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Post considerationem eorum quae pertinent ad mysteria verbi incarnati, considerandum est de Ecclesiae sacramentis, quae ab ipso verbo incarnato efficaciam habent.
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After considering those things that concern the mystery of the incarnate Word, we must consider the sacraments of the Church which derive their efficacy from the Word incarnate Himself.
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Circa primum quinque consideranda sunt,
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Concerning the first our consideration will be fivefold:
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| Circa primum quaeruntur octo. | Under the first heading there are eight points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum sacramentum sit in genere signi. | (1) Whether a sacrament is a kind of sign? |
| Secundo, utrum omne signum rei sacrae sit sacramentum. | (2) Whether every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament? |
| Tertio, utrum sacramentum sit signum unius rei tantum, vel plurium. | (3) Whether a sacrament is a sign of one thing only, or of several? |
| Quarto, utrum sacramentum sit signum quod est res sensibilis. | (4) Whether a sacrament is a sign that is something sensible? |
| Quinto, utrum ad sacramentum requiratur determinata res sensibilis. | (5) Whether some determinate sensible thing is required for a sacrament? |
| Sexto, utrum ad sacramentum requiratur significatio quae est per verba. |
(6) Whether signification expressed by words is necessary for a sacrament? |
| Septimo, utrum requirantur determinata verba. | (7) Whether determinate words are required? |
| Octavo, utrum illis verbis possit aliquid addi vel subtrahi. | (8) Whether anything may be added to or subtracted from these words? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sacramentum non sit in genere signi. Videtur enim sacramentum dici a sacrando, sicut medicamentum a medicando. Sed hoc magis videtur pertinere ad rationem causae quam ad rationem signi. Ergo sacramentum magis est in genere causae quam in genere signi. | Objection 1: It seems that a sacrament is not a kind of sign. For sacrament appears to be derived from "sacring" [sacrando]; just as medicament, from "medicando" [healing]. But this seems to be of the nature of a cause rather than of a sign. Therefore a sacrament is a kind of cause rather than a kind of sign. |
| Praeterea, sacramentum videtur occultum aliquid significare, secundum illud Tob. XII, sacramentum regis abscondere bonum est; et Ephes. III, quae sit dispensatio sacramenti absconditi a saeculis in Deo. Sed id quod est absconditum, videtur esse contra rationem signi, nam signum est quod, praeter speciem quam sensibus ingerit, facit aliquid aliud in cognitionem venire, ut patet per Augustinum, in II de Doct. Christ. Ergo videtur quod sacramentum non sit in genere signi. | Objection 2: Further, sacrament seems to signify something hidden, according to Tobias 12:7: "It is good to hide the secret [sacramentum] of a king"; and Eph. 3:9: "What is the dispensation of the mystery [sacramenti] which hath been hidden from eternity in God." But that which is hidden, seems foreign to the nature of a sign; for "a sign is that which conveys something else to the mind, besides the species which it impresses on the senses," as Augustine explains (De Doctr. Christ. ii). Therefore it seems that a sacrament is not a kind of sign. |
| Praeterea, iuramentum quandoque sacramentum nominatur, dicitur enim in decretis, XXII Caus., qu. V, parvuli qui sine aetate rationabili sunt, non cogantur iurare, et qui semel periuratus fuerit, nec testis sit post hoc, nec ad sacramentum, idest ad iuramentum, accedat. Sed iuramentum non pertinet ad rationem signi. Ergo videtur quod sacramentum non sit in genere signi. | Objection 3: Further, an oath is sometimes called a sacrament: for it is written in the Decretals (Caus. xxii, qu. 5): "Children who have not attained the use of reason must not be obliged to swear: and whoever has foresworn himself once, must no more be a witness, nor be allowed to take a sacrament," i.e. an oath. But an oath is not a kind of sign, therefore it seems that a sacrament is not a kind of sign. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in X de Civ. Dei, sacrificium visibile invisibilis sacrificii sacramentum, idest sacrum signum, est. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x): "The visible sacrifice is the sacrament, i.e. the sacred sign, of the invisible sacrifice." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod omnia quae habent ordinem ad unum aliquid, licet diversimode, ab illo denominari possunt, sicut a sanitate quae est in animali, denominatur sanum non solum animal, quod est sanitatis subiectum, sed dicitur medicina sana inquantum est sanitatis effectiva, diaeta vero inquantum est conservativa eiusdem, et urina inquantum est significativa ipsius. Sic igitur sacramentum potest aliquid dici vel quia in se habet aliquam sanctitatem occultam, et secundum hoc sacramentum idem est quod sacrum secretum, vel quia habet aliquem ordinem ad hanc sanctitatem, vel causae vel signi vel secundum quamcumque aliam habitudinem. Specialiter autem nunc loquimur de sacramentis secundum quod important habitudinem signi. Et secundum hoc sacramentum ponitur in genere signi. | I answer that, All things that are ordained to one, even in different ways, can be denominated from it: thus, from health which is in an animal, not only is the animal said to be healthy through being the subject of health: but medicine also is said to be healthy through producing health; diet through preserving it; and urine, through being a sign of health. Consequently, a thing may be called a "sacrament," either from having a certain hidden sanctity, and in this sense a sacrament is a "sacred secret"; or from having some relationship to this sanctity, which relationship may be that of a cause, or of a sign or of any other relation. But now we are speaking of sacraments in a special sense, as implying the habitude of sign: and in this way a sacrament is a kind of sign. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia medicina se habet ut causa effectiva sanitatis, inde est quod omnia denominata a medicina dicuntur per ordinem ad unum primum agens, et per hoc, medicamentum importat causalitatem quandam. Sed sanctitas, a qua denominatur sacramentum, non significatur per modum causae efficientis, sed magis per modum causae formalis vel finalis. Et ideo non oportet quod sacramentum semper importet causalitatem. | Reply to Objection 1: Because medicine is an efficient cause of health, consequently whatever things are denominated from medicine are to be referred to some first active cause: so that a medicament implies a certain causality. But sanctity from which a sacrament is denominated, is not there taken as an efficient cause, but rather as a formal or a final cause. Therefore it does not follow that a sacrament need always imply causality. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit secundum quod sacramentum idem est quod sacrum secretum. Dicitur autem non solum Dei secretum, sed etiam regis, esse sacrum et sacramentum. Quia secundum antiquos sancta vel sacrosancta dicebantur quaecumque violari non licebat, sicut etiam muri civitatis, et personae in dignitatibus constitutae. Et ideo illa secreta, sive divina sive humana, quae non licet violari quibuslibet publicando, dicuntur sacra vel sacramenta. | Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers sacrament in the sense of a "sacred secret." Now not only God's but also the king's, secret, is said to be sacred and to be a sacrament: because according to the ancients, whatever it was unlawful to lay violent hands on was said to be holy or sacrosanct, such as the city walls, and persons of high rank. Consequently those secrets, whether Divine or human, which it is unlawful to violate by making them known to anybody whatever, are called "sacred secrets or sacraments." |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam iuramentum habet quandam habitudinem ad res sacras, inquantum scilicet est quaedam contestatio facta per aliquod sacrum. Et secundum hoc dicitur esse sacramentum, non eadem ratione qua nunc loquimur de sacramentis; non tamen aequivoce sumpto nomine sacramenti, sed analogice, scilicet secundum diversam habitudinem ad aliquid unum, quod est res sacra. | Reply to Objection 3: Even an oath has a certain relation to sacred things, in so far as it consists in calling a sacred thing to witness. And in this sense it is called a sacrament: not in the sense in which we speak of sacraments now; the word "sacrament" being thus used not equivocally but analogically, i.e. by reason of a different relation to the one thing, viz. something sacred. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omne signum rei sacrae sit sacramentum. Omnes enim creaturae sensibiles sunt signa rerum sacrarum, secundum illud Rom. I, invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur. Nec tamen omnes res sensibiles possunt dici sacramenta. Non ergo omne signum rei sacrae est sacramentum. | Objection 1: It seems that not every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament. For all sensible creatures are signs of sacred things; according to Rm. 1:20: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made." And yet all sensible things cannot be called sacraments. Therefore not every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament. |
| Praeterea, omnia quae in veteri lege fiebant, Christum figurabant, qui est sanctus sanctorum, secundum illud I Cor. X, omnia in figura contingebant illis, et Coloss. II, quae sunt umbra futurorum, corpus autem Christi. Nec tamen omnia gesta patrum veteris testamenti, vel etiam omnes caeremoniae legis, sunt sacramenta, sed quaedam specialiter, sicut in secunda parte habitum est. Ergo videtur quod non omne signum sacrae rei sit sacramentum. |
Objection 2: Further, whatever was done under the Old Law was a figure of Christ Who is the "Holy of Holies" (Dan. 9:24), according to 1 Cor. 10:11: "All (these) things happened to them in figure"; and Col. 2:17: "Which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is Christ's." And yet not all that was done by the Fathers of the Old Testament, not even all the ceremonies of the Law, were sacraments, but only in certain special cases, as stated in the FS, Question [101], Article [4]. Therefore it seems that not every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament. |
| Praeterea, etiam in novo testamento multa geruntur in signum alicuius rei sacrae, quae tamen non dicuntur sacramenta, sicut aspersio aquae benedictae, consecratio altaris, et consimilia. Non ergo omne signum rei sacrae est sacramentum. | Objection 3: Further, even in the New Testament many things are done in sign of some sacred thing; yet they are not called sacraments; such as sprinkling with holy water, the consecration of an altar, and such like. Therefore not every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament. |
| Sed contra est quod definitio convertitur cum definito. Sed quidam definiunt sacramentum per hoc quod est sacrae rei signum, et hoc etiam videtur ex auctoritate Augustini supra inducta. Ergo videtur quod omne signum rei sacrae sit sacramentum. |
On the contrary, A definition is convertible with the thing defined. Now some define a sacrament as being "the sign of a sacred thing"; moreover, this is clear from the passage quoted above (Article [1]) from Augustine. Therefore it seems that every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod signa dantur hominibus, quorum est per nota ad ignota pervenire. Et ideo proprie dicitur sacramentum quod est signum alicuius rei sacrae ad homines pertinentis, ut scilicet proprie dicatur sacramentum, secundum quod nunc de sacramentis loquimur, quod est signum rei sacrae inquantum est sanctificans homines. | I answer that, Signs are given to men, to whom it is proper to discover the unknown by means of the known. Consequently a sacrament properly so called is that which is the sign of some sacred thing pertaining to man; so that properly speaking a sacrament, as considered by us now, is defined as being the "sign of a holy thing so far as it makes men holy." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod creaturae sensibiles significant aliquid sacrum, scilicet sapientiam et bonitatem divinam, inquantum sunt in seipsis sacra, non autem inquantum nos per ea sanctificamur. Et ideo non possunt dici sacramenta secundum quod nunc loquimur de sacramentis. | Reply to Objection 1: Sensible creatures signify something holy, viz. Divine wisdom and goodness inasmuch as these are holy in themselves; but not inasmuch as we are made holy by them. Therefore they cannot be called sacraments as we understand sacraments now. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod quaedam ad vetus testamentum pertinentia significabant sanctitatem Christi secundum quod in se sanctus est. Quaedam vero significabant sanctitatem eius inquantum per eam nos sanctificamur, sicut immolatio agni paschalis significabat immolationem Christi, qua sanctificati sumus. Et talia dicuntur proprie veteris legis sacramenta. | Reply to Objection 2: Some things pertaining to the Old Testament signified the holiness of Christ considered as holy in Himself. Others signified His holiness considered as the cause of our holiness; thus the sacrifice of the Paschal Lamb signified Christ's Sacrifice whereby we are made holy: and such like are properly styled sacraments of the Old Law. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod res denominantur a fine et complemento. Dispositio autem non est finis, sed perfectio. Et ideo ea quae significant dispositionem ad sanctitatem, non dicuntur sacramenta, de quibus procedit obiectio; sed solum ea quae significant perfectionem sanctitatis humanae. | Reply to Objection 3: Names are given to things considered in reference to their end and state of completeness. Now a disposition is not an end, whereas perfection is. Consequently things that signify disposition to holiness are not called sacraments, and with regard to these the objection is verified: only those are called sacraments which signify the perfection of holiness in man. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod sacramentum non sit signum nisi unius rei. Id enim quo multa significantur, est signum ambiguum, et per consequens fallendi occasio, sicut patet de nominibus aequivocis. Sed omnis fallacia debet removeri a Christiana religione, secundum illud Coloss. II, videte ne quis vos seducat per philosophiam et inanem fallaciam. Ergo videtur quod sacramentum non sit signum plurium rerum. | Objection 1: It seems that a sacrament is a sign of one thing only. For that which signifies many things is an ambiguous sign, and consequently occasions deception: this is clearly seen in equivocal words. But all deception should be removed from the Christian religion, according to Col. 2:8: "Beware lest any man cheat you by philosophy and vain deceit." Therefore it seems that a sacrament is not a sign of several things. |
| Praeterea, sicut dictum est, sacramentum significat rem sacram inquantum est humanae sanctificationis causa. Sed una sola est causa sanctificationis humanae, scilicet sanguis Christi, secundum illud Heb. ult., Iesus, ut sanctificaret per suum sanguinem populum, extra portam passus est. Ergo videtur quod sacramentum non significet plura. |
Objection 2: Further, as stated above (Article [2]), a sacrament signifies a holy thing in so far as it makes man holy. But there is only one cause of man's holiness, viz. the blood of Christ; according to Heb. 13:12: "Jesus, that He might sanctify the people by His own blood, suffered without the gate." Therefore it seems that a sacrament does not signify several things. |
| Praeterea, dictum est quod sacramentum proprie significat ipsum finem sanctificationis. Sed finis sanctificationis est vita aeterna, secundum illud Rom. VI, habetis fructum vestrum in sanctificatione, finem vero vitam aeternam. Ergo videtur quod sacramenta non significent nisi unam rem, scilicet vitam aeternam. |
Objection 3: Further, it has been said above (Article [2], ad 3) that a sacrament signifies properly the very end of sanctification. Now the end of sanctification is eternal life, according to Rm. 6:22: "You have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end life everlasting." Therefore it seems that the sacraments signify one thing only, viz. eternal life. |
| Sed contra est quod in sacramento altaris est duplex res significata, scilicet corpus Christi verum et mysticum, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro sententiarum prosperi. | On the contrary, In the Sacrament of the Altar, two things are signified, viz. Christ's true body, and Christ's mystical body; as Augustine says (Liber Sent. Prosper.). |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, sacramentum proprie dicitur quod ordinatur ad significandam nostram sanctificationem. In qua tria possunt considerari, videlicet ipsa causa sanctificationis nostrae, quae est passio Christi; et forma nostrae sanctificationis, quae consistit in gratia et virtutibus; et ultimus finis nostrae sanctificationis, qui est vita aeterna. Et haec omnia per sacramenta significantur. Unde sacramentum est et signum rememorativum eius quod praecessit, scilicet passionis Christi; et demonstrativum eius quod in nobis efficitur per Christi passionem, scilicet gratiae; et prognosticum, idest praenuntiativum, futurae gloriae. |
I answer that, As stated above (Article [2]) a sacrament properly speaking is that which is ordained to signify our sanctification. In which three things may be considered; viz. the very cause of our sanctification, which is Christ's passion; the form of our sanctification, which is grace and the virtues; and the ultimate end of our sanctification, which is eternal life. And all these are signified by the sacraments. Consequently a sacrament is a sign that is both a reminder of the past, i.e. the passion of Christ; and an indication of that which is effected in us by Christ's passion, i.e. grace; and a prognostic, that is, a foretelling of future glory. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod tunc est signum ambiguum, praebens occasionem fallendi, quando significat multa quorum unum non ordinatur ad aliud. Sed quando significat multa secundum quod ex eis quodam ordine efficitur unum, tunc non est signum ambiguum, sed certum, sicut hoc nomen homo significat animam et corpus prout ex eis constituitur humana natura. Et hoc modo sacramentum significat tria praedicta secundum quod quodam ordine sunt unum. | Reply to Objection 1: Then is a sign ambiguous and the occasion of deception, when it signifies many things not ordained to one another. But when it signifies many things inasmuch as, through being mutually ordained, they form one thing, then the sign is not ambiguous but certain: thus this word "man" signifies the soul and body inasmuch as together they form the human nature. In this way a sacrament signifies the three things aforesaid, inasmuch as by being in a certain order they are one thing. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod sacramentum, in hoc quod significat rem sanctificantem, oportet quod significet effectum, qui intelligitur in ipsa causa sanctificante prout est causa sanctificans. | Reply to Objection 2: Since a sacrament signifies that which sanctifies, it must needs signify the effect, which is implied in the sanctifying cause as such. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod sufficit ad rationem sacramenti quod significet perfectionem quae est forma, nec oportet quod solum significet perfectionem quae est finis. | Reply to Objection 3: It is enough for a sacrament that it signify that perfection which consists in the form, nor is it necessary that it should signify only that perfection which is the end. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sacramentum non semper sit aliqua res sensibilis. Quia secundum philosophum, in libro priorum, omnis effectus suae causae signum est. Sed sicut sunt quidam effectus sensibiles, ita etiam sunt quidam effectus intelligibiles, sicut scientia est effectus demonstrationis. Ergo non omne signum est sensibile. Sufficit autem ad rationem sacramenti quod sit signum alicuius rei sacrae inquantum homo per eam sanctificatur, ut supra dictum est. Non ergo requiritur ad sacramentum quod sit aliqua res sensibilis. |
Objection 1: It seems that a sacrament is not always something sensible. Because, according to the Philosopher (Prior. Anal. ii), every effect is a sign of its cause. But just as there are some sensible effects, so are there some intelligible effects; thus science is the effect of a demonstration. Therefore not every sign is sensible. Now all that is required for a sacrament is something that is a sign of some sacred thing, inasmuch as thereby man is sanctified, as stated above (Article [2]). Therefore something sensible is not required for a sacrament. |
| Praeterea, sacramenta pertinent ad regnum Dei et cultum Dei. Sed res sensibiles non videntur pertinere ad cultum Dei, dicitur enim Ioan. IV, spiritus est Deus, et eos qui adorant eum, in spiritu et veritate adorare oportet; et Rom. XIV, non est regnum Dei esca et potus. Ergo res sensibiles non requiruntur ad sacramenta. |
Objection 2: Further, sacraments belong to the kingdom of God and the Divine worship. But sensible things do not seem to belong to the Divine worship: for we are told (Jn. 4:24) that "God is a spirit; and they that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth"; and (Rm. 14:17) that "the kingdom of God is not meat and drink." Therefore sensible things are not required for the sacraments. |
| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arbit., quod res sensibiles sunt minima bona, sine quibus homo recte vivere potest. Sed sacramenta sunt de necessitate salutis humanae, ut infra patebit, et ita sine eis homo recte vivere non potest. Non ergo res sensibiles requiruntur ad sacramenta. |
Objection 3: Further. Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii) that "sensible things are goods of least account, since without them man can live aright." But the sacraments are necessary for man's salvation, as we shall show farther on (Question [61], Article [1]): so that man cannot live aright without them. Therefore sensible things are not required for the sacraments. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., accedit verbum ad elementum, et fit sacramentum. Et loquitur ibi de elemento sensibili, quod est aqua. Ergo res sensibiles requiruntur ad sacramenta. | On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. lxxx super Joan.): "The word is added to the element and this becomes a sacrament"; and he is speaking there of water which is a sensible element. Therefore sensible things are required for the sacraments. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod divina sapientia unicuique rei providet secundum suum modum, et propter hoc dicitur, Sap. VIII, quod suaviter disponit omnia. Unde et Matth. XXV dicitur quod dividit unicuique secundum propriam virtutem. Est autem homini connaturale ut per sensibilia perveniat in cognitionem intelligibilium. Signum autem est per quod aliquis devenit in cognitionem alterius. Unde, cum res sacrae quae per sacramenta significantur, sint quaedam spiritualia et intelligibilia bona quibus homo sanctificatur, consequens est ut per aliquas res sensibiles significatio sacramenti impleatur, sicut etiam per similitudinem sensibilium rerum in divina Scriptura res spirituales nobis describuntur. Et inde est quod ad sacramenta requiruntur res sensibiles, ut etiam Dionysius probat, in I cap. caelestis hierarchiae. |
I answer that, Divine wisdom provides for each thing according to its mode; hence it is written (Wis. 8:1) that "she... ordereth all things sweetly": wherefore also we are told (Mt. 25:15) that she "gave to everyone according to his proper ability." Now it is part of man's nature to acquire knowledge of the intelligible from the sensible. But a sign is that by means of which one attains to the knowledge of something else. Consequently, since the sacred things which are signified by the sacraments, are the spiritual and intelligible goods by means of which man is sanctified, it follows that the sacramental signs consist in sensible things: just as in the Divine Scriptures spiritual things are set before us under the guise of things sensible. And hence it is that sensible things are required for the sacraments; as Dionysius also proves in his book on the heavenly hierarchy (Coel. Hier. i). |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod unumquodque praecipue denominatur et definitur secundum illud quod convenit ei primo et per se, non autem per id quod convenit ei per aliud. Effectus autem sensibilis per se habet quod ducat in cognitionem alterius, quasi primo et per se homini innotescens, quia omnis nostra cognitio a sensu initium habet. Effectus autem intelligibiles non habent quod possint ducere in cognitionem alterius nisi inquantum sunt per aliud manifestati, idest per aliqua sensibilia. Et inde est quod primo et principaliter dicuntur signa quae sensibus offeruntur, sicut Augustinus dicit, in II de Doct. Christ., quod signum est quod, praeter speciem quam ingerit sensibus, facit aliquid aliud in cognitionem venire. Effectus autem intelligibiles non habent rationem signi nisi secundum quod sunt manifestati per aliqua signa. Et per hunc etiam modum quaedam quae non sunt sensibilia, dicuntur quodammodo sacramenta, inquantum sunt significata per aliqua sensibilia, de quibus infra agetur. | Reply to Objection 1: The name and definition of a thing is taken principally from that which belongs to a thing primarily and essentially: and not from that which belongs to it through something else. Now a sensible effect being the primary and direct object of man's knowledge (since all our knowledge springs from the senses) by its very nature leads to the knowledge of something else: whereas intelligible effects are not such as to be able to lead us to the knowledge of something else, except in so far as they are manifested by some other thing, i.e. by certain sensibles. It is for this reason that the name sign is given primarily and principally to things which are offered to the senses; hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that a sign "is that which conveys something else to the mind, besides the species which it impresses on the senses." But intelligible effects do not partake of the nature of a sign except in so far as they are pointed out by certain signs. And in this way, too, certain things which are not sensible are termed sacraments as it were, in so far as they are signified by certain sensible things, of which we shall treat further on (Question [63], Article [1], ad 2; Article [3], ad 2; Question [73], Article [6]; Question [74], Article [1], ad 3). |
| Ad secundum dicendum, quod res sensibiles, prout in sua natura considerantur, non pertinent ad cultum vel regnum Dei, sed solum secundum quod sunt signa spiritualium rerum, in quibus regnum Dei consistit. | Reply to Objection 2: Sensible things considered in their own nature do not belong to the worship or kingdom of God: but considered only as signs of spiritual things in which the kingdom of God consists. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de rebus sensibilibus secundum quod in sua natura considerantur, non autem secundum quod assumuntur ad significandum spiritualia, quae sunt maxima bona. | Reply to Objection 3: Augustine speaks there of sensible things, considered in their nature; but not as employed to signify spiritual things, which are the highest goods. |
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| Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non requirantur determinatae res ad sacramenta. Res enim sensibiles requiruntur in sacramentis ad significandum, ut dictum est. Sed nihil prohibet diversis rebus sensibilibus idem significari, sicut in sacra Scriptura Deus aliquando metaphorice significatur per lapidem, quandoque per leonem, quandoque per solem, aut aliquid huiusmodi. Ergo videtur quod diversae res possint congruere eidem sacramento. Non ergo determinatae res in sacramentis requiruntur. |
Objection 1: It seems that determinate things are not required for a sacrament. For sensible things are required in sacraments for the purpose of signification, as stated above (Article [4]). But nothing hinders the same thing being signified by divers sensible things: thus in Holy Scripture God is signified metaphorically, sometimes by a stone (2 Kgs. 22:2; Zach. 3:9; 1 Cor. 10:4; Apoc. 4:3); sometimes by a lion (Is. 31:4; Apoc. 5:5); sometimes by the sun (Is. 60:19,20; Mal. 4:2), or by something similar. Therefore it seems that divers things can be suitable to the same sacrament. Therefore determinate things are not required for the sacraments. |
| Praeterea, magis necessaria est salus animae quam salus corporis. Sed in medicinis corporalibus, quae ad salutem corporis ordinantur, potest una res pro alia poni in eius defectu. Ergo multo magis in sacramentis, quae sunt medicinae spirituales ad salutem animae ordinatae, poterit una res assumi pro alia quando illa defuerit. | Objection 2: Further, the health of the soul is more necessary than that of the body. But in bodily medicines, which are ordained to the health of the body, one thing can be substituted for another which happens to be wanting. Therefore much more in the sacraments, which are spiritual remedies ordained to the health of the soul, can one thing be substituted for another when this happens to be lacking. |
| Praeterea, non est conveniens ut hominum salus arctetur per legem divinam, et praecipue per legem Christi, qui venit omnes salvare. Sed in statu legis naturae non requirebantur in sacramentis aliquae res determinatae, sed ex voto assumebantur, ut patet Gen. XXVIII, ubi se Iacob vovit Deo decimas et hostias pacificas oblaturum. Ergo videtur quod non debuit arctari homo, et praecipue in nova lege, ad alicuius rei determinatae usum in sacramentis. | Objection 3: Further, it is not fitting that the salvation of men be restricted by the Divine Law: still less by the Law of Christ, Who came to save all. But in the state of the Law of nature determinate things were not required in the sacraments, but were put to that use through a vow, as appears from Gn. 28, where Jacob vowed that he would offer to God tithes and peace-offerings. Therefore it seems that man should not have been restricted, especially under the New Law, to the use of any determinate thing in the sacraments. |
| Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Ioan. III, nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et spiritu sancto, non potest introire in regnum Dei. |
On the contrary, our Lord said (Jn. 3:5): "Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod in usu sacramentorum duo possunt considerari, scilicet cultus divinus, et sanctificatio hominis, quorum primum pertinet ad hominem per comparationem ad Deum, secundum autem e converso pertinet ad Deum per comparationem ad hominem. Non autem pertinet ad aliquem determinare quod est in potestate alterius, sed solum illud quod est in sua potestate. Quia igitur sanctificatio hominis est in potestate Dei sanctificantis, non pertinet ad hominem suo iudicio assumere res quibus sanctificetur, sed hoc debet esse ex divina institutione determinatum. Et ideo in sacramentis novae legis, quibus homines sanctificantur, secundum illud I Cor. VI, abluti estis, sanctificati estis, oportet uti rebus ex divina institutione determinatis. | I answer that, In the use of the sacraments two things may be considered, namely, the worship of God, and the sanctification of man: the former of which pertains to man as referred to God, and the latter pertains to God in reference to man. Now it is not for anyone to determine that which is in the power of another, but only that which is in his own power. Since, therefore, the sanctification of man is in the power of God Who sanctifies, it is not for man to decide what things should be used for his sanctification, but this should be determined by Divine institution. Therefore in the sacraments of the New Law, by which man is sanctified according to 1 Cor. 6:11, "You are washed, you are sanctified," we must use those things which are determined by Divine institution. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si idem possit per diversa signa significari, determinare tamen quo signo sit utendum ad significandum, pertinet ad significantem. Deus autem est qui nobis significat spiritualia per res sensibiles in sacramentis, et per verba similitudinaria in Scripturis. Et ideo, sicut iudicio spiritus sancti determinatum est quibus similitudinibus in certis Scripturae locis res spirituales significentur, ita etiam debet esse divina institutione determinatum quae res ad significandum assumantur in hoc vel in illo sacramento. | Reply to Objection 1: Though the same thing can be signified by divers signs, yet to determine which sign must be used belongs to the signifier. Now it is God Who signifies spiritual things to us by means of the sensible things in the sacraments, and of similitudes in the Scriptures. And consequently, just as the Holy Ghost decides by what similitudes spiritual things are to be signified in certain passages of Scripture, so also must it be determined by Divine institution what things are to be employed for the purpose of signification in this or that sacrament. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod res sensibiles habent naturaliter sibi inditas virtutes conferentes ad corporalem salutem, et ideo non refert, si duae earum eandem virtutem habeant, qua quis utatur. Sed ad sanctificationem non ordinantur ex aliqua virtute naturaliter indita, sed solum ex institutione divina. Et ideo oportuit divinitus determinari quibus rebus sensibilibus sit in sacramentis utendum. | Reply to Objection 2: Sensible things are endowed with natural powers conducive to the health of the body: and therefore if two of them have the same virtue, it matters not which we use. Yet they are ordained unto sanctification not through any power that they possess naturally, but only in virtue of the Divine institution. And therefore it was necessary that God should determine the sensible things to be employed in the sacraments. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XIX contra Faust., diversa sacramenta diversis temporibus congruunt, sicut etiam diversis verbis significantur diversa tempora, scilicet praesens, praeteritum et futurum. Et ideo, sicut in statu legis naturae homines, nulla lege exterius data, solo interiori instinctu movebantur ad Deum colendum, ita etiam ex interiori instinctu determinabatur eis quibus rebus sensibilibus ad Dei cultum uterentur. Postmodum vero necesse fuit etiam exterius legem dari, tum propter obscurationem legis naturae ex peccatis hominum; tum etiam ad expressiorem significationem gratiae Christi, per quam humanum genus sanctificatur. Et ideo etiam necesse fuit res determinari quibus homines uterentur in sacramentis. Nec propter hoc arctatur via salutis, quia res quarum usus est necessarius in sacramentis, vel communiter habentur, vel parvo studio adhibito haberi possunt. | Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix), diverse sacraments suit different times; just as different times are signified by different parts of the verb, viz. present, past, and future. Consequently, just as under the state of the Law of nature man was moved by inward instinct and without any outward law, to worship God, so also the sensible things to be employed in the worship of God were determined by inward instinct. But later on it became necessary for a law to be given (to man) from without: both because the Law of nature had become obscured by man's sins; and in order to signify more expressly the grace of Christ, by which the human race is sanctified. And hence the need for those things to be determinate, of which men have to make use in the sacraments. Nor is the way of salvation narrowed thereby: because the things which need to be used in the sacraments, are either in everyone's possession or can be had with little trouble. |
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| Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in significatione sacramentorum non requirantur verba. Dicit enim Augustinus, contra Faustum, libro XIX, quid sunt aliud quaeque corporalia sacramenta nisi quasi quaedam verba visibilia? Et sic videtur quod addere verba rebus sensibilibus in sacramentis sit addere verba verbis. Sed hoc est superfluum. Non ergo requiruntur verba cum rebus sensibilibus in sacramentis. | Objection 1: It seems that words are not required for the signification of the sacraments. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix): "What else is a corporeal sacrament but a kind of visible word?" Wherefore to add words to the sensible things in the sacraments seems to be the same as to add words to words. But this is superfluous. Therefore words are not required besides the sensible things in the sacraments. |
| Praeterea, sacramentum est aliquid unum. Ex his autem quae sunt diversorum generum, non videtur posse aliquid unum fieri. Cum igitur res sensibiles et verba sint diversorum generum, quia res sensibiles sunt a natura, verba autem a ratione; videtur quod in sacramentis non requirantur verba cum rebus sensibilibus. | Objection 2: Further, a sacrament is some one thing, but it does not seem possible to make one thing of those that belong to different genera. Since, therefore, sensible things and words are of different genera, for sensible things are the product of nature, but words, of reason; it seems that in the sacraments, words are not required besides sensible things. |
| Praeterea, sacramenta novae legis succedunt sacramentis veteris legis, quia, illis ablatis, ista sunt instituta, ut Augustinus dicit, XIX contra Faustum. Sed in sacramentis veteris legis non requirebatur aliqua forma verborum. Ergo nec in sacramentis novae legis. | Objection 3: Further, the sacraments of the New Law succeed those of the Old Law: since "the former were instituted when the latter were abolished," as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix). But no form of words was required in the sacraments of the Old Law. Therefore neither is it required in those of the New Law. |
| Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Ephes. V, Christus dilexit Ecclesiam, et tradidit semetipsum pro ea, ut illam sanctificaret, mundans eam lavacro aquae in verbo vitae. Et Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., accedit verbum ad elementum, et fit sacramentum. |
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 5:25,26): "Christ loved the Church, and delivered Himself up for it; that He might sanctify it, cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life." And Augustine says (Tract. xxx in Joan.): "The word is added to the element, and this becomes a sacrament." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod sacramenta, sicut dictum est, adhibentur ad hominum sanctificationem sicut quaedam signa. Tripliciter ergo considerari possunt, et quolibet modo congruit eis quod verba rebus sensibilibus adiungantur. Primo enim possunt considerari ex parte causae sanctificantis, quae est verbum incarnatum, cui sacramentum quodammodo conformatur in hoc quod rei sensibili verbum adhibetur, sicut in mysterio incarnationis carni sensibili est verbum Dei unitum. |
I answer that, The sacraments, as stated above (Articles [2],3), are employed as signs for man's sanctification. Consequently they can be considered in three ways: and in each way it is fitting for words to be added to the sensible signs. For in the first place they can be considered in regard to the cause of sanctification, which is the Word incarnate: to Whom the sacraments have a certain conformity, in that the word is joined to the sensible sign, just as in the mystery of the Incarnation the Word of God is united to sensible flesh. |
| Secundo possunt considerari sacramenta ex parte hominis qui sanctificatur, qui componitur ex anima et corpore, cui proportionatur sacramentalis medicina, quae per rem visibilem corpus tangit, et per verbum ab anima creditur. Unde Augustinus dicit, super illud Ioan. XV, iam vos mundi estis propter sermonem etc., unde ista est tanta virtus aquae ut corpus tangat et cor abluat, nisi faciente verbo, non quia dicitur, sed quia creditur? | Secondly, sacraments may be considered on the part of man who is sanctified, and who is composed of soul and body: to whom the sacramental remedy is adjusted, since it touches the body through the sensible element, and the soul through faith in the words. Hence Augustine says (Tract. lxxx in Joan.) on Jn. 15:3, "Now you are clean by reason of the word," etc.: "Whence hath water this so great virtue, to touch the body and wash the heart, but by the word doing it, not because it is spoken, but because it is believed?" |
| Tertio potest considerari ex parte ipsius significationis sacramentalis. Dicit autem Augustinus, in II de Doct. Christ., quod verba inter homines obtinuerunt principatum significandi, quia verba diversimode formari possunt ad significandos diversos conceptus mentis, et propter hoc per verba magis distincte possumus exprimere quod mente concipimus. Et ideo ad perfectionem significationis sacramentalis necesse fuit ut significatio rerum sensibilium per aliqua verba determinaretur. Aqua enim significare potest et ablutionem propter, suam humiditatem, et refrigerium propter suam frigiditatem, sed cum dicitur, ego te baptizo, manifestatur quod aqua utimur in Baptismo ad significandam emundationem spiritualem. | Thirdly, a sacrament may be considered on the part of the sacramental signification. Now Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that "words are the principal signs used by men"; because words can be formed in various ways for the purpose of signifying various mental concepts, so that we are able to express our thoughts with greater distinctness by means of words. And therefore in order to insure the perfection of sacramental signification it was necessary to determine the signification of the sensible things by means of certain words. For water may signify both a cleansing by reason of its humidity, and refreshment by reason of its being cool: but when we say, "I baptize thee," it is clear that we use water in baptism in order to signify a spiritual cleansing. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod res visibiles sacramentorum dicuntur verba per similitudinem quandam, inquantum scilicet participant quandam vim significandi, quae principaliter est in ipsis verbis, ut dictum est. Et ideo non est superflua ingeminatio verborum cum in sacramentis rebus visibilibus verba adduntur, quia unum eorum determinatur per aliud, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 1: The sensible elements of the sacraments are called words by way of a certain likeness, in so far as they partake of a certain significative power, which resides principally in the very words, as stated above. Consequently it is not a superfluous repetition to add words to the visible element in the sacraments; because one determines the other, as stated above. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, quamvis verba et aliae res sensibiles sint in diverso genere quantum pertinet ad naturam rei, conveniunt tamen ratione significandi. Quae perfectius est in verbis quam in aliis rebus. Et ideo ex verbis et rebus fit quodammodo unum in sacramentis sicut ex forma et materia, inquantum scilicet per verba perficitur significatio rerum, ut dictum est. Sub rebus autem comprehenduntur etiam ipsi actus sensibiles, puta ablutio et unctio et alia huiusmodi, quia in his est eadem ratio significandi et in rebus. | Reply to Objection 2: Although words and other sensible things are not in the same genus, considered in their natures, yet have they something in common as to the thing signified by them: which is more perfectly done in words than in other things. Wherefore in the sacraments, words and things, like form and matter, combine in the formation of one thing, in so far as the signification of things is completed by means of words, as above stated. And under words are comprised also sensible actions, such as cleansing and anointing and such like: because they have a like signification with the things. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, contra Faustum, alia debent esse sacramenta rei praesentis, et alia rei futurae. Sacramenta autem veteris legis praenuntia erant Christi venturi. Et ideo non ita expresse significabant Christum sicut sacramenta novae legis, quae ab ipso Christo effluunt, et quandam similitudinem ipsius in se habent, ut dictum est. Utebantur tamen in veteri lege aliquibus verbis in his quae ad cultum Dei pertinent, tam sacerdotes, qui erant sacramentorum illorum ministri, secundum illud Num. VI, sic benedicetis filiis Israel, et dicetis eis, benedicat tibi dominus, etc.; quam etiam illi qui illis sacramentis utebantur, secundum illud Deut. XXVI, profiteor hodie coram domino Deo tuo, et cetera. | Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix), the sacraments of things present should be different from sacraments of things to come. Now the sacraments of the Old Law foretold the coming of Christ. Consequently they did not signify Christ so clearly as the sacraments of the New Law, which flow from Christ Himself, and have a certain likeness to Him, as stated above. Nevertheless in the Old Law, certain words were used in things pertaining to the worship of God, both by the priests, who were the ministers of those sacraments, according to Num. 6:23,24: "Thus shall you bless the children of Israel, and you shall say to them: The Lord bless thee," etc.; and by those who made use of those sacraments, according to Dt. 26:3: "I profess this day before the Lord thy God," etc. |
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| Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non requirantur determinata verba in sacramentis. Ut enim philosophus dicit, voces non sunt eaedem apud omnes. Sed salus, quae per sacramentum quaeritur, est eadem apud omnes. Ergo non requiruntur aliqua determinata verba in sacramentis. | Objection 1: It seems that determinate words are not required in the sacraments. For as the Philosopher says (Peri Herm. i), "words are not the same for all." But salvation, which is sought through the sacraments, is the same for all. Therefore determinate words are not required in the sacraments. |
| Praeterea, verba requiruntur in sacramentis inquantum sunt principaliter significativa, sicut supra dictum est. Sed contingit per diversa verba idem significari. Ergo non requiruntur determinata verba in sacramentis. |
Objection 2: Further, words are required in the sacraments forasmuch as they are the principal means of signification, as stated above (Article [6]). But it happens that various words mean the same. Therefore determinate words are not required in the sacraments. |
| Praeterea, corruptio cuiuslibet rei variat eius speciem. Sed quidam corrupte verba proferunt, nec tamen propter hoc impediri creditur sacramentorum effectus, alioquin illiterati et balbi qui sacramenta conferunt, frequenter defectum in sacramentis inducerent. Ergo videtur quod non requirantur in sacramentis determinata verba. | Objection 3: Further, corruption of anything changes its species. But some corrupt the pronunciation of words, and yet it is not credible that the sacramental effect is hindered thereby; else unlettered men and stammerers, in conferring sacraments, would frequently do so invalidly. Therefore it seems that determinate words are not required in the sacraments. |
| Sed contra est quod dominus determinata verba protulit in consecratione sacramenti Eucharistiae, dicens, Matth. XXVI, hoc est corpus meum. Similiter etiam mandavit discipulis ut sub determinata forma verborum baptizarent, dicens, Matth. ult., euntes, docete omnes gentes, baptizantes eos in nomine patris et filii et spiritus sancti. |
On the contrary, our Lord used determinate words in consecrating the sacrament of the Eucharist, when He said (Mt. 26:26): "This is My Body." Likewise He commanded His disciples to baptize under a form of determinate words, saying (Mt. 28:19): "Go ye and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, in sacramentis verba se habent per modum formae, res autem sensibiles per modum materiae. In omnibus autem compositis ex materia et forma principium determinationis est ex parte formae, quae est quodammodo finis et terminus materiae. Et ideo principalius requiritur ad esse rei determinata forma quam determinata materia, materia enim determinata quaeritur ut sit proportionata determinatae formae. Cum igitur in sacramentis requirantur determinatae res sensibiles, quae se habent in sacramentis sicut materia, multo magis requiritur in eis determinata forma verborum. |
I answer that, As stated above (Article [6], ad 2), in the sacraments the words are as the form, and sensible things are as the matter. Now in all things composed of matter and form, the determining principle is on the part of the form, which is as it were the end and terminus of the matter. Consequently for the being of a thing the need of a determinate form is prior to the need of determinate matter: for determinate matter is needed that it may be adapted to the determinate form. Since, therefore, in the sacraments determinate sensible things are required, which are as the sacramental matter, much more is there need in them of a determinate form of words. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., verbum operatur in sacramentis, non quia dicitur, idest, non secundum exteriorem sonum vocis, sed quia creditur, secundum sensum verborum qui fide tenetur. Et hic quidem sensus est idem apud omnes, licet non eaedem voces quantum ad sonum. Et ideo, cuiuscumque linguae verbis proferatur talis sensus, perficitur sacramentum. | Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Tract. lxxx super Joan.), the word operates in the sacraments "not because it is spoken," i.e. not by the outward sound of the voice, "but because it is believed" in accordance with the sense of the words which is held by faith. And this sense is indeed the same for all, though the same words as to their sound be not used by all. Consequently no matter in what language this sense is expressed, the sacrament is complete. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet in qualibet lingua contingat diversis vocibus idem significari, semper tamen aliqua illarum vocum est qua principalius et communius homines illius linguae utuntur ad hoc significandum. Et talis vox assumi debet in significatione sacramenti. Sicut etiam inter res sensibiles illa assumitur ad significationem sacramenti cuius usus est communior ad actum per quem sacramenti effectus significatur, sicut aqua communius utuntur homines ad ablutionem corporalem, per quam spiritualis ablutio significatur; et ideo aqua assumitur ut materia in Baptismo. | Reply to Objection 2: Although it happens in every language that various words signify the same thing, yet one of those words is that which those who speak that language use principally and more commonly to signify that particular thing: and this is the word which should be used for the sacramental signification. So also among sensible things, that one is used for the sacramental signification which is most commonly employed for the action by which the sacramental effect is signified: thus water is most commonly used by men for bodily cleansing, by which the spiritual cleansing is signified: and therefore water is employed as the matter of baptism. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui corrupte profert verba sacramentalia, si hoc ex industria facit, non videtur intendere facere quod facit Ecclesia, et ita non videtur perfici sacramentum. Si autem hoc faciat ex errore vel lapsu linguae, si sit tanta corruptio quae omnino auferat sensum locutionis, non videtur perfici sacramentum. Et hoc praecipue contingit quando fit corruptio ex parte principii dictionis, puta si, loco eius quod est in nomine patris, dicat, in nomine matris. Si vero non totaliter auferatur sensus locutionis per huiusmodi corruptelam, nihilominus perficitur sacramentum. Et hoc praecipue contingit quando fit corruptio ex parte finis, puta si aliquis dicat patrias et filias. Quamvis enim huiusmodi verba corrupte prolata nihil significent ex virtute impositionis, accipiuntur tamen ut significantia ex accommodatione usus. Et ideo, licet mutetur sonus sensibilis, remanet tamen idem sensus. | Reply to Objection 3: If he who corrupts the pronunciation of the sacramental words---does so on purpose, he does not seem to intend to do what the Church intends: and thus the sacrament seems to be defective. But if he do this through error or a slip of the tongue, and if he so far mispronounce the words as to deprive them of sense, the sacrament seems to be defective. This would be the case especially if the mispronunciation be in the beginning of a word, for instance, if one were to say "in nomine matris" instead of "in nomine Patris." If, however, the sense of the words be not entirely lost by this mispronunciation, the sacrament is complete. This would be the case principally if the end of a word be mispronounced; for instance, if one were to say "patrias et filias." For although the words thus mispronounced have no appointed meaning, yet we allow them an accommodated meaning corresponding to the usual forms of speech. And so, although the sensible sound is changed, yet the sense remains the same. |
| Quod autem dictum est de differentia corruptionis circa principium vel finem dictionis, rationem habet quia apud nos variatio dictionis ex parte principii mutat significationem, variatio autem ex fine dictionis ut plurimum non mutat significationem. Quae tamen apud Graecos variatur etiam secundum principium dictionis in declinatione verborum. | What has been said about the various mispronunciations of words, either at the beginning or at the end, holds forasmuch as with us a change at the beginning of a word changes the meaning, whereas a change at the end generally speaking does not effect such a change: whereas with the Greeks the sense is changed also in the beginning of words in the conjugation of verbs. |
| Magis tamen videtur attendenda quantitas corruptionis ex parte dictionis. Quia ex utraque parte potest esse tam parva quod non aufert sensum verborum, et tam magna, quod aufert. Sed unum horum facilius accidit ex parte principii, aliud ex parte finis. | Nevertheless the principle point to observe is the extent of the corruption entailed by mispronunciation: for in either case it may be so little that it does not alter the sense of the words; or so great that it destroys it. But it is easier for the one to happen on the part of the beginning of the words, and the other at the end. |
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| Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nihil liceat addere verbis in quibus consistit forma sacramentorum. Non enim minoris sunt necessitatis huiusmodi verba sacramentalia quam verba sacrae Scripturae. Sed verbis sacrae Scripturae nihil licet addere vel minuere, dicitur enim Deut. IV, non addetis ad verbum quod vobis loquor, nec auferetis ab eo; et Apoc. ult., contestor omni audienti verba prophetiae libri huius, si quis apposuerit ad haec, apponet super eum Deus plagas scriptas in libro isto; et si quis diminuerit, auferet Deus partem eius de libro vitae. Ergo videtur quod neque in formis sacramentorum liceat aliquid addere vel minuere. |
Objection 1: It seems that it is not lawful to add anything to the words in which the sacramental form consists. For these sacramental words are not of less importance than are the words of Holy Scripture. But it is not lawful to add anything to, or to take anything from, the words of Holy Scripture: for it is written (Dt. 4:2): "You shall not add to the word that I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it"; and (Apoc. 22:18,19): "I testify to everyone that heareth the words of the prophecy of this book: if any man shall add to these things, God shall add to him the plagues written in this book. And if any man shall take away... God shall take away his part out of the book of life." Therefore it seems that neither is it lawful to add anything to, or to take anything from, the sacramental forms. |
| Praeterea, verba se habent in sacramentis per modum formae, ut dictum est. Sed in formis quaelibet additio vel subtractio variat speciem, sicut et in numeris, ut dicitur in VIII Metaphys. Ergo videtur quod, si aliquid addatur vel subtrahatur a forma sacramenti, non erit idem sacramentum. |
Objection 2: Further, in the sacraments words are by way of form, as stated above (Article [6], ad 2; Article [7]). But any addition or subtraction in forms changes the species, as also in numbers (Metaph. viii). Therefore it seems that if anything be added to or subtracted from a sacramental form, it will not be the same sacrament. |
| Praeterea, sicut ad formam sacramenti determinatus numerus dictionum requiritur, ita etiam requiritur determinatus ordo verborum, et etiam orationis continuitas. Si ergo additio vel subtractio non aufert sacramenti veritatem, videtur quod pari ratione nec transpositio verborum, aut etiam interpolatio pronuntiationis. | Objection 3: Further, just as the sacramental form demands a certain number of words, so does it require that these words should be pronounced in a certain order and without interruption. If therefore, the sacrament is not rendered invalid by addition or subtraction of words, in like manner it seems that neither is it, if the words be pronounced in a different order or with interruptions. |
| Sed contra est quod in formis sacramentorum quaedam apponuntur a quibusdam quae ab aliis non ponuntur, sicut Latini baptizant sub hac forma, ego te baptizo in nomine patris et filii et spiritus sancti; Graeci autem sub ista, baptizatur servus Christi n. in nomine patris, et cetera. Et tamen utrique verum conferunt sacramentum. Ergo in formis sacramentorum licet aliquid addere vel minuere. | On the contrary, Certain words are inserted by some in the sacramental forms, which are not inserted by others: thus the Latins baptize under this form: "I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost"; whereas the Greeks use the following form: "The servant of God, N... is baptized in the name of the Father," etc. Yet both confer the sacrament validly. Therefore it is lawful to add something to, or to take something from, the sacramental forms. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod circa omnes istas mutationes quae possunt in formis sacramentorum contingere, duo videntur esse consideranda. Unum quidem ex parte eius qui profert verba, cuius intentio requiritur ad sacramentum, ut infra dicetur. Et ideo, si intendat per huiusmodi additionem vel diminutionem alium ritum inducere qui non sit ab Ecclesia receptus, non videtur perfici sacramentum, quia non videtur quod intendat facere id quod facit Ecclesia. |
I answer that, With regard to all the variations that may occur in the sacramental forms, two points seem to call for our attention. one is on the part of the person who says the words, and whose intention is essential to the sacrament, as will be explained further on (Question [64], Article [8]). Wherefore if he intends by such addition or suppression to perform a rite other from that which is recognized by the Church, it seems that the sacrament is invalid: because he seems not to intend to do what the Church does. |
| Aliud autem est considerandum ex parte significationis verborum. Cum enim verba operentur in sacramentis quantum ad sensum quem faciunt, ut supra dictum est, oportet considerare utrum per talem mutationem tollatur debitus sensus verborum, quia sic manifestum est quod tollitur veritas sacramenti. Manifestum est autem quod, si diminuatur aliquid eorum quae sunt de substantia formae sacramentalis, tollitur debitus sensus verborum, et ideo non perficitur sacramentum. Unde Didymus dicit, in libro de spiritu sancto, si quis ita baptizare conetur ut unum de praedictis nominibus praetermittat, scilicet patris et filii et spiritus sancti, sine perfectione baptizabit. Si autem subtrahatur aliquid quod non sit de substantia formae, talis diminutio non tollit debitum sensum verborum, et per consequens nec sacramenti perfectionem. Sicut in forma Eucharistiae, quae est, hoc est enim corpus meum, ly enim sublatum non tollit debitum sensum verborum, et ideo non impedit perfectionem sacramenti, quamvis possit contingere quod ille qui praetermittit, peccet ex negligentia vel contemptu. |
The other point to be considered is the meaning of the words. For since in the sacraments, the words produce an effect according to the sense which they convey, as stated above (Article [7], ad 1), we must see whether the change of words destroys the essential sense of the words: because then the sacrament is clearly rendered invalid. Now it is clear, if any substantial part of the sacramental form be suppressed, that the essential sense of the words is destroyed; and consequently the sacrament is invalid. Wherefore Didymus says (De Spir. Sanct. ii): "If anyone attempt to baptize in such a way as to omit one of the aforesaid names," i.e. of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, "his baptism will be invalid." But if that which is omitted be not a substantial part of the form, such an omission does not destroy the essential sense of the words, nor consequently the validity of the sacrament. Thus in the form of the Eucharist---"For this is My Body," the omission of the word "for" does not destroy the essential sense of the words, nor consequently cause the sacrament to be invalid; although perhaps he who makes the omission may sin from negligence or contempt. |
| Circa additionem etiam contingit aliquid apponi quod est corruptivum debiti sensus, puta si aliquis dicat, ego te baptizo in nomine patris maioris et filii minoris, sicut Ariani baptizabant. Et ideo talis additio tollit veritatem sacramenti. Si vero sit talis additio quae non auferat debitum sensum, non tollitur sacramenti veritas. Nec refert utrum talis additio fiat in principio, medio vel fine. Ut, si aliquis dicat, ego te baptizo in nomine Dei patris omnipotentis, et filii eius unigeniti, et spiritus sancti Paracleti, erit verum Baptisma. Et similiter, si quis dicat, ego te baptizo in nomine patris et filii et spiritus sancti, et beata virgo te adiuvet, erit verum Baptisma. | Again, it is possible to add something that destroys the essential sense of the words: for instance, if one were to say: "I baptize thee in the name of the Father Who is greater, and of the Son Who is less," with which form the Arians baptized: and consequently such an addition makes the sacrament invalid. But if the addition be such as not to destroy the essential sense, the sacrament is not rendered invalid. Nor does it matter whether this addition be made at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end: For instance, if one were to say, "I baptize thee in the name of the Father Almighty, and of the only Begotten Son, and of the Holy Ghost, the Paraclete," the baptism would be valid; and in like manner if one were to say, "I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost"; and may the Blessed Virgin succour thee, the baptism would be valid. |
| Forte autem si diceret, ego te baptizo in nomine patris et filii et spiritus sancti et beatae virginis Mariae, non esset Baptismus, quia dicitur I Cor. I, nunquid Paulus pro vobis crucifixus est? Aut in nomine Pauli baptizati estis? Sed hoc verum est si sic intelligatur in nomine beatae virginis baptizari sicut in nomine Trinitatis, quo Baptismus consecratur, talis enim sensus esset contrarius verae fidei, et per consequens tolleret veritatem sacramenti. Si vero sic intelligatur quod additur, et in nomine beatae virginis, non quasi nomen beatae virginis aliquid operetur in Baptismo, sed ut eius intercessio prosit baptizato ad conservandam gratiam baptismalem, non tollitur perfectio sacramenti. |
Perhaps, however, if one were to say, "I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, and of the Blessed Virgin Mary," the baptism would be void; because it is written (1 Cor. 1:13): "Was Paul crucified for you or were you baptized in the name of Paul?" But this is true if the intention be to baptize in the name of the Blessed Virgin as in the name of the Trinity, by which baptism is consecrated: for such a sense would be contrary to faith, and would therefore render the sacrament invalid: whereas if the addition, "and in the name of the Blessed Virgin" be understood, not as if the name of the Blessed Virgin effected anything in baptism, but as intimating that her intercession may help the person baptized to preserve the baptismal grace, then the sacrament is not rendered void. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbis sacrae Scripturae non licet aliquid apponere quantum ad sensum, sed quantum ad expositionem sacrae Scripturae, multa verba eis a doctoribus apponuntur. Non tamen licet etiam verba sacrae Scripturae apponere ita quod dicantur esse de integritate sacrae Scripturae, quia hoc esset vitium falsitatis. Et similiter si quis diceret aliquid esse de necessitate formae quod non est. | Reply to Objection 1: It is not lawful to add anything to the words of Holy Scripture as regards the sense; but many words are added by Doctors by way of explanation of the Holy Scriptures. Nevertheless, it is not lawful to add even words to Holy Scripture as though such words were a part thereof, for this would amount to forgery. It would amount to the same if anyone were to pretend that something is essential to a sacramental form, which is not so. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod verba pertinent ad formam sacramenti ratione sensus significati. Et ideo, quaecumque fiat additio vel subtractio vocum quae non addat aliquid aut subtrahat debito sensui, non tollitur species sacramenti. | Reply to Objection 2: Words belong to a sacramental form by reason of the sense signified by them. Consequently any addition or suppression of words which does not add to or take from the essential sense, does not destroy the essence of the sacrament. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, si sit tanta interruptio verborum quod intercipiatur intentio pronuntiantis, tollitur sensus sacramenti, et per consequens veritas eius. Non autem tollitur quando est parva interruptio proferentis, quae intentionem et intellectum non aufert. | Reply to Objection 3: If the words are interrupted to such an extent that the intention of the speaker is interrupted, the sacramental sense is destroyed, and consequently, the validity of the sacrament. But this is not the case if the interruption of the speaker is so slight, that his intention and the sense of the words is not interrupted. |
| Et idem etiam dicendum est de transpositione verborum. Quia, si tollit sensum locutionis, non perficitur sacramentum, sicut patet de negatione praeposita vel postposita signo. Si autem sit talis transpositio quae sensum locutionis non variat, non tollitur veritas sacramenti, secundum quod philosophus dicit quod nomina et verba transposita idem significant. | The same is to be said of a change in the order of the words. Because if this destroys the sense of the words, the sacrament is invalidated: as happens when a negation is made to precede or follow a word. But if the order is so changed that the sense of the words does not vary, the sacrament is not invalidated, according to the Philosopher's dictum: "Nouns and verbs mean the same though they be transposed" (Peri Herm. x). |