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| Deinde considerandum est de iudiciaria potestate Christi. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. | We have now to consider Christ's judiciary power. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum iudiciaria potestas sit attribuenda Christo. | (1) Whether judiciary power is to be attributed to Christ? |
| Secundo, utrum conveniat sibi secundum quod est homo. | (2) Whether it belongs to Him as man? |
| Tertio, utrum fuerit eam ex merito adeptus. | (3) Whether He acquired it by merits? |
| Quarto, utrum eius potestas iudiciaria sit universalis respectu omnium hominum. | (4) Whether His judiciary power is universal with regard to all men? |
| Quinto, utrum, praeter iudicium quod agit in hoc tempore, sit expectandus ad universale iudicium futurum. |
(5) Whether besides the judgment that takes place now in time, we are to expect Him in the future general judgment? |
| Sexto, utrum eius iudiciaria potestas etiam ad Angelos se extendat. | (6) Whether His judiciary power extends likewise to the angels? |
| De executione autem finalis iudicii convenientius agetur cum considerabimus de his quae pertinent ad finem mundi. Nunc autem sufficit ea sola tangere quae pertinent ad Christi dignitatem. | It will be more suitable to consider the execution of the Last Judgment when we treat of things pertaining to the end of the world [*See XP, Questions [88], seqq.]. For the present it will be enough to touch on those points that concern Christ's dignity. |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod iudiciaria potestas non sit specialiter attribuenda Christo. Iudicium enim aliquorum videtur pertinere ad dominum, unde dicitur Rom. XIV, tu quis es, qui iudicas alienum servum? Sed esse dominum creaturarum est commune toti Trinitati. Non ergo debet Christo specialiter attribui iudiciaria potestas. |
Objection 1: It would seem that judiciary power is not to be specially attributed to Christ. For judgment of others seems to belong to their lord; hence it is written (Rm. 14:4): "Who art thou that judgest another man's servant?" But, it belongs to the entire Trinity to be Lord over creatures. Therefore judiciary power ought not to be attributed specially to Christ. |
| Praeterea, Daniel VII dicitur, antiquus dierum sedit; et postea subditur, iudicium sedit et libri aperti sunt. Sed antiquus dierum intelligitur pater, quia, ut Hilarius dicit, in patre est aeternitas. Ergo iudiciaria potestas magis est attribuenda patri quam Christo. |
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Dan. 7:9): "The Ancient of days sat"; and further on (Dan. 7:10), "the judgment sat, and the books were opened." But the Ancient of days is understood to be the Father, because as Hilary says (De Trin. ii): "Eternity is in the Father." Consequently, judiciary power ought rather to be attributed to the Father than to Christ. |
| Praeterea, eiusdem videtur iudicare cuius est arguere. Sed arguere pertinet ad spiritum sanctum, dicit enim dominus, Ioan. XVI, cum autem venerit ille, scilicet spiritus sanctus, arguet mundum de peccato et de iustitia et de iudicio. Ergo iudiciaria potestas magis debet attribui spiritui sancto quam Christo. |
Objection 3: Further, it seems to belong to the same person to judge as it does to convince. But it belongs to the Holy Ghost to convince: for our Lord says (Jn. 16:8): "And when He is come," i.e. the Holy Ghost, "He will convince the world of sin, and of justice, and of judgment." Therefore judiciary power ought to be attributed to the Holy Ghost rather than to Christ. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Act. X de Christo, hic est qui constitutus est a Deo iudex vivorum et mortuorum. |
On the contrary, It is said of Christ (Acts 10:42): "It is He who was appointed by God, to be judge of the living end of the dead." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod ad iudicium faciendum tria requiruntur. Primo quidem, potestas subditos coercendi, unde dicitur Eccli. VII, noli quaerere fieri iudex, nisi valeas virtute rumpere iniquitates. Secundo, requiritur rectitudinis zelus, ut scilicet aliquis non ex odio vel livore, sed ex amore iustitiae iudicium proferat, secundum illud Proverb. III, quem enim diligit dominus, corripit, et quasi pater in filio complacet sibi. Tertio, requiritur sapientia, secundum quam formatur iudicium, unde dicitur Eccli. X, iudex sapiens iudicabit populum suum. Prima autem duo praeexiguntur ad iudicium, sed proprie tertium est secundum quod accipitur forma iudicii, quia ipsa ratio iudicii est lex sapientiae vel veritatis, secundum quam iudicatur. | I answer that, Three things are required for passing judgment: first, the power of coercing subjects; hence it is written (Ecclus. 7:6): "Seek not to be made a judge unless thou have strength enough to extirpate iniquities." The second thing required is upright zeal, so as to pass judgment not out of hatred or malice, but from love of justice, according to Prov. 3:12: "For whom the Lord loveth, He chasteneth: and as a father in the son He pleaseth Himself." Thirdly, wisdom is needed, upon which judgment is based, according to Ecclus. 10:1: "A wise judge shall judge his people." The first two are conditions for judging; but on the third the very rule of judgment is based, because the standard of judgment is the law of wisdom or truth, according to which the judgment is passed. |
| Et quia filius est sapientia genita, et veritas a patre procedens et ipsum perfecte repraesentans, ideo proprie iudiciaria potestas attribuitur filio Dei. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera Relig., haec est incommutabilis illa veritas quae lex omnium artium recte dicitur, et ars omnipotentis artificis. Ut autem nos, et omnes animae rationales, secundum veritatem de inferioribus recte iudicamus, sic de nobis, quando eidem cohaeremus, sola ipsa veritas iudicat. De ipsa vero nec pater, non enim minus est quam ipse. Et ideo quae pater iudicat, per ipsam iudicat. Et postea concludit, pater ergo non iudicat quemquam, sed omne iudicium dedit filio. | Now because the Son is Wisdom begotten, and Truth proceeding from the Father, and His perfect Image, consequently, judiciary power is properly attributed to the Son of God. Accordingly Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): "This is that unchangeable Truth, which is rightly styled the law of all arts, and the art of the Almighty Craftsman. But even as we and all rational souls judge aright of the things beneath us, so does He who alone is Truth itself pass judgment on us, when we cling to Him. But the Father judges Him not, for He is the Truth no less than Himself. Consequently, whatever the Father judges, He judges through It." Further on he concludes by saying: "Therefore the Father judges no man, but has given all judgment to the Son." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex illa ratione probatur quod iudiciaria potestas sit communis toti Trinitati, quod et verum est. Sed tamen per quandam appropriationem iudiciaria potestas attribuitur filio, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves that judiciary power is common to the entire Trinity, which is quite true: still by special appropriation such power is attributed to the Son, as stated above. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in VI de Trin., patri attribuitur aeternitas propter commendationem principii, quod etiam importatur in ratione aeternitatis. Ibidem etiam Augustinus dicit quod filius est ars patris. Sic igitur auctoritas iudicandi attribuitur patri inquantum est principium filii; sed ipsa ratio iudicii attribuitur filio, qui est ars et sapientia patris, ut scilicet, sicut pater fecit omnia per filium suum inquantum est ars eius, ita etiam iudicat omnia per filium suum inquantum est sapientia et veritas eius. Et hoc significatur in Daniele, ubi primo dicitur quod antiquus dierum sedit, et postea subditur quod filius hominis pervenit usque ad antiquum dierum, et dedit ei potestatem et honorem et regnum, per quod datur intelligi quod auctoritas iudicandi est apud patrem, a quo filius accepit potestatem iudicandi. | Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Trin. vi), eternity is attributed to the Father, because He is the Principle, which is implied in the idea of eternity. And in the same place Augustine says that the Son is the art of the Father. So, then, judiciary authority is attributed to the Father, inasmuch as He is the Principle of the Son, but the very rule of judgment is attributed to the Son who is the art and wisdom of the Father, so that as the Father does all things through the Son, inasmuch as the Son is His art, so He judges all things through the Son, inasmuch as the Son is His wisdom and truth. And this is implied by Daniel, when he says in the first passage that "the Ancient of days sat," and when he subsequently adds that the Son of Man "came even to the Ancient of days, who gave Him power, and glory, and a kingdom": and thereby we are given to understand that the authority for judging lies with the Father, from whom the Son received the power to judge. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., ita dixit Christus quod spiritus sanctus arguet mundum de peccato, tanquam diceret, ille diffundet in cordibus vestris caritatem. Sic enim, timore depulso, arguendi habebitis libertatem. Sic ergo spiritui sancto attribuitur iudicium, non quantum ad rationem iudicii, sed quantum ad affectum iudicandi quem homines habent. | Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Tract. xcv in Joan.): "Christ said that the Holy Ghost shall convince the world of sin, as if to say 'He shall pour out charity upon your hearts.' For thus, when fear is driven away, you shall have freedom for convincing." Consequently, then, judgment is attributed to the Holy Ghost, not as regards the rule of judgment, but as regards man's desire to judge others aright. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod iudiciaria potestas non conveniat Christo secundum quod est homo. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., quod iudicium attribuitur filio inquantum est ipsa lex primae veritatis. Sed hoc pertinet ad Christum secundum quod est Deus. Ergo iudiciaria potestas non convenit Christo secundum quod est homo, sed secundum quod est Deus. | Objection 1: It would seem that judiciary power does not belong to Christ as man. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi) that judgment is attributed to the Son inasmuch as He is the law of the first truth. But this is Christ's attribute as God. Consequently, judiciary power does not belong to Christ as man but as God. |
| Praeterea, ad iudiciariam potestatem pertinet praemiare bene agentes, sicut et punire malos. Sed praemium bonorum operum est beatitudo aeterna, quae non datur nisi a Deo, dicit enim Augustinus, super Ioan., quod participatione Dei fit anima beata, non autem participatione animae sanctae. Ergo videtur quod iudiciaria potestas non conveniat Christo secundum quod est homo, sed secundum quod est Deus. | Objection 2: Further, it belongs to judiciary power to reward the good, just as to punish the wicked. But eternal beatitude, which is the reward of good works, is bestowed by God alone: thus Augustine says (Tract. xxiii super Joan.) that "the soul is made blessed by participation of God, and not by participation of a holy soul." Therefore it seems that judiciary power does not belong to Christ as man, but as God. |
| Praeterea, ad iudiciariam Christi potestatem pertinet iudicare occulta cordium, secundum illud I ad Cor. IV, nolite ante tempus iudicare, quousque veniat dominus, qui et illuminabit abscondita tenebrarum et manifestabit consilia cordium. Sed hoc pertinet ad solam virtutem divinam, secundum illud Ierem. XVII, pravum est cor hominis et inscrutabile, quis cognoscet illud? Ego dominus, scrutans corda et probans renes, qui do unicuique iuxta viam suam. Ergo iudiciaria potestas non convenit Christo secundum quod est homo, sed secundum quod est Deus. | Objection 3: Further, it belongs to Christ's judiciary power to judge secrets of hearts, according to 1 Cor. 4:5: "Judge not before the time; until the Lord come, who both will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of the hearts." But this belongs exclusively to the Divine power, according to Jer. 17:9,10: "The heart of man is perverse and unsearchable, who can know it? I am the Lord who search the heart, and prove the reins: who give to every one according to his way." Therefore judiciary power does not belong to Christ as man but as God. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. V, potestatem dedit ei iudicium facere, quia filius hominis est. |
On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 5:27): "He hath given Him power to do judgment, because He is the Son of man." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod Chrysostomus, super Ioan., sentire videtur quod iudiciaria potestas non conveniat Christo secundum quod est homo, sed solum secundum quod est Deus. Unde auctoritatem Ioannis inductam sic exponit, potestatem dedit ei iudicium facere. Quia filius hominis est, nolite mirari hoc. Non enim propterea suscepit iudicium quoniam homo est, sed quia ineffabilis Dei filius est, propterea iudex est. Quia vero ea quae dicebantur erant maiora quam secundum hominem, ideo, hanc opinionem solvens, dixit, ne miremini quia filius hominis est, etenim ipse est etiam filius Dei. Quod quidem probat per resurrectionis effectum, unde subdit, quia venit hora in qua omnes qui in monumentis sunt, audient vocem filii Dei. | I answer that, Chrysostom (Hom. xxxix in Joan.) seems to think that judiciary power belongs to Christ not as man, but only as God. Accordingly he thus explains the passage just quoted from John: "'He gave Him power to do judgment, because He is the Son of man: wonder not at this.' For He received judiciary power, not because He is man; but because He is the Son of the ineffable God, therefore is He judge. But since the expressions used were greater than those appertaining to man, He said in explanation: 'Wonder not at this, because He is the Son of man, for He is likewise the Son of God.'" And he proves this by the effect of the Resurrection: wherefore He adds: "Because the hour cometh when the dead in their graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God." |
| Sciendum tamen quod, quamvis apud Deum remaneat primaeva auctoritas iudicandi, hominibus tamen committitur a Deo iudiciaria potestas respectu eorum qui eorum iurisdictioni subiiciuntur. Unde dicitur Deut. I, quod iustum est iudicate, et postea subditur, quia Dei est iudicium, cuius scilicet auctoritate vos iudicatis. Dictum est autem supra quod Christus, etiam in natura humana, est caput totius Ecclesiae, et quod sub pedibus eius Deus omnia subiecit. Unde et ad eum pertinet, etiam secundum naturam humanam, habere iudiciariam potestatem. Propter quod videtur auctoritatem praedictam Evangelii sic esse intelligendam, potestatem dedit ei iudicium facere quia filius hominis est, non quidem propter conditionem naturae, quia sic omnes homines huiusmodi potestatem haberent, ut Chrysostomus obiicit, sed hoc pertinet ad gratiam capitis, quam Christus in humana natura accepit. |
But it must be observed that although the primary authority of judging rests with God, nevertheless the power to judge is committed to men with regard to those subject to their jurisdiction. Hence it is written (Dt. 1:16): "Judge that which is just"; and further on (Dt. 1:17): "Because it is the judgment of God," that is to say, it is by His authority that you judge. Now it was said before (Question [8], Articles [1],4) that Christ even in His human nature is Head of the entire Church, and that God has "put all things under His feet." Consequently, it belongs to Him, even according to His human nature, to exercise judiciary power. on this account. it seems that the authority of Scripture quoted above must be interpreted thus: "He gave Him power to do judgment, because He is the Son of Man"; not on account of the condition of His nature, for thus all men would have this kind of power, as Chrysostom objects (Hom. xxxix in Joan.); but because this belongs to the grace of the Head, which Christ received in His human nature. |
| Competit autem Christo hoc modo secundum humanam naturam iudiciaria potestas, propter tria. Primo quidem, propter convenientiam et affinitatem ipsius ad homines. Sicut enim Deus per causas medias, tanquam propinquiores effectibus, operatur; ita iudicat per hominem Christum homines, ut sit suavius iudicium hominibus. Unde apostolus dicit, Heb. IV, non habemus pontificem qui non possit compati infirmitatibus nostris, tentatum per omnia per similitudinem, absque peccato. Adeamus ergo cum fiducia ad thronum gratiae eius. Secundo, quia in finali iudicio, ut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., erit resurrectio corporum mortuorum, quae suscitat Deus per filium hominis, sicut per eundem Christum suscitat animas inquantum est filius Dei. Tertio quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de verbis domini, rectum erat ut iudicandi viderent iudicem. Iudicandi autem erant boni et mali. Restabat ut in iudicio forma servi et bonis et malis ostenderetur, forma Dei solis bonis servaretur. |
Now judiciary power belongs to Christ in this way according to His human nature on three accounts. First, because of His likeness and kinship with men; for, as God works through intermediary causes, as being closer to the effects, so He judges men through the Man Christ, that His judgment may be sweeter to men. Hence (Heb. 4:15) the Apostle says: "For we have not a high-priest, who cannot have compassion on our infirmities; but one tempted in all things like as we are, without sin. Let us go therefore with confidence to the throne of His grace." Secondly, because at the last judgment, as Augustine says (Tract. xix in Joan.), "there will be a resurrection of dead bodies, which God will raise up through the Son of Man"; just as by "the same Christ He raises souls," inasmuch as "He is the Son of God." Thirdly, because, as Augustine observes (De Verb. Dom., Serm. cxxvii): "It was but right that those who were to be judged should see their judge. But those to be judged were the good and the bad. It follows that the form of a servant should be shown in the judgment to both good and wicked, while the form of God should be kept for the good alone." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod iudicium pertinet ad veritatem sicut ad regulam iudicii, sed ad hominem qui est veritate imbutus pertinet secundum quod est unum quodammodo cum ipsa veritate, quasi quaedam lex et quaedam iustitia animata. Unde et ibidem Augustinus introduxit quod dicitur I Cor. II, spiritualis iudicat omnia. Anima autem Christi prae ceteris creaturis magis fuit unita veritati et magis ea repleta, secundum illud Ioan. I, vidimus eum plenum gratiae et veritatis. Et secundum hoc, ad animam Christi maxime pertinet omnia iudicare. | Reply to Objection 1: Judgment belongs to truth as its standard, while it belongs to the man imbued with truth, according as he is as it were one with truth, as a kind of law and "living justice" [*Aristotle, Ethic. v]. Hence Augustine quotes (De Verb. Dom., Serm. cxxvii) the saying of 1 Cor. 2:15: "The spiritual man judgeth all things." But beyond all creatures Christ's soul was more closely united with truth, and more full of truth; according to Jn. 1:14: "We saw Him... full of grace and truth." And according to this it belongs principally to the soul of Christ to judge all things. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod solius Dei est sui participatione animas beatas facere. Sed adducere homines ad beatitudinem, inquantum est caput et auctor salutis eorum, Christi est, secundum illud Heb. II, qui multos filios in gloriam adduxerat, auctorem salutis eorum per passionem consummari. | Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to God alone to bestow beatitude upon souls by a participation with Himself; but it is Christ's prerogative to bring them to such beatitude, inasmuch as He is their Head and the author of their salvation, according to Heb. 2:10: "Who had brought many children into glory, to perfect the author of their salvation by His Passion." |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod cognoscere occulta cordium et diiudicare per se quidem pertinet ad solum Deum, sed ex refluentia divinitatis ad animam Christi, convenit ei etiam cognoscere et diiudicare occulta cordium, ut supra dictum est, cum de scientia Christi ageretur. Et ideo dicitur Rom. II, in die cum iudicabit Deus occulta hominum per Iesum Christum. |
Reply to Objection 3: To know and judge the secrets of hearts, of itself belongs to God alone; but from the overflow of the Godhead into Christ's soul it belongs to Him also to know and to judge the secrets of hearts, as we stated above (Question [10], Article [2]), when dealing with the knowledge of Christ. Hence it is written (Rm. 2:16): "In the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ." |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non ex meritis fuerit adeptus iudiciariam potestatem. Iudiciaria enim potestas assequitur regiam dignitatem, secundum illud Proverb. XX, rex qui sedet in solio iudicii, dissipat omne malum intuitu suo. Sed regiam dignitatem Christus obtinuit absque meritis, competit enim ei ex hoc ipso quod est unigenitus Dei; dicitur enim Luc. I, dabit ei dominus Deus sedem David, patris eius, et regnabit in domo Iacob in aeternum. Ergo Christus iudiciariam potestatem non obtinuit ex meritis. |
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not acquire His judiciary power by His merits. For judiciary power flows from the royal dignity: according to Prov. 20:8: "The king that sitteth on the throne of judgment, scattereth away all evil with his look." But it was without merits that Christ acquired royal power, for it is His due as God's Only-begotten Son: thus it is written (Lk. 1:32): "The Lord God shall give unto Him the throne of David His father, and He shall reign in the house of Jacob for ever." Therefore Christ did not obtain judiciary power by His merits. |
| Praeterea, sicut dictum est, iudiciaria potestas competit Christo inquantum est caput nostrum. Sed gratia capitis non competit Christo ex meritis, sed consequitur personalem unionem divinae et humanae naturae, secundum illud, vidimus gloriam eius, quasi unigeniti a patre, plenum gratiae et veritatis, et de plenitudine eius nos omnes accepimus, quod pertinet ad rationem capitis. Ergo videtur quod Christus non habuerit ex meritis iudiciariam potestatem. |
Objection 2: Further, as stated above (Article [2]), judiciary power is Christ's due inasmuch as He is our Head. But the grace of headship does not belong to Christ by reason of merit, but follows the personal union of the Divine and human natures: according to Jn. 1:14,16: "We saw His glory... as of the Only-Begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth... and of His fulness we all have received": and this pertains to the notion of headship. Consequently, it seems that Christ did not have judiciary power from merits. |
| Praeterea, apostolus dicit, I Cor. II, spiritualis iudicat omnia. Sed homo efficitur spiritualis per gratiam, quae non est ex meritis, alioquin iam non esset gratia, ut dicitur Rom. XI. Ergo videtur quod iudiciaria potestas non conveniat nec Christo nec aliis ex meritis, sed ex sola gratia. |
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:15): "The spiritual man judgeth all things." But a man becomes spiritual through grace, which is not from merits; otherwise it is "no more grace," as is said in Rm. 11:6. Therefore it seems that judiciary power belongs neither to Christ nor to others from any merits, but from grace alone. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Iob XXXVI, causa tua quasi impii iudicata est, iudicium causamque recipies. Et Augustinus dicit, in libro de verbis domini, sedebit iudex qui stetit sub iudice, damnabit veros reos qui falso factus est reus. |
On the contrary, It is written (Job 36:17): "Thy cause hath been judged as that of the wicked, cause and judgment thou shalt recover." And Augustine says (Serm. cxxvii): "The Judge shall sit, who stood before a judge; He shall condemn the truly wicked, who Himself was falsely reputed wicked." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod nihil prohibet unum et idem deberi alicui ex causis diversis, sicut gloria corporis resurgentis debita fuit Christo non solum propter congruentiam divinitatis et propter gloriam animae, sed etiam ex merito humilitatis passionis. Et similiter dicendum est quod iudiciaria potestas homini Christo competit et propter divinam personam, et propter capitis dignitatem, et propter plenitudinem gratiae habitualis, et tamen etiam ex merito eam obtinuit, ut scilicet, secundum Dei iustitiam, iudex esset qui pro Dei iustitia pugnavit et vicit, et iniuste iudicatus est. Unde ipse dicit, Apoc. III, ego vici, et sedi in throno patris mei. In throno autem intelligitur iudiciaria potestas, secundum illud Psalmi, sedet super thronum, et iudicat iustitiam. |
I answer that, There is nothing to hinder one and the same thing from being due to some one from various causes: as the glory of the body in rising was due to Christ not only as befitting His Godhead and His soul's glory, but likewise "from the merit of the lowliness of His Passion" [*Cf. Augustine, Tract. civ in Joan.]. And in the same way it must be said that judiciary power belongs to the Man Christ on account of both His Divine personality, and the dignity of His headship, and the fulness of His habitual grace: and yet He obtained it from merit, so that, in accordance with the Divine justice, He should be judge who fought for God's justice, and conquered, and was unjustly condemned. Hence He Himself says (Apoc. 3:21): "I have overcome and am set down in My Father's throne [Vulg.: 'with My Father in His throne']." Now judiciary power is understood by "throne," according to Ps. 9:5: "Thou hast sat on the throne, who judgest justice." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de iudiciaria potestate secundum quod debetur Christo ex ipsa unione ad verbum Dei. | Reply to Objection 1: This argument holds good of judiciary power according as it is due to Christ by reason of the union with the Word of God. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit ex parte gratiae capitis. | Reply to Objection 2: This argument is based on the ground of His grace as Head. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit ex parte gratiae habitualis, quae est perfectiva animae Christi. Per hoc tamen quod his modis debetur Christo iudiciaria potestas, non excluditur quin debeatur ei ex merito. | Reply to Objection 3: This argument holds good in regard to habitual grace, which perfects Christ's soul. But although judiciary power be Christ's due in these ways, it is not hindered from being His due from merit. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad Christum non pertineat iudiciaria potestas quantum ad omnes res humanas. Ut enim legitur Luc. XII, cum quidam de turba diceret, dic fratri meo ut dividat mecum hereditatem, ille respondit, homo, quis me constituit iudicem aut divisorem super vos? Non ergo habet iudicium super omnes res humanas. | Objection 1: It would seem that judiciary power concerning all human affairs does not belong to Christ. For as we read in Lk. 12:13,14, when one of the crowd said to Christ: "Speak to my brother that he divide the inheritance with me; He said to him: Man, who hath appointed Me judge, or divider over you?" Consequently, He does not exercise judgment over all human affairs. |
| Praeterea, nullus habet iudicium nisi super ea quae sunt sibi subiecta. Sed Christo nondum videmus omnia esse subiecta, ut dicitur Heb. II. Ergo videtur quod Christus non habeat super omnes res humanas iudicium. | Objection 2: Further, no one exercises judgment except over his own subjects. But, according to Heb. 2:8, "we see not as yet all things subject to" Christ. Therefore it seems that Christ has not judgment over all human affairs. |
| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XX de Civ. Dei, quod ad iudicium divinum pertinet hoc quod interdum boni affliguntur in hoc mundo et interdum prosperantur, et similiter mali. Sed hoc fuit etiam ante Christi incarnationem. Ergo non omnia iudicia Dei circa res humanas pertinent ad potestatem iudiciariam Christi. | Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx) that it is part of Divine judgment for the good to be afflicted sometimes in this world, and sometimes to prosper, and in like manner the wicked. But the same was the case also before the Incarnation. Consequently, not all God's judgments regarding human affairs are included in Christ's judiciary power. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. V, pater omne iudicium dedit filio. |
On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 5:22): "The Father hath given all judgment to the Son." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, si de Christo loquamur secundum divinam naturam, manifestum est quod omne iudicium patris pertinet ad filium, sicut enim pater facit omnia verbo suo, ita et omnia iudicat verbo suo. | I answer that, If we speak of Christ according to His Divine Nature, it is evident that every judgment of the Father belongs to the Son; for, as the Father does all things through His Word, so He judges all things through His Word. |
| Si vero loquamur de Christo secundum humanam naturam, sic etiam manifestum est quod omnes res humanae subduntur eius iudicio. Et hoc manifestum est, primo quidem, si consideremus habitudinem animae Christi ad verbum Dei. Si enim spiritualis iudicat omnia, ut dicitur I Cor. II, inquantum mens eius verbo Dei inhaeret; multo magis anima Christi, quae plena est veritate verbi Dei, super omnia iudicium habet. | But if we speak of Christ in His human nature, thus again is it evident that all things are subject to His judgment. This is made clear if we consider first of all the relationship subsisting between Christ's soul and the Word of God; for, if "the spiritual man judgeth all things," as is said in 1 Cor. 2:15, inasmuch as his soul clings to the Word of God, how much more Christ's soul, which is filled with the truth of the Word of God, passes judgment upon all things. |
| Secundo, apparet idem ex merito mortis eius. Quia, ut dicitur Rom. XIV, in hoc Christus mortuus est et resurrexit, ut vivorum et mortuorum dominetur. Et ideo super omnes habet iudicium. Propter quod et apostolus ibi subdit quod omnes stabimus ante tribunal Christi, et Daniel VII, quod dedit ei potestatem et honorem et regnum, et omnes populi, tribus et linguae servient ei. |
Secondly, the same appears from the merit of His death; because, according to Rm. 14:9: "To this end Christ died and rose again; that He might be Lord both of the dead and of the living." And therefore He has judgment over all men; and on this account the Apostle adds (Rm. 14:10): "We shall all stand before the judgment seat of Christ": and (Dan. 7:14) it is written that "He gave Him power, and glory, and a kingdom; and all peoples, tribes, and tongues shall serve Him." |
| Tertio, apparet idem ex comparatione rerum humanarum ad finem humanae salutis. Cuicumque enim committitur principale, committitur et accessorium. Omnes autem res humanae ordinantur in finem beatitudinis, quae est salus aeterna, ad quam homines admittuntur, vel etiam repelluntur, iudicio Christi, ut patet Matth. XXV. Et ideo manifestum est quod ad iudiciariam potestatem Christi pertinent omnes res humanae. | Thirdly, the same thing is evident from comparison of human affairs with the end of human salvation. For, to whomsoever the substance is entrusted, the accessory is likewise committed. Now all human affairs are ordered for the end of beatitude, which is everlasting salvation, to which men are admitted, or from which they are excluded by Christ's judgment, as is evident from Mt. 25:31,40. Consequently, it is manifest that all human affairs are included in Christ's judiciary power. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, iudiciaria potestas consequitur regiam dignitatem. Christus autem, quamvis rex esset constitutus a Deo, non tamen in terris vivens terrenum regnum temporaliter administrare voluit, unde ipse dicit, Ioan. XVIII, regnum meum non est de hoc mundo. Et similiter etiam iudiciariam potestatem exercere noluit super res temporales, qui venerat homines ad divina transferre, ut Ambrosius, ibidem, dicit, bene terrena declinat qui propter divina descenderat, nec iudex dignatur esse litium et arbiter facultatum, vivorum habens mortuorumque iudicium, arbitriumque meritorum. |
Reply to Objection 1: As was said above (Article [3], Objection [1]), judiciary power goes with royal dignity. Now Christ, although established king by God, did not wish while living on earth to govern temporarily an earthly kingdom; consequently He said (Jn. 18:36): "My kingdom is not of this world." In like fashion He did not wish to exercise judiciary power over temporal concerns, since He came to raise men to Divine things. Hence Ambrose observes on this passage in Luke: "It is well that He who came down with a Divine purpose should hold Himself aloof from temporal concerns; nor does He deign to be a judge of quarrels and an arbiter of property, since He is judge of the quick and the dead, and the arbitrator of merits." |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod Christo omnia sunt subiecta quantum ad potestatem, quam a patre super omnia accepit, secundum illud Matth. ult., data est mihi omnis potestas in caelo et in terra. Nondum tamen sunt ei omnia subiecta quantum ad executionem suae potestatis. Quod quidem erit in futuro, quando de omnibus voluntatem suam adimplebit, quosdam quidem salvando, quosdam puniendo. | Reply to Objection 2: All things are subject to Christ in respect of that power, which He received from the Father, over all things, according to Mt. 28:18: "All power is given to Me in heaven and in earth." But as to the exercise of this power, all things are not yet subject to Him: this will come to pass in the future, when He shall fulfil His will regarding all things, by saving some and punishing others. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod ante incarnationem huiusmodi iudicia exercebantur per Christum inquantum est verbum Dei, cuius potestatis facta est particeps per incarnationem anima ei personaliter unita. | Reply to Objection 3: Judgments of this kind were exercised by Christ before His Incarnation, inasmuch as He is the Word of God: and the soul united with Him personally became a partaker of this power by the Incarnation. |
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| Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod post iudicium quod in praesenti tempore agitur, non restat aliud iudicium generale. Post ultimam enim retributionem praemiorum et poenarum, frustra adhiberetur iudicium. Sed in hoc praesenti tempore fit retributio praemiorum et poenarum, dixit enim dominus latroni in cruce, Luc. XXIII, hodie mecum eris in Paradiso; et Luc. XVI dicitur quod mortuus est dives et sepultus in Inferno. Ergo frustra expectatur finale iudicium. |
Objection 1: It would seem that after the Judgment that takes place in the present time, there does not remain another General Judgment. For a judgment serves no purpose after the final allotment of rewards and punishments. But rewards and punishments are allotted in this present time: for our Lord said to the thief on the cross (Lk. 23:43): "This day thou shalt be with Me in paradise": and (Lk. 16:22) it is said that "the rich man died and was buried in hell." Therefore it is useless to look forward to a final Judgment. |
| Praeterea, Nahum I dicitur, secundum aliam litteram, non iudicabit Deus bis in idipsum. Sed in hoc tempore Dei iudicium exercetur et quantum ad temporalia et quantum ad spiritualia. Ergo videtur quod non sit expectandum aliud finale iudicium. | Objection 2: Further, according to another (the Septuagint) version of Nahum 1:9, "God shall not judge the same thing a second time." But in the present time God judges both temporal and spiritual matters. Therefore, it does not seem that another final judgment is to be expected. |
| Praeterea, praemium et poena respondent merito et demerito. Sed meritum et demeritum non pertinent ad corpus nisi inquantum est animae instrumentum. Ergo nec praemium seu poena debetur corpori nisi per animam. Non ergo requiritur aliud iudicium in fine, ad hoc quod homo praemietur aut puniatur in corpore, praeter illud quo nunc puniuntur aut praemiantur animae. | Objection 3: Further, reward and punishment correspond with merit and demerit. But merit and demerit bear relation to the body only in so far as it is the instrument of the soul. Therefore reward or punishment is not due to the body save as the soul's instrument. Therefore no other Judgment is called for at the end (of the world) to requite man with reward or punishment in the body, besides that Judgment in which souls are now punished or rewarded. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. XII, sermo quem locutus sum vobis, ille vos iudicabit in novissimo die. Erit ergo quoddam iudicium in novissimo die, praeter iudicium quod nunc agitur. | On the contrary, It is said in Jn. 12:48: "The word that I have spoken, the same shall judge you [Vulg.: 'him'] in the last day." Therefore there will be a Judgment at the last day besides that which takes place in the present time. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod iudicium de aliqua re mutabili perfecte dari non potest ante eius consummationem. Sicut iudicium de aliqua actione qualis sit, perfecte dari non potest antequam sit consummata et in se et in suis effectibus, quia multae actiones videntur esse utiles, quae ex effectibus demonstrantur nocivae. Et similiter de homine aliquo iudicium perfecte dari non potest quandiu eius vita terminetur, eo quod multipliciter potest mutari de bono in malum aut e converso, vel de bono in melius, aut de malo in peius. Unde apostolus dicit, Heb. IX, quod hominibus statutum est semel mori, post hoc autem, iudicium. |
I answer that, Judgment cannot be passed perfectly upon any changeable subject before its consummation: just as judgment cannot be given perfectly regarding the quality of any action before its completion in itself and in its results: because many actions appear to be profitable, which in their effects prove to be hurtful. And in the same way perfect judgment cannot be passed upon any man before the close of his life, since he can be changed in many respects from good to evil, or conversely, or from good to better, or from evil to worse. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 9:27): "It is appointed unto men once to die, and after this the Judgment." |
| Sciendum tamen quod, licet per mortem vita hominis temporalis terminetur secundum se, remanet tamen ex futuris secundum quid dependens. Uno quidem modo, secundum quod adhuc vivit in memoriis hominum, in quibus quandoque contra veritatem remanet bonae famae vel malae. Alio modo in filiis, qui sunt quasi aliquid patris, secundum illud Eccli. XXX, mortuus est pater illius, et quasi non est mortuus, similem enim reliquit sibi post se. Et tamen multorum bonorum sunt mali filii, et e converso. Tertio modo, quantum ad effectum suorum operum, sicut ex deceptione Arii et aliorum seductorum pullulat infidelitas usque ad finem mundi; et usque tunc proficit fides ex praedicatione apostolorum. Quarto modo, quantum ad corpus, quod quandoque honorifice traditur sepulturae, quandoque vero relinquitur insepultum, et tandem incineratum resolvitur omnino. Quinto modo, quantum ad ea in quibus homo suum affectum defixit, puta in quibuscumque temporalibus rebus, quorum quaedam citius finiuntur, quaedam diutius durant. | But it must be observed that although man's temporal life in itself ends with death, still it continues dependent in a measure on what comes after it in the future. In one way, as it still lives on in men's memories, in which sometimes, contrary to the truth, good or evil reputations linger on. In another way in a man's children, who are so to speak something of their parent, according to Ecclus. 30:4: "His father is dead, and he is as if he were not dead, for he hath left one behind him that is like himself." And yet many good men have wicked sons, and conversely. Thirdly, as to the result of his actions: just as from the deceit of Arius and other false leaders unbelief continues to flourish down to the close of the world; and even until then faith will continue to derive its progress from the preaching of the apostles. In a fourth way, as to the body, which is sometimes buried with honor and sometimes left unburied, and finally falls to dust utterly. In a fifth way, as to the things upon which a man's heart is set, such as temporal concerns, for example, some of which quickly lapse, while others endure longer. |
| Omnia autem haec subduntur existimationi divini iudicii. Et ideo de his omnibus perfectum et manifestum iudicium haberi non potest quandiu huius temporis cursus durat. Et propter hoc oportet esse finale iudicium in novissimo die, in quo perfecte id quod ad unumquemque hominem pertinet quocumque modo, perfecte et manifeste diiudicetur. | Now all these things are submitted to the verdict of the Divine Judgment; and consequently, a perfect and public Judgment cannot be made of all these things during the course of this present time. Wherefore, there must be a final Judgment at the last day, in which everything concerning every man in every respect shall be perfectly and publicly judged. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod opinio quorundam fuit quod animae sanctorum non praemiantur in caelo, nec animae damnatorum puniuntur in Inferno, usque ad diem iudicii. Quod apparet falsum ex hoc quod apostolus, II Cor. V, dicit, audemus, et bonam voluntatem habemus, peregrinari a corpore et praesentes esse ad dominum, quod est iam non ambulare per fidem, sed per speciem, ut patet ex his quae subsequuntur. Hoc autem est videre Deum per essentiam, in quo consistit vita aeterna, ut patet Ioan. XVII. Unde manifestum est animas a corporibus separatas esse in vita aeterna. |
Reply to Objection 1: Some men have held the opinion that the souls of the saints shall not be rewarded in heaven, nor the souls of the lost punished in hell, until the Judgment-day. That this is false appears from the testimony of the Apostle (2 Cor. 5:8), where he says: "We are confident and have a good will to be absent rather from the body, and to be present with the Lord": that is, not to "walk by faith" but "by sight," as appears from the context. But this is to see God in His Essence, wherein consists "eternal life," as is clear from Jn. 17:3. Hence it is manifest that the souls separated from bodies are in eternal life. |
| Et ideo dicendum est quod post mortem, quantum ad ea quae sunt animae, homo sortitur quendam immutabilem statum. Et ideo, quantum ad praemium animae, non oportet ulterius differri iudicium. Sed quia quaedam alia sunt ad hominem pertinentia quae toto temporis cursu aguntur, quae non sunt aliena a divino iudicio, oportet iterum in fine temporis omnia haec in iudicium adduci. Licet enim homo secundum haec non mereatur neque demereatur, tamen pertinent ad aliquod eius praemium vel poenam. Unde oportet haec omnia existimari in finali iudicio. | Consequently, it must be maintained that after death man enters into an unchangeable state as to all that concerns the soul: and therefore there is no need for postponing judgment as to the reward of the soul. But since there are some other things pertaining to a man which go on through the whole course of time, and which are not foreign to the Divine judgment, all these things must be brought to judgment at the end of time. For although in regard to such things a man neither merits nor demerits, still in a measure they accompany his reward or punishment. Consequently all these things must be weighed in the final judgment. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus non iudicabit bis in idipsum, idest secundum idem. Sed secundum diversa non est inconveniens Deum bis iudicare. | Reply to Objection 2: "God shall not judge twice the same thing," i.e. in the same respect; but it is not unseemly for God to judge twice according to different respects. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet praemium vel poena corporis dependeat ex praemio vel poena animae, tamen, quia anima non est mutabilis nisi per accidens propter corpus, separata statim a corpore habet statum immutabilem, et accipit suum iudicium. Sed corpus remanet mutabilitati subiectum usque ad finem temporis. Et ideo oportet quod tunc recipiat suum praemium vel poenam in finali iudicio. | Reply to Objection 3: Although the reward or punishment of the body depends upon the reward or punishment of the soul, nevertheless, since the soul is changeable only accidentally, on account of the body, once it is separated from the body it enters into an unchangeable condition, and receives its judgment. But the body remains subject to change down to the close of time: and therefore it must receive its reward or punishment then, in the last Judgment. |
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| Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod potestas Christi iudiciaria non se extendat ad Angelos. Angeli enim, tam boni quam mali, iudicati sunt a principio mundi, quando, quibusdam cadentibus per peccatum, alii sunt in beatitudine confirmati. Sed illi qui iudicati sunt, non iterum indigent iudicari. Ergo potestas iudiciaria Christi non se extendit ad Angelos. | Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's judiciary power does not extend to the angels, because the good and wicked angels alike were judged in the beginning of the world, when some fell through sin while others were confirmed in bliss. But those already judged have no need of being judged again. Therefore Christ's judiciary power does not extend to the angels. |
| Praeterea, non est eiusdem iudicare et iudicari. Sed Angeli venient cum Christo iudicaturi, secundum illud Matth. XXV, cum venerit filius hominis in maiestate sua, et omnes Angeli eius cum eo. Ergo videtur quod Angeli non sint iudicandi a Christo. | Objection 2: Further, the same person cannot be both judge and judged. But the angels will come to judge with Christ, according to Mt. 25:31: "When the Son of Man shall come in His majesty, and all the angels with Him." Therefore it seems that the angels will not be judged by Christ. |
| Praeterea, Angeli sunt superiores aliis creaturis. Si ergo Christus est iudex non solum hominum, sed etiam Angelorum, pari ratione erit iudex omnium creaturarum. Quod videtur esse falsum, cum hoc sit proprium providentiae Dei, unde dicitur Iob XXXIV, quem constituit alium super terram? Aut quem posuit super orbem quem fabricatus est? Non ergo Christus est iudex Angelorum. |
Objection 3: Further, the angels are higher than other creatures. If Christ, then, be judge not only of men but likewise of angels, then for the same reason He will be judge of all creatures; which seems to be false, since this belongs to God's providence: hence it is written (Job 34:13): "What other hath He appointed over the earth? or whom hath He set over the world which He made?" Therefore Christ is not the judge of the angels. |
| Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I Cor. VI, an nescitis quoniam Angelos iudicabimus? Sed sancti non iudicabunt nisi auctoritate Christi. Ergo multo magis Christus habet iudiciariam potestatem super Angelos. |
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:3): "Know you not that we shall judge angels?" But the saints judge only by Christ's authority. Therefore, much more does Christ possess judiciary power over the angels. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod Angeli subsunt iudiciariae potestati Christi, non solum quantum ad divinam naturam, prout est verbum Dei, sed etiam ratione humanae naturae. Quod patet ex tribus. Primo quidem, ex propinquitate naturae assumptae ad Deum, quia, ut dicitur Heb. II, nusquam Angelos apprehendit, sed semen Abrahae apprehendit. Et ideo anima Christi magis est repleta veritate verbi Dei quam aliquis Angelorum. Unde et Angelos illuminat, sicut Dionysius dicit, VII cap. Cael. Hier. Unde de eis habet iudicare. Secundo, quia per humilitatem passionis humana natura in Christo meruit exaltari super Angelos, ita quod, sicut dicitur Philipp. II, in nomine Iesu omne genu flectatur, caelestium, terrestrium et Infernorum. Et ideo Christus habet iudiciariam potestatem etiam super Angelos bonos et malos. In cuius signum dicitur, Apoc. VII, quod omnes Angeli stabant in circuitu throni. Tertio, ratione eorum quae circa homines operantur, quorum Christus speciali quodam modo est caput. Unde dicitur Heb. I, omnes sunt administratorii spiritus, in ministerium missi propter eos qui hereditatem capiunt salutis. Subsunt autem iudicio Christi, uno quidem modo, quantum ad dispensationem eorum quae per ipsos aguntur. Quae quidem dispensatio fit etiam per hominem Christum, cui Angeli ministrabant, ut dicitur Matth. IV; et a quo Daemones petebant ut in porcos mitterentur, ut dicitur Matth. VIII. Secundo, quantum ad alia accidentalia praemia bonorum Angelorum, quae sunt gaudia quae habent de salute hominum, secundum illud Luc. XV, gaudium est Angelis Dei super uno peccatore poenitentiam agente. Et etiam quantum ad poenas accidentales Daemonum, quibus torquentur vel hic, vel recluduntur in Inferno. Et hoc etiam pertinet ad hominem Christum. Unde Marci I dicitur quod Daemon clamavit, quid nobis et tibi, Iesu Nazarene? Venisti perdere nos? Tertio, quantum ad praemium essentiale beatorum Angelorum, quod est beatitudo aeterna, et quantum ad poenam essentialem malorum, quae est damnatio aeterna. Sed hoc factum est per Christum inquantum est verbum Dei, a principio mundi. |
I answer that, The angels are subjects of Christ's judiciary power, not only with regard to His Divine Nature, as He is the Word of God, but also with regard to His human nature. And this is evident from three considerations. First of all, from the closeness of His assumed nature to God; because, according to Heb. 2:16: "For nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold." Consequently, Christ's soul is more filled with the truth of the Word of God than any angel: for which reason He also enlightens the angels, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), and so He has power to judge them. Secondly, because by the lowliness of His Passion, human nature in Christ merited to be exalted above the angels; so that, as is said in Phil. 2:10: "In the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those that are in heaven, on earth, and under the earth." And therefore Christ has judiciary power even over the good and wicked angels: in token whereof it is said in the Apocalypse (7:11) that "all the angels stood round about the throne." Thirdly, on account of what they do for men, of whom Christ is the Head in a special manner. Hence it is written (Heb. 1:14): "They are [Vulg.: 'Are they not'] all ministering spirits, sent to minister for them, who shall receive the inheritance of salvation (?)." But they are submitted to Christ's judgment, first, as regards the dispensing of those things which are done through them; which dispensing is likewise done by the Man Christ, to whom the angels ministered, as related (Mt. 4:11), and from whom the devils besought that they might be sent into the swine, according to Mt. 8:31. Secondly, as to other accidental rewards of the good angels, such as the joy which they have at the salvation of men, according to Lk. 15:10: "There shall be joy before the angels of God upon one sinner doing penance": and furthermore as to the accidental punishments of the devils wherewith they are either tormented here, or are shut up in hell; and this also belongs to the Man Christ: hence it is written (Mk. 1:24) that the devil cried out: "What have we to do with thee, Jesus of Nazareth? art Thou come to destroy us?" Thirdly, as to the essential reward of the good angels, which is everlasting bliss; and as to the essential punishment of the wicked angels, which is everlasting damnation. But this was done by Christ from the beginning of the world, inasmuch as He is the Word of God. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de iudicio quantum ad praemium essentiale et poenam principalem. | Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers judgment as to the essential reward and chief punishment. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., licet spiritualis iudicet omnia, tamen iudicatur ab ipsa veritate. Et ideo, licet Angeli, ex eo quod sunt spirituales, iudicent, iudicantur tamen a Christo, inquantum est veritas. | Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): "Although the spiritual man judgeth all things, still he is judged by Truth Itself." Consequently, although the angels judge, as being spiritual creatures, still they are judged by Christ, inasmuch as He is the Truth. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus habet iudicium non solum super Angelos, sed etiam super administrationem totius creaturae. Si enim, ut Augustinus dicit, in III de Trin., inferiora quodam ordine reguntur a Deo per superiora, oportet dicere quod omnia regantur per animam Christi, quae est super omnem creaturam. Unde et apostolus dicit, Heb. II, non enim Angelis subiecit Deus orbem terrae futurum, scilicet subiectum ei de quo loquimur, idest Christo. Nec tamen propter hoc alium constituit Deus super terram. Quia unus et idem est Deus et homo dominus Iesus Christus. | Reply to Objection 3: Christ judges not only the angels, but also the administration of all creatures. For if, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii) the lower things are ruled by God through the higher, in a certain order, it must be said that all things are ruled by Christ's soul, which is above every creature. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 2:5): "For God hath not subjected unto angels the world to come"—subject namely to Christ—"of whom we speak" [Douay: 'whereof we speak'] [*The words "subject namely to Christ" are from a gloss]. Nor does it follow that God set another over the earth; since one and the same Person is God and Man, our Lord Jesus Christ. |
| De cuius incarnationis mysterio ad praesens dicta sufficiant. | Let what has been said of the Mystery of His Incarnation suffice for the present. |