering?

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus omnes passiones sustinuerit. Dicit enim Hilarius, in X de Trin., unigenitus Dei, ad peragendum mortis suae sacramentum, consummasse in se omne humanarum genus passionum testatur, cum, inclinato capite, emisit spiritum. Videtur ergo quod omnes passiones humanas sustinuerit. Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did endure all sufferings, because Hilary (De Trin. x) says: "God's only-begotten Son testifies that He endured every kind of human sufferings in order to accomplish the sacrament of His death, when with bowed head He gave up the ghost." It seems, therefore, that He did endure all human sufferings.
Praeterea, Isaiae LII dicitur, ecce, intelliget servus meus, et exaltabitur, et elevabitur, et sublimis erit valde. Sicut obstupuerunt super eum multi, sic inglorius erit inter viros aspectus eius, et forma eius inter filios hominum. Sed Christus est exaltatus secundum hoc quod habuit omnem gratiam et omnem scientiam, pro quo super eo multi admirantes obstupuerunt. Ergo videtur quod inglorius fuerit sustinendo omnem passionem humanam. Objection 2: Further, it is written (Is. 52:13): "Behold My servant shall understand, He shall be exalted and extolled, and shall be exceeding high; as many as have been astonished at Him [Vulg.: 'thee'], so shall His visage be inglorious among men, and His form among the sons of men." But Christ was exalted in that He had all grace and all knowledge, at which many were astonished in admiration thereof. Therefore it seems that He was "inglorious," by enduring every human suffering.
Praeterea, passio Christi ordinata est ad liberationem hominis a peccato, ut supra dictum est. Sed Christus venit liberare homines ab omni peccatorum genere. Ergo debuit pati omne genus passionum. Objection 3: Further, Christ's Passion was ordained for man's deliverance from sin, as stated above (Article [3]). But Christ came to deliver men from every kind of sin. Therefore He ought to have endured every kind of suffering.
Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. XIX, quod milites primi quidem fregerunt crura et alterius qui crucifixus est cum eo, ad Iesum autem cum venissent, non fregerunt eius crura. Non ergo passus est omnem humanam passionem. On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 19:32): "The soldiers therefore came: and they broke the legs of the first, and of the other who was crucified with Him; but after they were come to Jesus, when they saw that He was already dead, they did not break His legs." Consequently, He did not endure every human suffering.
Respondeo dicendum quod passiones humanae possunt considerari dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad speciem. Et sic non oportuit Christum omnem humanam passionem pati, quia multae passionum species sibi invicem contrariantur, sicut combustio in igne et submersio in aqua. Loquimur enim nunc de passionibus ab extrinseco illatis, quia passiones ab intrinseco causatas, sicut sunt aegritudines corporales, non decuit eum pati, ut supra dictum est. Sed secundum genus, passus est omnem passionem humanam. Quod quidem potest considerari tripliciter. Uno modo, ex parte hominum. Passus est enim aliquid et a gentilibus, et a Iudaeis; a masculis et feminis, ut patet de ancillis accusantibus Petrum. Passus est etiam a principibus, et a ministris eorum, et popularibus, secundum illud Psalmi, quare fremuerunt gentes, et populi meditati sunt inania? Astiterunt reges terrae, et principes convenerunt in unum, adversus dominum et adversus Christum eius. Passus est etiam a familiaribus et notis, sicut patet de Iuda eum prodente, et Petro ipsum negante. I answer that, Human sufferings may be considered under two aspects. First of all, specifically, and in this way it was not necessary for Christ to endure them all, since many are mutually exclusive, as burning and drowning; for we are dealing now with sufferings inflicted from without, since it was not beseeming for Him to endure those arising from within, such as bodily ailments, as already stated (Question [14], Article [4]). But, speaking generically, He did endure every human suffering. This admits of a threefold acceptance. First of all, on the part of men: for He endured something from Gentiles and from Jews; from men and from women, as is clear from the women servants who accused Peter. He suffered from the rulers, from their servants and from the mob, according to Ps. 2:1,2: "Why have the Gentiles raged, and the people devised vain things? The kings of the earth stood up, and the princes met together, against the Lord and against His Christ." He suffered from friends and acquaintances, as is manifest from Judas betraying and Peter denying Him.
Alio modo patet idem ex parte eorum in quibus homo potest pati. Passus est enim Christus in suis amicis eum deserentibus; in fama per blasphemias contra eum dictas; in honore et gloria per irrisiones et contumelias ei illatas; in rebus per hoc quod etiam vestibus spoliatus est; in anima per tristitiam, taedium et timorem; in corpore per vulnera et flagella. Secondly, the same is evident on the part of the sufferings which a man can endure. For Christ suffered from friends abandoning Him; in His reputation, from the blasphemies hurled at Him; in His honor and glory, from the mockeries and the insults heaped upon Him; in things, for He was despoiled of His garments; in His soul, from sadness, weariness, and fear; in His body, from wounds and scourgings.
Tertio potest considerari quantum ad corporis membra. Passus est enim Christus in capite pungentium spinarum coronam; in manibus et pedibus fixionem clavorum; in facie alapas et sputa; et in toto corpore flagella. Fuit etiam passus secundum omnem sensum corporeum, secundum tactum quidem, flagellatus et clavis confixus; secundum gustum, felle et aceto potatus; secundum olfactum, in loco fetido cadaverum mortuorum, qui dicitur Calvariae, appensus patibulo; secundum auditum, lacessitus vocibus blasphemantium et irridentium; secundum visum, videns matrem et discipulum quem diligebat flentes. Thirdly, it may be considered with regard to His bodily members. In His head He suffered from the crown of piercing thorns; in His hands and feet, from the fastening of the nails; on His face from the blows and spittle; and from the lashes over His entire body. Moreover, He suffered in all His bodily senses: in touch, by being scourged and nailed; in taste, by being given vinegar and gall to drink; in smell, by being fastened to the gibbet in a place reeking with the stench of corpses, "which is called Calvary"; in hearing, by being tormented with the cries of blasphemers and scorners; in sight, by beholding the tears of His Mother and of the disciple whom He loved.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum illud Hilarii est intelligendum quantum ad omnia genera passionum, non autem quantum ad omnes species. Reply to Objection 1: Hilary's words are to be understood as to all classes of sufferings, but not as to their kinds.
Ad secundum dicendum quod similitudo ibi attenditur, non quantum ad numerum passionum et gratiarum, sed quantum ad magnitudinem utriusque, quia sicut sublimatus est in donis gratiarum super alios, ita deiectus est infra alios per ignominiam passionis. Reply to Objection 2: The likeness is sustained, not as to the number of the sufferings and graces, but as to their greatness; for, as He was uplifted above others in gifts of graces, so was He lowered beneath others by the ignominy of His sufferings.
Ad tertium dicendum quod, secundum sufficientiam, una minima passio Christi suffecit ad redimendum genus humanum ab omnibus peccatis. Sed secundum convenientiam, sufficiens fuit quod pateretur omnia genera passionum, sicut iam dictum est. Reply to Objection 3: The very least one of Christ's sufferings was sufficient of itself to redeem the human race from all sins; but as to fittingness, it sufficed that He should endure all classes of sufferings, as stated above.

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Whether the pain of Christ's Passion was greater than all other pains?

Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod dolor passionis Christi non fuerit maior omnibus aliis doloribus. Dolor enim patientis augetur secundum gravitatem et diuturnitatem passionis. Sed quidam martyres graviores passiones et diuturniores sustinuerunt quam Christus, sicut patet de Laurentio, qui est assatus in craticula; et de Vincentio, cuius carnes sunt ungulis ferreis laceratae. Ergo videtur quod dolor Christi patientis non fuerit maximus. Objection 1: It would seem that the pain of Christ's Passion was not greater than all other pains. For the sufferer's pain is increased by the sharpness and the duration of the suffering. But some of the martyrs endured sharper and more prolonged pains than Christ, as is seen in St. Lawrence, who was roasted upon a gridiron; and in St. Vincent, whose flesh was torn with iron pincers. Therefore it seems that the pain of the suffering Christ was not the greatest.
Praeterea, virtus mentis est mitigativa doloris, in tantum quod Stoici posuerunt tristitiam in animo sapientis non cadere. Et Aristoteles posuit quod virtus moralis medium tenet in passionibus. Sed in Christo fuit perfectissima virtus mentis. Ergo videtur quod in Christo fuerit minimus dolor. Objection 2: Further, strength of soul mitigates pain, so much so that the Stoics held there was no sadness in the soul of a wise man; and Aristotle (Ethic. ii) holds that moral virtue fixes the mean in the passions. But Christ had most perfect strength of soul. Therefore it seems that the greatest pain did not exist in Christ.
Praeterea, quanto aliquod patiens est magis sensibile, tanto maior sequitur dolor passionis. Sed anima est sensibilior quam corpus, cum corpus sentiat ex anima. Adam etiam in statu innocentiae videtur corpus sensibilius habuisse quam Christus, qui assumpsit corpus humanum cum naturalibus defectibus. Ergo videtur quod dolor animae patientis in Purgatorio vel in Inferno, vel etiam dolor Adae si passus fuisset, maior fuisset quam dolor passionis Christi. Objection 3: Further, the more sensitive the sufferer is, the more acute will the pain be. But the soul is more sensitive than the body, since the body feels in virtue of the soul; also, Adam in the state of innocence seems to have had a body more sensitive than Christ had, who assumed a human body with its natural defects. Consequently, it seems that the pain of a sufferer in purgatory, or in hell, or even Adam's pain, if he suffered at all, was greater than Christ's in the Passion.
Praeterea, maioris boni amissio causat maiorem dolorem. Sed peccator peccando amittit maius bonum quam Christus patiendo, quia vita gratiae est melior quam vita naturae. Christus etiam, qui amisit vitam post triduum resurrecturus, minus aliquid videtur amisisse quam illi qui amittunt vitam permansuri in morte. Ergo videtur quod dolor Christi non fuerit maximus dolor. Objection 4: Further, the greater the good lost, the greater the pain. But by sinning the sinner loses a greater good than Christ did when suffering; since the life of grace is greater than the life of nature: also, Christ, who lost His life, but was to rise again after three days, seems to have lost less than those who lose their lives and abide in death. Therefore it seems that Christ's pain was not the greatest of all.
Praeterea, innocentia patientis diminuit dolorem passionis. Sed Christus innocenter est passus, secundum illud Ierem. XI, ego autem quasi agnus mansuetus qui portatur ad victimam. Ergo videtur quod dolor passionis Christi non fuerit maximus. Objection 5: Further, the victim's innocence lessens the sting of his sufferings. But Christ died innocent, according to Jer. 9:19: "I was as a meek lamb, that is carried to be a victim." Therefore it seems that the pain of Christ's Passion was not the greatest.
Praeterea, in his quae Christi sunt, nihil fuit superfluum. Sed minimus dolor Christi suffecisset ad finem salutis humanae, habuisset enim infinitam virtutem ex persona divina. Ergo superfluum fuisset assumere maximum dolorem. Objection 6: Further, there was nothing superfluous in Christ's conduct. But the slightest pain would have sufficed to secure man's salvation, because from His Divine Person it would have had infinite virtue. Therefore it would have been superfluous to choose the greatest of all pains.
Sed contra est quod habetur Thren. I ex persona Christi, attendite, et videte si est dolor sicut dolor meus. On the contrary, It is written (Lam. 1:12) on behalf of Christ's Person: "O all ye that pass by the way attend, and see if there be any sorrow like unto My sorrow."
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est cum de defectibus assumptis a Christo ageretur, in Christo patiente fuit verus dolor et sensibilis, qui causatur ex corporali nocivo; et dolor interior, qui causatur ex apprehensione alicuius nocivi, qui tristitia dicitur. Uterque autem dolor in Christo fuit maximus inter dolores praesentis vitae. Quod quidem contingit propter quatuor. Primo quidem, propter causas doloris. Nam doloris sensibilis causa fuit laesio corporalis. Quae acerbitatem habuit, tum propter generalitatem passionis, de qua dictum est, tum etiam ex genere passionis. Quia mors confixorum in cruce est acerbissima, quia configuntur in locis nervosis et maxime sensibilibus, scilicet in manibus et pedibus; et ipsum pondus corporis pendentis continue auget dolorem; et cum hoc etiam est doloris diuturnitas, quia non statim moriuntur, sicut hi qui sunt gladio interfecti. Doloris autem interioris causa fuit, primo quidem, omnia peccata humani generis, pro quibus satisfaciebat patiendo, unde ea quasi sibi adscribit, dicens in Psalmo, verba delictorum meorum. Secundo, specialiter casus Iudaeorum et aliorum in eius mortem delinquentium, et praecipue discipulorum, qui scandalum passi fuerant in Christi passione. Tertio etiam amissio vitae corporalis, quae naturaliter est horribilis humanae naturae. I answer that, As we have stated, when treating of the defects assumed by Christ (Question [15], Articles [5],6), there was true and sensible pain in the suffering Christ, which is caused by something hurtful to the body: also, there was internal pain, which is caused from the apprehension of something hurtful, and this is termed "sadness." And in Christ each of these was the greatest in this present life. This arose from four causes. First of all, from the sources of His pain. For the cause of the sensitive pain was the wounding of His body; and this wounding had its bitterness, both from the extent of the suffering already mentioned (Article [5]) and from the kind of suffering, since the death of the crucified is most bitter, because they are pierced in nervous and highly sensitive parts---to wit, the hands and feet; moreover, the weight of the suspended body intensifies the agony, and besides this there is the duration of the suffering because they do not die at once like those slain by the sword. The cause of the interior pain was, first of all, all the sins of the human race, for which He made satisfaction by suffering; hence He ascribes them, so to speak, to Himself, saying (Ps. 21:2): "The words of my sins." Secondly, especially the fall of the Jews and of the others who sinned in His death chiefly of the apostles, who were scandalized at His Passion. Thirdly, the loss of His bodily life, which is naturally horrible to human nature.
Secundo potest magnitudo considerari ex perceptibilitate patientis. Nam et secundum corpus erat optime complexionatus, cum corpus eius fuerit formatum miraculose operatione spiritus sancti, sicut et alia quae per miracula facta sunt, sunt aliis potiora, ut Chrysostomus dicit de vino in quod Christus aquam convertit in nuptiis. Et ideo in eo maxime viguit sensus tactus, ex cuius perceptione sequitur dolor. Anima etiam, secundum vires interiores, efficacissime apprehendit omnes causas tristitiae. The magnitude of His suffering may be considered, secondly, from the susceptibility of the sufferer as to both soul and body. For His body was endowed with a most perfect constitution, since it was fashioned miraculously by the operation of the Holy Ghost; just as some other things made by miracles are better than others, as Chrysostom says (Hom. xxii in Joan.) respecting the wine into which Christ changed the water at the wedding-feast. And, consequently, Christ's sense of touch, the sensitiveness of which is the reason for our feeling pain, was most acute. His soul likewise, from its interior powers, apprehended most vehemently all the causes of sadness.
Tertio magnitudo doloris Christi patientis potest considerari ex doloris puritate. Nam in aliis patientibus mitigatur tristitia interior, et etiam dolor exterior, ex aliqua consideratione rationis, per quandam derivationem seu redundantiam a superioribus viribus ad inferiores. Quod in Christo patiente non fuit, unicuique enim virium permisit agere quod est sibi proprium, sicut Damascenus dicit. Thirdly, the magnitude of Christ's suffering can be estimated from the singleness of His pain and sadness. In other sufferers the interior sadness is mitigated, and even the exterior suffering, from some consideration of reason, by some derivation or redundance from the higher powers into the lower; but it was not so with the suffering Christ, because "He permitted each one of His powers to exercise its proper function," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii).
Quarto potest considerari magnitudo doloris Christi patientis ex hoc quod passio illa et dolor a Christo fuerunt assumpta voluntarie, propter finem liberationis hominum a peccato. Et ideo tantam quantitatem doloris assumpsit quae esset proportionata magnitudini fructus qui inde sequebatur. Fourthly, the magnitude of the pain of Christ's suffering can be reckoned by this, that the pain and sorrow were accepted voluntarily, to the end of men's deliverance from sin; and consequently He embraced the amount of pain proportionate to the magnitude of the fruit which resulted therefrom.
Ex his igitur omnibus causis simul consideratis manifeste apparet quod dolor Christi fuit maximus. From all these causes weighed together, it follows that Christ's pain was the very greatest.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit ex uno tantum praedictorum, scilicet ex laesione corporali, quae est causa sensibilis doloris. Sed ex aliis causis multo magis dolor Christi patientis augetur, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 1: This argument follows from only one of the considerations adduced---namely, from the bodily injury, which is the cause of sensitive pain; but the torment of the suffering Christ is much more intensified from other causes, as above stated.
Ad secundum dicendum quod virtus moralis aliter mitigat tristitiam interiorem, et aliter exteriorem dolorem sensibilem. Tristitiam enim interiorem diminuit directe, in ea medium constituendo sicut in propria materia. Medium autem in passionibus virtus moralis constituit, ut in secunda parte habitum est, non secundum quantitatem rei, sed secundum quantitatem proportionis, ut scilicet passio non excedat regulam rationis. Et quia Stoici reputabant quod nulla tristitia esset ad aliquid utilis, ideo credebant quod totaliter a ratione discordaret, et per consequens quod totaliter esset sapienti vitanda. Sed secundum rei veritatem, tristitia aliqua laudabilis est, ut Augustinus probat, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quando scilicet procedit ex sancto amore, ut puta cum aliquis tristatur de peccatis propriis vel alienis. Assumitur etiam ut utilis ad finem satisfactionis pro peccato, secundum illud II Cor. VII, quae secundum Deum est tristitia, poenitentiam in salutem stabilem operatur. Et ideo Christus, ut satisfaceret pro peccatis omnium hominum, assumpsit tristitiam maximam quantitate absoluta, non tamen excedentem regulam rationis. Dolorem autem exteriorem sensus virtus moralis directe non minuit, quia talis dolor non obedit rationi, sed sequitur corporis naturam. Diminuit tamen ipsum indirecte per redundantiam a superioribus viribus in inferiores. Quod in Christo non fuit, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 2: Moral virtue lessens interior sadness in one way, and outward sensitive pain in quite another; for it lessens interior sadness directly by fixing the mean, as being its proper matter, within limits. But, as was laid down in the FS, Question [64], Article [2], moral virtue fixes the mean in the passions, not according to mathematical quantity, but according to quantity of proportion, so that the passion shall not go beyond the rule of reason. And since the Stoics held all sadness to be unprofitable, they accordingly believed it to be altogether discordant with reason, and consequently to be shunned altogether by a wise man. But in very truth some sadness is praiseworthy, as Augustine proves (De Civ. Dei xiv)---namely, when it flows from holy love, as, for instance, when a man is saddened over his own or others' sins. Furthermore, it is employed as a useful means of satisfying for sins, according to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 7:10): "The sorrow that is according to God worketh penance, steadfast unto salvation." And so to atone for the sins of all men, Christ accepted sadness, the greatest in absolute quantity, yet not exceeding the rule of reason. But moral virtue does not lessen outward sensitive pain, because such pain is not subject to reason, but follows the nature of the body; yet it lessens it indirectly by redundance of the higher powers into the lower. But this did not happen in Christ's case, as stated above (cf. Question [14], Article [1], ad 2; Question [45], Article [2]).
Ad tertium dicendum quod dolor animae separatae patientis pertinet ad statum futurae damnationis, qui excedit omne malum huius vitae, sicut sanctorum gloria excedit omne bonum praesentis vitae. Unde, cum diximus Christi dolorem esse maximum, non comparamus ipsum dolori animae separatae. Corpus autem Adae pati non poterat, nisi peccaret et sic fieret mortale et passibile. Et minus doleret patiens quam corpus Christi, propter rationes praedictas. Ex quibus etiam apparet quod etiam si, per impossibile, ponatur quod Adam in statu innocentiae passus fuisset, minor fuisset eius dolor quam Christi. Reply to Objection 3: The pain of a suffering, separated soul belongs to the state of future condemnation, which exceeds every evil of this life, just as the glory of the saints surpasses every good of the present life. Accordingly, when we say that Christ's pain was the greatest, we make no comparison between His and the pain of a separated soul. But Adam's body could not suffer, except he sinned. so that he would become mortal, and passible. And, though actually suffering, it would have felt less pain than Christ's body, for the reasons already stated. From all this it is clear that even if by impassibility Adam had suffered in the state of innocence, his pain would have been less than Christ's.
Ad quartum dicendum quod Christus non solum doluit pro amissione vitae corporalis propriae, sed etiam pro peccatis omnium aliorum. Qui dolor in Christo excessit omnem dolorem cuiuslibet contriti. Tum quia ex maiori sapientia et caritate processit, ex quibus dolor contritionis augetur. Tum etiam quia pro omnium peccatis simul doluit, secundum illud Isaiae LIII, vere dolores nostros ipse tulit. Vita autem corporalis Christi fuit tantae dignitatis, et praecipue propter divinitatem unitam, quod de eius amissione etiam ad horam, magis esset dolendum quam de amissione alterius hominis per quantumcumque tempus. Unde et philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod virtuosus plus diligit vitam suam quanto scit eam esse meliorem, et tamen eam exponit propter bonum virtutis. Et similiter Christus vitam suam maxime dilectam exposuit propter bonum caritatis, secundum illud Ierem. XII, dedi dilectam animam meam in manibus inimicorum eius. Reply to Objection 4: Christ grieved not only over the loss of His own bodily life, but also over the sins of all others. And this grief in Christ surpassed all grief of every contrite heart, both because it flowed from a greater wisdom and charity, by which the pang of contrition is intensified, and because He grieved at the one time for all sins, according to Is. 53:4: "Surely He hath carried our sorrows." But such was the dignity of Christ's life in the body, especially on account of the Godhead united with it, that its loss, even for one hour, would be a matter of greater grief than the loss of another man's life for howsoever long a time. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) that the man of virtue loves his life all the more in proportion as he knows it to be better; and yet he exposes it for virtue's sake. And in like fashion Christ laid down His most beloved life for the good of charity, according to Jer. 12:7: "I have given My dear soul into the hands of her enemies."
Ad quintum dicendum quod innocentia patientis minuit dolorem passionis quantum ad numerum, quia, dum nocens patitur, dolet non solum de poena, sed etiam de culpa; innocens autem solum de poena. Qui tamen dolor in eo augetur ex innocentia, inquantum apprehendit nocumentum illatum ut magis indebitum. Unde etiam et alii magis sunt reprehensibiles si eis non compatiuntur, secundum illud Isaiae LVII, iustus autem perit, et non est qui recogitet in corde suo. Reply to Objection 5: The sufferer's innocence does lessen numerically the pain of the suffering, since, when a guilty man suffers, he grieves not merely on account of the penalty, but also because of the crime. whereas the innocent man grieves only for the penalty: yet this pain is more intensified by reason of his innocence, in so far as he deems the hurt inflicted to be the more undeserved. Hence it is that even others are more deserving of blame if they do not compassionate him. according to Is. 57:1: "The just perisheth, and no man layeth it to heart."
Ad sextum dicendum quod Christus voluit genus humanum a peccatis liberare, non sola potestate, sed etiam iustitia. Et ideo non solum attendit quantam virtutem dolor eius haberet ex divinitate unita, sed etiam quantum dolor eius sufficeret secundum naturam humanam, ad tantam satisfactionem. Reply to Objection 6: Christ willed to deliver the human race from sins not merely by His power, but also according to justice. And therefore He did not simply weigh what great virtue His suffering would have from union with the Godhead, but also how much, according to His human nature, His pain would avail for so great a satisfaction.

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Whether Christ suffered in His whole soul?

Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non fuerit passus secundum totam animam. Anima enim patitur, patiente corpore, per accidens, inquantum est corporis actus. Sed anima non est actus corporis secundum quamlibet partem eius, nam intellectus nullius corporis actus est, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo videtur quod Christus non fuerit passus secundum totam animam. Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not suffer in His whole soul. For the soul suffers indirectly when the body suffers, inasmuch as it is the "act of the body." But the soul is not, as to its every part, the "act of the body"; because the intellect is the act of no body, as is said De Anima iii. Therefore it seems that Christ did not suffer in His whole soul.
Praeterea, quaelibet potentia animae patitur a suo obiecto. Sed superioris partis rationis obiectum sunt rationes aeternae, quibus inspiciendis et consulendis intendit, ut Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin. Ex rationibus autem aeternis nullum potuit Christus pati nocumentum, cum in nullo ei contrariarentur. Ergo videtur quod non fuerit passus secundum totam animam. Objection 2: Further, every power of the soul is passive in regard to its proper object. But the higher part of reason has for its object the eternal types, "to the consideration and consultation of which it directs itself," as Augustine says (De Trin. xii). But Christ could suffer no hurt from the eternal types, since they are nowise opposed to Him. Therefore it seems that He did not suffer in His whole soul.
Praeterea, quando passio sensibilis usque ad rationem pertingit, tunc dicitur completa passio. Quae in Christo non fuit, ut Hieronymus dicit, sed solum propassio. Unde et Dionysius dicit, in epistola ad Ioannem Evangelistam, quod passiones sibi illatas patiebatur secundum iudicare solum. Non ergo videtur quod Christus secundum totam animam pateretur. Objection 3: Further, a sensitive passion is said to be complete when it comes into contact with the reason. But there was none such in Christ, but only "pro-passions"; as Jerome remarks on Mt. 26:37. Hence Dionysius says in a letter to John the Evangelist that "He endured only mentally the sufferings inflicted upon Him." Consequently it does not seem that Christ suffered in His whole soul.
Praeterea, passio dolorem causat. Sed in intellectu speculativo non est dolor, quia delectationi quae est ab eo quod est considerare, nulla tristitia opponitur, ut philosophus dicit, I Topic. Ergo videtur quod Christus non pateretur secundum totam animam. Objection 4: Further, suffering causes pain: but there is no pain in the speculative intellect, because, as the Philosopher says (Topic. i), "there is no sadness in opposition to the pleasure which comes of consideration." Therefore it seems that Christ did not suffer in His whole soul.
Sed contra est quod in Psalmo dicitur, ex persona Christi, repleta est malis anima mea, Glossa, non vitiis, sed doloribus, quibus anima carni compatitur, vel malis, scilicet pereuntis populi, compatiendo. Non autem fuisset anima eius his malis repleta, si non secundum totam animam passus esset. Ergo Christus secundum totam animam passus est. On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 87:4) on behalf of Christ: "My soul is filled with evils": upon which the gloss adds: "Not with vices, but with woes, whereby the soul suffers with the flesh; or with evils, viz. of a perishing people, by compassionating them." But His soul would not have been filled with these evils except He had suffered in His whole soul. Therefore Christ suffered in His entire soul.
Respondeo dicendum quod totum dicitur respectu partium. Partes autem animae dicuntur potentiae eius. Sic ergo dicitur anima tota pati, inquantum patitur secundum suam essentiam, vel inquantum secundum omnes suas potentias patitur. Sed considerandum est quod aliqua potentia animae potest pati dupliciter. Uno modo, passione propria, quae quidem est secundum quod patitur a suo obiecto, sicut si visus patiatur ex superabundantia visibilis. Alio modo patitur aliqua potentia passione subiecti super quod fundatur, sicut visus patitur patiente sensu tactus in oculo, super quem fundatur visus; puta cum oculus pungitur, aut etiam distemperatur per calorem. I answer that, A whole is so termed with respect to its parts. But the parts of a soul are its faculties. So, then, the whole soul is said to suffer in so far as it is afflicted as to its essence, or as to all its faculties. But it must be borne in mind that a faculty of the soul can suffer in two ways: first of all, by its own passion; and this comes of its being afflicted by its proper object; thus, sight may suffer from superabundance of the visible object. In another way a faculty suffers by a passion in the subject on which it is based; as sight suffers when the sense of touch in the eye is affected, upon which the sense of sight rests, as, for instance, when the eye is pricked, or is disaffected by heat.
Sic igitur dicendum quod, si intelligamus totam animam ratione suae essentiae, sic manifestum est totam animam Christi passam esse. Nam tota essentia animae coniungitur corpori ita quod tota est in toto, et tota in qualibet parte eius. Et ideo, corpore patiente et disposito ad separationem ab anima, tota anima patiebatur. Si vero intelligamus totam animam secundum omnes potentias eius, sic, loquendo de passionibus propriis potentiarum, patiebatur quidem secundum omnes vires inferiores, quia in singulis viribus inferioribus animae, quae circa temporalia operantur, inveniebatur aliquid quod erat causa doloris Christi, sicut ex supra dictis patet. Sed secundum hoc superior ratio non patiebatur in Christo ex parte sui obiecti, scilicet Dei, qui non erat animae Christi causa doloris, sed delectationis et gaudii. Secundum autem illum modum passionis quo potentia aliqua dicitur pati ex parte sui subiecti, sic omnes potentiae animae Christi patiebantur. Omnes enim potentiae animae Christi radicantur in essentia eius, ad quam perveniebat passio, passo corpore, cuius est actus. So, then, we say that if the soul be considered with respect to its essence, it is evident that Christ's whole soul suffered. For the soul's whole essence is allied with the body, so that it is entire in the whole body and in its every part. Consequently, when the body suffered and was disposed to separate from the soul, the entire soul suffered. But if we consider the whole soul according to its faculties, speaking thus of the proper passions of the faculties, He suffered indeed as to all His lower powers; because in all the soul's lower powers, whose operations are but temporal, there was something to be found which was a source of woe to Christ, as is evident from what was said above (Article [6]). But Christ's higher reason did not suffer thereby on the part of its object, which is God, who was the cause, not of grief, but rather of delight and joy, to the soul of Christ. Nevertheless, all the powers of Christ's soul did suffer according as any faculty is said to be affected as regards its subject, because all the faculties of Christ's soul were rooted in its essence, to which suffering extended when the body, whose act it is, suffered.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet intellectus, secundum quod est potentia quaedam, non sit corporis actus; essentia tamen animae est corporis actus, in qua radicatur potentia intellectiva, ut in prima parte habitum est. Reply to Objection 1: Although the intellect as a faculty is not the act of the body, still the soul's essence is the act of the body, and in it the intellective faculty is rooted, as was shown in the FP, Question [77], Articles [6],8.
Ad secundum dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de passione quae est ex parte proprii obiecti, secundum quam superior ratio in Christo passa non fuit. Reply to Objection 2: This argument proceeds from passion on the part of the proper object, according to which Christ's higher reason did not suffer.
Ad tertium dicendum quod dolor tunc dicitur esse passio perfecta, per quam anima perturbatur, quando passio sensitivae partis pertingit usque ad immutandam rationem a rectitudine sui actus, ut scilicet sequatur passionem, et non habeat liberum arbitrium super eam. Sic autem passio sensitivae partis non pervenit in Christo usque ad rationem, sed ex parte subiecti, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 3: Grief is then said to be a true passion, by which the soul is troubled, when the passion in the sensitive part causes reason to deflect from the rectitude of its act, so that it then follows the passion, and has no longer free-will with regard to it. In this way passion of the sensitive part did not extend to reason in Christ, but merely subjectively, as was stated above.
Ad quartum dicendum quod intellectus speculativus non potest habere dolorem vel tristitiam ex parte sui obiecti, quod est verum absolute consideratum, quod est perfectio eius. Potest tamen ad ipsum pertinere dolor, vel causa doloris, per modum iam dictum. Reply to Objection 4: The speculative intellect can have no pain or sadness on the part of its object, which is truth considered absolutely, and which is its perfection: nevertheless, both grief and its cause can reach it in the way mentioned above.

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Whether Christ's entire soul enjoyed blessed fruition during the Passion?

Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima Christi, in articulo illius passionis, non tota frueretur fruitione beata. Impossibile est enim simul dolere et gaudere, cum dolor et gaudium sint contraria. Sed anima Christi tota patiebatur dolorem in tempore passionis, ut supra habitum est. Non ergo poterat esse ut tota frueretur. Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's entire soul did not enjoy blessed fruition during the Passion. For it is not possible to be sad and glad at the one time, since sadness and gladness are contraries. But Christ's whole soul suffered grief during the Passion, as was stated above (Article [7]). Therefore His whole soul could not enjoy fruition.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod tristitia, si sit vehemens, non solum impedit delectationem contrariam, sed quamcumque, et e converso. Dolor autem passionis Christi fuit maximus, ut ostensum est, et similiter delectatio fruitionis est maxima, ut in primo secundae partis habitum est. Non ergo potuit esse quod anima Christi tota simul pateretur et frueretur. Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii) that, if sadness be vehement, it not only checks the contrary delight, but every delight; and conversely. But the grief of Christ's Passion was the greatest, as shown above (Article [6]); and likewise the enjoyment of fruition is also the greatest, as was laid down in the first volume of the FS, Question [34], Article [3]. Consequently, it was not possible for Christ's whole soul to be suffering and rejoicing at the one time.
Praeterea, fruitio beata est secundum cognitionem et amorem divinorum, ut patet per Augustinum, in I de Doct. Christ. Sed non omnes vires animae attingunt ad cognoscendum et amandum Deum. Non ergo tota anima Christi fruebatur. Objection 3: Further, beatific "fruition" comes of the knowledge and love of Divine things, as Augustine says (Doctr. Christ. i). But all the soul's powers do not extend to the knowledge and love of God. Therefore Christ's whole soul did not enjoy fruition.
Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod divinitas Christi permisit carni agere et pati quae propria. Ergo, pari ratione, cum proprium esset animae Christi, inquantum erat beata, quod frueretur, passio eius fruitionem non impediebat. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): Christ's Godhead "permitted His flesh to do and to suffer what was proper to it." In like fashion, since it belonged to Christ's soul, inasmuch as it was blessed, to enjoy fruition, His Passion did not impede fruition.
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est prius, tota anima potest intelligi et secundum essentiam, et secundum omnes eius potentias. Si autem intelligatur secundum essentiam, sic tota anima fruebatur, inquantum est subiectum superioris partis animae, cuius est frui divinitate, ut, sicut passio ratione essentiae attribuitur superiori parti animae, ita e converso fruitio ratione superioris partis animae attribuatur essentiae. Si vero accipiamus totam animam ratione omnium potentiarum eius, sic non tota anima fruebatur, nec directe quidem, quia fruitio non potest esse actus cuiuslibet partis animae; nec per redundantiam, quia, dum Christus erat viator, non fiebat redundantia gloriae a superiori parte in inferiorem, nec ab anima in corpus. Sed quia nec e converso superior pars animae non impediebatur circa id quod est sibi proprium, per inferiorem, consequens est quod superior pars animae perfecte fruebatur, Christo patiente. I answer that, As stated above (Article [7]), the whole soul can be understood both according to its essence and according to all its faculties. If it be understood according to its essence, then His whole soul did enjoy fruition, inasmuch as it is the subject of the higher part of the soul, to which it belongs, to enjoy the Godhead: so that as passion, by reason of the essence, is attributed to the higher part of the soul, so, on the other hand, by reason of the superior part of the soul, fruition is attributed to the essence. But if we take the whole soul as comprising all its faculties, thus His entire soul did not enjoy fruition: not directly, indeed, because fruition is not the act of any one part of the soul; nor by any overflow of glory, because, since Christ was still upon earth, there was no overflowing of glory from the higher part into the lower, nor from the soul into the body. But since, on the contrary, the soul's higher part was not hindered in its proper acts by the lower, it follows that the higher part of His soul enjoyed fruition perfectly while Christ was suffering.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod gaudium fruitionis non contrariatur directe dolori passionis, quia non sunt de eodem. Nihil enim prohibet contraria eidem inesse non secundum idem. Et sic gaudium fruitionis potest pertinere ad superiorem partem rationis per proprium actum, dolor autem passionis secundum suum subiectum. Ad essentiam vero animae pertinet dolor passionis ex parte corporis, cuius est forma, gaudium vero fruitionis ex parte potentiae, cui subiicitur. Reply to Objection 1: The joy of fruition is not opposed directly to the grief of the Passion, because they have not the same object. Now nothing prevents contraries from being in the same subject, but not according to the same. And so the joy of fruition can appertain to the higher part of reason by its proper act; but grief of the Passion according to the subject. Grief of the Passion belongs to the essence of the soul by reason of the body, whose form the soul is; whereas the joy of fruition (belongs to the soul) by reason of the faculty in which it is subjected.
Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum illud philosophi habet veritatem ratione redundantiae quae naturaliter fit ab una potentia animae in aliam. Sed hoc in Christo non fuit, ut supra dictum est. Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher's contention is true because of the overflow which takes place naturally of one faculty of the soul into another; but it was not so with Christ, as was said above.
Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de totalitate animae quantum ad eius potentias. Reply to Objection 3: Such argument holds good of the totality of the soul with regard to its faculties.

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Whether Christ suffered at a suitable time?

Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non fuerit convenienti tempore passus. Passio enim Christi figurabatur per immolationem agni paschalis, unde et apostolus dicit, I Cor. V, Pascha nostrum immolatus est Christus. Sed agnus paschalis immolabatur quartadecima die ad vesperam, ut dicitur Exod. XII. Ergo videtur quod Christus tunc debuerit pati. Quod patet esse falsum, nam tunc Pascha cum suis discipulis celebravit, secundum illud Marc. XIV, prima die azymorum, quando Pascha immolabant; sequenti autem die passus fuit. Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not suffer at a suitable time. For Christ's Passion was prefigured by the sacrifice of the Paschal lamb: hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:7): "Christ our Pasch is sacrificed." But the paschal lamb was slain "on the fourteenth day at eventide," as is stated in Ex. 12:6. Therefore it seems that Christ ought to have suffered then; which is manifestly false: for He was then celebrating the Pasch with His disciples, according to Mark's account (14:12): "On the first day of the unleavened bread, when they sacrificed the Pasch"; whereas it was on the following day that He suffered.
Praeterea, passio Christi dicitur eius exaltatio, secundum illud Ioan. III, oportet exaltari filium hominis. Ipse autem Christus dicitur sol iustitiae, ut patet Malach. ultimo. Ergo videtur quod debuit pati hora sexta, quando sol est in maxima sua exaltatione. Cuius contrarium videtur per id quod dicitur Marc. XV, erat autem hora tertia, et crucifixerunt eum. Objection 2: Further, Christ's Passion is called His uplifting, according to Jn. 3:14: "So must the Son of man be lifted up." And Christ is Himself called the Sun of Justice, as we read Mal. 4:2. Therefore it seems that He ought to have suffered at the sixth hour, when the sun is at its highest point, and yet the contrary appears from Mk. 15:25: "It was the third hour, and they crucified Him."
Praeterea, sicut sol in hora sexta maxime exaltatur quolibet die, ita in solstitio aestivali maxime exaltatur quolibet anno. Debuit ergo Christus magis pati circa tempus solstitii aestivalis, quam circa tempus aequinoctii vernalis. Objection 3: Further, as the sun is at its highest point in each day at the sixth hour, so also it reaches its highest point in every year at the summer solstice. Therefore Christ ought to have suffered about the time of the summer solstice rather than about the vernal equinox.
Praeterea, per praesentiam Christi in mundo mundus illuminabatur, secundum illud Ioan. IX, quandiu sum in mundo, lux mundi sum. Conveniens igitur fuisset humanae saluti ut diutius in hoc mundo vixisset, ita quod non pateretur in iuvenili aetate, sed magis in senili. Objection 4: Further, the world was enlightened by Christ's presence in it, according to Jn. 9:5: "As long as I am in the world I am the light of the world." Consequently it was fitting for man's salvation that Christ should have lived longer in the world, so that He should have suffered, not in young, but in old, age.
Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. XIII, sciens Iesus quod venit hora eius ut transeat de hoc mundo ad patrem. Et Ioan. II dicit, nondum venit hora mea. Ubi dicit Augustinus, ubi tantum fecit quantum sufficere iudicavit, venit hora eius, non necessitatis, sed voluntatis; non conditionis, sed potestatis. Convenienti igitur tempore passus est. On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 13:1): "Jesus, knowing that His hour was come for Him to pass out of this world to the Father"; and (Jn. 2:4): "My hour is not yet come." Upon which texts Augustine observes: "When He had done as much as He deemed sufficient, then came His hour, not of necessity, but of will, not of condition, but of power." Therefore Christ died at an opportune time.
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, passio Christi subiecta erat eius voluntati. Voluntas autem eius regebatur divina sapientia, quae omnia convenienter et suaviter disponit, ut dicitur Sap. VIII. Et ideo dicendum est quod convenienti tempore passio Christi celebrata est. Unde et in libro quaest. Nov. et Vet. Test., dicitur, omnia propriis locis et temporibus gessit salvator. I answer that, As was observed above (Article [1]), Christ's Passion was subject to His will. But His will was ruled by the Divine wisdom which "ordereth all things" conveniently and "sweetly" (Wis. 8:1). Consequently it must be said that Christ's Passion was enacted at an opportune time. Hence it is written in De Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. lv: "The Saviour did everything in its proper place and season."
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quidam dicunt Christum fuisse passum quartadecima luna, quando Iudaei Pascha immolabant. Unde et Ioan. XVIII dicitur quod Iudaei non introierunt in praetorium Pilati ipso die passionis, ut non contaminarentur, sed ut manducarent Pascha. Ubi Chrysostomus dicit quod tunc Iudaei faciebant Pascha, ipse vero ante unam diem celebravit Pascha, reservans suam occisionem sextae feriae, quando vetus Pascha fiebat. Cui videtur consonare quod dicitur Ioan. XIII, quod ante diem festum Paschae, Christus, facta cena, pedes discipulorum lavit. Reply to Objection 1: Some hold that Christ did die on the fourteenth day of the moon, when the Jews sacrificed the Pasch: hence it is stated (Jn. 18:28) that the Jews "went not into Pilate's hall" on the day of the Passion, "that they might not be defiled, but that they might eat the Pasch." Upon this Chrysostom observes (Hom. lxxxii in Joan.): "The Jews celebrated the Pasch then; but He celebrated the Pasch on the previous day, reserving His own slaying until the Friday, when the old Pasch was kept." And this appears to tally with the statement (Jn. 13:1-5) that "before the festival day of the Pasch... when supper was done"... Christ washed "the feet of the disciples."
Sed contra hoc videtur esse quod dicitur Matth. XXVI, quod prima die azymorum accesserunt discipuli ad Iesum dicentes, ubi vis paremus tibi comedere Pascha? Ex quo patet, cum primus dies azymorum dicatur quartusdecimus dies mensis primi, quando agnus immolabatur et luna plenissima est, ut Hieronymus dicit, quartadecima luna Christum cenam fecisse, et quintadecima eum passum fuisse. Et hoc expressius manifestatur per id quod dicitur Marc. XIV, primo die azymorum, quando Pascha immolabant, etc.; et Luc. XXII, venit dies azymorum, in quo necesse erat occidi Pascha. But Matthew's account (26:17) seems opposed to this; that "on the first day of the Azymes the disciples came to Jesus, saying: Where wilt Thou that we prepare for Thee to eat the Pasch?" From which, as Jerome says, "since the fourteenth day of the first month is called the day of the Azymes, when the lamb was slain, and when it was full moon," it is quite clear that Christ kept the supper on the fourteenth and died on the fifteenth. And this comes out more clearly from Mk. 14:12: "On the first day of the unleavened bread, when they sacrificed the Pasch," etc.; and from Lk. 22:7: "The day of the unleavened bread came, on which it was necessary that the Pasch should be killed."
Et ideo quidam dicunt quod Christus die convenienti, idest quartadecima luna, Pascha cum discipulis suis manducavit, demonstrans quod usque ad ultimum diem non erat contrarius legi, ut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., sed Iudaei, occupati circa procurationem mortis Christi, contra legem celebrationem Paschae in crastinum distulerunt. Et propter hoc de his dicitur quod in die passionis Christi noluerunt intrare praetorium, ut non contaminarentur, sed manducarent Pascha. Consequently, then, others say that Christ ate the Pasch with His disciples on the proper day---that is, on the fourteenth day of the moon---"showing thereby that up to the last day He was not opposed to the law," as Chrysostom says (Hom. lxxxi in Matth.): but that the Jews, being busied in compassing Christ's death against the law, put off celebrating the Pasch until the following day. And on this account it is said of them that on the day of Christ's Passion they were unwilling to enter Pilate's hall, "that they might not be defiled, but that they might eat the Pasch."
Sed nec illud videtur esse consonum verbis Marci dicentis, primo die azymorum, quando Pascha immolabant. Simul ergo Christus et Iudaei vetus Pascha celebraverunt. Et, sicut Beda dicit, super Marc., licet Christus, qui est Pascha nostrum, sit crucifixus sequenti die, hoc est quintadecima luna; attamen nocte qua agnus immolabatur, corporis sanguinisque sui discipulis tradens mysteria celebranda, et a Iudaeis tentus et alligatus, ipsius immolationis, hoc est passionis suae, sacravit exordium. But even this solution does not tally with Mark, who says: "On the first day of the unleavened bread, when they sacrificed the Pasch." Consequently Christ and the Jews celebrated the ancient Pasch at the one time. And as Bede says on Lk. 22:7,8: "Although Christ who is our Pasch was slain on the following day---that is, on the fifteenth day of the moon---nevertheless, on the night when the Lamb was sacrificed, delivering to the disciples to be celebrated, the mysteries of His body and blood, and being held and bound by the Jews, He hallowed the opening of His own immolation---that is, of His Passion."
Cum autem dicitur, Ioan. XIII, ante diem festum Paschae, intelligitur hoc fuisse quartadecima luna, quod tunc evenit feria quinta, nam, luna existente quintadecima, erat dies solemnissimus Paschae apud Iudaeos. Et sic eundem diem quem Ioannes nominat ante diem festum Paschae, propter distinctionem naturalem dierum, Matthaeus nominat primam diem azymorum, quia, secundum ritum Iudaicae festivitatis, solemnitas incipiebat a vespera praecedentis diei. Quod autem dicitur eos comesturos esse Pascha in quintadecima luna, intelligendum est quod ibi Pascha non dicitur agnus paschalis, qui immolatus fuerat decimaquarta luna, sed dicitur cibus paschalis, idest azymi panes, quos oportebat comedi a mundis. Unde Chrysostomus ibi aliam expositionem ponit, quod Pascha potest accipi pro toto festo Iudaeorum, quod septem diebus agebatur. But the words (Jn. 13:1) "Before the festival day of the Pasch" are to be understood to refer to the fourteenth day of the moon, which then fell upon the Thursday: for the fifteenth day of the moon was the most solemn day of the Pasch with the Jews: and so the same day which John calls "before the festival day of the Pasch," on account of the natural distinction of days, Matthew calls the first day of the unleavened bread, because, according to the rite of the Jewish festivity, the solemnity began from the evening of the preceding day. When it is said, then, that they were going to eat the Pasch on the fifteenth day of the month, it is to be understood that the Pasch there is not called the Paschal lamb, which was sacrificed on the fourteenth day, but the Paschal food---that is, the unleavened bread---which had to be eaten by the clean. Hence Chrysostom in the same passage gives another explanation, that the Pasch can be taken as meaning the whole feast of the Jews, which lasted seven days.
Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de consensu Evang., hora erat quasi sexta, cum traditus esset dominus crucifigendus a Pilato, ut Ioannes dicit, non enim erat plena sexta, sed quasi sexta, idest, peracta quinta, et aliquid de sexta esse coeperat, donec, completa sexta, Christo pendente in cruce, tenebrae fierent. Intelligitur autem fuisse hora tertia cum clamaverunt Iudaei ut dominus crucifigeretur, et veracissime demonstratur tunc eos crucifixisse quando clamaverunt. Ergo, ne quisquam cogitationem tanti criminis a Iudaeis aversus in milites converteret, erat, inquit, hora tertia, et crucifixerunt eum, ut illi potius eum crucifixisse inveniantur qui hora tertia ut crucifigeretur clamaverunt. Quanquam non desint qui parasceve, quam Ioannes commemorat, dicens, erat autem parasceve hora quasi sexta, horam diei tertiam velint intelligi. Parasceve quippe interpretatur praeparatio. Verum autem Pascha, quod in passione domini celebratur, incoepit praeparari ab hora noctis nona, quando scilicet omnes principes sacerdotum dixerunt, reus est mortis. Ab illa ergo hora noctis usque ad Christi crucifixionem occurrit hora parasceve sexta, secundum Ioannem; et hora diei tertia, secundum Marcum. Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Consensu Evang. iii): "'It was about the sixth hour' when the Lord was delivered up by Pilate to be crucified," as John relates. For it "was not quite the sixth hour, but about the sixth---that is, it was after the fifth, and when part of the sixth had been entered upon until the sixth hour was ended---that the darkness began, when Christ hung upon the cross. It is understood to have been the third hour when the Jews clamored for the Lord to be crucified: and it is most clearly shown that they crucified Him when they clamored out. Therefore, lest anyone might divert the thought of so great a crime from the Jews to the soldiers, he says: 'It was the third hour, and they crucified Him,' that they before all may be found to have crucified Him, who at the third hour clamored for His crucifixion. Although there are not wanting some persons who wish the Parasceve to be understood as the third hour, which John recalls, saying: 'It was the Parasceve, about the sixth hour.' For 'Parasceve' is interpreted 'preparation.' But the true Pasch, which was celebrated in the Lord's Passion, began to be prepared from the ninth hour of the night---namely, when the chief priests said: 'He is deserving of death.'" According to John, then, "the sixth hour of the Parasceve" lasts from that hour of the night down to Christ's crucifixion; while, according to Mark, it is the third hour of the day.
Quidam tamen dicunt quod haec diversitas ex peccato scriptoris contingit apud Graecos, nam figurae quibus tria et sex repraesentantur, satis sunt propinquae apud eos. Still, there are some who contend that this discrepancy is due to the error of a Greek transcriber: since the characters employed by them to represent 3 and 6 are somewhat alike.
Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in libro de quaest. Nov. et Vet. Test., tunc voluit dominus passione sua mundum redimere et reformare, quando eum creaverat, idest in aequinoctio. Et tunc dies super noctem increscit, quia per passionem salvatoris a tenebris ad lucem perducimur. Et quia perfecta illuminatio erit in secundo adventu Christi, ideo tempus secundi adventus aestati comparatur, Matth. XXIV, ubi dicitur, cum ramus eius iam tener fuerit et folia nata, scitis quia prope est aestas. Ita et vos, cum videritis haec omnia, scitote quia prope est et in ianuis. Et tunc etiam erit maxima Christi exaltatio. Reply to Objection 3: According to the author of De Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. lv, "our Lord willed to redeem and reform the world by His Passion, at the time of year at which He had created it---that is, at the equinox. It is then that day grows upon night; because by our Saviour's Passion we are brought from darkness to light." And since the perfect enlightening will come about at Christ's second coming, therefore the season of His second coming is compared (Mt. 24:32,33) to the summer in these words: "When the branch thereof is now tender, and the leaves come forth, you know that summer is nigh: so you also, when you shall see all these things, know ye that it is nigh even at the doors." And then also shall be Christ's greatest exaltation.
Ad quartum dicendum quod Christus in iuvenili aetate pati voluit propter tria. Primo quidem, ut ex hoc magis suam dilectionem commendaret, quod vitam suam pro nobis dedit quando erat in perfectissimo statu. Secundo, quia non conveniebat ut in eo appareret naturae diminutio, sicut nec morbus, ut supra dictum est. Tertio ut, in iuvenili aetate moriens et resurgens, futuram resurgentium qualitatem in seipso Christus praemonstraret. Unde dicitur Ephes. IV, donec occurramus omnes in unitatem fidei et agnitionis filii Dei, in virum perfectum, in mensuram aetatis plenitudinis Christi. Reply to Objection 4: Christ willed to suffer while yet young, for three reasons. First of all, to commend the more His love by giving up His life for us when He was in His most perfect state of life. Secondly, because it was not becoming for Him to show any decay of nature nor to be subject to disease, as stated above (Question [14], Article [4]). Thirdly, that by dying and rising at an early age Christ might exhibit beforehand in His own person the future condition of those who rise again. Hence it is written (Eph. 4:13): "Until we all meet into the unity of faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ."

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Article: 10  [ << | >> ]

Whether Christ suffered in a suitable place?

Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non convenienti loco Christus passus fuerit. Christus enim passus est secundum carnem humanam, quae quidem concepta fuit ex virgine in Nazareth, et nata in Bethlehem. Ergo videtur quod non in Ierusalem, sed in Nazareth vel in Bethlehem pati debuerit. Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not suffer in a suitable place. For Christ suffered according to His human nature, which was conceived in Nazareth and born in Bethlehem. Consequently it seems that He ought not to have suffered in Jerusalem, but in Nazareth or Bethlehem.
Praeterea, veritas debet respondere figurae. Sed passio Christi figurabatur per sacrificia veteris legis. Sed huiusmodi sacrificia offerebantur in templo. Ergo et Christus in templo pati debuit, et non extra portam civitatis. Objection 2: Further, the reality ought to correspond with the figure. But Christ's Passion was prefigured by the sacrifices of the Old Law, and these were offered up in the Temple. Therefore it seems that Christ ought to have suffered in the Temple, and not outside the city gate.
Praeterea, medicina debet morbo respondere. Sed passio Christi fuit medicina contra peccatum Adae. Adam autem non fuit sepultus in Ierusalem, sed in Hebron, dicitur enim Iosue XIV, nomen Hebron antea vocabatur Cariath Arbe, Adam maximus ibi in terra Enacim situs erat. Objection 3: Further, the medicine should correspond with the disease. But Christ's Passion was the medicine against Adam's sin: and Adam was not buried in Jerusalem, but in Hebron; for it is written (Josue 14:15): "The name of Hebron before was called Cariath-Arbe: Adam the greatest in the land of [Vulg.: 'among'] the Enacims was laid there."
Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc. XIII, non capit prophetam perire extra Ierusalem. Convenienter igitur in Ierusalem passus est. On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 13:33): "It cannot be that a prophet perish out of Jerusalem." Therefore it was fitting that He should die in Jerusalem.
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in libro octoginta trium quaest., omnia propriis locis et temporibus gessit salvator, quia, sicut omnia sunt in manu eius, ita etiam omnia loca. Et ideo, sicut convenienti tempore Christus passus est, ita etiam convenienti loco. I answer that, According to the author of De Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. lv, "the Saviour did everything in its proper place and season," because, as all things are in His hands, so are all places: and consequently, since Christ suffered at a suitable time, so did He in a suitable place.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus convenientissime in Ierusalem passus est. Primo quidem, quia Ierusalem erat locus a Deo electus ad sacrificia sibi offerenda. Quae quidem figuralia sacrificia figurabant Christi passionem, quod est verum sacrificium, secundum illud Ephes. V, tradidit semetipsum hostiam et oblationem in odorem suavitatis. Unde Beda dicit, in quadam homilia, quod appropinquante hora passionis, dominus appropinquare voluit loco passionis, scilicet in Ierusalem, quo pervenit ante quinque dies Paschae, sicut agnus paschalis ante quinque dies Paschae, idest decima luna, secundum praeceptum legis, ad locum immolationis ducebatur. Reply to Objection 1: Christ died most appropriately in Jerusalem. First of all, because Jerusalem was God's chosen place for the offering of sacrifices to Himself: and these figurative sacrifices foreshadowed Christ's Passion, which is a true sacrifice, according to Eph. 5:2: "He hath delivered Himself for us, an oblation and a sacrifice to God for an odor of sweetness." Hence Bede says in a Homily (xxiii): "When the Passion drew nigh, our Lord willed to draw nigh to the place of the Passion"---that is to say, to Jerusalem---whither He came five days before the Pasch; just as, according to the legal precept, the Paschal lamb was led to the place of immolation five days before the Pasch, which is the tenth day of the moon.
Secundo, quia virtus passionis eius ad totum mundum diffundenda erat, in medio terrae habitabilis pati voluit, idest in Ierusalem. Unde dicitur in Psalmo, Deus autem, rex noster ante saecula, operatus est salutem in medio terrae, idest in Ierusalem, quae dicitur esse terrae umbilicus. Secondly, because the virtue of His Passion was to be spread over the whole world, He wished to suffer in the center of the habitable world---that is, in Jerusalem. Accordingly it is written (Ps. 73:12): "But God is our King before ages: He hath wrought salvation in the midst of the earth"---that is, in Jerusalem, which is called "the navel of the earth" [*Cf. Jerome's comment on Ezech. 5:5].
Tertio, quia hoc maxime conveniebat humilitati eius, ut scilicet, sicut turpissimum genus mortis elegit, ita etiam ad eius humilitatem pertinuit quod in loco tam celebri confusionem pati non recusavit. Unde Leo Papa dicit, in sermone quodam Epiphaniae, qui servi susceperat formam, Bethlehem praeelegit nativitati, Ierusalem passioni. Thirdly, because it was specially in keeping with His humility: that, as He chose the most shameful manner of death, so likewise it was part of His humility that He did not refuse to suffer in so celebrated a place. Hence Pope Leo says (Serm. I in Epiph.): "He who had taken upon Himself the form of a servant chose Bethlehem for His nativity and Jerusalem for His Passion."
Quarto, ut ostenderet a principibus populi exortam esse iniquitatem occidentium ipsum. Et ideo in Ierusalem, ubi principes morabantur, voluit pati. Unde dicitur Act. IV, convenerunt in ista civitate adversus puerum sanctum tuum Iesum, quem unxisti, Herodes et Pontius Pilatus, cum gentibus et populis Israel. Fourthly, He willed to suffer in Jerusalem, where the chief priests dwelt, to show that the wickedness of His slayers arose from the chiefs of the Jewish people. Hence it is written (Acts 4:27): "There assembled together in this city against Thy holy child Jesus whom Thou hast anointed, Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the people of Israel."
Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus non in templo aut in civitate, sed extra portam passus est, propter tria. Primo quidem, ut veritas responderet figurae. Nam vitulus et hircus, qui solemnissimo sacrificio ad expiationem totius multitudinis offerebantur, extra castra comburebantur, ut praecipitur Levit. XVI. Unde dicitur Heb. XIII, quorum animalium infertur sanguis pro peccato in sancta per pontificem, horum corpora cremantur extra castra. Propter quod et Iesus, ut sanctificaret suum populum, extra portam passus est. Reply to Objection 2: For three reasons Christ suffered outside the gate, and not in the Temple nor in the city. First of all, that the truth might correspond with the figure. For the calf and the goat which were offered in most solemn sacrifice for expiation on behalf of the entire multitude were burnt outside the camp, as commanded in Lev. 16:27. Hence it is written (Heb. 13:27): "For the bodies of those beasts, whose blood is brought into the holies by the high-priest for sin, are burned without the camp. Wherefore Jesus also, that He might sanctify the people by His own blood, suffered without the gate."
Secundo, ut per hoc daret exemplum nobis exeundi a mundana conversatione. Unde ibidem subditur, exeamus igitur ad eum extra castra, improperium eius portantes. Secondly, to set us the example of shunning worldly conversation. Accordingly the passage continues: "Let us go forth therefore to Him without the camp, bearing His reproach."
Tertio, ut Chrysostomus dicit, in sermone de passione, noluit dominus pati sub tecto, non in templo Iudaico, ne Iudaei subtraherent sacrificium salutare, ne putares pro illa tantum plebe oblatum. Et ideo foras civitatem, foras muros, ut scias sacrificium esse commune quod totius terrae est oblatio, quod communis est purificatio. Thirdly, as Chrysostom says in a sermon on the Passion (Hom. i De Cruce et Latrone): "The Lord was not willing to suffer under a roof, nor in the Jewish Temple, lest the Jews might take away the saving sacrifice, and lest you might think He was offered for that people only. Consequently, it was beyond the city and outside the walls, that you may learn it was a universal sacrifice, an oblation for the whole world, a cleansing for all."
Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Hieronymus dicit, super Matth., quidam exposuit Calvariae locum, in quo sepultus est Adam, et ideo sic appellatum quia ibi antiqui hominis sit conditum caput. Favorabilis interpretatio, et mulcens aures populi, nec tamen vera. Extra urbem enim et foris portam, loca sunt in quibus truncantur capita damnatorum; et Calvariae, idest decollatorum, sumpsere nomen. Propterea autem ibi crucifixus est Iesus, ut ubi prius erat area damnatorum, ibi erigerentur vexilla martyrii. Adam vero sepultum iuxta Hebron, in libro Iesu filii Nave legimus. Magis autem Christus crucifigendus erat in loco communi damnatorum quam iuxta sepulcrum Adae, ut ostenderetur quod crux Christi non solum erat in remedium contra peccatum personale Adae, sed etiam contra peccatum totius mundi. Reply to Objection 3: According to Jerome, in his commentary on Mt. 27:33, "someone explained 'the place of Calvary' as being the place where Adam was buried; and that it was so called because the skull of the first man was buried there. A pleasing interpretation indeed, and one suited to catch the ear of the people, but, still, not the true one. For the spots where the condemned are beheaded are outside the city and beyond the gates, deriving thence the name of Calvary---that is, of the beheaded. Jesus, accordingly, was crucified there, that the standards of martyrdom might be uplifted over what was formerly the place of the condemned. But Adam was buried close by Hebron and Arbe, as we read in the book of Jesus Ben Nave." But Jesus was to be crucified in the common spot of the condemned rather than beside Adam's sepulchre, to make it manifest that Christ's cross was the remedy, not only for Adam's personal sin, but also for the sin of the entire world.

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Whether it was fitting for Christ to be crucified with thieves?

Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit conveniens Christum cum latronibus crucifigi. Dicitur enim II Cor. VI, quae participatio iustitiae cum iniquitate? Sed Christus factus est nobis iustitia a Deo; iniquitas autem pertinet ad latrones. Non ergo fuit conveniens ut Christus simul cum latronibus crucifigeretur. Objection 1: It would seem unfitting for Christ to have been crucified with thieves, because it is written (2 Cor. 6:14): "What participation hath justice with injustice?" But for our sakes Christ "of God is made unto us justice" (1 Cor. 1:30); whereas iniquity applies to thieves. Therefore it was not fitting for Christ to be crucified with thieves.
Praeterea, super illud Matth. XXVI, si oportuerit me mori tecum, non te negabo, dicit Origenes, mori cum Iesu pro omnibus moriente, hominum non erat. Et Ambrosius dicit, super illud Luc. XXII, paratus sum tecum et in carcerem et in mortem ire, passio, inquit, domini aemulos habet, pares non habet. Multo igitur minus conveniens videtur quod Christus simul cum latronibus pateretur. Objection 2: Further, on Mt. 26:35, "Though I should die with Thee, I will not deny Thee," Origen (Tract. xxxv in Matth.) observes: "It was not men's lot to die with Jesus, since He died for all." Again, on Lk. 22:33, "I am ready to go with Thee, both into prison and death," Ambrose says: "Our Lord's Passion has followers, but not equals." It seems, then, much less fitting for Christ to suffer with thieves.
Praeterea, Matth. XXVII dicitur quod latrones qui crucifixi erant, improperabant ei. Sed Luc. XXIII dicitur quod unus eorum qui crucifixi erant cum Christo, ei dicebat, memento mei, domine, cum veneris in regnum tuum. Ergo videtur quod, praeter latrones blasphemantes, fuerit cum eo crucifixus alius non blasphemans. Et sic videtur inconvenienter ab Evangelistis narratum quod Christus fuerit cum latronibus crucifixus. Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mt. 27:44) that "the thieves who were crucified with Him reproached Him." But in Lk. 22:42 it is stated that one of them who were crucified with Christ cried out to Him: "Lord, remember me when Thou shalt come into Thy kingdom." It seems, then, that besides the blasphemous thieves there was another man who did not blaspheme Him: and so the Evangelist's account does not seem to be accurate when it says that Christ was crucified with thieves.
Sed contra est quod Isaiae LIII fuerat prophetatum, et cum sceleratis reputatus est. On the contrary, It was foretold by Isaias (53:12): "And He was reputed with the wicked."
Respondeo dicendum quod Christus inter latrones crucifixus est, alia quidem ratione quantum ad intentionem Iudaeorum, alia vero quantum ad Dei ordinationem. Quantum enim ad intentionem Iudaeorum, duos latrones utrinque crucifixerunt, sicut dicit Chrysostomus, ut eorum suspicionis fieret particeps. Sed non ita evenit. Nam de illis nil dicitur, huius autem ubique crux honoratur. Reges, diademata deponentes, assumunt crucem, in purpuris, in diadematibus, in armis, in mensa sacrata, ubique terrarum crux emicat. I answer that, Christ was crucified between thieves from one intention on the part of the Jews, and from quite another on the part of God's ordaining. As to the intention of the Jews, Chrysostom remarks (Hom. lxxxvii in Matth.) that they crucified the two thieves, one on either side, "that He might be made to share their guilt. But it did not happen so; because mention is never made of them; whereas His cross is honored everywhere. Kings lay aside their crowns to take up the cross: on their purple robes, on their diadems, on their weapons, on the consecrated table, everywhere the cross shines forth."
Quantum vero ad Dei ordinationem, Christus cum latronibus crucifixus est, quia, ut Hieronymus dicit, super Matth., sicut pro nobis maledictum crucis factus est Christus, sic, pro omnium salute, inter noxios quasi noxius crucifigitur. Secundo, ut dicit Leo Papa, in sermone de passione, duo latrones unus ad dexteram alius ad sinistram crucifiguntur, ut in ipsa patibuli specie demonstraretur illa quae in iudicio ipsius omnium hominum facienda est discretio. Et Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., ipsa crux, si attendas, tribunal fuit. In medio enim iudice constituto, unus, qui credidit, liberatus; alius, qui insultavit, damnatus est. Iam significabat quid facturus est de vivis et mortuis, alios positurus ad dextram et alios ad sinistram. Tertio, secundum Hilarium, duo latrones laevae ac dextrae affiguntur, omnem humani generis diversitatem vocari ad sacramentum passionis domini ostendentes. Sed quia per diversitatem fidelium atque infidelium fit omnium secundum dextram et sinistram divisio, unus ex duobus, ad dextram situs, fidei iustificatione salvatur. Quarto quia, ut Beda dicit, super Marc., latrones qui cum domino crucifixi sunt, significant eos qui, sub fide et confessione Christi, vel agonem martyrii vel quaelibet arctioris disciplinae instituta subeunt. Sed qui hoc pro aeterna gloria gerunt, dextri latronis fide designantur, qui vero humanae laudis intuitu, sinistri latronis mentem imitantur et actus. As to God's ordinance, Christ was crucified with thieves, because, as Jerome says on Mt. 27:33: "As Christ became accursed of the cross for us, so for our salvation He was crucified as a guilty one among the guilty." Secondly, as Pope Leo observes (Serm. iv de Passione): "Two thieves were crucified, one on His right hand and one on His left, to set forth by the very appearance of the gibbet that separation of all men which shall be made in His hour of judgment." And Augustine on Jn. 7:36: "The very cross, if thou mark it well, was a judgment-seat: for the judge being set in the midst, the one who believed was delivered, the other who mocked Him was condemned. Already He has signified what He shall do to the quick and the dead; some He will set on His right, others on His left hand." Thirdly, according to Hilary (Comm. xxxiii in Matth.): "Two thieves are set, one upon His right and one upon His left, to show that all mankind is called to the sacrament of His Passion. But because of the cleavage between believers and unbelievers, the multitude is divided into right and left, those on the right being saved by the justification of faith." Fourthly, because, as Bede says on Mk. 15:27: "The thieves crucified with our Lord denote those who, believing in and confessing Christ, either endure the conflict of martyrdom or keep the institutes of stricter observance. But those who do the like for the sake of everlasting glory are denoted by the faith of the thief on the right; while others who do so for the sake of human applause copy the mind and behavior of the one on the left."
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Christus debitum mortis non habuit, sed mortem voluntarie subiit ut sua virtute vinceret mortem, ita etiam non habuit meritum ut cum latronibus poneretur, sed voluit cum iniquis deputari ut sua virtute iniquitatem destrueret. Unde Chrysostomus dicit, super Ioan., quod latronem in cruce convertere et in Paradisum inducere, non minus fuit quam concutere petras. Reply to Objection 1: Just as Christ was not obliged to die, but willingly submitted to death so as to vanquish death by His power: so neither deserved He to be classed with thieves; but willed to be reputed with the ungodly that He might destroy ungodliness by His power. Accordingly, Chrysostom says (Hom. lxxxiv in Joan.) that "to convert the thief upon the cross, and lead him into paradise, was no less a wonder than to shake the rocks."
Ad secundum dicendum quod non conveniebat quod cum Christo aliquis alius pateretur ex eadem causa. Unde Origenes ibidem subdit, omnes fuerant in peccatis, et omnes opus habebant ut pro eis alius moreretur, non ipsi pro aliis. Reply to Objection 2: It was not fitting that anyone else should die with Christ from the same cause as Christ: hence Origen continues thus in the same passage: "All had been under sin, and all required that another should die for them, not they for others."
Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de consensu Evang., possumus intelligere Matthaeum posuisse pluralem numerum pro singulari, cum dixit, latrones improperabant ei. Vel potest dici, secundum Hieronymum, quod primum uterque blasphemaverit; deinde, visis signis, unus eorum crediderit. Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Consensu Evang. iii): We can understand Matthew "as putting the plural for the singular" when he said "the thieves reproached Him." Or it may be said, with Jerome, that "at first both blasphemed Him, but afterwards one believed in Him on witnessing the wonders."

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Whether Christ's Passion is to be attributed to His Godhead?

Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio Christi sit eius divinitati attribuenda. Dicitur enim I Cor. II, si cognovissent, nunquam dominum gloriae crucifixissent. Sed dominus gloriae est Christus secundum divinitatem. Ergo passio Christi competit ei secundum divinitatem. Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's Passion is to be attributed to His Godhead; for it is written (1 Cor. 2:8): "If they had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory." But Christ is the Lord of glory in respect of His Godhead. Therefore Christ's Passion is attributed to Him in respect of His Godhead.
Praeterea, principium salutis humanae est ipsa divinitas, secundum illud Psalmi, salus autem iustorum a domino. Si ergo passio Christi ad eius divinitatem non pertineret, videtur quod non posset esse nobis fructifera. Objection 2: Further, the principle of men's salvation is the Godhead Itself, according to Ps. 36:39: "But the salvation of the just is from the Lord." Consequently, if Christ's Passion did not appertain to His Godhead, it would seem that it could not produce fruit in us.
Praeterea, Iudaei puniti sunt pro peccato occisionis Christi tanquam homicidae ipsius Dei, quod magnitudo poenae demonstrat. Hoc autem non esset, si passio ad divinitatem non pertineret. Ergo passio Christi ad divinitatem pertinuit. Objection 3: Further, the Jews were punished for slaying Christ as for murdering God Himself; as is proved by the gravity of the punishment. Now this would not be so if the Passion were not attributed to the Godhead. Therefore Christ's Passion should be so attributed.
Sed contra est quod Athanasius dicit, in epistola ad Epictetum, natura Deus manens verbum est impassibile. Sed impassibile non potest pati. Passio ergo Christi non pertinebat ad eius divinitatem. On the contrary, Athanasius says (Ep. ad Epict.): "The Word is impassible whose Nature is Divine." But what is impassible cannot suffer. Consequently, Christ's Passion did not concern His Godhead.
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, unio humanae naturae et divinae facta est in persona et hypostasi et supposito, manente tamen distinctione naturarum, ut scilicet sit eadem persona et hypostasis divinae et humanae naturae, salva tamen utriusque naturae proprietate. Et ideo, sicut supra dictum est, supposito divinae naturae attribuenda est passio, non ratione divinae naturae, quae est impassibilis, sed ratione humanae naturae. Unde in epistola synodali Cyrilli dicitur, si quis non confitetur Dei verbum passum carne et crucifixum carne, anathema sit. Pertinet ergo passio Christi ad suppositum divinae naturae ratione naturae passibilis assumptae, non autem ratione divinae naturae impassibilis. I answer that, As stated above (Question [2], Articles [1],2,3,6), the union of the human nature with the Divine was effected in the Person, in the hypostasis, in the suppositum, yet observing the distinction of natures; so that it is the same Person and hypostasis of the Divine and human natures, while each nature retains that which is proper to it. And therefore, as stated above (Question [16], Article [4]), the Passion is to be attributed to the suppositum of the Divine Nature, not because of the Divine Nature, which is impassible, but by reason of the human nature. Hence, in a Synodal Epistle of Cyril [*Act. Conc. Ephes., P. i, cap. 26] we read: "If any man does not confess that the Word of God suffered in the flesh and was crucified in the flesh, let him be anathema." Therefore Christ's Passion belongs to the "suppositum" of the Divine Nature by reason of the passible nature assumed, but not on account of the impassible Divine Nature.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus gloriae dicitur crucifixus, non secundum quod dominus est gloriae, sed secundum quod erat homo passibilis. Reply to Objection 1: The Lord of glory is said to be crucified, not as the Lord of glory, but as a man capable of suffering.
Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in quodam sermone Ephesini Concilii, quod mors Christi, tanquam facta mors Dei, scilicet per unionem in persona, destruxit mortem, quoniam Deus et homo erat qui patiebatur. Non enim natura Dei laesa est, nec mutatione sua suscepit passiones. Reply to Objection 2: As is said in a sermon of the Council of Ephesus [*P. iii, cap. 10], "Christ's death being, as it were, God's death"---namely, by union in Person---"destroyed death"; since He who suffered "was both God and man. For God's Nature was not wounded, nor did It undergo any change by those sufferings."
Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut subditur ibidem, non purum hominem crucifixerunt Iudaei, sed Deo intulerunt praesumptiones. Pone enim principem loqui per verbum, et hoc formari per litteras in charta aliqua, et dirigi civitatibus, et aliquis inobediens chartam disrumpat. Ad mortis sententiam deducetur, non tanquam chartam discerpens, sed tanquam verbum imperiale disrumpens. Non ergo securus sit Iudaeus, tanquam purum hominem crucifigens. Quod enim videbat, quasi charta erat, quod autem in ea celabatur, imperiale verbum erat, natum ex natura, non prolatum per linguam. Reply to Objection 3: As the passage quoted goes on to say: "The Jews did not crucify one who was simply a man; they inflicted their presumptions upon God. For suppose a prince to speak by word of mouth, and that his words are committed to writing on a parchment and sent out to the cities, and that some rebel tears up the document, he will be led forth to endure the death sentence, not for merely tearing up a document, but as destroying the imperial message. Let not the Jew, then, stand in security, as crucifying a mere man; since what he saw was as the parchment, but what was hidden under it was the imperial Word, the Son by nature, not the mere utterance of a tongue."

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