QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE DE VIRTUTIBUS
Disputed Questions on the Virtues
Question 1: On the Virtues in General
Question 2: On Charity
Question 3: On Fraternal Correction
Question 4: On Hope
Question 5: On the Cardinal Virtues
Disputed Question on the Virtues in General
translated by Ralph McInerny
in Disputed Questions on Virtue,
St. Augustine’s Press, South Bend, Indiana, 1999
modified and html-edited by Joseph Kenny, O.P.
THIRTEEN QUESTIONS are addressed.
- Et primo enim quaeritur, utrum virtutes sint habitus.
- Secundo utrum definitio virtutis quam Augustinus ponit, sit conveniens.
- Tertio utrum potentia animae possit esse virtutis subiectum.
- Quarto utrum irascibilis et concupiscibilis possint esse subiectum virtutis.
- Quinto utrum voluntas sit subiectum virtutis.
- Sexto utrum in intellectu practico sit virtus sicut in subiecto.
- Septimo utrum in intellectu speculativo sit virtus.
- Octavo utrum virtutes insint nobis a natura.
- Nono utrum virtutes acquirantur ex actibus.
- Decimo utrum sint aliquae virtutes homini ex infusione.
- Undecimo utrum virtus infusa augeatur.
- Duodecimo de distinctione virtutum.
- Decimotertio utrum virtus sit in medio.
- Are virtues habits?
- Is Augustine’s definition of virtue a good one?
- Can a power of the soul be a subject of virtue?
- Can the irascible or concupiscible appetite be a subject of virtue?
- Can the will be a subject of virtue?
- Can virtue be in practical intellect as a subject?
- Is there a virtue in speculative intellect?
- Are the virtues in us by nature?
- Are virtues acquired by actions?
- Are there infused virtues?
- Can an infused virtue increase?
- Distinguishing the virtues.
- Does virtue lie in the mean?
Et primo quaeritur utrum virtutes sint habitus
Are Virtues habits?
Et videtur quod non, sed magis actus. It seems that they are not, but are rather acts. Augustinus enim dicit in Lib. Retract., quod bonus usus liberi arbitrii est virtus. Sed usus liberi arbitrii est actus. Ergo virtus est actus. 1. For Augustine says in the Retractions that the good use of free will is a virtue. But the use of free will is an act. Therefore, virtue is an act. Praeterea, praemium non debetur alicui nisi ratione actus. Debetur autem omni habenti virtutem; quia quicumque in caritate decedit, ad beatitudinem perveniet. Ergo virtus est meritum. Meritum autem est actus. Ergo virtus est actus. 2. Moreover, no one is owed a reward except by reason of an act. But a reward is owed to everyone possessing virtue, because whoever dies in charity attains happiness. Therefore, virtue is a merit. But merit is an act. Therefore, virtue is an act. Praeterea, quanto aliquid est in nobis Deo similius, tanto est melius. Sed maxime Deo similamur secundum quod sumus in actu, quia est actus purus. Ergo actus est optimum eorum quae sunt in nobis. Sed virtutes sunt maxima bona quae sunt in nobis, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de libero arbitrio. Ergo virtutes sunt actus. 3. Moreover, the more something in us is like God, the better it is. But we are most like God insofar as we actually are, because he is pure act. Therefore, act is what is best in us. But virtues are what is best in us, as Augustine says in On free will. Therefore, virtues are acts. Praeterea, perfectio viae respondet perfectioni patriae. Sed perfectio patriae est actus, scilicet felicitas, quae in actu consistit, secundum philosophum. Ergo et perfectio viae, scilicet virtus, actus est. 4. Moreover, perfection in this life answers to perfection in the next. But the perfection of heaven is an act, namely, happiness, that consists in activity, according to the Philosopher. Therefore, the perfection of this fife, which is virtue, is an act. Praeterea, contraria sunt quae in eodem genere ponuntur, et mutuo se expellunt. Sed actus peccati expellit virtutem ratione oppositionis quam habet ad ipsam. Ergo virtus est in genere actus. 5. Moreover, contraries belong to the same genus and mutually exclude one another. But an act of sin expels virtue because of its opposition to it. Therefore, virtue is in the genus of act. Praeterea, philosophus dicit in I caeli et mundi, quod virtus est ultimum de potentia: ultimum potentiae est actus. Ergo virtus est actus. 6. Moreover, the Philosopher says in On the heavens 1 that virtue is the utmost of a potency. But the utmost of a potency is act. Therefore, virtue is an act. Praeterea, pars rationalis est nobilior et perfectior quam pars sensitiva. Sed vis sensitiva habet suam operationem nullo habitu vel qualitate mediante. Ergo nec in parte intellectiva oportet ponere habitus, quibus mediantibus pars intellectiva perfectam operationem habeat. 7. Moreover, the rational part is more noble and perfect than the sensitive part. But no habit or quality mediates between the sensitive part and its activity. Therefore, in the intellective part, there should not be habits by the mediation of which the intellective part has its perfect operation. Praeterea, philosophus dicit in VII Physic., quod virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum. Optimum autem est actus; dispositio autem est eiusdem generis cum eo ad quod disponit. Ergo virtus est actus. 8. Moreover, the Philosopher says in Physics 7 that virtue is the disposition of the perfected to the best. But the best is act, and a disposition is in the same genus as that to which it disposes. Therefore, virtue is an act. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in Lib. de moribus Ecclesiae, quod virtus est ordo amoris: ordo autem, ut ipse dicit in XIX de Civit. Dei, est parium dispariumque sua cuique tribuens loca dispositio. Virtus ergo est dispositio: non ergo habitus. 9. Moreover, Augustine says in On the customs of the Church that virtue is the order of love. But order, as he says in The City of God xix, disposes what is equal and unequal in a thing to their places. Therefore, virtue is a disposition and not a habit. Praeterea, habitus est qualitas de difficili mobilis. Sed virtus est facile mobilis, quia per unum actum peccati mortalis amittitur. Ergo virtus non est habitus. 10. Moreover, habit is a quality difficult to change. But virtue is easily removed, because it is taken away by one act of mortal sin. Therefore, virtue is not a habit. Praeterea, si habitibus aliquibus indigemus, qui sint virtutes, aut indigemus ad operationes naturales, aut meritorias, quae sunt quasi supernaturales. Non autem ad naturales: quia si quaelibet natura, etiam sensibilis et insensibilis, potest suam operationem perficere absque habitu, multo fortius hoc poterit rationalis natura. Similiter nec ad operationes meritorias, quia has Deus in nobis operatur: Philipp. II, 13. Qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere, pro bona voluntate. Ergo nullo modo virtutes sunt habitus. 11. Moreover, if we need certain habits, which are virtues, we need them either for natural activities or for meritorious ones, which are supernatural. But not for the natural, because if any nature, sensible or insensible, can perfect its activity without a habit, a fortiori rational nature can do this. Likewise, not for meritorious activities, because God works these in us, Philippians 2:13, “who works in you both the will and the performance.” Therefore, virtues are in no way habits. Praeterea, omne agens secundum formam, semper agit secundum exigentiam illius formae, sicut calidum agit semper calefaciendo. Si ergo in mente sit aliqua habitualis forma quae virtus dicatur, oportebit quod habens virtutem, secundum virtutem operetur; quod est falsum: quia sic quilibet habens virtutem esset confirmatus. Ergo virtutes non sunt habitus. 12. Moreover, any agent that acts thanks to its form acts according to the demands of that form, as the warm always acts by heating. Therefore, if there were in the mind some habitual form called virtue, the one having virtue would have to act virtuously, which is false, because then anyone having virtue would be confirmed (in the good). Therefore, virtues are not habits. Praeterea, habitus ad hoc insunt potentiis, ut tribuant eis facilitatem operandi. Sed ad actus virtutum non indigemus aliquo facilitatem faciente, ut videtur. Consistunt enim principaliter in electione et voluntate: nihil autem est facilius eo quod est in voluntate constitutum. Ergo virtutes non sunt habitus. 13. Moreover, habits are in powers that they might have ease of action. But we do not need something facilitating the acts of virtues, as is clear. For they consist chiefly in choice and will. But nothing easier than what is constituted in the will. Therefore, virtues are not habits. Praeterea, effectus non potest esse nobilior quam sua causa. Sed si virtus est habitus, erit causa actus, qui est habitu nobilior. Ergo non videtur conveniens quod virtus sit habitus. 14. Moreover, the effect cannot be nobler than its cause. But if virtue is a habit, it will be the cause of the act, which is nobler than the habit. Therefore, it does not seem fitting that virtue should be a habit. Praeterea, medium et extrema sunt unius generis. Sed virtus moralis est medium inter passiones; passiones autem sunt de genere actuum. Ergo, et cetera. 15. Moreover, the mean and extremes are in the same genus. But moral virtue is a mean between passions; but passions are in the genus of acts; therefore... Sed contra. ON THE CONTRARY Virtus, secundum Augustinum, est bona qualitas mentis. Non autem potest esse in aliqua specie nisi in prima, quae est habitus. Ergo virtus est habitus. 1. Virtue, according to Augustine, is a good quality of mind. But it can only be in the first species [of quality], which is habit. Therefore, virtue is a habit. Praeterea, philosophus dicit in II Ethic., quod virtus est habitus electivus in mente consistens. 2. Moreover, the Philosopher says in Ethics 2 that virtue is a habit of choosing in the mind. Praeterea, virtutes sunt in dormientibus; quia non amittuntur nisi per peccatum mortale. Non sunt autem in eis actus virtutum, quia non habent usum liberi arbitrii. Ergo virtutes non sunt actus. 3. Moreover, virtues exist in sleepers, because they are only taken away by mortal sin. But there are no virtuous acts of sleepers, since they do not have the use of free will. Therefore, virtues are not acts. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod virtus, secundum sui nominis rationem, potentiae complementum designat; unde et vis dicitur, secundum quod res aliqua per potestatem completam quam habet, potest sequi suum impetum vel motum. Virtus enim, secundum suum nomen, potestatis perfectionem demonstrat; unde philosophus dicit in I caeli et mundi, quod virtus est ultimum in re de potentia. Quia vero potentia ad actum dicitur, complementum potentiae attenditur penes hoc quod completam operationem suscipit. Quia vero operatio est finis operantis, cum omnis res, secundum philosophum in I caeli et mundi, sit propter suam operationem, sicut propter finem proximum; unumquodque est bonum, secundum quod habet completum ordinem ad suum finem. Inde est quod virtus bonum facit habentem, et opus eius reddit bonum, ut dicitur in II Ethic.; et per hunc etiam modum patet quod est dispositio perfecti ad optimum, ut dicitur in VII Metaph. RESPONSE. It should be said that virtue, given its meaning, designates the completion of a power; so strength means that thanks to which a thing, by the complete power it has, can bring about its impetus or motion. Virtue, according to its name, points to the perfection of a power. Hence, the Philosopher said in On the heavens 1 that virtue is the utmost reach of the power of the thing. But because potency is said with reference to act, a potency is fulfilled when it has its complete activity. And because activity is the end of the agent, since any thing is for the sake of its own activity as for its proximate end, as the Philosopher says in On the heavens 1, a thing is good insofar as it has a complete ordering to its end. Hence, virtue makes the one having it good and makes his work good, as is said in Ethics 2, and thus it is evident that it is the disposition of the perfected for the best, as is said in Metaphysics 7. Et haec omnia conveniunt virtuti cuiuscumque rei. Nam virtus equi est quae facit ipsum bonum, et opus ipsius; similiter virtus lapidis, vel hominis, vel cuiuscumque alterius. Secundum autem diversam conditionem potentiarum, diversus est modus complexionis ipsius. Est enim aliqua potentia tantum agens; aliqua tantum acta vel mota; alia vero agens et acta. All of these pertain to the virtue of anything. For the virtue of a horse is what makes him and his activity good; similarly the virtue of a rock or a man or any other thing. But as potencies differ so does the mode of their complexity. For some powers only act, others are only acted upon or moved, yet others are both acted upon and act on others. Potentia igitur quae est tantum agens, non indiget, ad hoc quod sit principium actus, aliquo inducto; unde virtus talis potentiae nihil est aliud quam ipsa potentia. Talis autem potentia est divina, intellectus agens, et potentiae naturales; unde harum potentiarum virtutes non sunt aliqui habitus, sed ipsae potentiae in seipsis completae. The potency which only acts does not require, in order to be a principle of action, that anything be brought to bear on it; hence, the virtue of such a potency is nothing other than the potency itself. Such is the divine power, the agent intellect and natural powers; that is why the virtues of such powers are not habits but the potencies themselves as complete in themselves. Illae vero potentiae sunt tantum actae quae non agunt nisi ab aliis motae; nec est in eis agere vel non agere, sed secundum impetum virtutis moventis agunt; et tales sunt vires sensitivae secundum se consideratae; unde in III Ethic. dicitur, quod sensus nullius actus est principium: et hae potentiae perficiuntur ad suos actus per aliquid superinductum; quod tamen non inest eis sicut aliqua forma manens in subiecto, sed solum per modum passionis, sicut species in pupilla. Unde nec harum potentiarum virtutes sunt habitus, sed magis ipsae potentiae, secundum quod sunt actu passae a suis activis. Potentiae vero illae sunt agentes et actae quae ita moventur a suis activis, quod tamen per eas non determinantur ad unum; sed in eis est agere, sicut vires aliquo modo rationales; et hae potentiae complentur ad agendum per aliquid superinductum, quod non est in eis per modum passionis tantum, sed per modum formae quiescentis, et manentis in subiecto; ita tamen quod per eas non de necessitate potentia ad unum cogatur; quia sic potentia non esset domina sui actus. Harum potentiarum virtutes non sunt ipsae potentiae; neque passiones, sicut est in sensitivis potentiis; neque qualitates de necessitate agentes, sicut sunt qualitates rerum naturalium; sed sunt habitus, secundum quos potest quis agere cum voluerit ut dicit Commentator in III de anima. Et Augustinus in Lib. de bono coniugali dicit, quod habitus est quo quis agit, cum tempus affuerit. But those powers which both act and are acted upon and which are so moved that they are not determined to a single object, act in a manner that is, in a way, rational. Such powers act insofar as something is added to them, not just in a manner of a passion, but as a form which abides in the subject but which does not determine the subject to a single object - if that were so, the power would not have dominion over its act. Hence, in Ethics 3 it is said that sense is not the principle of any act, and these powers are perfected in their acts only thanks to something superadded, which, however, is not in them in the manner of a form abiding in its subject but only in the manner of passion, as the species (image) in the pupil. Hence, the virtues of these powers are not habits but rather the power themselves, insofar as they are actually acted upon by their agents. Those powers act and are acted upon that are so moved by their agents that they are not determined to one. Action belongs to them as to powers which in a sense are rational, and these powers are completed in acting by something superadded, which is not in them in the manner of a passion alone but in the manner of an abiding form remaining in the subject, in such a way, however, that by it the power is not necessitated to one, since then the power would not have dominion over its act. The virtues of these powers are not the powers themselves, nor passion, as with sensitive powers, nor qualities acting necessarily, like the qualities of natural things. Rather they are habits thanks to which one can act when he likes, as the Commentator says in On the Soul 3. And Augustine in On the conjugal good says that habit is that whereby one acts when time permits. Sic ergo patet quod virtutes sunt habitus. Et qualiter habitus distent a secunda et tertia specie qualitatis, qualiter autem a quarta differant, in promptu est: nam figura non dicit ordinem ad actum quantum in se est. Therefore, it is clear that virtues are habits and how habits differ from the second and third species of quality. How do they differ from the fourth species? Figure as such is not ordered to act. Ex his etiam potest patere quod habitus virtutum ad tria indigemus. Primo ut sit uniformitas in sua operatione; ea enim quae ex sola operatione dependent, facile immutantur, nisi secundum aliquam inclinationem habitualem fuerint stabilita. From all of which it can be seen that we need the habit of virtues for three things. First, for uniformity in operation; for what depends solely on operation is easily altered unless it is stabilized by some habitual inclination. Secundo ut operatio perfecta in promptu habeatur. Nisi enim potentia rationalis per habitum aliquo modo inclinetur ad unum, oportebit semper, cum necesse fuerit operari, praecedere inquisitionem de operatione; sicut patet de eo qui vult considerare nondum habens scientiae habitum, et qui vult secundum virtutem agere habitu virtutis carens. Unde philosophus dicit in V Ethic., quod repentina sunt ab habitu. Second, in order that perfect operation be promptly at hand. For unless the rational power is in some way inclined to one [of contraries] by habit, when we act it will always be necessary for the activity to be preceded by inquiry, something obvious in one who does not yet have the habit of science or one wishing to act virtuously who does not have the habit of virtue. Hence, the Philosopher in Ethics 6 says that things done right away are from habit. Tertio ut delectabiliter perfecta operatio compleatur. Quod quidem fit per habitum; qui cum sit per modum cuiusdam naturae, operationem sibi propriam quasi naturalem reddit, et per consequens delectabilem. Nam convenientia est delectationis causa; unde philosophus, in II Ethic., ponit signum habitus, delectationem in opere existentem. Third, in order that perfect activity might be pleasantly accomplished. This results from habit which, since it acts in the manner of a kind of nature, makes the activity proper to it, as it were, natural and, consequently, delightful. For fittingness is a cause of delight. Hence, the Philosopher in Ethics 2 gives as a mark of habit the delight taken in acting. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut potestas, ita et virtus accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo materialiter, prout dicimus, id quod possumus, esse nostram potentiam; et sic Augustinus bonum usum liberi arbitrii dicit esse virtutem. Alio modo essentialiter; et sic neque potentia neque virtus est actus. Ad 1. It should be said that virtue, like power, is understood in two ways. In one way, materially, as when we say that what we can do is our power or strength; and thus Augustine calls the good use of free will a virtue. Second, essentially, and thus neither power nor virtue is an act. Ad secundum dicendum, quod mereri dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo proprie; et sic nihil aliud est quam facere aliquam actionem unde aliquis sibi iuste acquirat mercedem. Alio modo improprie; et sic quaelibet conditio quae facit hominem aliquo modo dignum, meritum dicitur; ut si dicamus, quod species Priami meruit imperium, quia digna imperio fuit. Praemium ergo cum merito debeatur, debetur quodammodo et qualitati habituali, per quam aliquis redditur idoneus ad praemium: et sic debetur parvulis baptizatis. Et iterum debetur merito actuali; et sic non debetur virtuti, sed actui virtutis. Et tamen etiam parvulis quodammodo redditur ratione meriti actualis, in quantum ex merito Christi sacramentum efficaciam habet, quo regenerantur ad vitam. Ad 2. It should be said that to deserve or merit is taken in two ways. First, properly, and thus it is nothing other than the performance of some action by which one justly acquires a reward for himself. Second, improperly, and thus any condition that makes a man in any way worthy is called merit, as when we say that the mien of Priam merits command since it was worthy of command. So a reward ought to follow on merit, and is in a way owed to the habitual quality by which one is made worthy of reward, and thus it is owed to baptized infants. It is also owed to actual merit, and thus it is not owed to virtue but to the act of virtue. Yet even to little ones it is given as by reason of actual merit, insofar as by the merit of Christ the sacrament has the efficacy, by which one is regenerated to life. Ad tertium dicendum, quod Augustinus dicit, virtutes esse maxima bona, non simpliciter, sed in genere; sicut et ignis dicitur subtilissimum corporum. Unde non sequitur quod nihil sit in nobis ipsis virtutibus melius; sed quod sint de numero eorum quae sunt maxima bona secundum genus suum. Ad 3. It should be said that Augustine says that the virtues are the highest goods, not absolutely, but of their kind, just as fire is said to be the most subtle body. Hence, it does not follow that there is nothing in us better than these virtues but that they are numbered among things that are the highest goods of their kind. Ad quartum dicendum, quod sicut in vita est perfectio habitualis quae est virtus, et perfectio actualis quae est virtutis actus; ita etiam in ipsa patria felicitas est perfectio actualis, procedens ex aliquo habitu consummato. Unde etiam philosophus in I Ethic. dicit, quod felicitas est operatio secundum virtutem perfectam. Ad 4. It should be said that just as in life there is a habitual perfection which is a virtue, and the actual perfection which is the act of virtue, so too in heaven happiness is actual perfection, proceeding from some consummate habit. Hence, the Philosopher too in Ethics 1 says that happiness is an activity in accord with perfect virtue. Ad quintum dicendum, quod actus vitiosus directe tollit actum virtutis per modum contrarietatis; ipsum vero virtutis habitum tollit per accidens, in quantum separatur a causa virtutis infusae, scilicet a Deo. Unde Is., LIX, 2: peccata vestra diviserunt inter vos et Deum vestrum. Et propter hoc virtutes acquisitae, per unum actum vitiosum non tolluntur. Ad 5. It should be said that vicious acts directly remove the act of virtue because of contrariety, but they remove the habit of virtue only incidentally insofar as it is separated from the cause of infused virtue, namely, from God. Hence, in Isaiah 59:2: “But your iniquities have divided between you and your God.” That is why acquired virtues are not taken away by one vicious act. Ad sextum dicendum, quod illa definitio philosophi potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo materialiter, ut per virtutem intelligamus id in quod virtus potest, quod est ultimum inter ea in quae potentia potest; sicut virtus eius qui potest ferre centum libras, est in eo in quantum potest ferre centum libras non in quantum ferre potest sexaginta. Alio modo potest intelligi essentialiter; et sic virtus dicitur ultimum potentiae, quia designat potentiae complementum; sive id per quod potentia completur, sit aliud a potentia, sive non. Ad 6. It should be said that that definition of the Philosopher can be understood in two ways. In one way, materially, such that by virtue we understand that of which the virtue is capable, which is the utmost of which the power is capable, as the virtue of one who can carry a hundred pounds is his insofar as he can carry a hundred pounds, not sixty. Second, it can be understood essentially, and thus virtue means the utmost reach of the power because it signifies the completion or fulfillment of the power, whether or not what completes the power is other than it. Ad septimum dicendum, quod non est similis ratio de potentiis sensitivis et rationabilibus, ut dictum est. Ad 7. It should be said that sensitive and rational powers do not get the same account. Ad octavum dicendum, quod dispositio ad aliquid dicitur id per quod aliquid movetur in illud consequendum. Motus autem habet quandoque terminum in eodem genere, sicut motus alterationis est qualitas; unde dispositio ad hunc terminum semper est eiusdem generis cum termino. Quandoque vero habet terminum alterius generis, sicut alterationis terminus est forma substantialis; et sic dispositio non est semper eiusdem generis cum eo ad quod disponit; sicut calor est dispositio ad formam substantialem ignis. Ad 8. It should be said that a disposition for something is that through which something is moved to achieve something. But motion sometimes has its term in the same genus, as quality in the case of alteration as such; hence the disposition to that term is always of the same genus as the term. Sometimes, however, it has a term in another genus, as when the term of alteration is a substantial form, and thus the disposition is not always of the same genus as that to which it disposes, as heat is a disposition to the substantial form of heat. Ad nonum dicendum, quod dispositio dicitur tribus modis. Uno modo per quam materia disponitur ad formae receptionem, sicut calor est dispositio ad formam ignis. Alio modo per quam aliquod agens disponitur ad agendum, sicut velocitas est dispositio ad cursum. Tertio modo dispositio dicitur ipsa ordinatio aliquorum ad invicem; et hoc modo dispositio ab Augustino sumitur. Dispositio vero contra habitum dividitur primo modo; ipsa vero virtus, dispositio est secundo modo. Ad 9. It should be said that disposition is said in three ways. First, as heat is the disposition for the form of fire. Second, as that by which an agent is disposed to act, as speed is the disposition to run. Third, disposition means the ordering of things to one another, and Augustine takes disp6sition in this sense. Disposition in the first sense is contrasted with habit, whereas in the second sense, virtue itself is a disposition. Ad decimum dicendum, quod nulla res est adeo stabilis, quae non statim ex se deficiat, sua causa deficiente. Unde non est mirum, si deficiente coniunctione ad Deum per peccatum mortale, deficiat virtus infusa. Nec hoc repugnat suae immobilitati, quae intelligi non potest nisi sua causa manente. Ad 10. It should be said that nothing is so stable that it is not immediately undone when its cause is removed. It is no wonder then that if union with God is taken away by mortal sin, infused virtue should go. Nor does this impugn its stability, which can only be understood in terms of its cause remaining. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod ad utrasque operationes habitu indigemus; ad naturales quidem tribus rationibus superius positis; ad meritorias autem insuper, ut naturalis potentia elevetur ad id quod est supra naturam ex habitu infuso. Nec hoc removetur ex hoc quod Deus in nobis operatur; quia ita agit in nobis, quod et nos agimus; unde habitu indigemus, quo sufficienter agere possimus. Ad 11. It should be said that we need habit for both operations. For natural operations for the three reasons given above; for meritorious acts too, in order that the natural power can be elevated by the infused habit to that which is above nature. Nor is this affected by the fact that God works in us, because he so acts in us that we too act, hence we need a habit whereby we can act sufficiently. Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod omnis forma recipitur in suo supposito secundum modum recipientis. Proprietas autem rationalis potentiae est ut in opposita possit, et ut sit domina sui actus. Unde nunquam per formam habitualem receptam cogitur potentia rationalis ad similiter agendum; sed potest agere vel non agere. Ad 12. It should be said that every form is received in its subject in the manner of the one receiving. But it is proper to the rational power that it is capable of opposites and has dominion over its act. Hence, the rational power is not forced to do the same thing by the habitual form acquired, but it can act or not act. Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod illa quae in sola electione consistunt facile est quod qualitercumque fiant; sed quod debito modo fiant, scilicet expedite, firmiter, et delectabiliter, hoc non est facile; unde ad hoc habitibus virtutum indigemus. Ad 13. It should be said that what is a matter of choice alone can easily come about in one way or another, but it is no easy matter for it to come about as it should, that is, expeditiously, firmly, pleasantly. For that we need the habits of the virtues. Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod omnes motus animalium vel hominum, qui de novo incipiunt, sunt ab aliquo movente moto, et dependent ab aliquo priori actu existente; et sic habitus de se actum non elicit, nisi ab aliquo agente excitatus. Ad 14. It should be said that any motion, whether of man or beast, that begins from scratch is produced by some mover, and depends on something that exists prior, and thus a habit does not elicit an act from itself except insofar as it is stirred by some agent. Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod virtus est medium inter passiones, non quasi aliqua passio media; sed actio, quae in passionibus medium constituit. Ad 15. It should be said that virtue is a mean between passions, not as if it were some middle passion, but as an action that brings about a mean between passions.
Secundo quaeritur utrum definitio virtutis quam Augustinus ponit sit conveniens
Is Augustine’s definition of virtue all right?
Scilicet: virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, qua nemo male utitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. His definition is: Virtue is a good quality of mind whereby we live rightly, which no one misuses and that God works in us without us. Et videtur quod sit inconveniens. This does not seem right. Virtus enim est bonitas quaedam. Si ergo ipsa est bona: aut ergo sua bonitate, aut alia. Si alia, procedetur in infinitum: si seipsa, ergo virtus est bonitas prima quia sola bonitas prima est bona per seipsam. 1. Virtue is a good. If it is good, this is either by its own goodness or that of another. If another’s, we have an infinite regress. If by its own, virtue is the first goodness because only the first goodness is good of itself. Praeterea, illud quod est commune omni enti, non debet poni in definitione alicuius. Sed bonum, quod convertitur cum ente, est commune omni enti. Ergo non debet poni in definitione virtutis. 2. Moreover, what is common to every being ought not be put in the definition of any one of them, but the good, which is convertible with being, is common to every being and thus ought not be put into the definition of virtue. Praeterea, sicut bonum est in moralibus, ita et in naturalibus. Sed bonum et malum in naturalibus non diversificant speciem. Ergo nec in definitione virtutis debet poni bona, quasi differentia specifica ipsius virtutis. 3. Moreover, the good is in the moral as it is in the natural, but good and evil in natural things do not constitute species. Therefore, good ought not be put into the definition as the specific difference of virtue. Praeterea, differentia non includitur in ratione generis. Sed bonum includitur in ratione qualitatis, sicut et ens. Ergo non debet addi in definitione virtutis, ut dicatur: virtus est bona qualitas mentis et cetera. 4. Moreover, the difference is not included in the definition of the genus. But good is included in the definition of quality, as is being. Therefore, it ought not be added to the definition of virtue, as when it is said that virtue is a good quality of mind, etc. Praeterea, malum et bonum sunt opposita. Sed malum non constituit aliquam speciem, cum sit privatio. Ergo nec bonum; ergo non debet poni in definitione virtutis tamquam differentia constitutiva. 5. Moreover, good and evil are opposites. But evil does not constitute any species, since it is a privation. No more then should good. Therefore, it ought not be put into the definition of virtue as a constitutive difference. Praeterea, bonum est in plus quam qualitas. Ergo per bonum non differt una qualitas ab alia; ergo non debet poni in definitione virtutis bonum, sicut differentia qualitatis vel virtutis. 6. Moreover, because good is broader than quality, one quality does not differ from another because it is good. Therefore, good ought not be put in the definition of virtue as a difference of quality or virtue. Praeterea, ex duobus actibus nihil fit. Sed bonum importat actum quemdam, et qualitas similiter. Ergo male dicitur, quod virtus sit bona qualitas. 7. Moreover, nothing comes to be from two acts. But good implies an act and so too does quality. Therefore, it is not wen said that virtue is a good quality. Praeterea, quod praedicatur in abstracto, non praedicatur in concreto; sicut albedo est color, non tamen colorata. Sed bonitas praedicatur de virtute in abstracto. Ergo non praedicatur in concreto; ergo non bene dicitur: virtus est bona qualitas. 8. Moreover, what is predicated abstractly is not predicated concretely: Whiteness is a color but it is not colored. But goodness is predicated abstractly of virtue, and thus is not predicated of it concretely. Therefore, it is not right to say that virtue is a good quality. Praeterea, nulla differentia praedicatur in abstracto de specie unde dicit Avicenna, quod homo non est rationalitas, sed rationale. Sed virtus est bonitas. Ergo bonitas non est differentia virtutis; ergo non bene dicitur: virtus est bona qualitas. 9. Moreover, no difference is predicated abstractly of species, and that is why Avicenna says that man is not rationality but rational. But virtue is goodness. Therefore, goodness is not a difference of virtue, and it is not right to say that virtue is a good quality. Praeterea, malum moris idem est quod vitium. Ergo bonum moris idem est quod virtus; ergo bonum non debet poni in definitione virtutis, quia sic idem definiret seipsum. 10. Moreover, evil in the moral order is vice. Therefore, good in the moral order is the same as virtue. But then good ought not be put in the definition of virtue, because then the thing would be defined by itself. Praeterea, mens ad intellectum pertinet. Sed virtus magis respicit affectum. Ergo male dicitur, quod virtus sit bona qualitas mentis. 11. Moreover, mind pertains to intellect. But virtue looks rather to appetite. Therefore it is not right to say that virtue is a good quality of mind. Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, mens nominat superiorem partem animae. Sed aliquae virtutes sunt in inferioribus potentiis. Ergo male ponitur in definitione virtutis bona qualitas mentis. 12. Moreover, according to Augustine mind names the higher part of the soul. But some virtues are in the lower powers. Therefore, it is not right to put ‘good quality of mind’ in the definition of virtue. Praeterea, subiectum virtutis nominat potentiam, non essentiam. Sed mens videtur nominare essentiam animae; quia dicit Augustinus, quod in mente est intelligentia, memoria et voluntas. Ergo non debet poni mens in definitione virtutis. 13. Moreover, a power not the essence is called the subject of virtue. But mind seems to name the essence of soul, because Augustine says that in mind are intelligence, memory, and will. Therefore, mind ought not be put in the definition of virtue. Praeterea, illud quod est proprium speciei, non debet poni in definitione generis. Sed rectitudo est proprium iustitiae. Ergo non debet poni rectitudo in definitione virtutis, ut dicatur bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur. 14. Moreover, that which is proper to species ought not be put in the definition of the genus. But rectitude is proper to justice. Therefore, rectitude ought not be put in the definition of virtue as when it is called a good quality of mind whereby one lives rightly. Praeterea, vivere viventibus est esse. Sed virtus non perficit ad esse, sed ad opera. Ergo male dicitur, qua recte vivitur. 15. Moreover, for living things to be is to live. But virtue does not perfect with respect to existence but with respect to acts. Therefore, it is not right that it be called that whereby one lives rightly. Praeterea, quicumque superbit de aliqua re, male utitur ea. Sed de virtutibus aliquis superbit. Ergo virtutibus aliquis male utitur. 16. Moreover, whoever takes pride in something, uses it badly. But one can be proud of virtues. Therefore, one can use virtue badly. Praeterea, Augustinus in libro de Lib. Arbit. dicit, quod solum maximis bonis nullus male utitur. Sed virtus non est de maximis bonis; quia maxima bona sunt quae propter se appetuntur; quod non convenit virtutibus, cum propter aliud appetantur, quia propter felicitatem. Ergo male ponitur qua nullus male utitur. 17. Moreover, in On free will Augustine says that it is only the greatest goods that no one uses badly. But virtue is not among the greatest goods, since the greatest is desired for its own sake, and that is not the case with virtue, which is sought for the sake of something else, namely, happiness. That being so, it is not right to include in the definition, ‘which no one uses badly.’ Praeterea, ab eodem aliquid generatur et nutritur et augetur. Sed virtus per actus nostros nutritur et augetur; quia diminutio cupiditatis est augmentum caritatis. Ergo per actus nostros virtus generatur; ergo male ponitur in definitione, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. 18. Moreover, a thing is generated, nourished, and grows from the same thing. But virtue is nourished and increased by our acts because a lessening of cupidity is an increase in charity. Therefore, virtue comes about from our own acts, and ‘what God works in us without us’ is wrongly put into its definition. Praeterea, removens prohibens ponitur movens et causa. Sed liberum arbitrium est quodammodo removens prohibens virtutis. Ergo est quodammodo causa; ergo non bene ponitur, quod sine nobis Deus virtutem operetur. 19. Moreover, the removal of an impediment counts as an efficient cause. But free will is in a way the removal of an impediment to virtue. Therefore, it is in a way its cause, and it is not right to say that God causes virtue in us without us. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit: qui creavit te sine te, non iustificabit te sine te. Ergo et cetera. 20. Moreover, Augustine says: Who created you without your help will not justify you without your help. Therefore... Praeterea, ista definitio convenit gratiae, ut videtur. Sed virtus et gratia non sunt unum et idem. Ergo non bene definitur per hanc definitionem virtus. 21. Moreover, that definition seems to belong to grace. But virtue and grace are not one and the same thing. Therefore, this is not a good definition of virtue. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod ista definitio complectitur definitionem virtutis, etiam si ultima particula omittatur; et convenit omni virtuti humanae. Sicut enim dictum est, virtus perficit potentiam in comparatione ad actum perfectum; actus autem perfectus est finis potentiae vel operantis; unde virtus facit et potentiam bonam et operantem, ut prius dictum est. Et ideo in definitione virtutis aliquid ponitur quod pertinet ad perfectionem actus, et aliquid quod pertinet ad perfectionem potentiae vel operantis. RESPONSE. it should be said that this would be the definition of virtue even if that last clause were omitted, and it fits every human virtue. For, as has been said, virtue perfects a power with respect to perfect act. But perfect act is the end of the power or of the one acting. Hence, virtue makes both the power and the agent good, as was said earlier. Thus, in the definition of virtue there is something that pertains to the perfection of the act and something that pertains to the perfection of the power or agent. Ad perfectionem autem actus duo requiruntur. Requiritur autem quod actus sit rectus, et quod habitus non possit esse principium contrarii actus. Illud enim quod est principium boni et mali actus, non potest esse, quantum est de se, principium perfectum boni actus; quia habitus est perfectio potentiae. Oportet ergo quod ita sit principium actus boni, quod nullo modo mali; propter quod philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., quod opinio, quae potest esse vera et falsa, non est virtus; sed scientia, quae non est nisi de vero. Primum designatur in hoc quod dicitur, qua recte vivitur: secundum, in hoc quod dicitur, qua nemo male utitur. Two things are required for the perfection of the act: first, that the act be right; second, that the habit cannot be the principle of the contrary of the act. That which is the principle of both a good and a bad act cannot as such be the perfect principle of the good act, for habit is the perfection of the power. That is why it must be the principle only of the good act and in no way of a bad. Hence the Philosopher in Ethics 6 says that opinion, which bears on both the true and false, is not a virtue, whereas science, which bears only on the true, is. The first condition is indicated by ‘whereby one lives rightly,’and the second by ‘which no one uses badly.’ Ad hoc vero quod virtus facit subiectum bonum, tria sunt ibi consideranda. Subiectum ipsum: et hoc determinatur cum dicitur mentis; quia virtus humana non potest esse nisi in eo quod est hominis in quantum est homo. Perfectio vero intellectus designatur in hoc quod dicitur bona; quia bonum dicitur secundum ordinem ad finem. Modus autem inhaerendi designatur in hoc quod dicitur qualitas; quia virtus non inest per modum passionis, sed per modum habitus; ut supra dictum est. In order for virtue to make the subject good, three things must be taken into account. The subject itself, and this is indicated when he says ‘of mind,’ since human virtue can be in man only insofar as he is a man. The perfection of intellect is indicated by the inclusion of ‘good,’because good follows on the ordering to end. The mode of inherence is designated by the mention of ‘quality,’ because virtue cannot inhere in the manner of a passion, but rather in the manner of a habit, as has been said above. Haec autem omnia conveniunt tam virtuti morali quam intellectuali, quam theologicae, quam acquisitae, quam infusae. Hoc vero quod Augustinus addit quam in nobis sine nobis Deus operatur, convenit solum virtuti infusae. [The perfection of intellect is called ‘good’ because good means the order to the end. The mode of inherence is designated by ‘quality’ because virtue does not inhere in the manner of a passion but in the manner of a habit, as was said above.] All these things belong to both moral and intellectual virtue, whether theological or acquired or infused. When Augustine adds ‘what God works in us without us,’ this pertains to infused virtue only. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod accidentia sicut non dicuntur entia quia subsistant, sed quia aliquid eis est; ita virtus non dicitur bona quod ipsa sit bona, sed qua aliquid est bonum. Unde non oportet quod virtus sit bona alia bonitate, quasi informetur alia bonitate. Ad 1. It should be said that just as accidents are called beings, not because they subsist, but because by them something is, so virtue is not called good because it itself is good, but because by it something else is good. That is why virtue need not be good by another goodness, as if it were informed by another goodness. Ad secundum dicendum, quod bonum quod convertitur cum ente, non ponitur hic in definitione virtutis; sed bonum quod determinatur ad actum moralem. Ad 2. It should be said that the good that is convertible with being is not put in the definition of virtue, but the good that is specific to the moral act. Ad tertium dicendum, quod actiones diversificantur secundum formam agentis, ut calefacere et infrigidare. Bonum autem et malum sunt quasi forma et obiectum voluntatis; quia semper agens imprimit formam suam in patientem, et movens in motum. Et ideo actus morales, quorum principium est voluntas, diversificantur specie secundum bonum et malum. Principium autem naturalium operationum non est finis, sed forma; et ideo non diversificantur in naturalibus species secundum bonum et malum; sed in moralibus sic. Ad 3. It should be said that acts are distinguished according to the form of the agent, as heating and freezing are. But good and evil are, as it were, the form and object of will: The agent always impresses its form on what it acts upon, as does the mover on the moved. Therefore, moral acts, which have will as their principle, are distinguished specifically into the good and bad. But the principle of natural activities is form, not the end, and that is why natural activities are not distinguished into good and bad as species, though that is how it is in moral acts. Ad quartum dicendum, quod bonitas moralis non includitur in intellectu qualitatis; et ideo ratio non est ad propositum. Ad 4. It should be said that moral goodness is not included in the understanding of quality, so the argument is not relevant. Ad quintum dicendum, quod malum non constituit speciem ratione privationis, sed ratione eius quod privationi substernitur, quia non compatitur secum rationem boni; et ex hoc habet quod constituit speciem. Ad 5. It should be said that evil does not constitute a species by reason of privation, but by reason of that which sustains the privation, because it is incompatible with the notion of good, and from this it takes its species. Ad sextum dicendum, quod obiectio illa procedit de bono naturae, non de bono moris, quod ponitur in definitione virtutis. Ad 6. It should be said that this objection proceeds from the good of nature, not from the good of morals, which is put in the definition of virtue. Ad septimum dicendum, quod bonitas non importat aliam bonitatem quam ipsam virtutem, ut ex dictis patet. Ipsa enim virtus per essentiam suam est qualitas; unde manifestum est quod bona et qualitas non dicunt diversos actus, sed unum. Ad 7. It should be said that goodness does not imply another goodness than that of virtue itself, as is clear from the foregoing. In its essence virtue is a quality; hence, it is obvious that good and quality do not indicate different acts, but one. Ad octavum dicendum, quod istud fallit in transcendentibus, quae circumeunt omne ens. Nam essentia est ens, et bonitas bona, et unitas una, non autem sic potest dici albedo alba. Cuius ratio est, quia quidquid cadit in intellectu, oportet quod cadat sub ratione entis, et per consequens sub ratione boni et unius; unde essentia et bonitas et unitas non possunt intelligi, nisi intelligantur sub ratione boni et unius et entis. Propter hoc potest dici bonitas bona, et unitas una. Ad 8. It should be said that this does not obtain in transcendentals which apply to every being, for essence is being and goodness is good and unity is one, but we cannot say that whiteness is white. The reason is that anything the intellect grasps falls under the notion of being, and consequently under the good and one. Hence, essence and goodness cannot be understood otherwise than under the notes of good and one and being, which is why goodness is said to be good and unity one. [In the absence of Thomas’s response to the remaining objections, Vincent de Castro Novo, O.P. supplied the following responses.] Ad 9. It should be said that difference, like genus, is predicated of species essentially, not denominatively. Therefore, if the species is subsistent and compositive, it is not predicated of the difference abstractly, but concretely. The concrete names of composite substances signify the composites, and these are properly put into a category, as species and genera, for example, man and animal. Therefore, if the difference must be predicated of such a species essentially, it should be signified concretely; otherwise it would not be said of the whole species. But if the species is a simple form—think of accidents, the concrete names of which, like ‘white’ and ‘black,’ are not placed in a category as species or genera, save by way of reduction, but only as abstractly signified, e.g., whiteness, music, justice, and, generally, virtue—then either the genus or difference abstractly signified is predicated of them, and that is why, just as virtue is essentially a quality, so it is essentially the goodness of reason or of the moral. Ad 10. It should be said that the moral good is said of the act, of the habit, and of the object. Similarly, moral evil is said of a bad act which is a sin and of a bad habit which is a vice. Hence, virtue is that which makes the one having it good and makes his act good with moral goodness; similarly vice is what makes the one having it evil and makes his act evil with moral badness. Therefore, moral evil is not the same as vice, since vice names a habit, whereas moral evil is said of habit and act and object. By parity of reasoning the moral good is not identical with virtue, since moral goodness is said of the act as well.
Three things can be considered in virtue.
First, that which the essence of virtue directly implies, and thus virtue implies a certain disposition whereby a thing is well and fittingly disposed given its nature. Hence, the Philosopher says in Physics 7 that “virtue is a disposition that perfects for the best, and I mean the perfected which is disposed according to nature.” In this way, vice is opposed to virtue because it implies a disposition by which a thing is disposed to that which does not befit its nature. Hence, Augustine says in On free will 3: “When you see something that is lacking to the perfection of a nature, call it a vice, because the vice of a thing seems to be that by which it is indisposed to that which befits its nature.”
Second, is that which follows on its essence which virtue signifies by way of consequence; in this way, virtue implies a goodness that makes the one having it good. For a thing’s good consists in this, that it is appropriately disposed with respect to its nature. This is what virtue brings about, as has been said, which is why it is an ordered, that is, a good action. For virtue is ordered by reason to the good or fitting act. Hence, virtue is the perfection of a power with reference to act and not only makes the one having it good but makes his act good as well. In this way, virtue is opposed to sin, which properly signifies an inordinate act.
From this it is clear that the vicious habit, evil, and sin can be called the evil of morals, and every virtue the good of morals, and not the reverse.
Ad 11. It should be said that mind is taken here to stand for the rational powers and thus means both intellect and will: will is essentially a rational power. Virtues are found both in intellect and in the affective part. Intellectual virtues give the capacity of acting well but not the good use of that capacity, whereas moral virtues, which are virtues simply speaking, give to the affective both the capacity of acting well and its good use, bringing it about that one uses the capacity well and rightly. For example, justice not only gives one the capacity to perform just acts but also makes one act justly. Grammar, on the other hand, only gives the capacity to speak correctly and well, but does not bring it about that a man always speaks well. One well versed in grammar can make grammatical mistakes, for example, solecisms. From which it is clear that virtue refers both to the appetitive and the intellective powers, since both are included in mind. Ad 12. It should be said that mind means a type of power which is the principle of the acts over which man has dominion, and these are properly called human acts. Reason and will are such powers, for they are what first move and command the act over which man has dominion, and they are said to be essentially rational. But the irascible and concupiscible are principles of human acts insofar as they participate in reason, but as moved movers. For they are moved by the higher appetite insofar as they obey it, and thus, insofar as they participate in reason and are so fashioned as to obey this, it is clear that reason and will are the first principle of the human act as moving and commanding, and sensitive appetite is a secondary principle as a moved mover, and such powers are meant by mind and can be the subject of virtue.
Again, mind implies a power that is rational either essentially or by way of participation. The irascible and concupiscible are rational powers by way of participation, and can be the subject of virtue insofar as they participate in mind.
Ad 13. It should be said that mind signifies what is highest in the soul’s power. Hence, since the divine image is found in that which is highest in us, it must be said that image does not pertain to soul in its essence but only according to mind which names its highest power. Thus, insofar as it is image mind names a power of the soul and not its essence; thus mind includes those powers which in their acts recede from matter and the conditions of matter. In mind are included intelligence, will, and memory, not as accidents of a subject, but as parts of a whole. Ad 14. It should be said that rectitude is of two kinds. There is one which is special and is constitutive with reference to external things which come into man’s use and are the proper matter of justice. There is another that is general and implies an order to the fitting end and to divine law, and this is common to every virtue and enters into the definition of virtue. Ad 15. It should be said that “to live” is taken in two ways. In one way for the existence of the living thing, and thus it pertains to the essence of the soul which is the principle of being in living things. Hence, the Philosopher in On the Soul 2 says that for living things to exist is for them to live. In that sense, ‘live’ does not enter into the definition of virtue. It is taken in another sense for the activity of the living thing, insofar as understanding and sensing are ways of being alive. Hence, it is that the activity that is most pleasurable and most occupies one is called his life, and the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 1 that the human race lives by art and reasoning, that is, acts. It is in this sense that life is put in the definition of virtue, which by virtue a man rightly acts. Ad 16. It should be said that badly using virtue can mean two things. First, when it is taken as an object, and then one can badly use it when he thinks ill of virtue or hates or takes pride in it. Second, as the elicitive principle of bad use, such that a bad act is elicited by virtue, and in this sense one cannot use virtue badly. For virtue is a habit always inclining to the good, since every virtue gives the capacity of acting well and also give good use and not just the capacity and insure that one uses the capacity well. Of this kind are the virtues of the appetitive power, as justice not only makes a man ready to do just things but brings it about that he acts justly. Ad 17. It should be said that only the greatest goods are such that one cannot use them badly as objects since they are of themselves desirable and can be hated by no one. But virtues, which are not the greatest goods, one can use badly as objects, as was said above; but they cannot be used badly as being the elicitive principle. It is not necessary that what one cannot use badly as an elicitive principle should be the highest good. It can also be said, according to Augustine, that virtue is numbered among the highest goods insofar as through it man is ordered to the highest good, which is God, and for this reason no one uses virtue badly. Ad 18. It should be said that just as acquired virtues increase and are nourished by the acts that caused them, so infused virtues are increased by the act of God by whom they are caused. Our acts dispose for an increase of charity and the infused virtues, as a man at the outset, by doing what is natural to him, prepares and disposes himself to receive charity from God. Subsequent acts can merit an increase in charity because they presuppose charity, which is the principle of merit. But no one can merit that he might receive charity in the first place, because there can be no merit without charity. From which it is clear that charity and the other infused virtues are not actively increased by acts, but only as disposing and meriting; they are actively increased by the action of God who perfects and conserves the charity that he first infused. Ad 19. It should be said that sin is what prevents virtue. Free will without the action of God is not of itself sufficient to remove sin, because God alone effectively wipes away iniquity and rids of sin. The Holy Spirit moving the mind of man more or less according to his own will provides any disposition or preparation or effort of free will that precedes charity. For the remission of sin is not without grace, and thus in Romans 3:24, we read, “They are justified freely by his grace.” Ad 20. It should be said that infused virtue is caused in us by God without our doing anything but not without our consent; thus, God does not justify us unless we are consenting because it is by an act of free will that we consent to God’s justice when we are justified. That movement is not formally the cause of justifying grace, but its effect, such that the whole operation pertains to grace and to God, which effectively justifies by infusing grace. The things done by us of which we are the cause God causes in us but not without our acting, for he acts in every will and nature. Ad 21. It should be said that the definition of virtue, properly understood, does not apply to grace, for grace is an instance of the first species of quality. It is not a habit like virtue, nor is it immediately ordered to activity; rather, it is like a relation which confers a kind of spiritual and divine existence On the Soul and is presupposed by the infused virtues as their cause and root. Grace is to the essence of soul as health is to the body. That is why Chrysostom in a homily said that grace is the health of mind. It is not counted among the sciences or virtues or the other qualities that philosophers have enumerated because they only knew those accidents of the soul which are ordered to acts proportioned to human nature.
Virtue, therefore, is essentially a habit, but grace is not a habit but rather a supernatural participation in the divine nature according to which we become consorts of the divine nature, as is said in 1 Peter 2, by the reception of which we are said to be reborn as the sons of God. Hence, just as the natural light of reason is root and cause of acquired virtue, so the light of grace, which is the participation in the divine nature in the very essence of the soul by means of a kind of indwelling, is the root and cause of infused virtue.
Again, virtue is a good quality which makes the one having it good: For this goodness which virtue confers on the one having it is the goodness of perfection in relation to activity of which it is the immediate principle. But the goodness that grace confers On the Soul is the goodness of perfection not immediately in relation to activity but to a certain spiritual and divine existence, thanks to which those having grace are said to be made like God and thus sons of God freely by his grace. Hence, the ‘good’ put in the definition of virtue indicates a fittingness to some pre-existent nature, essential or participated. This good is not attributed to grace, save as to the principle and cause of such goodness in man.
Mind as it is put in the definition of virtue means a power of the soul, which is the subject of virtue; but potency in the definition of grace means the essence of the soul, which is the subject of grace.
Again ‘to live’ as put in the definition of virtue means activity of which virtue is the immediate principle, but life as it is attributed to grace means a certain divine existence of which it is the immediate principle, and not activity to which it is only ordered through the mediation of virtue.
Again, virtue is called the disposition of what is best on the part of one already perfected, because it perfects the power with respect to the activity whereby a thing achieves its end. Grace is not the disposition of the perfected to the best in this way, first, because it does not primarily perfect the power but the essence, and also because it does not have activity as its proper effect, but rather something divine. From all of which it is clear that the definition of virtue does not apply to grace.
This is the end of the additions.
Tertio quaeritur utrum potentia animae possit esse virtutis subiectum
Can a Power of the soul be the subject of virtue?
Et videtur quod non. It seems that it cannot. Quia secundum Augustinum, virtus est qua recte vivitur. Vivere autem non est secundum potentiam animae sed secundum essentiam. Ergo potentia animae non est virtutis subiectum. 1. According to Augustine, virtue is that whereby we live well. But to live follows on the essence of the soul, not on a power of it. Therefore, there cannot be a virtue of a power of the soul. Praeterea, nobilius est esse gratiae quam naturae. Esse autem naturae est per essentiam animae, quae est nobilior suis potentiis, utpote earum principium. Ergo esse gratiae, quod est per virtutes, non est per potentias: et sic potentia non est virtutis subiectum. 2. Moreover, the existence of grace is more perfect than that of nature. The existence of nature is through the essence of soul, which is more noble than the powers, being their principle. Therefore, the existence of grace, which is through the virtues, is not through the powers, so power cannot be the subject of virtue. Praeterea, accidens subiectum esse non potest. Sed potentia animae est de genere accidentium; potentia enim et impotentia naturalis pertinent ad secundam speciem qualitatis. Ergo potentia animae non potest esse virtutis subiectum. 3. Moreover, an accident cannot be a subject. But a power of the soul is in the genus of accident, for natural ability and inability belong to the second species of quality. Therefore, a power of the soul cannot be the subject of virtue. Praeterea, si aliqua potentia animae est virtutis subiectum, et quaelibet; cum quaelibet potentia animae vitiis impugnetur, contra quae virtutes ordinantur, sed non quaelibet potentia animae potest esse virtutis subiectum, ut post patebit. Ergo virtutis subiectum potentia esse non potest. 4. Moreover, if one power of the soul could be the subject of virtue, any could, since any power of the soul is hostile to vice, against which the virtues are ordered. But not just any power of the soul can be the subject of virtue, as will be clear below. Therefore, the subject of virtue cannot be a power. Praeterea, principia activa in naturis aliorum agentium subiecta non sunt, ut calor et frigus. Sed potentiae animae sunt quaedam activa principia; sunt enim principia operationum animae. Ergo aliorum accidentium subiecta esse non possunt. 5. Moreover, active principles such as heat and cold found in the natures of other agents are not subjects; but the powers of the soul are active principles, for they are the principles of the activities of the soul. Therefore, they cannot be the subjects of other accidents. Praeterea, anima subiectum est potentiae. Si ergo potentia subiectum est alterius accidentis, pari ratione illud accidens erit subiectum alterius accidentis; et ita ibitur in infinitum; quod est inconveniens. Non ergo potentia animae est subiectum virtutis. 6. Moreover, the subject of a power is the soul. Therefore, if a power is the subject of another accident, by parity of reasoning that accident will be the subject of another accident, and so it will go on indefinitely, which is absurd. Therefore, the power of the soul is not the subject of virtue. Praeterea, in Lib. I Poster. dicitur quod qualitatis non est qualitas. Sed potentia animae quaedam qualitas est in secunda specie qualitatis; virtus autem in prima specie qualitatis est. Ergo potentia animae non potest esse subiectum virtutis. 7. Moreover, it is said in Posterior Analytics 1 that there is no quality of quality. But the power of the soul belongs to the second species of quality; and virtue is in the first species of quality. Therefore, the power of the soul cannot be the subject of virtue. Sed contra. Cuius est actio, eius est principium actionis. Sed actiones virtutum sunt potentiarum animae. Ergo et ipsae virtutes. ON THE CONTRARY. 1. That whose action it is, is the principle of the action. But the actions of the virtues are of the powers. Therefore, the virtues are as well. Praeterea, philosophus dicit in I Ethic., quod virtutes intelligibiles sunt rationales per essentiam, virtutes autem morales sunt rationales per participationem. Sed rationale per essentiam et per participationem nominat quasdam animae potentias. Ergo potentiae animae sunt subiecta virtutum. 2. Moreover, the Philosopher says in Ethics 1 that the intellectual virtues are essentially rational, but the moral virtues are rational by way of participation. But what is rational either essentially or by participation names a power of the soul. Therefore, the powers of the soul are not subject of virtue. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod subiectum tripliciter comparatur ad accidens. Uno modo sicut praebens ei sustentamentum; nam accidens per se non subsistit, fulcitur vero per subiectum. Alio modo sicut potentia ad actum; nam subiectum accidenti subiicitur, sicut quaedam potentia activi; unde et accidens forma dicitur. Tertio modo sicut causa ad effectum; nam principia subiecta sunt principia per se accidentis. RESPONSE. It should be said that a subject relates to accident in three ways. In one way, as providing it sustaining power, for the accident does not exist of itself, but is supported by the subject. In another way, as potency to act, for the subject is subject to the accident as to an active power, which is why the accident is called a form. In a third way, as cause to effect, for the subject principles are, per se, principles of the accident. Quantum igitur ad primum, unum accidens alterius subiectum esse non potest. Nam, cum nullum accidens per se subsistat, non potest alteri sustentamentum praebere: nisi fortasse dicatur, quod in quantum est a subiecto sustentatum, aliud accidens sustentat. With respect to the first, one accident cannot be the subject of another accident. For, since no accident exists of itself, it cannot provide sustaining power to another, unless perhaps it were said that it sustains another accident insofar as it itself is sustained by the subject. Sed quantum ad alia duo, unum accidens se habet ad aliud per modum subiecti: nam unum accidens est in potentia ad alterum, sicut diaphanum ad lucem, et superficies ad colorem. Unum etiam accidens potest esse causa alterius, ut humor saporis; et per hunc modum dicitur unum accidens alterius accidentis esse subiectum. Non quod unum accidens possit alteri accidenti sustentamentum praebere; sed quia subiectum est receptivum unius accidentis altero mediante. Et per hunc modum dicitur potentia animae esse habitus subiectum. Nam habitus ad potentiam animae comparatur ut actus ad potentiam; cum potentia sit indeterminata quantum est de se, et per habitum determinetur ad hoc vel illud. Ex principiis etiam potentiarum habitus acquisiti causantur. Sic ergo dicendum est, potentias esse virtutum subiecta; quia virtus animae inest, potentia mediante. With respect to the other two, one accident relates to another in the manner of a subject insofar as it is in potency to the other, as the diaphanous relates to fight and surface to color. One accident can also be the cause of another, as the moist is of taste, and in this way one accident can be the subject of another. It is not that one accident can provide sustainment to the other, but that the subject receives one accident by the mediation of the other. It is in this way that a power of the soul is said to be the subject of a habit. The habit is to the power as act to potency, since potency taken as such is undetermined and is only determined to this or that by a habit. And acquired habits are caused by the principles of the powers. That is why the powers must be called the subjects of virtue, since virtue is in the soul by the mediation of the power. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod vivere in definitione virtutis positum ad actionem pertinet, ut supra dictum est. Ad 1. It should be said that living as it occurs in the definition of virtue pertains to action, as was said earlier. Ad secundum dicendum, quod esse spirituale non per virtutes est, sed per gratiam. Nam gratia est principium spiritualiter essendi, virtus vero spiritualiter operandi. Ad 2. It should be said that spiritual existence is from grace, not from virtue, for grace is the principle of existing spiritually, but virtue is the principle of acting spiritually. Ad tertium dicendum, quod potentia non est per se subiectum, sed in quantum est per animam sustentata. Ad 3. It should be said that the power is not of itself a subject, but only insofar as it is sustained by the soul. Ad quartum dicendum, quod nunc loquimur de virtutibus humanis; et ideo illae potentiae quae nullo modo possunt esse humanae, ad quas nullo modo se extendit imperium rationis, sicut sunt vires animae vegetabilis, non possunt esse subiecta virtutum. Omnis autem impugnatio quae ex his viribus provenit, fit mediante appetitu sensitivo, ad quem pertingit imperium rationis, ut possit dici humanus, et virtutis humanae subiectum. Ad 4. It should be noted that we are speaking now of human virtues. Therefore, powers which cannot in any way be human, since the sway of reason does not extend to them, cannot be subjects of virtue, e.g., the vegetative powers. However, whatever resistance arises from such powers is mediated through sense appetite to which the sway of reason extends and which can therefore be called human and be the subject of human virtue. Ad quintum dicendum, quod inter potentias animae non sunt activae nisi intellectus agens, et vires animae vegetabilis, quae non sunt aliquorum habituum subiecta. Aliae autem potentiae animae sunt passivae: principia tamen actionum animae existentes secundum quod sunt motae a suis activis. Ad 5. It should be said that only the agent intellect and the powers of the vegetable soul are active powers of soul, and they are not subjects of any habit. But the passive powers of the soul are the principles of acts only insofar as they are moved by their active causes. Ad sextum dicendum, quod non oportet in infinitum abire, quia pervenietur ad aliquod accidens quod non est in potentia respectu alterius accidentis. Ad 6. It should be said that it is not necessary to regress infinitely, because we will come to an accident that is not in potency to another accident. Ad septimum dicendum, quod qualitatis non dicitur esse qualitas, ita quod per se sit qualitas qualitatis subiectum; quod in proposito non accidit, ut supra dictum est. Ad 7. It should be said that there is no quality of quality such that one quality would be the per se subject of another, which is not the case here, as was said above.
Quarto quaeritur utrum irascibilis et concupiscibilis possint esse subiectum virtutis
Whether the irascible and concupiscible can be the subject of virtue
Et videtur quod non. It seems that they cannot. Quia contraria nata sunt fieri circa idem. Virtuti autem contrarium est peccatum mortale, quod non potest esse in sensualitate, cuius partes sunt irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Ergo irascibilis et concupiscibilis subiectum virtutis esse non possunt. 1. Contraries come to be in the same thing. But mortal sin is contrary to virtue and cannot exist in sensuality, whose parts are the irascible and concupiscible. Therefore, the irascible and concupiscible cannot be subjects of virtue. Praeterea, eiusdem potentiae sunt habitus et actus. Sed principalis actus virtutis est electio, secundum philosophum in Lib. Ethic., quae non potest esse actus irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Ergo nec habitus virtutum possunt esse in irascibili et concupiscibili. 2. Moreover, habit and act belong to the same power. But the principal act of virtue is choice, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, but this is not an act of either the concupiscible or the irascible. So there cannot be habits of virtue in the irascible and concupiscible. Praeterea, nullum corruptibile est subiectum perpetui; unde Augustinus probat animam esse perpetuam, quia est subiectum veritatis, quae est perpetua. Sed irascibilis et concupiscibilis, sicut et ceterae potentiae sensitivae, non remanent post corpus, ut quibusdam videtur; virtutes autem manent. Nam iustitia est perpetua et immortalis, ut dicitur Sapient. I, v. 15; quod pari ratione de omnibus dici potest. Ergo irascibilis et concupiscibilis virtutum subiectum esse non possunt. 3. Moreover, no corruptible thing is the subject of what is perpetual; hence Augustine proves that the soul is perpetual, because it is the subject of truth which is perpetual. But the irascible and concupiscible, like the other powers of the soul, do not survive the body as, or so it has seemed to some, the virtues do. For justice is perpetual and immortal, as is said in Wisdom 1, 15, and for the same reason this could be said of all virtues. Therefore, the irascible and concupiscible cannot be the subject of virtues. Praeterea, irascibilis et concupiscibilis habent organum corporale. Si ergo virtutes sunt in irascibili et concupiscibili, sunt in organo corporali. Ergo possunt apprehendi per imaginationem vel phantasiam; et sic non sunt sola mente perceptibiles; ut Augustinus dicit de iustitia, quod est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis. 4. Moreover, the irascible and concupiscible have bodily organs. Therefore, if there are virtues of the irascible and concupiscible, they are in a bodily organ and can be grasped by the imagination or fancy. But then they are not perceptible by mind alone, as Augustine says of justice, which is a rectitude perceptible only by mind. Sed dicendum, quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis possunt esse subiectum virtutis, in quantum participant aliqualiter, ratione. —Sed contra, irascibilis et concupiscibilis dicuntur ratione participare, in quantum a ratione ordinantur. Sed ordo rationis non potest virtuti sustentamentum praebere, cum non sit quid subsistens. Ergo nec in quantum ratione participant, possunt irascibilis et concupiscibilis esse virtutis subiectum. 5. If it should be said that the irascible and concupiscible can be the subject of virtue insofar as they participate in reason in some way, the response is that they are said to participate in reason insofar as they are ordered by reason. But the ordering of reason cannot provide sustaining power to a virtue, since it is not something subsistent. Therefore, the irascible and concupiscible cannot be the subject of virtue because they participate in reason. Praeterea, sicuti irascibilis et concupiscibilis, quae pertinent ad sensibilem appetitum, subserviunt rationi; ita et potentiae apprehensivae et sensitivae. Sed in nulla apprehensiva potentiarum sensitivarum potest esse virtus. Ergo nec in irascibili et concupiscibili. 6. Moreover, the apprehensive and sensitive powers serve reason as do the irascible and concupiscible, which pertain to sense appetite, do. But there is no virtue in any of the apprehensive powers of sense. Therefore, not in the irascible and concupiscible. Praeterea, si ordo rationis participari potest in irascibili et concupiscibili, poterit minui rebellio sensualitatis, quae has duas vires continet ad rationem. Sed rebellio praedicta non est infinita, cum sensualitas sit virtus finita, et virtutis finitae non possit esse actio infinita. Ergo poterit totaliter tolli praedicta rebellio; omne enim finitum consumitur multoties ablato quodam, ut patet per philosophum in I Physic.; et sic sensualitas in hac vita possit totaliter curari. Quod est impossibile. 7. Moreover, if the order of reason can be participated in by the irascible and concupiscible, the rebellion of sensuality would be diminished, and these two powers would be contained by reason. But this rebellion is not infinite, since sensuality is a finite power and there cannot be an infinite act of a finite power. Thus, it could completely stamp out this rebellion, since any finite thing is removed if a little bit is taken away again and again, as the Philosopher makes clear in Physics 1. But then sensuality in this life could be totally cured, which is impossible. Sed dicendum, quod Deus, qui virtutem infundit, posset totaliter praedictam rebellionem auferre; sed ex parte nostra est quod non totaliter auferatur. —Sed contra, homo est id quod est in quantum est rationalis; cum ex hoc speciem sortiatur. Quanto igitur id quod est in homine, magis rationi subiicitur; tanto magis competit humanae naturae. Maxime autem subiicerentur inferiores vires animae rationi si praedicta rebellio totaliter tolleretur. Ergo hoc esset competens maxime humanae naturae; et ita ex parte nostra non est impedimentum quin praedicta rebellio totaliter tollatur. 8. If it should be said that God, who infuses virtue, could completely remove this rebellion even if it cannot be done by us, the response is that man is what he is insofar as he is rational, since his species is formed from this. To the degree then that anything in man is subject to reason, it belongs to human nature. But the foregoing powers of the soul would be maximally subject to reason if this rebellion were totally quelled. Therefore, this would especially belong to human nature and thus the impediment of this rebellion could be totally removed by us. Praeterea, ad rationem virtutis non sufficit quod peccatum vitetur. Perfectio enim iustitiae in hoc consistit quod in Psal. XXXIII, v. 15, dicitur: declina a malo, et fac bonum. Sed ad irascibilem pertinet detestari malum, ut dicitur in Lib. de spiritu et anima. Ergo in irascibili ad minus non potest esse virtus. 9. Moreover, it does not suffice for the notion of virtue that vice be avoided, for the perfection of justice consists in what is said in Psalm 33:15: “Forsake evil and do good.” But it is a note of the irascible that it detests evil, as is said in Of the spirit and soul. Therefore, virtue can be in the irascible at least. Praeterea, in eodem libro dicitur, quod in ratione est desiderium virtutum, in irascibili odium vitiorum. Sed in eodem est desiderium virtutis et virtus, cum quaelibet res suam perfectionem desideret. Ergo omnis virtus est in ratione, et non in irascibili et concupiscibili. 10. Moreover, in the same book it is said that in reason there is a desire for virtues, but in the irascible a hatred of vice. But the desire for virtue and virtue are in the same power, since a thing desires its own perfection. Therefore, every virtue is in reason and not in the irascible and concupiscible. Praeterea, in nulla potentia potest esse habitus quae agitur tantum et non agit; eo quod habitus est id quo quis agit cum voluerit, ut dicit Commentator in III de anima. Sed irascibilis et concupiscibilis non agunt, sed aguntur: quia ut dicitur in III Ethic., sensus nullius actus dominus est. Ergo non potest esse habitus virtutis in irascibili et concupiscibili. 11. Moreover, no potency which is only acted upon and does not act can have a habit, since a habit is that whereby one acts when he wishes, as the Commentator says in On the Soul 3. But the irascible and concupiscible do not act, but are acted upon, because as is said in Ethics 3, sense is not the master of any act. Therefore, there cannot be a habit of virtue in the irascible and concupiscible. Praeterea, proprium subiectum parificatur propriae passioni. Virtus autem parificatur rationi, non autem irascibili et concupiscibili, quae sunt nobis et brutis communes. Virtus ergo est in hominibus tantum, sicut et ratio; ergo omnis virtus est in ratione, non autem in irascibili et concupiscibili. 12. Moreover, the proper subject is commensurate with the proper passion. But virtue is commensurate with reason and not with the irascible and concupiscible, which are common to the brutes and us. That is why virtue like reason is found only in men. Therefore, every virtue is in reason and none in the irascible and concupiscible. Praeterea, Rom. VII, dicit Glossa: bona est lex, quae dum concupiscentiam prohibet, omne malum prohibet. Omnia ergo vitia ad concupiscibilem pertinent, cuius est concupiscentia. Sed in eodem, sunt virtutes et vitia. Ergo virtutes non sunt in irascibili, sed in concupiscibili ad minus. 13. Moreover, the gloss on Romans 7: “The law is good which while it prohibits concupiscence, prohibits every evil.” Therefore, all vices pertain to the concupiscible appetite where concupiscence lies. But virtues and vices are in the same subject. Therefore, if not in the irascible, virtues are in the concupiscible at least. Sed contra. Est quod philosophus, dicit de temperantia et fortitudine, quod sunt irrationabilium partium. Partes autem irrationabiles, id est sensibilis appetitus, sunt irascibilis et concupiscibilis, ut habetur in III de anima. Ergo in irascibili et concupiscibili possunt esse virtutes. ON THE CONTRARY. 1. There is what the Philosopher says of temperance and fortitude, that they are in irrational parts. But the parts of the irrational, that is, of sense appetite, are the irascible and concupiscible, as is said in On the Soul. Therefore, there can be virtues in the irascible and concupiscible. Praeterea, peccatum veniale est dispositio ad mortale. Perfectio autem et dispositio sunt in eodem. Cum igitur veniale peccatum sit in irascibili et concupiscibili (prius enim motus est actus sensualitatis, ut ponitur in Glossa ad Rom. VIII); ergo et mortale peccatum ibi esse poterit; et sic etiam virtus, quae est peccato mortali contraria. 2. Moreover, venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. But completion and disposition pertain to the same thing. Therefore, since venial sin is in the irascible and concupiscible (for the first movement is the act of sensuality, as is said in the gloss on Romans 8), mortal sin too can be there, and thus virtue too, which is the contrary of mortal sin. Praeterea, medium et extrema sunt in eodem. Sed virtus aliqua est medium inter contrarias passiones; sicut fortitudo inter timorem et audaciam, et temperantia inter superfluum et diminutum in concupiscentiis. Cum igitur huiusmodi passiones sint in irascibili et concupiscibili, videtur etiam quod in eisdem sit virtus. 3. Moreover, the middle and extremes belong to the same thing. But virtue is a kind of mean between contrary passions, as courage between fear and boldness, and temperance between too much and too little in things desired. Therefore, since passions of this kind are in the irascible and concupiscible, it seems that virtue too is in them. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod circa quaestionem istam partim ab omnibus convenitur, et partim opiniones sibi invicem repugnant. Ab omnibus enim conceditur aliquas virtutes in irascibili et concupiscibili esse, sicut temperantiam in concupiscibili et fortitudinem in irascibili; sed in hoc est differentia. Quidam enim distinguunt duplicem irascibilem et concupiscibilem esse; in superiori parte animae, et iterum in inferiori. Dicunt enim, quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis quae sunt in superiori parte animae, cum ad naturam rationalem pertineant, possunt esse subiectum virtutis; non tamen illae quae sunt in inferiori parte ad naturam sensualem et brutalem pertinentes. Sed hoc quidem in alia quaestione discussum est; utrum scilicet in superiori parte animae possint distingui duae vires, quarum una sit irascibilis et alia concupiscibilis, proprie loquendo. RESPONSE. It should be said that everyone is agreed on this question, at least in part, though in part there are conflicting opinions as well. It is conceded by all that there are some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible, such as temperance in the concupiscible and courage in the irascible, but there is this difference. Some distinguish two kinds of irascible and concupiscible, one in the superior, the other in the inferior pari of the soul. For they say that the irascible and concupiscible which are in the superior part of the soul, since they pertain to rational nature can be the subject of virtue, but not those which are in the inferior part and pertain to sensual and brute nature. But this has been discussed in another question, namely, whether in the superior part of the soul two powers can be distinguished, one irascible and the other concupiscible, properly speaking. Sed, quidquid de hoc dicatur, nihilominus in irascibili et concupiscibili quae sunt in inferiori appetitu, secundum philosophum in III Ethic., oportet ponere esse aliquas virtutes, ut etiam alii dicunt: quod quidem sic patet. Cum enim virtus, ut supra dictum est, nominet quoddam potentiae complementum, potentia autem ad actum respiciat; oportet humanam virtutem in illa potentia ponere quae est principium actus humani. Actus autem humanus dicitur qui non quocumque modo in homine vel per hominem exercetur; cum in quibusdam etiam plantae, bruta et homines conveniant; sed qui hominis proprius est. Inter cetera vero hoc habet homo proprium in suo actu, quod sui actus est dominus. But whatever be said of that, so far as the irascible and concupiscible in the inferior appetite are concerned, there must be virtues in them as well, as Aristotle says in Ethics 3, and others agree. This is obvious from the following consideration. It has been pointed out that virtue names the fulfillment of a power, and a power looks to act, so virtue is found in a power which is a principle of human action. It is not just any activity found in man or engaged in by a man that is called human, since there are many activities shared by plants, animals, and men, but only that which is proper to him. Unlike these other things, it is proper to man that he have dominion over his acts. Any act over which a man has dominion is properly called a human act, but not those over which he does not have dominion, even though they occur in him, e.g., digesting and growing and the like. Therefore, there can be virtue in that which is a principle of an act over which man has dominion. Quilibet igitur actus cuius homo dominus est, est proprie actus humanus; non autem illi quorum homo non est dominus, licet in homine fiant, ut digerere, et augeri, et alia huiusmodi. In eo igitur quod est principium talis actus cuius homo dominus est, potest poni virtus humana. Sciendum tamen est, quod huiusmodi actus contingit esse triplex principium. Unum sicut primum movens et imperans, per hoc quod homo sui actus sit dominus; et hoc est ratio vel voluntas. Aliud est movens motum, sicut appetitus sensibilis, qui etiam movetur ab appetitu superiori in quantum ei obedit, et tunc iterum movet membra exteriora per sui imperium. Tertium autem est quod est motum tantum, scilicet membrum exterius. Therefore, any act of which man is master is properly a human act, but not those of which he is not, even though they occur in a man, such as digesting, growing, and the like. Therefore, there can be human virtue in that thanks to which man has domain over his acts. But it should be noted that acts of this kind have a threefold principle. One that is the first and commanding mover, thanks to which man has dominion over his acts, and this is reason or will. The other is a moved mover, namely, sense appetite, which is moved by the higher appetite insofar as it obeys it and then by its command moves the external members. Third, there is that which is only moved, namely, the external members. Cum autem utrumque, scilicet membrum exterius et appetitus inferior a superiori parte animae moveantur; tamen aliter, et aliter. Nam membrum exterius ad nutum obedit superiori imperanti absque ulla repugnantia secundum naturae ordinem, nisi sit impedimentum aliquod; ut patet in manu et pede. Appetitus autem inferior habet propriam inclinationem ex natura sua, unde non obedit superiori appetitui ad nutum, sed interdum repugnat; unde Aristoteles dicit in politica sua, quod anima dominatur corpori dispotico principatu, sicut dominus servo, qui non habet facultatem resistendi in aliquo imperio domini; ratio vero dominatur inferioribus animae partibus regali et politico principatu, id est sicut reges et principes civitatum dominantur liberis, qui habent ius et facultatem repugnandi quantum ad aliqua praecepta regis vel principis. However, although both the external members and the inferior appetite are moved by the higher part of the soul, this does not happen in the same way. For, in the nature of things, such external members as the hand or foot obey the command of the higher straightaway without any resistance, un1css there be some impediment. But the lower appetite has an inclination of its own following on its nature and does not automatically obey the higher appetite. Hence, Aristotle says in the Politics that the soul rules the body as a despot would, as a master rules a slave who does not have the capacity to resist the master’s command. But reason rules the inferior parts of the soul with a royal and political governance, that is, as kings and princes rule free men who have the right and capacity to resist to some degree the commands of king or prince. In membro igitur exteriori non est necessarium aliquid perfectivum actus humani, nisi naturalis eius dispositio, per quam natum est moveri a ratione; sed in appetitu inferiori, qui rationi repugnare potest, est necessarium aliquid quo operationem quam ratio imperat, absque repugnantia prosequatur. Si enim immediatum operationis principium sit imperfectum, oportet operationem esse imperfectam, quantacumque perfectio adsit superiori principio. Et ideo, si appetitus inferior non esset in perfecta dispositione ad sequendum imperium rationis, operatio, quae est appetitus inferioris, sicut proximi principii, non esset in bonitate perfecta; esset enim cum quadam repugnantia sensibilis appetitus; ex quo quaedam tristitia consequeretur appetitui inferiori per quamdam violentiam a superiori moto; sicut accidit in eo qui habet fortes concupiscentias, quas tamen non sequitur, ratione prohibente. Therefore, there is no need in the external member for anything perfective of the human act, save its natural disposition by which it is fashioned to be moved by reason. But in the inferior appetite, which can resist reason, there is need for something whereby the activity that reason commands be accomplished without resistance. For if the immediate principle of operation is imperfect, the operation must be imperfect, however much perfection is found in the higher principle. Therefore, if the lower appetite is not perfected by a disposition to follow the command of reason, the operation, which is from the lower appetite as from its proper principle, would not be of perfect goodness. For there would be some resistance of sense appetite, and a sadness would result in sense appetite, since it would be moved as it were violently by the higher. This happens in those who have strong desires which they do not, however, follow because of reason’s prohibition. Quando igitur oportet operationem hominis esse circa ea quae sunt obiecta sensibilis appetitus, requiritur ad bonitatem operationis quod sit in appetitu sensibili aliqua dispositio, vel perfectio, per quam appetitus praedictus de facili obediat rationi; et hanc virtutem vocamus. Quando igitur aliqua virtus est circa illa quae proprie ad vim irascibilem pertinent, sicut fortitudo circa timores et audacias, magnanimitas circa ardua sperata, mansuetudo circa iras: talis virtus dicitur esse etiam in irascibili sicut in subiecto. Quando autem est circa ea quae sunt proprie concupiscibilis, dicitur esse in concupiscibili sicut in subiecto; sicut castitas, quae est circa delectationes venereas, et sobrietas et abstinentia, quae sunt circa delectationes in cibis et potibus. Therefore, when human action must deal with the objects of sense appetite, the good of the operation requires that there be a disposition or perfection in sense appetite by which it easily obeys reason. This is what we call virtue. Therefore, when there is a virtue with respect to that which pertains to the irascible power, such as courage with respect to fear and boldness, or magnanimity with respect to difficult things hoped for, and patience with respect to anger, such virtues are said to be in the irascible as in their subject. But when it is a matter of things which properly pertain to the concupiscible, they are said to be in the concupiscible as in their subject, such as chastity, which is concerned with venereal pleasure, and sobriety and abstinence, which are concerned with the pleasures of food and drink. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod virtus et peccatum mortale dupliciter considerari possunt; scilicet secundum actum et secundum habitum. Sicut autem actio concupiscibilis et irascibilis si secundum se consideratur, non est peccatum mortale, concurrit tamen in actu peccati mortalis, quando ratione movente vel consentiente tendit in contrarium legis divinae; ita actus eorumdem, si per se accipiantur, non possunt esse actus virtutis, sed solum quando concurrunt ad consequendum imperium rationis. Et sic actus peccati mortalis et virtutis pertinet aliquo modo ad irascibilem et concupiscibilem; unde et habitus utriusque in irascibili et concupiscibili esse possunt. Hoc tamen in re est, quod sicut actus virtutis consistit in hoc quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis sequuntur rationem, ita actus peccati consistit in hoc quod ratio trahitur ad sequendum inclinationem irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Unde et peccatum consuevit frequentius rationi attribui tamquam proximae causae; et eadem ratione virtus irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Ad 1. It should be said that virtue and mortal sin can be considered as acts or as habits. For the acts of the concupiscible and irascible, considered in themselves, are not mortal sins, but turn into mortal sin when, with reason consenting or moving, they tend to what is contrary to divine law. Some of these acts then, taken as such, cannot be acts of virtue, but only when they concur in following the command of reason. Thus the act of mortal sin and of virtue pertain in a way to the irascible and concupiscible, and that is why the habit of either can be in the irascible and concupiscible. And so in the case in point: just as the act of virtue consists in this that the irascible and concupiscible follow reason, so the act of sin consists in this, that reason is drawn to follow the inclination of the irascible and concupiscible. That is why sin and the virtues of the irascible and concupiscible are often attributed to reason as to their proximate cause. Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut iam dictum est, actus virtutis non potest esse irascibilis vel concupiscibilis tantum, sine ratione. Id tamen quod est in actu virtutis, principalius est rationis, scilicet electio; sicut et in qualibet operatione principalior est agentis actio quam passio patientis. Ratio enim imperat irascibili et concupiscibili. Non ergo pro tanto dicitur esse virtus in irascibili vel concupiscibili, quasi per eas totus actus virtutis vel principalior pars expleatur; sed in quantum, per virtutis habitum, ultimum complementum bonitatis actui virtutis confertur: in hoc scilicet quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis absque difficultate sequantur ordinem rationis. Ad 2. It should be said that, as has been pointed out already, the act of virtue cannot be of the irascible and concupiscible alone, apart from reason. Choice, the chief thing in the act of virtue, comes from reason, and, as in any activity, the action of the agent is prior to the passion of the patient. But reason commands the irascible and concupiscible. Therefore, virtue is not said to be in the irascible or concupiscible as if the whole act of virtue or even its chief part were accomplished by them, but insofar as, by the habit of virtue, the ultimate fulfillment of goodness is conferred on the act of virtue, such that the irascible and concupiscible follow the command of reason without difficulty. Ad tertium dicendum, quod supposito quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis non remaneant actu in anima separata, manent tamen in ea sicut in radice: nam essentia animae est radix potentiarum. Et similiter virtutes quae ascribuntur irascibili et concupiscibili, manent in ratione sicut in radice. Nam ratio est radix omnium virtutum, ut postea ostendetur. Ad 3. It should be said that, supposing that the irascible and concupiscible do not actually remain in the separated soul, they would still remain in it as in their root, for the essence of the soul is the root of the powers. Similarly, virtues which are ascribed to the irascible and concupiscible remain in reason as in their root, for reason is the root of all the virtues, as will be shown later. Ad quartum dicendum, quod in formis invenitur quidam gradus. Sunt enim quaedam formae et virtutes totaliter ad materiam depressae, quarum omnis actio materialis est; ut patet in formis elementaribus. Intellectus vero est totaliter a materia liber; unde et eius operatio est absque corporis communione. Irascibilis autem et concupiscibilis medio modo se habent. Quod enim organo corporali utantur, ostendit corporalis transmutatio, quae earum actibus adiungitur; quod iterum sint aliquo modo a materia elevatae, ostenditur per hoc quod per imperium moventur et quod obediunt rationi. Et sic in eis est virtus, id est in quantum elevatae sunt a materia, et rationi obediunt. Ad 4. It should be said that a certain hierarchy is found in forms. For some forms and powers are totally immersed in matter and their activities are wholly material, as is evident of the forms of elements. But the intellect is wholly free from matter, so its operation does not involve any sharing in matter. The irascible and concupiscible are in a midway condition. For the bodily change conjoined to their acts shows that they use a bodily organ, but that they are in some way lifted above matter is shown by this, that they are moved on command and obey reason. So there is virtue in them insofar as they are lifted above matter and obey reason. Ad quintum dicendum, quod licet ordo rationis quo irascibilis et concupiscibilis participant, non sit aliquid subsistens, nec per se possit esse subiectum; potest tamen esse ratio quare aliquid sit subiectum. Ad 5. It should be said that although the order of reason in which the irascible and concupiscible participate is not something subsistent and cannot be a subject as such, yet it can be the reason why something is a subject. Ad sextum dicendum, quod virtutes sensitivae cognitivae sunt naturaliter praeviae rationi, cum ab eis ratio accipiat; appetitivae autem sequuntur naturaliter ordinem rationis cum naturaliter appetitus inferior superiori obediat; et ideo non est simile. Ad 6. It should be said that the powers of sense knowledge are naturally prior to reason since reason receives from them, but the appetitive naturally follow the order of reason since the lower appetite naturally obeys the higher, and so it is not similar. Ad septimum dicendum, quod tota rebellio irascibilis et concupiscibilis ad rationem tolli non potest per virtutem; cum ex ipsa sui natura irascibilis et concupiscibilis in id quod est bonum secundum sensum, quandoque rationi repugnet; licet hoc possit fieri divina virtute, quae potens est etiam naturas immutare. Nihilominus tamen per virtutem minuitur illa rebellio, in quantum praedictae vires assuefiunt ut rationi subdantur; ut sic ex extrinseco habeant id quod ad virtutem pertinet, scilicet ex dominio rationis super eas; ex seipsis autem retineant aliquid de motibus propriis, qui quandoque sunt contrarii rationi. Ad 7. It should be said that the rebellion against reason by the irascible and concupiscible cannot be wholly removed by virtue; since of their very nature the irascible and concupiscible tend to that which is good according to sense, they sometimes resist reason. But this can be brought about by the divine power which is even capable of changing natures. Nevertheless, this rebellion is diminished by virtue insofar as these powers become accustomed to being subject to reason, and thus, they have what pertains to virtue from outside, namely, from the dominion of reason over them. Of themselves they retain something of the movements proper to them which are sometimes contrary to reason. Ad octavum dicendum, quod licet quandoque in homine principium sit quod est rationis; tamen ad integritatem humanae naturae requiritur non solum ratio, sed inferiores animae vires, et ipsum corpus. Et ideo ex conditione humanae naturae sibi relictae provenit ut in inferioribus animae viribus aliquid sit rationi rebellans, dum inferiores vires animae proprios motus habent. Secus autem est in statu innocentiae et gloriae, cum ex coniunctione ad Deum ratio sortitur vim totaliter sub se inferiores vires continendi. Ad 8. It should be said that although there is in man the principle of reason, the integrity of human nature requires not only reason, but also the lower powers, and the body too. So it is that left to itself the condition of human nature is such that there is resistance to reason on the part of the lower powers, something which follows on the fact that these lower powers of the soul have their own activities. It is otherwise in the state of innocence and of glory, since reason thanks to its union with God draws strength to contain entirely the lower powers. Ad nonum dicendum, quod detestari malum, secundum quod ad irascibilem pertinere dicitur, non solum importat declinationem a malo, sed quemdam motum irascibilis ad mali destructionem; sicut accidit illi qui non solum malum refugit, sed ad mala extirpanda per vindictam movetur. Hoc autem est aliquod bonum facere. Licet autem sic malum detestari, ad irascibilem et concupiscibilem pertineat, non tamen solum habet actum hunc; nam et insurgere ad arduum bonum consequendum ad irascibilem pertinet; in qua non solum est passio irae et audaciae, sed etiam spei. Ad 9. It should be said insofar as the detestation of evil is said to pertain to the irascible, it not only implies a turning away from evil but a move by the irascible to destroy evil, much like one who not only flees evil but is moved by anger to extirpate evil. But this is to do something good. Although evil thus detested, it is not only this that pertains to the irascible and concupiscible, for to pursue an arduous good pertains to the irascible, in which there is not only the motion of wrath and boldness but of hope. Ad decimum dicendum, quod illa verba sunt accipienda per quamdam adaptationem, et non per proprietatem. Nam in qualibet potentia animae est desiderium boni proprii; unde et irascibilis appetit victoriam, sicut et concupiscibilis delectationem. Sed quia concupiscibilis fertur in id quod est bonum toti animali simpliciter sive absolute; ideo omne desiderium boni appropriatur sibi. Ad 10. It should be said that those words must be understood by way of adaption and not properly, for in every power of the soul there is a desire for a proper good, so the irascible desires victory as the concupiscible desires pleasure. But because the concupiscible is drawn to something simply or absolutely good for the whole animal, every desire of the good is attributed to it. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod licet irascibilis et concupiscibilis secundum se consideratae agantur, et non agant: tamen in homine secundum quod participant aliqualiter rationem, etiam quodam modo agunt; non tamen totaliter aguntur. Unde etiam in politicis dicit philosophus, quod dominium rationis super has vires est politicum; quia huiusmodi vires aliquid habent de proprio motu, ubi non totaliter obediunt rationi. Dominium autem animae ad corpus non est regale, sed dispoticum; quia membra corporis ad nutum obediunt animae quantum ad motum. Ad 11. It should be said that, although the irascible and concupiscible, considered as such, are acted upon and do not act, however, insofar as in man they participate somewhat in reason they also in a way act and are not wholly acted upon. Hence, in the Politics the Philosopher says the reason’s dominion over these powers is pofitical, because such powers retain their own activities and do not obey reason completely. The soul’s dominion over body is not royal but despotic, because the members of the body instantly obey the soul so far as their activities go. Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod licet istae vires sint in brutis, non tamen in eis participant aliquid rationis; et ideo virtutes morales habere non possunt. Ad 12. It should be said that although these powers are found in brutes, in them they do not participate in reason and thus they cannot have moral virtues. Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod omnia mala ad concupiscentiam pertinent, sicut ad primam radicem, et non sicut ad proximum principium. Nam omnes passiones ex irascibili et concupiscibili oriuntur, ut ostensum est, cum de passionibus animae ageretur. Perversitas vero rationis et voluntatis ut plurimum ex passionibus accidit. Vel potest dici quod per concupiscentiam intelligit non solum id quod est proprium vis concupiscibilis, sed quod est commune toti appetitivae potentiae; in cuius unaquaque particula invenitur alicuius concupiscentia, circa quam contingit esse peccatum. Nec aliter peccari potest nisi aliquid concupiscendo vel appetendo. Ad 13. It should be said all evil can be laid to concuptscence as to its ultimate, but not to its proximate, root. All passions take their rise from the concupiscible and irascible, as was shown when we dealt with the emotions. Indeed, the perversity of reason and will most often come about because of the emotions. Or we could say that we understand by concupiscence not only the concupiscible power itself but what is common to all appetitive powers, in each species of which there is to be found something of concupiscence, because of which sin occurs. One cannot otherwise sin than by desiring and seeking.
Quinto quaeritur utrum voluntas sit subiectum virtutis
Whether will is the subject of virtue
Et videtur quod sic. And it seems that it is. Maior enim perfectio requiritur in imperante ad hoc quod recte imperet, quam in exequente ad hoc quod recte exequatur; quia ex imperante procedit ordinatio exequentis. Sed ad actum virtutis se habet voluntas sicut imperans, irascibilis autem et concupiscibilis sicut obedientes et exequentes. Cum igitur in irascibili et concupiscibili sit virtus sicut in subiecto, videtur quod multo fortius debeat esse in voluntate. 1. A greater perfection is needed in the commander if he is to command perfectly than in the executor if he is to execute well, because the order to execute comes from the commander. But the will commands the act of virtue, and the irascible and concupiscible obey and execute. Therefore, since virtue exists in the irascible and concupiscible as in a subject, it seems that it should even more so be in the will. Sed diceretur, quod naturalis inclinatio voluntatis ad bonum sufficit ad eius rectitudinem. Nam finem naturaliter desideramus; unde non requiritur quod rectificetur per habitum virtutis superadditum. —Sed contra, voluntas non solum est finis ultimi, sed etiam finium aliorum. Sed circa appetitum aliorum finium contingit voluntatem et recte et non recte se habere. Nam boni praestituunt sibi bonos fines, mali vero malos, ut dicitur in III Ethic.: qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei. Ergo requiritur ad rectitudinem voluntatis, quod sit in ea aliquis habitus virtutis ipsam perficiens. 2. lt will be said that the will’s natural inclination to the good suffices for its rectitude, since we naturally desire the end, so it does not need to be rectified by a superadded habit of virtue. On the contrary: Will does not bear on the ultimate end alone, but also on other ends. But with respect to the desire for other ends the will can act rightly or not rightly. For the good propose for themselves good ends, and the evil evil, as is said in Ethics 3: As a person is, so does the end appear to him. Therefore, for rectitude of will there is required that there be in it some habit of virtue that perfects it. Praeterea, etiam inest animae cognoscitivae aliqua cognitio naturalis, quae est primorum principiorum; et tamen respectu huius cognitionis est aliqua virtus intellectualis in nobis, scilicet intellectus, qui est habitus principiorum. Ergo et in voluntate debet esse aliqua virtus respectu eius ad quod naturaliter inclinatur. 3. Moreover, the soul’s knowing power has some natural knowledge, namely, of first principles, yet we have an intellectual virtue with respect to such knowledge, namely, insight (intellectus), which is the habit of first principles. So there should be in will a virtue with respect to that to which it is naturally inclined. Praeterea, sicut circa passiones est aliqua virtus moralis, ut temperantia et fortitudo; ita etiam est aliqua virtus circa operationes, ut iustitia. Operari autem sine passione est voluntatis, sicut operari ex passione est irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Ergo sicut aliqua virtus moralis est in irascibili et concupiscibili, ita aliqua est in voluntate. 4. Moreover, just as there is moral virtue governing the emotions, namely temperance and courage, so there is a virtue governing actions, namely justice. But will acts without emotion while the irascible and concupiscible are with emotion. Therefore, just as there is moral virtue in the irascible and concupiscible, so too is there in the will. Praeterea, philosophus in IV Ethic. dicit, quod amor sive amicitia est ex passione. Amicitia autem est ex electione. Dilectio autem quae est sine passione, est actus voluntatis. Cum igitur amicitia sit vel virtus, vel non sine virtute, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic.; videtur quod virtus sit in voluntate sicut in subiecto. 5. Moreover, the Philosopher says in Ethics 4 that love or friendship involves emotion. But friendship is a matter of choice, and the love that is without passion is an act of will. Therefore, since friendship is a virtue, or not without virtue, as is said in Ethics 8, it seems that there is also virtue in will as in a subject. Praeterea, caritas est potissima inter virtutes, ut probat apostolus, I ad Cor. XIII. Sed caritatis subiectum esse non potest nisi voluntas; non enim est eius subiectum concupiscibilis inferior, quae solum ad bona sensibilia se extendit. Ergo voluntas est subiectum virtutis. 6. Moreover, charity is the most powerful of the virtues, as the Apostle proves in 1 Corinthians 13. But only will can be the subject of charity; the concupiscible, which is lower, cannot be its subject since it bears only on sensible goods. Therefore, will is the subject of virtue. Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, per voluntatem immediatius Deo coniungimur. Sed id quod coniungit nos Deo, est virtus. Ergo videtur quod virtus sit in voluntate sicut in subiecto. 7. Moreover, according to Augustine we are conjoined to God most immediately through will. But that which conjoins us to God is virtue. Therefore, it seems that virtue is in will as in a subject. Praeterea, felicitas, secundum Hugonem de s. Victore, in voluntate est. Virtutes autem sunt dispositiones quaedam ad felicitatem. Cum igitur dispositio et perfectio sint in eodem, videtur quod virtus sit in voluntate sicut in subiecto. 8. Moreover, happiness according to Hugh of St. Victor is in the will. But virtues are dispositions to happiness. Therefore, since disposition and perfection are in the same thing, it seems that virtue is in will as in a subject. Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, voluntas est qua peccatur et recte vivitur. Rectitudo autem vitae pertinet ad virtutem; unde Augustinus dicit, quod virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur. Ergo virtus est in voluntate. 9. Moreover, according to Augustine, will is that whereby we either live rightly or sin. But rectitude of fife pertains to virtue. Hence, Augustine says that virtue is a good quality of mind, whereby we live rightly. Therefore, virtue is in the will. Praeterea, contraria nata sunt fieri circa idem. Virtuti autem peccatum contrariatur. Cum igitur omne peccatum sit in voluntate, ut Augustinus dicit, videtur quod virtus sit in eadem. 10. Moreover, contraries are such as to be in the same subject; but sin is contrary to virtue. Therefore, just as every sin is in the will, as Augustine says, so it seems that every virtue too must be in the will. Praeterea, virtus humana in illa parte animae debet esse quae est propria hominis. Sed voluntas est propria hominis, sicut et ratio; utpote magis propinqua rationi quam irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Cum igitur irascibilis et concupiscibilis sint subiecta virtutum, videtur quod multo fortius voluntas. 11. Moreover, human virtue ought to be in the part of the soul that it proper to man. But will is proper to man, just as reason is, as being closer to reason than are the irascible and concupiscible. Therefore, since the irascible and concupiscible are subject of virtue, it seems that the will should be a fortiori. Sed contra. ON THE CONTRARY Omnis virtus aut est intellectualis, aut moralis, ut patet per philosophum in fine I Ethic. Virtus autem moralis est sicut in subiecto in eo quod est rationale non per essentiam, sed per participationem; virtus vero intellectualis habet pro subiecto id quod est rationale per essentiam. Cum igitur voluntas in neutra parte possit computari; quia nec est cognoscitiva potentia, quod pertinet ad rationalem per essentiam; neque pertinet ad irrationalem animae partem quae pertinet ad rationalem per participationem; videtur quod voluntas nullo modo subiectum virtutis esse possit. 1. Every virtue is either intellectual or moral, as is clear from what the Philosopher says at the end of Ethics 1. But moral virtue has as its subject that which is rational by participation, not essentially. But intellectual virtue has for subject that which is rational essentially. Therefore, since the will can be counted in neither part, since it is not a knowing power, which pertains to the essentially rational, nor does it pertain to the rational by way of participation, it seems that the will can in no way be the subject of virtue. Praeterea, ad eumdem actum non debent ordinari plures virtutes. Hoc autem sequeretur, si voluntas virtutis esset subiectum; quia ostensum est, quod in irascibili et concupiscibili sunt aliquae virtutes; et cum ad actus illarum virtutum se habeat quodammodo voluntas, oporteret quod ad eosdem actus essent aliquae virtutes in voluntate. Ergo non est dicendum, quod voluntas sit subiectum virtutis. 2. Moreover, several virtues ought not pertain to the same act, but that is what would happen if the will were the subject of virtue because, as has been shown, there are virtues in the irascible and concupiscible, and since will is related in some way to the acts of those virtues, there would have to be virtues in the will related to those acts. Therefore, it should not be said that the will is the subject of virtue. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod per habitum virtutis potentia quae ei subiicitur, respectu sui actus complementum acquirit. Unde ad id ad quod potentia aliqua se extendit ex ipsa ratione potentiae, non est necessarius habitus virtutis. Virtus autem ordinat potentias ad bonum; ipsa enim est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit. Voluntas autem hoc quod virtus facit circa alias potentias, habet ex ipsa ratione suae potentiae: nam eius obiectum est bonum. Unde tendere in bonum hoc modo se habet ad voluntatem sicut tendere in delectabile ad concupiscibilem, et sicut ordinari ad sonum se habet ad auditum. Unde voluntas non indiget aliquo habitu virtutis inclinante ipsam ad bonum quod est sibi proportionatum, quia in hoc ex ipsa ratione potentiae tendit; sed ad bonum quod transcendit proportionem potentiae, indiget habitu virtutis. Cum autem uniuscuiusque appetitus tendat in proprium bonum appetentis; dupliciter aliquod bonum potest excedere voluntatis proportionem. RESPONSE. It should be said that a power acquires a complement to its act from the habit of virtue to which it is subject. Hence, a habit of virtue is not needed in order for a power to extend to its proper objects. Virtue orders the power to the good, since virtue is what makes the one having it good and renders his act good. But will has by reason of itself that which other powers have as a result of virtue, since its object is the good. Hence, for the will to tend to the good is like the concupiscible tending to the pleasurable and hearing to sound. Hence, the will is in no need of a habit of virtue in order to be inclined to the good proportioned to it, to which it tends because of what it is, but with respect to the good which transcends what is proportioned to the power, it needs a habit of virtue. Since it is the nature of any appetite to tend to the proper good of the desirer, a good can exceed the proportion of will in two ways. Uno modo ratione speciei; alio modo ratione individui. Ratione quidem speciei, ut voluntas elevetur ad aliquod bonum quod excedit limites humani boni: et dico humanum id quod ex viribus naturae homo potest. Sed supra humanum bonum est bonum divinum, id quod voluntatem hominis caritas elevat, et similiter spes. In one way by reason of the species, in another by reason of the individual. By reason of the species, as when the will is elevated to a good that exceeds the limits of the human good, and by human I mean what a man can do with his own powers. But the divine good is above the human good, and charity raises man’s will to that, and so does hope. Ratione autem individui, hoc modo quod aliquis quaerat id quod est alterius bonum, licet voluntas extra limites boni humani non feratur; et sic voluntatem perficit iustitia, et omnes virtutes in aliud tendentes, ut liberalitas, et alia huiusmodi. Nam iustitia est alterius bonum, ut philosophus dicit in V Ethic. Sic ergo duae virtutes sunt in voluntate sicut in subiecto; scilicet caritas et iustitia. Cuius signum est, quod istae virtutes quamvis ad appetitivam pertineant, tamen non circa passiones consistunt, sicut temperantia et fortitudo: unde patet quod non sunt in sensibili appetitu, in quo sunt passiones, sed in appetitu rationali, qui est voluntas, in quo passiones non sunt. Nam omnis passio est in parte animae sensitiva, ut probatur in VII Physic. Illae autem virtutes quae circa passiones consistunt, sicut fortitudo circa timores et audacias, et temperantia circa concupiscentias, oportet eadem ratione esse in appetitu sensitivo. Nec oportet quod ratione istarum passionum sit aliqua virtus in voluntate quia bonum in istis passionibus est quod est secundum rationem. Et ad hoc naturaliter se habet voluntas ex ratione ipsius potentiae, cum sit proprium obiectum voluntatis. By reason of the individual, as when someone seeks the good of another, although the will is not borne beyond the limits of the human good, and thus justice perfects will as do all the virtues which relate to the other, such as liberality and the like. For justice is the good of the other, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 5. Thus, there are two virtues in will as in a subject, namely, charity and justice. A sign of this is that these virtues, although they pertain to appetite, are not about emotions, as temperance and courage are, and thus, it is clear that they are not in sense appetite in which the emotions are found, but in rational appetite, that is, will, in which there are no emotions. For every emotion is in the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in Physics 8. But those virtues which concern the emotions, as courage concerns fear and boldness, and temperance desire, must for this reason be in sense appetite. Nor need there be any virtue in the will because of such emotions, because the good of such emofions is according to reason. To which, since it is its proper object, the will is naturally disposed by reason of what it is. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ad imperandum sufficit voluntati iudicium rationis; nam voluntas appetit naturaliter quod est bonum secundum rationem, sicut concupiscibilis quod est delectabile secundum sensum. Ad 1. It should be said that the judgment of reason suffices for the will to command, since will naturally seeks the good according to reason, as the concupiscible seeks what is pleasurable to the sense. Ad secundum dicendum, quod inclinatio naturalis voluntatis non solum est in ultimum finem, sed in id bonum quod sibi a ratione demonstratur. Nam bonum intellectum est obiectum voluntatis, ad quod naturaliter ordinatur voluntas, sicut et quaelibet potentia in suum obiectum, dummodo hoc sit proprium bonum, ut supra dictum est. Tamen circa hoc aliquis peccat, in quantum iudicium rationis intercipitur passione. Ad 2. It should be said that the natural inclination of will is not only to the ultimate end, but to the good shown to it by reason. For the good as understood is the object of will and to it the will is naturally ordered, as any power is ordered to its own object, so long as it is its proper good, as was said earlier. But one can sin in this regard insofar as the judgment of reason is intercepted by emotion. Ad tertium dicendum, quod cognitio fit per aliquam speciem; nec ad cognoscendum potentia intellectus sufficit per seipsam, nisi species a sensibilibus accipiat. Et ideo oportet in his etiam quae naturaliter cognoscimus, esse quemdam habitum, qui etiam quodammodo principium a sensibus sumit, ut dicitur in fine Poster. Sed voluntas ad volendum non indiget aliqua specie; unde non est simile. Ad 3. It should be said that knowledge comes about through some likeness (species), nor does the power of intellect suffice of itself for knowing unless it receives an intelligible species. That is why in things that we know naturally there must be some habit which also takes its rise from the senses, as is said at the end of the PosteriorAnalytics. But will does not need any species in order to will, so the case is not similar. Ad quartum dicendum, quod circa passiones virtutes sunt in appetitu inferiori; nec ad huiusmodi requiritur alia virtus in appetitu superiori, ratione iam dicta. Ad 4. It should be said that the virtues which concern emotions are in the lower appetite, nor is any virtue of the higher appetite required for them, for the reason already given. Ad quintum dicendum, quod amicitia proprie non est virtus, sed consequens virtutem. Nam ex hoc ipso quod aliquis est virtuosus, sequitur quod diligat sibi similes. Secus autem est de caritate, quae est quaedam amicitia ad Deum, elevans hominem in id quod metam naturae excedit; unde caritas in voluntate est, ut diximus. Ad 5. It should be said that friendship is not a virtue properly speaking, but something following on virtue. For because one is virtuous it follows that he will love those like himself It is otherwise with charity, which is a friendship with God that lifts man up to that which exceeds the limits of his nature. Hence, charity is in the will, as we said. Et per hoc patet responsio ad sextum et septimum; nam virtus coniungens voluntatem Deo est caritas. Ad 6 & 7. From this the reply to six and seven are obvious, for the virtue joining the will to God is charity. Ad octavum dicendum, quod ad felicitatem quaedam praeexiguntur sicut dispositiones, sicuti actus virtutum moralium, per quos removentur impedimenta felicitatis; scilicet inquietudo mentis a passionibus, et ab exterioribus perturbationibus. Aliquis autem actus est virtutis qui est essentialiter ipsa felicitas quando est completus; scilicet actus rationis vel intellectus. Nam felicitas contemplativa nihil aliud est quam perfecta contemplatio summae veritatis; felicitas autem activa est actus prudentiae, quo homo et se et alios gubernat. Aliquid autem est in felicitate sicut perfectivum felicitatis; scilicet delectatio, quae perficit felicitatem, sicut decor iuventutem, ut dicitur in X Ethic.: et hoc pertinet ad voluntatem; et in ordine ad hoc perficit voluntatem caritas, si loquamur de felicitate caelesti, quae sanctis repromittitur. Si autem loquamur de felicitate contemplativa, de qua philosophi tractaverunt, ad huiusmodi delectationem voluntas naturali desiderio ordinatur. Et sic patet quod non oportet omnes virtutes esse in voluntate. Ad 8. It should be said that certain dispositions are prerequisites to happiness, such as the acts of the moral virtues by which impediments to happiness are removed, such as disturbance of the mind by passions and external distractions. But there is an act of virtue which when it is complete is essentially happiness, namely, the act of reason or intellect. For contemplative happiness is nothing else than the perfect contemplation of the highest truth; but active happiness is the act of prudence by which a man governs himself and others. But there is something perfective of happiness, namely, pleasure which completes happiness as comeliness does youth, as is said in Ethics 10. This pertains to will, and if we are speaking of celestial happiness which is promised to the saints, the will is ordered to it by charity, but if we are speaking of contemplative happiness, the will is ordered to it by a natural desire. Thus, it is clear that not all virtues need be in the will. Ad nonum dicendum, quod voluntate recte vivitur et peccatur sicut imperante omnes actus virtutum et vitiorum; non autem sicut eliciente; unde non oportet quod voluntas sit proximum subiectum cuiuslibet virtutis. Ad 9. It should be said that one lives rightly or sinfully by will which commands all the acts of virtues and vices, although not as eliciting, so it is not necessary that the will be the proximate subject of every virtue. Ad decimum dicendum, quod peccatum omne est in voluntate sicut in causa, in quantum omne peccatum fit ex consensu voluntatis; non tamen oportet quod omne peccatum sit in voluntate sicut in subiecto; sed sicut gula et luxuria sunt in concupiscibili, ita et superbia in irascibili. Ad 10. It should be said that every sin is in the will as in its cause insofar as every sin comes about by consent of the will, but it is not necessary that every sin be in the will as in its subject: Gluttony and dissipation are in the concupiscible, and pride is in the irascible. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod ex propinquitate voluntatis ad rationem contingit quod voluntas secundum ipsam rationem potentiae consonet rationi; et ideo non indiget ad hoc habitu virtutis super inducto, sicut inferiores potentiae, scilicet irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Ad 11. It should be said that from will’s closeness to reason it happens that will is in harmony with reason just because of what it is, and therefore, there is no need of any habit of virtue besides, as there is with the lower powers, namely, the irascible and concupiscible. REPLIES TO ARGUMENTS ON THE CONTRARY Ad primum vero eorum quae in contrarium obiiciuntur, dicendum, quod caritas et spes, quae sunt in voluntate, non continentur sub ista philosophi divisione; sunt enim aliud genus virtutum, et dicuntur virtutes theologicae. Iustitia vero inter morales continetur; voluntas enim sicut et alii appetitus, ratione participat, in quantum dirigitur a ratione. Licet enim voluntas ad eamdem naturam intellectivae partis pertineat, non tamen ad ipsam potentiam rationis. Ad 1. It should be said that charity and hope which are in the will are not included in this division of philosophy, for they are another kind of virtue called theological. justice is included among the moral virtues, for the will like other appetites participates in reason in the sense that it is directed by reason. For although will belongs by nature to the same intellectual part as reason, it is not the same power as reason. Ad secundum dicendum, quod respectu illorum ad quae habetur virtus in irascibili et concupiscibili, non oportet esse virtutem in voluntate, ratione prius dicta. Ad 2. It should be said that with respect to the things to which a virtue of the irascible or concupiscible relates, there need be no virtue in will, for the reason already given.
Sexto quaeritur utrum in intellectu practico sit virtus sicut in subiecto
Whether practical intellect is the subject of virtue
Et videtur quod non. It seems that it is not. Quia secundum philosophum in II Ethic., scire, parum vel nihil prodest ad virtutem. Loquitur autem ibi de scientia practica; quod patet ex hoc quod subiungit, quod multi non operantur ea quorum habent scientiam; scientia enim ordinata ad opus est practici intellectus. Ergo practicus intellectus non poterit esse subiectum virtutis. 1. The Philosopher says in Ethics 2 that knowing is of little or no avail for virtue, and he is speaking there of practical knowledge, as is clear from what he adds, that many do not do the things of which they have knowledge: It is the knowledge of practical reason that is ordered to action. Therefore, practical intellect cannot be the subject of virtue. Praeterea, sine virtute non potest aliquis recte agere. Sed sine perfectione practici intellectus potest aliquis recte agere, eo quod potest instrui ab alio de agendis. Ergo perfectio practici intellectus non est virtus. 2. Moreover, without virtue no one can act rightly. But without the perfection of practical intellect, a person can act rightly, since he can be instructed by someone else concerning things to be done. Therefore-, the perfection of practical intellect is not a virtue. Praeterea, tanto aliquid magis peccat, quanto magis recedit a virtute. Sed recessus a perfectione practici intellectus diminuit peccatum; ignorantia enim excusat vel a tanto, vel a toto. Ergo perfectio practici intellectus non potest esse virtus. 3. Moreover, the more one sins, the more he recedes from virtue. But departure from the perfection of practical intellect lessens sin, for ignorance excuses either in part or in full. Therefore, the perfection of practical intellect cannot be a virtue. Praeterea, virtus secundum Tullium, agit in modum naturae. Sed modus agendi naturae opponitur contra modum agendi rationis, sive practici intellectus; quod patet in II Physic., ubi dividitur agens a natura contra agens a proposito. Ergo videtur quod in practico intellectu non sit virtus. 4. Moreover, according to Cicero, virtue acts as nature does, but nature’s manner of acting is opposed to that of reason, that is, of practical intellect, something clear from Physics 2, where the natural is distinguished from the way in which one acts knowingly. Therefore, it would seem that there is no virtue in the practical intellect. Praeterea, bonum et verum formaliter differunt secundum proprias rationes. Sed differentia formalis obiectorum diversificat habitus. Cum igitur virtutis obiectum sit bonum, practici autem intellectus perfectio sit verum, tamen ordinatum ad opus; videtur quod perfectio practici intellectus non sit virtus. 5. Moreover, the good and the true are formally different in their proper notions, but the formal difference of objects diversifies habits. Therefore, since the object of virtue is the good, whereas the perfection of practical intellect is the true, although ordered to action, it seems that the perfection of practical intellect is not virtue. Praeterea, virtus, secundum philosophum in II Ethic., est habitus voluntarius. Sed habitus intellectus practici differunt ab habitibus voluntatis vel appetitivae partis. Ergo habitus qui sunt in intellectu practico, non sunt virtutes; et sic intellectus practicus non potest esse subiectum virtutis. 6. Moreover, according to Aristotle in Ethics 2, virtue is a voluntary habit, but the habits of practical intellect differ from those of will or the appetitive part. Therefore, the habits which are in practical intellect are not virtues. Consequently, the practical intellect is not the subject of virtue. Sed contra. ON THE CONTRARY Est quod prudentia ponitur una quatuor virtutum principalium; et tamen eius subiectum est practicus intellectus. Ergo intellectus practicus potest esse subiectum virtutis. 1. Prudence is one of the four principal virtues, but its subject is practical intellect. Therefore practical intellect can be the subject of virtue. Praeterea, virtus humana est cuius subiectum est potentia humana. Sed potentia humana magis est intellectus practicus quam irascibilis et concupiscibilis; sicut quod est per essentiam tale, magis est eo quod est per participationem. Ergo intellectus practicus potest esse subiectum virtutis humanae. 2. Moreover, human virtue has a human power for its subject. But intellect is more of a human power than are the irascible and concupiscible, since that which is something essentially is greater than that which is such only by participation. Therefore, the practical intellect is the subject of human virtue. Praeterea, propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis. Sed in parte affectiva est virtus propter rationem; quia ad hoc quod obediat rationi vis affectiva, in ea ponitur virtus. Ergo multo fortius in ratione practica debet esse virtus. 3. Moreover, that for the sake of which something is takes precedence, but in the affective part virtue is for the sake of reason, since in order that the affective power might obey reason a virtue is established in it. All the more reason, then, why there should be a virtue in practical reason. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod inter virtutes naturales et rationales haec differentia assignatur; quod naturalis virtus est determinata ad unum, virtus autem rationalis ad multa se habet. Oportet autem ut appetitus animalis vel rationalis inclinetur in suum appetibile ex aliqua apprehensione praeexistente; inclinatio enim in finem absque praeexistente cognitione ad appetitum pertinet naturalem, sicut grave inclinatur ad medium. Sed quia aliquod bonum apprehensum oportet esse obiectum appetitus animalis et rationalis; ubi ergo istud bonum uniformiter se habet, potest esse inclinatio naturalis in appetitu, et iudicium naturale in vi cognitiva, sicut accidit in brutis. Cum enim sint paucarum operationum propter debilitatem principii activi quod ad pauca se extendit; est in omnibus unius speciei bonum uniformiter se habens. Unde per appetitum naturalem inclinationem habent in id, et per vim cognitivam naturale iudicium habent de illo proprio bono uniformiter se habente. Et ex hoc naturali iudicio et naturali appetitu provenit quod omnis hirundo uniformiter facit nidum, et quod omnis aranea uniformiter facit telam; et sic est in omnibus aliis brutis considerare. Homo autem est multarum operationum et diversarum; et hoc propter nobilitatem sui principii activi, scilicet animae, cuius virtus ad infinita quodammodo se extendit. Et ideo non sufficeret homini naturalis appetitus boni, nec naturale iudicium ad recte agendum, nisi amplius determinetur et perficiatur. RESPONSE. It should be said that there is this difference between natural and rational virtue that the former is determined to one, whereas the latter is ordered to many things. Both animal and rational appetites are inclined to what they desire by means of a preexisting cognition. As for natural appetite, it tends to its end without any pre-existent knowledge, as the heavy inclines to the center. Because the known good is the object of animal and rational appetites, where this good is always the same, there can be a natural inclination in appetite and a natural judgment in the cognitive power, as happens in beasts which have few activities because of the weakness of the active power which extends to few. In all things of the same species there is the same unchanging good. Hence, they have a natural inclination to it and a natural judgment in the cognitive power with respect to that uniform good. From this natural judgment and desire it comes about that all swallows builds their nests in the same way and all spiders spin a web the same way, and so it is with all beasts. But man has many and different activities because of the nobility of his active principle, the soul, whose power extends in a way to an infinity of things. Therefore, the natural desire of the good does not suffice for man, or the natural judgment for acting well, unless they be further determined and perfected. Per naturalem siquidem appetitum homo inclinatur ad appetendum proprium bonum; sed cum hoc multipliciter varietur, et in multis bonum hominis consistat; non potuit homini inesse naturalis appetitus huius boni determinati, secundum conditiones omnes quae requiruntur ad hoc quod sit ei bonum; cum hoc multipliciter varietur secundum diversas conditiones personarum et temporum et locorum, et huiusmodi. Et eadem ratione naturale iudicium; quod est uniforme, et ad huiusmodi bonum quaerendum non sufficit; unde oportuit in homine per rationem, cuius est inter diversa conferre, invenire et diiudicare proprium bonum, secundum omnes conditiones determinatum, prout est nunc et hic quaerendum. A man is inclined by natural appetite to seek his proper good, but since this varies in many ways and because man’s good consists of many things, there could not be a natural appetite for this determinate good given all the conditions needed if it is to be good for him, since this varies widely according to the condition of persons, times, and places and the like. For the same reason the natural judgment, which is uniform, does not suffice for the pursuit of a good of this kind. So it is that a man must by reason, which compares different things, discover and discern his proper good, determined with respect to all its conditions insofar as it sought here and now. Et ad hoc faciendum ratio absque habitu perficiente hoc modo se habet sicut et in speculativo se habet ratio absque habitu scientiae ad diiudicandum de aliqua conclusione alicuius scientiae; quod quidem non potest nisi imperfecte et cum difficultate agere. Sicut igitur oportet rationem speculativam habitu scientiae perfici ad hoc quod recte diiudicet de scibilibus ad scientiam aliquam pertinentibus; ita oportet quod ratio practica perficiatur aliquo habitu ad hoc quod recte diiudicet de bono humano secundum singula agenda. Et haec virtus dicitur prudentia, cuius subiectum est ratio practica; et est perfectiva omnium virtutum moralium quae sunt in parte appetitiva, quarum unaquaeque facit inclinationem appetitus in aliquod genus humani boni: sicut iustitia facit inclinationem in bonum quod est aequalitas pertinentium ad communicationem vitae; temperantia in bonum quod est refrenari a concupiscentiis; et sic de singulis virtutibus. Unumquodque autem horum contingit multipliciter fieri, et non eodem modo in omnibus; unde ad hoc quod rectus modus statuatur, requiritur iudicii prudentia. With respect to doing, reason without a perfecting habit is like speculative reason without the habit of science when it judges the conclusion of some science, something it can do only imperfectly and with difficulty. Thus it is that speculative reason needs to be perfected by the habit of science in order to judge the objects pertaining to that science; so too practical reason is perfected by a habit in order that it might rightly judge the human good with respect to all the things that must be done. This virtue is called prudence and its subject is practical reason; it is perfective of the moral virtues in the appetitive part, all of which incline appetite to some type of human good, as justice gives an inclination to the good of equality in things pertaining to common life, temperance to the good which is the restraint of desire, and so with the other virtues, every one of which is exercised in many ways and not uniformly in every case. That is why prudence of judgment is needed in order that the right mode be established. Et ita ab ipsa est rectitudo et complementum bonitatis in omnibus aliis virtutibus; unde philosophus dicit quod medium in virtute morali determinatur secundum rationem rectam. Et quia ex hac rectitudine et bonitatis complemento omnes habitus appetitivi virtutis rationem sortiuntur, inde est quod prudentia est causa omnium virtutum appetitivae partis, quae dicuntur morales in quantum sunt virtutes; et propterea dicit Gregorius in XXII Moral., quod ceterae virtutes, nisi ea quae appetunt, prudenter agant, virtutes esse nequaquam possunt. From this the rectitude and completion of goodness in all other virtues comes; hence, the Philosopher says that the mean in moral virtue is determined by right reason. Because all the habits of the appetitive part take the note of virtue from this rectitude and completion of goodness, virtue is the cause of all the virtues of the appetitive part, which are called moral insofar as they are virtues. Moreover, Gregory in the Morals on Job 22 says that the other virtues can be virtues only insofar as they do prudently what they seek. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod philosophus ibi loquitur de scientia practica; sed prudentia plus importat quam scientia practica: nam ad scientiam practicam pertinet universale iudicium de agendis; sicut fornicationem esse malam, furtum non esse faciendum, et huiusmodi. Qua quidem scientia existente, in particulari actu contingit iudicium rationis intercipi, ut non recte diiudicet; et propter hoc dicitur parum valere ad virtutem, quia ea existente contingit hominem contra virtutem peccare. Sed ad prudentiam pertinet recte iudicare de singulis agibilibus, prout sint nunc agenda: quod quidem iudicium corrumpitur per quodlibet peccatum. Et ideo prudentia manente, homo non peccat; unde ipsa non parum sed multum confert ad virtutem; immo ipsam virtutem causat, ut dictum est. Ad 1. It should be said that the Philosopher is speaking there of practical science, and prudence implies more than practical science. Practical science makes a universal judgment of things to be done, for example, fornication is evil, theft ought not he committed, and the like. This knowledge can be present yet reason’s judgment concerning the particular act be intercepted with the result that one does not judge correctly. That is why moral science is said to avail little for the acquisition of virtue, because even when it is had a man can sin against virtue. It is the task of prudence to judge correctly concerning singular things to be done, to be done now, a judgment that is indeed corrupted by any sin. Therefore, while prudence remains, a man does not sin. Hence, it avails not a little but much for virtue, indeed it causes virtue, as has been said. Ad secundum dicendum, quod homo ab alio potest accipere consilium in universali de agendis; sed quod iudicium recte servet in ipso actu contra omnes passiones, hoc solum ex rectitudine prudentiae provenit; et sine hoc virtus esse non potest. Ad 2. It should be said that a man can take general advice from another concerning what is to be done, but that he rightly follow it in action against all passions can only result from the rectitude of prudence without which virtue simply would not be. Ad tertium dicendum, quod ignorantia quae opponitur prudentiae, est ignorantia electionis, secundum quam omnis malus est ignorans; quae provenit ex eo quod iudicium rationis intercipitur per appetitus inclinationem: et hoc non excusat peccatum, sed constituit. Sed ignorantia quae opponitur scientiae practicae, excusat vel diminuit peccatum. Ad 3. It should be said that the ignorance which is the opposite of prudence is ignorance of choice according to which every evil is due to the ignorance which follows on the interception of reason’s judgment by the inclination of appetite. And this is no excuse for sin, since it constitutes it, but the ignorance which is opposed to practical science excuses or diminishes sin. Ad quartum dicendum, quod verbum Tullii intelligitur quantum ad inclinationem appetitus tendentis in aliquod bonum commune, sicut in fortiter agere, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Sed nisi rationis iudicio dirigeretur, talis inclinatio frequenter duceretur in praecipitium; et tanto magis, quanto esset vehementior; sicut ponit philosophus exemplum de caeco, in VI Ethic., qui tanto magis laeditur ad parietem impingens, quanto fortius currit. Ad 4. It should be said that Cicero’s remark is to be understood as applying to the inclination of appetite tending to some general good, such as acting courageously and the like. But if this inclination is not directed by the judgment of reason, it is frequently led astray and so much the more as it is more vehement, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 6 of the blind man who is the more injured by hitting the wall the faster he runs. Ad quintum dicendum, quod bonum et verum sunt obiecta duarum partium animae, scilicet intellectivae et appetitivae: quae quidem duo hoc modo se habent, quod utraque ad actum alterius operatur; sicut voluntas vult intellectum intelligere, et intellectus intelligit voluntatem velle. Et ideo haec duo, bonum et verum, se invicem includunt: nam bonum est quoddam verum, in quantum est ab intellectu apprehensum; prout scilicet intellectus intelligit voluntatem velle bonum, vel etiam in quantum intelligit aliquid esse bonum; similiter etiam et ipsum verum est quoddam bonum intellectus, quod etiam sub voluntate cadit, in quantum homo vult intelligere verum. Nihilominus tamen verum intellectus practici est bonum, quod et finis operationis: bonum enim non movet appetitum, nisi in quantum est apprehensum. Ideo nihil prohibet in intellectu practico esse virtutem. Ad 5. It should be said that the good and true are objects of different parts of the soul, namely, of the intellective and the appetitive, which two are so related that both act on the act of the other, as win wishes the intellect to understand and intellect understands the will to will. Therefore, these two, good and true, include one another, since the good is a kind of truth, insofar as it is grasped by intellect when intellect understands the will to be willing the good or even insofar as it understands that something is good. So too the true is a good of intellect which thus falls to the will insofar as a man wills to understand the true. Nevertheless, the truth of the practical intellect is the good, which is the end of action, for good does not move appetite save insofar as it is understood. Therefore, nothing prevents there being a virtue in practical intellect. Ad sextum dicendum, quod philosophus in II Ethic., definit virtutem moralem: de virtute enim intellectuali determinat in VI Ethic. Virtus autem quae est in intellectu practico, non est moralis, sed intellectualis: nam etiam prudentiam inter virtutes intellectuales philosophus ponit, ut patet in II Ethic. Ad 6. It should be said that the Philosopher defines moral virtue in Ethics 2 and intellectual virtue in Ethics 6. The virtue that is in practical intellect is not moral but intellectual, since the Philosopher numbers prudence among the intellectual virtues, as is evident in Ethics 2.
Septimo quaeritur utrum in intellectu speculativo sit virtus
Are there virtues of the speculative intellect?
Et videtur quod non. It seems that there are not. Virtus enim omnis ordinatur ad actum: virtus enim est quae opus bonum reddit. Intellectus autem speculativus non ordinatur ad actum: nihil enim dicit de imitando vel fugiendo, ut patet in III de anima. Ergo in intellectu speculativo non potest esse virtus. 1. Every virtue is ordered to action, since virtue is what renders action good. But the speculative intellect is not ordered to action, for it says nothing of imitating or fleeing, as is clear from On the Soul 3. Therefore, there can be no virtue of the speculative intellect. Praeterea, virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed habitus intellectus speculativi non faciunt bonum habentem; non enim dicitur propter hoc bonus homo, quia habet scientiam. Ergo habitus qui sunt in intellectu speculativo, non sunt virtutes. 2. Moreover, virtue is what makes the one having it good, as is said in Ethics 2. But a habit of speculative intellect does not make the one having it good; one is not called a good man because he possesses science. Therefore, the habits which are found in the speculative intellect are not virtues. Praeterea, intellectus speculativus praecipue perficitur habitu scientiae. Scientia autem non est virtus; quod ex hoc patet, quia contra virtutes dividitur: dicitur enim in prima specie qualitatis esse habitus et dispositio; et habitus dicitur scientiae et virtutis. Ergo in intellectu speculativo non est virtus. 3. Moreover, the speculative intellect is chiefly perfected by the habit of science, but science is not a virtue, as is clear from the fact that it is distinguished from the virtues. For a habit or disposition is said to be in the first species of quality, and habit is predicated of science and virtue. Therefore, there is no virtue of the speculative intellect. Praeterea, omnis virtus ordinatur ad aliquid, quia ad felicitatem quae est finis virtutis. Sed intellectus speculativus non ordinatur ad aliquid: non enim scientiae speculativae propter utilitatem quaeruntur, sed propter seipsas, ut dicitur in I Metaph. Ergo in intellectu speculativo non potest esse virtus. 4. Moreover, every virtue is ordered to something, namely, happiness which is the end of virtue. But the speculative intellect is not ordered to anything; speculative sciences are not sought for the sake of utility, but for themselves, as is said in Metaphysics 1. Therefore, there cannot be a virtue in the speculative intellect. Praeterea, actus virtutis est meritorius. Sed intelligere non sufficit ad meritum; immo scienti bonum, et non facienti peccatum est illi, ut dicit Iacobus, IV, 17. Ergo in intellectu speculativo non est virtus. 5. Moreover, the act of virtue is meritorious. But understanding does not suffice for merit, indeed one who knows the good and does not do it sins, as is said in James 4:17. Therefore, there is no virtue of speculative intellect. Sed contra. ON THE CONTRARY Fides est in intellectu speculativo, cum sit eius obiectum veritas prima. Sed fides est virtus. Ergo intellectus speculativus potest esse subiectum virtutis. 1. Faith is in the speculative intellect, since its object is the First Truth. But faith is a virtue. Therefore, the speculative intellect can be the subject of virtue. Praeterea, verum et bonum sunt aeque nobilia. Nam se invicem circumeunt; nam verum est quoddam bonum, et bonum est quoddam verum: et utrumque commune omni enti. Si igitur in voluntate, cuius obiectum est bonum, potest esse virtus; ergo et in intellectu speculativo, cuius obiectum est verum, poterit esse virtus. 2. Moreover, the true and good are equally noble, for they include one another, for the true is a kind of good and the good is a kind of truth, and both are common to every being. Therefore, if there can be virtue in the will, whose object is the good, there can be virtue in speculative intellect, whose object is the true. Respondeo. Dicendum quod virtus in unaquaque re dicitur per respectum ad bonum; eo quod uniuscuiusque virtus est, ut philosophus dicit, quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit; sicut virtus equi quae facit equum esse bonum, et bene ire, et bene ferre sessorem, quod est opus equi. Ex hoc quidem igitur aliquis habitus habebit rationem virtutis, quia ordinatur ad bonum. Hoc autem contingit dupliciter: uno modo formaliter, alio modo materialiter. RESPONSE. It should be said that virtue in anything is said with respect to the good, because, as the Philosopher says, any virtue makes the one having it good and renders his action good. For example, the virtue of the horse makes the horse good and makes him run well and sit a rider well, and these are the functions of a horse. To the degree then that a habit has the note of virtue, it is ordered to the good. But this occurs in two ways, formally and materially. Formaliter quidem, quando aliquis habitus ordinatur ad bonum sub ratione boni; materialiter vero, quando ordinatur ad id quod est bonum, non tamen sub ratione boni. Bonum autem sub ratione boni est obiectum solius appetitivae partis; nam bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Illi igitur habitus qui vel sunt in parte appetitiva, vel a parte appetitiva dependent, ordinantur formaliter ad bonum; unde potissime habent rationem virtutis. Illi vero habitus qui nec sunt in appetitiva parte, nec ab eadem dependent, possunt quidem ordinari materialiter in id quod est bonum, non tamen formaliter sub ratione boni; unde et possunt aliquo modo dici virtutes, non tamen ita proprie sicut primi habitus. Sciendum est autem, quod intellectus tam speculativus quam practicus potest perfici dupliciter aliquo habitu. Formally, when a habit is ordered to the good as good; materially when it is ordered to something that is good but not under the note of goodness. Good under the note of goodness is the object of the appetitive part alone, for good is that which all things seek. Therefore, those habits which are either in the appetitive part or depend upon it are formally ordered to the good and are called virtues in the strongest sense. Habits which are not in the appetitive part nor depend upon it can be materially ordered to that which is good although not formally under the note of goodness, hence they can in some way be called virtues, though not so properly as the first habits. But it should be noted that the intellect, both speculative and practical, can be perfected by a habit in two ways. Uno modo absolute et secundum se, prout praecedit voluntatem, quasi eam movens; alio modo prout sequitur voluntatem, quasi ad imperium actum suum eliciens: quia, ut dictum est, istae duae potentiae, scilicet intellectus et voluntas, se invicem circumeunt. Illi igitur habitus qui sunt in intellectu practico vel speculativo, primo modo, possunt dici aliquo modo virtutes, licet non ita secundum perfectam rationem; et hoc modo intellectus scientia et sapientia, sunt in intellectu speculativo, ars vero in intellectu practico. Dicitur enim aliquis intelligens vel sciens secundum quod eius intellectus perfectus est ad cognoscendum verum; quod quidem est bonum intellectus. Et licet istud verum possit esse volitum, prout homo vult intelligere verum; non tamen quantum ad hoc perficiuntur habitus praedicti. In one way absolutely and as such, insofar as it precedes win as moving it; in another way insofar as it follows will which elicits its act on command, because, as has been said, these two powers, intellect and will, involve one another. Therefore, the habits which are in practical or speculative intellect in the first way can be called virtues in a way, though not according to the full sense of the term, and so it is with understanding, science, and wisdom in the speculative intellect, and art in the practical intellect. For one is said to be knowing or understanding insofar as his intellect is perfected with respect to knowing the truth, which indeed is the good of intellect. And although the true can be willed, insofar as a man wishes to understand the truth, it is not in this respect that the foregoing habits perfect. Non enim ex hoc quod homo habet scientiam, efficitur volens considerare verum, sed solummodo potens; unde et ipsa veri consideratio non est scientia in quantum est volita, sed secundum quod directe tendit in obiectum. Et similiter est de arte respectu intellectus practici; unde ars non perficit hominem ex hoc quod bene velit operari secundum artem, sed solummodo ad hoc quod sciat et possit. Habitus vero qui sunt in intellectu speculativo vel practico secundum quod intellectus sequitur voluntatem, habent verius rationem virtutis; in quantum per eos homo efficitur non solum potens vel sciens recte agere, sed volens. Quod quidem ostenditur in fide et prudentia, sed diversimode. Fides enim perficit intellectum speculativum, secundum quod imperatur ei a voluntate; quod ex actu patet: homo enim ad ea quae sunt supra rationem humanam, non assentit per intellectum nisi quia vult; sicut Augustinus dicit, quod credere non potest homo nisi volens. For a man is not made willing to consider the truth by the fact that he has science: He is only capable of it. Hence, the very consideration of the true is not science as it is willed, but insofar as it tends directly to its object. And similarly in the case of art in the practical intellect, which is why art does not perfect a man in such a way that he wills to act according to the art, but only that he should know and be capable. But habits which are in speculative or practical intellect insofar as intellect follows will more truly have the note of virtue, since by them a man is made not only capable or cognizant of acting well, but willing. This can be seen in the case of faith and prudence, though differently. Faith perfects the speculative intellect insofar as it is commanded by will, which is clear from its act, for a man does not give intellectual assent to what is above human reason unless he wills to; as Augustine says: “No man can believe unless he is willing.” Ita et similiter erit fides in intellectu speculativo, secundum quod subiacet imperio voluntatis; sicut temperantia est in concupiscibili secundum quod subiacet imperio rationis. Unde voluntas imperat intellectui, credendo, non solum quantum ad actum exequendum, sed quantum ad determinationem obiecti: quia ex imperio voluntatis in determinatum creditum intellectus assentit; sicut et in determinatum medium a ratione, concupiscibilis, per temperantiam tendit. Prudentia vero est in intellectu sive ratione practica, ut dictum est: non quidem ita quod ex voluntate determinetur obiectum prudentiae, sed solum finis; obiectum autem ipsa perquirit: praesupposito enim a voluntate fine boni, prudentia perquirit vias per quas hoc bonum et perficiatur et conservetur. Just as faith is in the speculative intellect following the command of will, so temperance is in the concupiscible insofar as it is subject to the command of reason. Hence, in believing will commands intellect, not only with respect to bringing off the act, but also with respect to the determination of its object, since intellect assents to a definite belief on the will’s command, just as in the determination of the mean by reason the concupiscible tends because of temperance. But prudence is in practical intellect or reason, as has been said, and will determines only the end of prudence, not its object: For prudence seeks its object presupposing the will for the good end, inquiring into ways whereby this good can be achieved and retained. Sic igitur patet quod habitus in intellectu existentes diversimode se habent ad voluntatem. Nam quidam in nullo a voluntate dependent, nisi quantum ad eorum usum; et hoc quidem per accidens, cum huiusmodi usus habituum aliter a voluntate dependeat, et aliter ab habitibus praedictis, sicut sunt scientia et sapientia et ars. Non enim per hos habitus homo ad hoc perficitur, ut homo eis bene velit uti; sed solum ut ad hoc sit potens. Aliquis vero habitus intellectus dependet a voluntate sicut a qua accipit principium suum: nam finis in operativis principium est; et sic se habet prudentia. Aliquis vero habitus etiam determinationem obiecti a voluntate accipit, sicut est in fide. Thus it is clear that habits of intellect are related to the will in different ways, for some depend on will only for their use, and this is incidental to them. Use depends on will in one way and on such habits as science and wisdom and art in another. These habits do not perfect a man in such a way that he chooses to use them well, but give him only the capacity. But there is an intellectual habit which receives its principle or starting point from will, for in action the end is the starting point. This is how it is with prudence. There is another intellectual habit which receives its determinate object from the will, and this is faith. Et licet omnes quoquo modo possint dici virtutes; tamen perfectius et magis proprie hi duo ultimi habent rationem virtutis; licet ex hoc non sequatur quod sint nobiliores habitus aut perfectiores. Now all these habits can be called virtues but not in the same sense. These last two more perfectly and properly fulfill the definition of virtue, although from this it does not follow that they are more noble or more perfect habits. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod habitus intellectus speculativi ordinatur ad actum proprium, quem perfectum reddit, qui est veri consideratio: non autem ordinatur sicut in finem in aliquem exteriorem actum, sed finem habet in suo actu proprio. Intellectus autem practicus ordinatur sicut in finem in alium exteriorem actum: non enim consideratio de agendis vel faciendis pertinet ad intellectum practicum nisi propter agere vel facere. Et sic habitus intellectus speculativi reddit actum suum nobiliori modo bonum quam habitus intellectus practici: quia ille ut finem, hic ut ad finem; licet habitus intellectus practici, ex eo quod ordinat ad bonum sub ratione boni, prout praesupponitur voluntati, magis proprie habeat rationem virtutis. Ad 1. It should be said that a habit of speculative intellect is ordered to its proper act which makes it perfect, that is, to the consideration of truth, but it is not ordered to some external action as to an end: Its end lies in its proper act. But practical intellect is ordered to an external action as to its end, for the consideration of what ought to be done or made pertains to practical intellect for the sake of acting or doing. Thus, the habit of speculative intellect makes its act good in a more noble way than does the habit of practical intellect, the former as an end, the latter as for an end, even though the habit of practical intellect, insofar as it orders to the good as good, and presupposes the will, is more properly called virtue. Ad secundum dicendum, quod homo non dicitur bonus simpliciter ex eo quod est in parte bonus, sed ex eo quod secundum totum est bonus: quod quidem contingit per bonitatem voluntatis. Nam voluntas imperat actibus omnium potentiarum humanarum. Quod provenit ex hoc quod quilibet actus est bonum suae potentiae; unde solus ille dicitur esse bonus homo simpliciter qui habet bonam voluntatem. Ille autem qui habet bonitatem secundum aliquam potentiam, non praesupposita bona voluntate, dicitur bonus secundum quod habet bonum visum et auditum, aut est bene videns et audiens. Et sic patet, quod ex eo quod homo habet scientiam, non dicitur bonus simpliciter, sed bonus secundum intellectum, vel bene intelligens; et similiter est de arte, et de aliis huiusmodi habitibus. Ad 2. It should be said that a man is not said to be simply good when he is only partially good but only when he is good as a whole, which comes about by the goodness of will. The will commands the acts of all human powers, because every act is the good of its power. Thus, a man will be called simply good when he has a good will. But he who has goodness with respect to some power, not presupposing a good will, is called good insofar as he has good sight or hearing or is said to see and hear well. It is clear from this that a man is not said to be absolutely good just because he knows; he is only said to think well, and the same is true with respect to art and other like habits. Ad tertium dicendum, quod scientia dividitur contra moralem virtutem, et tamen ipsa est virtus intellectualis; vel etiam dividitur contra virtutem propriissime dictam: sic enim ipsa non est virtus, ut supra dictum est. Ad 3. It should be said that science is distinguished from moral virtue yet is an intellectual virtue; it is also distinguished from virtue in the most proper sense, for it is not that kind of virtue, as has been said. Ad quartum dicendum, quod intellectus speculativus non ordinatur ad aliquid extra se; ordinatur autem ad proprium actum sicut ad finem. Felicitas autem ultima, scilicet contemplativa, in eius actu consistit. Unde actus speculativi intellectus sunt propinquiores felicitati ultimae per modum similitudinis, quam habitus practici intellectus; licet habitus intellectus practici fortasse sint propinquiores per modum praeparationis, vel per modum meriti. Ad 4. It should be said that the speculative intellect is not ordered to something outside itself, but it is ordered to its own act as to an end. Ultimate, that is, contemplative, happiness consists in its activity. Hence, the acts of speculative intellect are closer to ultimate happiness by way of similarity than the habits of practical intellect, though the habits of practical intellect are perhaps closer by way of preparation or merit. Ad quintum dicendum, quod per actum scientiae, aut alicuius talis habitus, potest homo mereri, secundum quod imperatur a voluntate, sine qua nullum est meritum. Tamen scientia non ad hoc perficit intellectum ut dictum est. Non enim ex eo quod homo habet scientiam, efficitur bene volens considerare, sed solummodo bene potens; et ideo mala voluntas non opponitur scientiae vel arti, sicut prudentiae, vel fidei, aut temperantiae. Et inde est quod philosophus dicit, quod ille qui peccat voluntarius in agibilibus, est minus prudens; licet e contrario sit in scientia et arte. Nam grammaticus qui involuntarie soloecizat, apparet esse minus sciens grammaticam. Ad 5. It should be said that by the act of such a habit as science a man can merit insofar as it is commanded by will without which there is no merit. However, science does not perfect intellect in that way, as has been said. A man is not made willing to use it from the fact that he has knowledge, but only capablc.Thcrcf0rc, a bad will Is not opposed to science or art as It is to prudence, faith, or temperance. Hence, the Philosopher says that he who sins voluntarily in things to be done is less prudent, though it is the opposite in science and art: The grammarian who deliberately commits a solecism is no less a grammarian.
Octavo quaeritur utrum virtutes insint nobis a natura
Do we have any natural virtues
Et videtur quod sic. Il seems that we do. Dicit enim Damascenus, III Lib.: naturales sunt virtutes, et naturaliter et aequaliter insunt nobis. 1. St. John Damascene said in Book Three, Chapter 14, “Virtues are natural and are in us naturally and equally.” Praeterea, Matth., IV, 23, dicit Glossa: docet naturales iustitias: scilicet castitatem, iustitiam, humilitatem, quales naturaliter habet homo. 2. Moreover, the gloss on Matthew 4:23, says: He teaches natural justice, namely, chastity, justice, humility, virtues a man has naturally. Praeterea, Rom. II, 14, dicitur quod homines non habentes legem, naturaliter ea quae legis sunt, faciunt. Sed lex praecipit actum virtutis. Ergo actum virtutis naturaliter homo facit; et ita videtur quod virtus sit a natura. 3. Moreover, it is said in Romans 2:14, that men who have not the law naturally do what is of the law. But law commands the act of virtue. Therefore, men naturally perform the acts of virtue, and so it seems that virtue is from nature. Praeterea, Antonius dicit in sermone ad monachos: si naturam voluntas mutaverit, perversitas est. Conditio servetur, et virtus est. Et in eodem sermone dicitur, quod sufficit homini naturalis ornatus. Hoc autem non esset, si virtutes non essent naturales. Ergo virtutes sunt naturales. 4. Moreover, Anthony says in a sermon to monks, “If will changed nature, it would be perversity; if the condition is preserved, it is virtue.” And in the same sermon he says that natural adornment suffices for a man. But this would not be if the virtues were not natural. Therefore, the virtues are natural. Praeterea, Tullius dicit, quod celsitudo animi est nobis a natura. Sed hoc videtur ad magnanimitatem pertinere. Ergo magnanimitas inest nobis a natura; et eadem ratione aliae virtutes. 5. Moreover, Cicero says that elevation of soul is ours by nature, but this seems to refer to magnanimity. Therefore, magnanimity is in us naturally and for the same reason the other virtues. Praeterea, ad faciendum opus virtutis non requiritur nisi posse bonum, et velle, et nosse. Sed notio boni inest nobis a natura, ut dicit Augustinus in II de libero arbitrio. Velle etiam bonum inest homini a natura, ut idem dicit super Genes. ad litteram. Posse etiam bonum inest homini naturaliter, cum voluntas sit domina sui actus. Ergo ad opus virtutis sufficit natura. Virtus igitur est homini naturalis, quantum ad sui inchoationem. 6. Moreover, to do the work of virtue nothing is needed but being capable of the good, to will it and to know it. But the notion of good is in us naturally, as Augustine says in On free will 2. But to will the good is natural to man, as Augustine says when commenting literally on Genesis. “To be capable of the good is in man naturally, since the will has dominion over his acts. Therefore, nature suffices for the work of virtue. Therefore, virtue is natural to man, with respect to its beginning over his acts. Sed diceretur, quod virtus est homini naturalis quantum ad sui inchoationem, sed perfectio virtutis non est a natura. —Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit in III Lib.: manentes in eo quod secundum naturam, in virtute sumus; declinantes autem ab eo quod est secundum naturam, ex virtute, ad id quod est praeter naturam devenimus et in malitia sumus. Ex quo patet, quod secundum naturam inest a malitia declinare. Sed hoc est perfectae virtutis. Ergo et perfectio virtutis est a natura. 7. But it might be said that virtue is natural to man as to its beginning, but its perfection is not from nature. On the contrary, there is what Damascene says in Book Three, Chapter 14: “Remaining in that which is according to nature, we are in virtue; but falling away from that which is according to nature, from virtue, we arrive at that which is against nature and we are in evil.” From which it is clear that to turn away from evil is according to nature, but this is the mark of perfect virtue. There the perfection of virtue too is from nature. Praeterea, virtus, cum sit forma, est quoddam simplex, et partibus carens. Si igitur secundum aliquid sui est a natura videtur quod totaliter sit a natura. 8. Moreover, virtue, since it is a form, is something simple, lacking parts. Therefore, if it is according to nature in some part, it is totally from nature. Praeterea, homo dignior est et perfectior aliis creaturis irrationalibus. Sed aliae creaturae sufficienter habent a natura ea quae pertinent ad suam perfectionem. Cum igitur virtutes sint quaedam perfectiones hominis, videtur quod insint homini a natura. 9. Moreover, man is more worthy and perfect that irrational creatures, but in what pertains to their perfection nature is sufficient for such creatures. Therefore, since the virtues are perfections of man, it seems that they are in man by nature. Sed diceretur, quod hoc non potest esse, quia perfectio hominis consistit in multis et diversis; natura autem ordinatur ad unum. Sed contra est, quod virtutis inclinatio est etiam ad unum, sicut et naturae: dicit enim Tullius, quod virtus est habitus in modum naturae, rationi consentaneus. Ergo nihil prohibet virtutes inesse homini a natura. 10. But it will be said that this cannot be because man’s perfection lies in many and diverse things whereas nature is ordered to one. On the contrary. The inclination of virtue like that of nature is to one. For Cicero says that virtue is a habit after the manner of nature, in agreement with reason. Therefore nothing prevents virtues from being in man from nature. Praeterea, virtus in medio consistit. Medium autem est unum determinatum. Ergo nihil prohibet inclinationem naturae esse ad id quod est virtutis. 11. Moreover, virtue consists in the mean, but the mean is determined to one. Therefore, nothing prevents nature from inclining to the same thing as virtue. Praeterea, peccatum est privatio modi, speciei et ordinis. Sed peccatum est privatio virtutis. Ergo virtus consistit in modo, specie et ordine. Sed modus, species et ordo sunt homini naturalia. Ergo virtus est homini naturalis. 12. Moreover, sin is the privation of mode, species, and order. But sin is the privation of virtue. Therefore, virtue consists in mode species, and order. But these three are natural to man. Therefore, virtue is natural to man. Praeterea, pars appetitiva in anima sequitur partem cognitivam. Sed in parte cognitiva est aliquis habitus naturalis, scilicet intellectus principiorum. Ergo et in parte appetitiva et affectiva, quae est subiectum virtutis, est aliquis habitus naturalis; et ita videtur quod aliqua virtus sit naturalis. 13. Moreover, the appetitive part of the soul follows the cognitive part, but in the cognitive part there is a certain natural habit, namely, the understanding of principles. Therefore, there must be a natural habit in the appetitive and affective part of the soul which is the subject of virtue. Therefore, there seems to be some virtue that is natural. Praeterea, naturale est cuius principium est intra; sicut ferri sursum est naturale igni, quia principium huius motus est in eo quod movetur. Sed principium virtutis est in homine. Ergo virtus est homini naturalis. 14. Moreover, the natural is that whose principle is within, as to be borne upward is natural to fire, because the principle of this motion is in that which is moved. But the principle of virtue is in man. Therefore, virtue is natural to man. Praeterea, cuius est semen naturale, ipsum quoque est naturale. Sed semen virtutis est naturale; dicit enim quaedam Glossa, Hebr., I, quod voluit Deus inseminare omni animae initia sapientiae et intellectus. Ergo videtur quod virtutes sint naturales. 15. Moreover, that whose seed is natural is itself natural, but the seed of virtue is natural, for a gloss on Hebrews 1 says that God willed to sow in every soul the beginnings of wisdom and understanding. It seems, therefore, that the virtues are natural. Praeterea, contraria sunt eiusdem generis. Sed virtuti contrariatur malitia. Malitia autem est naturalis; dicitur enim Sap., XII, v. 10: erat enim naturalis malitia eius; et Ephes., II, 3, dicitur: eramus natura filii irae. Ergo videtur quod virtus sit naturalis. 16. Moreover, contraries are of the same genus, but virtue is contrary to evil. But evil is natural, for it is said in Wisdom 12:10, “and their malice natural” and Ephesians 2:3, “and were by nature childrcn of the wrath.” Therefore, it seems that virtue is natural. Praeterea, naturale est quod vires inferiores rationi subdantur; dicit enim philosophus in III de anima, quod appetitus superioris, qui est rationis, movet inferiorem, qui est partis sensitivae; sicut sphaera superior movet inferiorem sphaeram. Virtus autem moralis in hoc consistit quod inferiores vires rationi subdantur. Ergo huiusmodi virtutes sunt naturales. 17. Moreover, it is natural for the lower powers to be subject to reason, for the Philosopher says in On the Soul 3 that the appetite of the higher part, which is reason, moves the lower, which is of the sensitive part, as the higher sphere moves the lower. But moral virtue consists in this, that the lower powers are subject to reason. Therefore, such virtues are natural. Praeterea, ad hoc quod aliquis motus sit naturalis, sufficit naturalis aptitudo interioris principii passivi. Sic enim generatio simplicium corporum dicitur naturalis, et etiam motus caelestium corporum; nam principium activum caelestium corporum non est natura, sed intellectus; principium etiam generationis simplicium corporum est extrinsecus. Sed ad virtutem inest homini aptitudo naturalis; dicit enim philosophus in II Ethicor.: innatis quidem nobis a natura suscipere, perfectis autem ab assuetudine. Ergo videtur quod virtus est naturalis. 18. Moreover, in order for a motion to be natural it suffices that there be a natural aptitude of the inner passive principle. This is how the generation of simple bodies is said to be natural; the active power of the celestial bodies is not nature, but intellect, so that the principle of generation of simple bodies is extrinsic to them. But in man there is a natural aptitude for virtue. Aristotle says in Ethics 2: We receive the innate from nature but the perfected from practice. It seems, then, that virtue is natural. Praeterea, illud quod inest homini a nativitate, est naturale. Sed secundum philosophum in VI Ethic., quidam confestim a nativitate videntur esse fortes et temperati, et secundum alias virtutes dispositi; et Iob, XXXI, 18: ab infantia crevit mecum miseratio, et de utero egressa est mecum. Ergo virtutes sunt homini naturales. 19. Moreover, that which is in a man from birth is natural, but according to the Philosopher in Ethics 6 some seem from birth to be courageous and temperate and disposed to other virtues. And job 31, 18, says, “For from my infancy mercy grew up with me and it came out with me from my mother’s womb.” Therefore, virtues are natural to man. Praeterea, natura non deficit in necessariis. Sed virtutes sunt homini necessariae ad finem ad quem naturaliter ordinatur, scilicet ad felicitatem, quae est actus virtutis perfectae. Ergo virtutes habet homo a natura. 20. Moreover, nature does not fail in what is necessary, but virtues are necessary for a man given the end to which he is ordered, namely, happiness, which is the act of perfect virtue. Therefore, a man has virtues from nature. Sed contra. ON THE CONTRARY Naturalia per peccatum non amittuntur; unde Dionysius dicit, quod data naturalia in Daemonibus permanent. Sed virtutes per peccatum amittuntur. Ergo non sunt naturales. 1. The natural is not removed by sin. Hence Dionysius says that what was given by nature survives even in the devils. But virtues are taken away by sin. Therefore, they are not natural. Praeterea, ea quae insunt naturaliter, et ea quae sunt a natura, neque assuescimus neque dissuescimus. Sed ea quae sunt virtutis, possumus assuescere et dissuescere. Ergo virtutes non sunt naturales. 2. Moreover, we neither acquire nor lose that which is in us naturally and is from nature. But we can acquire and lose what pertains to virtue. Therefore, the virtues are not natural. Praeterea, ea quae insunt naturaliter, communiter insunt omnibus. Sed virtutes non insunt communiter omnibus, cum quibusdam insint vitia contraria virtutibus. 3. Moreover, what is naturally in us is in everyone. But the virtues are not commn to all, because in some are found to virtue. Praeterea, naturalibus neque meremur neque demeremur, quia sunt in nobis. Sed virtutibus meremur, sicut et vitiis demeremur. Ergo virtutes et vitia non sunt naturalia. 4. Moreover, we neither gain nor lose merit because of what is natural in us. But we merit by the virtues as we lost merit by vices. Therefore, the virtues and vices are not natural. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod secundum quod diversificati sunt aliqui circa productionem formarum naturalium, ita diversificati sunt circa adeptionem scientiarum et virtutum. RESPONSE. It should be said that there is a division of opinion concerning the acquisition of sciences and virtues like that concerning the production of natural forms. Fuerunt enim aliqui qui posuerunt formas praeexistere in materia secundum actum, latenter autem; et quod per agens naturale reducuntur de occulto in manifestum. Et haec fuit opinio Anaxagorae qui posuit omnia esse in omnibus, ut ex omnibus omnia generari possent. For there were those who held that forms actually pre-exist in matter, though latently, and then are brought from a hidden to a manifest state by the natural agent. This was the view of Anaxagoras, who held that everything is in everything, with the result that anything can be generated from anything. Alii autem dixerunt, formas esse totaliter ab extrinseco, vel participatione idearum, ut posuit Plato, vel intelligentia agente, ut posuit Avicenna; et quod agentia naturalia disponunt solummodo materiam ad formam. Others said that forms are totally from without, whether by participation in Ideas, as Plato held, or from the agent intellect, as Avicenna thought, and that natural agents only dispose matter for form. Tertia est via Aristotelis media, quae ponit, quod formae praeexistunt in potentia materiae, sed reducuntur in actum per agens exterius naturale. A third and middle way is that of Aristotle who held that forms pre-exist potentially in matter and are brought to act by an externl natural agent. Similiter etiam et circa scientias et virtutes aliqui dixerunt, quod scientiae et virtutes insunt nobis a natura, et quod per studium solummodo tolluntur impedimenta scientiae et virtutis: et hoc videtur Plato posuisse; qui posuit scientias et virtutes causari in nobis per participationem formarum separatarum; sed anima impediebatur ab earum usu per unionem ad corpus; quod impedimentum tolli oportebat per studium scientiarum, et exercitium virtutum. Alii vero dixerunt, quod scientiae et virtutes sunt in nobis ex influxu intelligentiae agentis, ad cuius influentiam recipiendam homo disponitur per studium et exercitium. Tertia est opinio media, quod scientiae et virtutes secundum aptitudinem insunt nobis a natura; sed earum perfectio non est nobis a natura. Similarly, in the case of sciences and virtues, some held that sciences and virtues are in us by nature and that by effort it is only impediments to science and virtue that are removed. Plato seems to have held this when he said that sciences and virtues are caused in us by participation in separated forms, but the soul was impeded from using them because of its union with the body, an impediment that must be removed by pursuit of the sciences and the exercise of the virtues. But others said that the sciences and virtues are in us by the influence of the agent intellect, to whose influence a man is disposed by study and exercise. Third is the middle opinion, that sciences and virtues are in us as an aptitude from nature, but their perfection is not in us from nature. Et haec opinio melior est, quia sicut circa formas naturales nihil derogat virtus naturalium agentium; ita circa adeptionem scientiae et virtutis studio et exercitio suam efficaciam conservat. Sciendum tamen est, quod aptitudo perfectionis et formae in aliquo subiecto potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo secundum potentiam passivam tantum; sicut in materia aeris est aptitudo ad formam ignis. Alio modo secundum potentiam passivam et activam simul: sicut in corpore sanabili est aptitudo ad sanitatem, quia corpus est susceptivum sanitatis. Et hoc modo in homine est aptitudo naturalis ad virtutem; partim quidem secundum naturam speciei, prout aptitudo ad virtutem est communis omnibus hominibus, et partim secundum naturam individui, secundum quod quidam prae aliis sunt apti ad virtutem. This view is best because just as with natural forms it does not take away the power of natural agents, so it preserves their efficacy with respect to the acqwisition of science and virtue by study and exercise. However, it should be noted that the aptitude for perfection and for form can be in a subject in two ways. In one way according to passive potency alone, as in the matter of air there is an aptitude for the form of fire; in another way, according to both active and passive potency, as in the curable body there is an aptitude for health because the body is susceptible of health. It is in this way that there is in man a natural aptitude for virtue, partly indeed due to the nature of species, insofar as the aptitude for virtue is common to all men, and partly due to the nature of the individual, insofar as some are more apt than others for virtue. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod in homine triplex potest esse subiectum virtutis, sicut ex superioribus patet; scilicet intellectus, voluntas et appetitus inferior, qui in concupiscibilem et irascibilem dividitur. In unoquoque autem est considerare aliquo modo et susceptibilitatem virtutis et principium activum virtutis. Manifestum est enim quod in parte intellectiva est intellectus possibilis, qui est in potentia ad omnia intelligibilia, in quorum cognitione consistit intellectualis virtus; et intellectus agens, cuius lumine intelligibilia fiunt actu; quorum quaedam statim a principio naturaliter homini innotescunt absque studio et inquisitione: et huiusmodi sunt principia prima, non solum in speculativis, ut: omne totum est maius sua parte, et similia; sed etiam in operativis, ut: malum esse fugiendum, et huiusmodi. Haec autem naturaliter nota, sunt principia totius cognitionis sequentis, quae per studium acquiritur; sive sit practica, sive sit speculativa. For evidence of this, notice that there are three ways in which a man can be a subject of virtue, as is clear from what has already been said; namely, intellect, will, and the lower appetite, which is divided into the concupiscible and irascible. In each of them the manner of susceptibility to virtue and the active principle of virtue must be considered. For it is obvious that in the intellective part there is the possible intellect, which is in potency to all intelligIbles, in the knowledge of which intellectual virtue consists, and the agent intellect, in whose light things come to be actually intelligible, some of which a man naturally knows from the outset without study and inquiry, first principles, that is, not only speculative, such as every whole is greater than its part and the like, but also in the practical order, such as evil is to be avoided and the like. These naturally known things are the principles of all subsequent speculative or practical knowledge which is acquired by study. Similiter autem circa voluntatem manifestum est quod est aliquod principium activum naturale. Nam voluntas naturaliter inclinatur in ultimum finem. Finis autem in operativis habet rationem principii naturalis. Ergo inclinatio voluntatis est quoddam principium activum respectu omnis dispositionis, quae per exercitium in parte affectiva acquiritur. Manifestum autem est quod ipsa voluntas, in quantum est potentia ad utrumlibet se habens, in his quae sunt ad finem, est susceptiva habitualis inclinationis in haec vel in illa. Irascibilis autem et concupiscibilis naturaliter sunt obaudibiles rationi: unde naturaliter sunt susceptivae virtutis, quae in eis perficitur, secundum quod disponuntur ad bonum rationis sequendum. So too with will it is obvious that there is a natural active principle, for the will is naturally inclined to the ultimate end, and where it is a matter of action the end has the note of a natural principle. Therefore, the inclination of will is an active natural principle with respect to every disposition acquired by the affective part through exercise. But it is clear that the will itself, insofar as it is a power related to many, is susceptible of an habitual inclination to this or that with regard to the means to the end. The concupiscible and irascible naturally heed reason and hence have a natural receptivity to virtue, which is brought to perfection in them insofar as they are disposed to follow the good of reason. Et omnes praedictae inchoationes virtutum consequuntur naturam speciei humanae unde et omnibus sunt communes. Est autem aliqua inchoatio virtutis, quae consequitur naturam individui, secundum quod aliquis homo ex naturali complexione vel caelesti impressione inclinatur ad actum alicuius virtutis. Et haec quidem inclinatio est quaedam virtutis inchoatio; non tamen est virtus perfecta; quia ad virtutem perfectam requiritur moderatio rationis: unde et in definitione virtutis ponitur, quod est electiva medii secundum rationem rectam. Si enim aliquis absque rationis discretione inclinationem huiusmodi sequeretur, frequenter peccaret. Et sicut haec virtutis inchoatio absque rationis opere, perfectae virtutis rationem non habet, ita nec aliqua praemissarum. Nam ex universalibus principiis in specialia pervenitur per inquisitionem rationis. Rationis etiam officio ex appetitu ultimi finis homo deducitur in ea quae sunt convenientia illi fini. Ipsa etiam ratio imperando irascibilem et concupiscibilem facit sibi esse subiectas. Unde manifestum est quod ad consummationem virtutis requiritur opus rationis; sive virtus sit in intellectu, sive sit in voluntate, sive in irascibili et concupiscibili. Haec tamen est consummatio: quod ad virtutem inferioris partis ordinatur inchoatio virtutis quae est in superiori; sicut ad virtutem quae est in voluntate, aptus redditur homo et per inchoationem virtutis quae est in voluntate, et per eam quae est in intellectu. Ad virtutem vero quae est in irascibili et concupiscibili, per inchoationem virtutis quae est in eis, et per eam quae est in superioribus; sed non e converso. All the foregoing beginnings of virtue follow on the nature of the human species and hence are common to all. But there is another beginning of virtue which follows on individual nature, insofar as a man, by natural makeup or celestial influence, is inclined to the act of a given virtue. This inclination is a kind of beginning of virtue but is not perfected virtue, because for perfected virtue the governance of reason is needed, which is why the definition of virtue states that it is elective of the mean according to right reason. For if someone should follow such an inclination without the discernment of reason, he would frequently sin. just as this beginning of virtue without the work of reason cannot have the perfect note of virtue, no more can any of the other beginnings of virtue mentioned. For one moves to the specific from universal principles by rational inquiry, and it is by the office of reason too that a man is led from desire of the ultimate end to the things which are appropriate to that end. In commanding the irascible and concupiscible, reason causes them to be subject to itself. So it is clear that for the consummation of virtue the work of reason is required, whether the virtue be in intellect or will or in the irascible or concupiscible. This is the consummation, that the beginning of virtue in the higher part is ordered to the virtue of the lower part, just as a man is made apt for the virtue that is in the will by the beginning of virtue that is in the will, and by that which is in intellect. But the virtue which is in the irascible and concupiscible [is brought to consummation] by the beginnings of virtue in them, and by that which is in the higher, but not vice versa. Unde etiam manifestum est, quod ratio, quae est superior, operatur ad completionem omnis virtutis. Dividitur autem principium operativum quod est ratio, contra principium operativum quod est natura, ut patet in II Phys.; eo quod rationalis potestas est ad opposita, natura autem ordinatur ad unum. Unde manifestum est quod perfectio virtutis non est a natura, sed a ratione. Hence, it is manifest that reason, which is higher, works for the completion of every virtue. Both reason and nature are operative principles but they differ, as is clear in Physics 2, because the rational power relates to opposites whereas nature is ordered to one. Obviously then the perfection of virtue is from reason, not nature. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod virtutes dicuntur naturales quantum ad naturales inchoationes virtutum quae insunt homini, non quantum ad earum perfectionem. Ad 1. It should be said that virtues are called natural because of the natural beginnings of virtue in a man, not because of their perfection. Et similiter dicendum ad secundum, tertium, quartum et quintum. Ad 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. The same answer applies to all these. Ad sextum dicendum, quod posse bonum simpliciter inest nobis a natura, eo quod potentiae sunt naturales; velle autem et scire est nobis aliquo modo a natura, scilicet secundum quamdam inchoationem in universali. Sed hoc non sufficit ad virtutem. Requiritur autem ad bonam operationem, quae est effectus virtutis, quod homo prompte et infallibiliter ut in pluribus bonum attingat; quod non potest aliquis facere sine habitu virtutis: sicut etiam manifestum est quod aliquis in universali scit opus artis facere, ut puta argumentari, vel secare, aut aliquid huiusmodi facere; sed ad hoc quod prompte et sine errore faciat, requiritur quod habeat artem; et similiter est in virtute. Ad 6. It should be said that the ability to be good is in us from nature simply speaking in that the powers are natural; but to will and to know are in us by nature in a manner of speaking, namely, according to some general beginning, but this does not suffice for virtue. For good action, which is the effect of virtue, requires that a man promptly and for the most part infallibly attain the good, which no one can do without the habit of virtue. Clearly someone may know generally how to make a work of art, for example to argue, to saw, or to make something, but to do so readily and without error, he has need of art, and it is the same with virtue. Ad septimum dicendum, quod ex natura habet homo aliqualiter quod declinet malitiam; sed ad hoc quod hoc prompte faciat et infallibiliter, requiritur habitus virtutis. Ad 7. It should be said that for man to turn away from evil is in a way natural, but to do this promptly and infallibly the habit of virtue is needed. Ad octavum dicendum, quod virtus non dicitur partim a natura esse, eo quod aliqua pars eius sit a natura et aliqua non, sed quia secundum aliquem modum essendi imperfectum est a natura; scilicet secundum potentiam et aptitudinem. Ad 8. It should be said that virtue is not said to be partly from nature because some part of it is from nature and another not, but because it is from nature according to an imperfect way of being, namely, according to potency and aptitude. Ad nonum dicendum, quod Deus est per se perfectus in bonitate; unde nullo indiget ad bonitatem consequendam. Substantiae autem superiores et ei propinquae, paucis indigent ad consequendam perfectionem bonitatis ab ipso. Homo autem, qui est magis remotus, pluribus indiget ad assecutionem perfectae bonitatis, quia est capax beatitudinis. Quae autem creaturae non sunt capaces beatitudinis, paucioribus indigent quam homo. Unde homo est dignior eis licet pluribus indigeat; sicut ille qui potest consequi perfectam sanitatem multis exercitiis, est melius dispositus quam ille qui non potest consequi nisi parvam, sed per modica exercitia. Ad 9. It should be said that God is of himself perfected in goodness; hence, there is no way in which he needs to pursue goodness. The higher substances close to him need little from him in order to achieve the perfection of goodness. But man, who is more remote, needs many things for the pursuit of perfect goodness, because he is capable of happiness. Creatures who are not capable of happiness need fewer things than a man does. Hence, man is more worthy than they, even though he needs more things, just as one who can acquire perfect health by much exercise is better disposed than another who can achieve only a little even though by slight exercise. Ad decimum dicendum, quod ad ea quae sunt unius virtutis, posset esse inclinatio naturalis. Sed ad ea quae sunt omnium virtutum, non posset esse inclinatio a natura; quia dispositio naturalis quae inclinat ad unam virtutem, inclinat ad contrarium alterius virtutis: puta, qui est dispositus secundum naturam ad fortitudinem, quae est in prosequendo ardua, est minus dispositus ad mansuetudinem, quae consistit in refrenando passiones irascibilis. Unde videmus quod animalia quae naturaliter inclinantur ad actum alicuius virtutis, inclinantur ad vitium contrarium alteri virtuti; sicut leo, qui naturaliter est audax est etiam naturaliter crudelis. Et haec quidem naturalis inclinatio ad hanc vel illam virtutem sufficit aliis animalibus, quae non possunt consequi perfectum bonum secundum virtutem, sed consequuntur qualecumque determinatum bonum. Homines autem nati sunt pervenire ad perfectum bonum secundum virtutem; et ideo oportet quod habeant inclinationem ad omnes actus virtutum: quod cum non possit esse a natura, oportet quod sit secundum rationem, in qua existunt semina omnium virtutum. Ad 10. It should be said that there can be a natural inclination with respect to the object of one virtue but not with respect to all because the natural disposition which inclines to one virtue inclines to the opposite of another virtue. For example, one naturally disposed to courage, which is the pursuit of the arduous, is less disposed to patience, which consists in restraining the passions of the irascible. Thus we see that animals naturally inclined to the act of one virtue are inclined to a vice contrary to another virtue, as the Eon who is bold is also naturally cruel. Such natural inclinations to this or that virtue suffice for animals who are incapable of achieving the perfect good according to virtue but pursue some limited good. But men are made to achieve the perfect good according to virtue and must therefore have an inclination to all the acts of virtue, which, since it cannot be from nature, must come from reason, in which are found the seeds of all the virtues. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod medium virtutis non est determinatum secundum naturam, sicut est determinatum medium mundi in quod tendunt gravia; sed oportet quod medium virtutis determinetur secundum rationem rectam, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Quia quod est mediocre uni, est parum vel multum alteri. Ad 11. It should be said that the mean of virtue is not determined by nature as is the middle of the earth toward which heavy things tend. The mean of virtue must be determined by right reason, as is said in Ethics 2, because what is enough for one is too little or too much for another. Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod modus, species et ordo constituunt quodlibet bonum, ut dicit Augustinus in Lib. de natura boni. Unde modus, species et ordo, in quibus consistit bonum naturae, naturaliter adsunt homini, nec per peccatum privantur; sed peccatum dicitur esse privatio modi, speciei et ordinis, secundum quod in his consistit bonum virtutis. Ad 12. It should be said that mode, species, and order constitute any good, as Augustine says in On the nature ofgood 2. Hence, mode, species, and order, in which the good of nature consists, are naturally present in man nor are they taken away by sin. Sin can be called the deprivation of mode, species, and order insofar as the good of virtue consists of these. Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod voluntas non exit in actum suum per aliquas species ipsam informantes, sicut intellectus possibilis; et ideo non requiritur aliquis naturalis habitus in voluntate ad naturale desiderium; et praecipue cum ex habitu naturali intellectus moveatur voluntas, in quantum bonum intellectum est obiectum voluntatis. Ad 13. It should be said that the will does not produce its act through some species informing it, as the possible intellect does. Therefore, no natural habit for a natural desire is needed in the will, and all the less so because the will is moved by the natural habit of intellect insofar as the known good is the object of will. Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod licet principium virtutis sit intra hominem, scilicet ratio; tamen hoc principium non agit per modum naturae; et ideo quod ab ea est, non dicitur naturale. Ad 14. It should be said that although the principle of virtue, namely, reason, is within man, this principle does not work in the mode of nature, and that is why what comes from it is not called natural. Et similiter dicendum est ad decimumquintum. Ad 15. The same response suffices for 15. Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod malitia eorum erat naturalis, in quantum erat in consuetudinem reducta, prout consuetudo est altera natura. Nos autem eramus natura filii irae propter peccatum originale, quod est peccatum naturae. Ad 16. It should be said that their malice was natural insofar as it was due to custom, since custom is a second nature. But we were by nature the sons of wrath because of original sin, which is a sin of nature. Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod naturale est quod vires inferiores sint subiicibiles rationi, non tamen quod sint secundum habitum subiectae. Ad 17. It should be said that it is natural that the lower powers be subject to reason, but not that they be subject to it according to a habit. Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod motus dicitur esse naturalis propter aptitudinem naturalem mobilis, quando movens movet ad unum determinate per modum naturae; sicut generans in elementis, et motor corporum caelestium. Sic autem non est in proposito; unde ratio non sequitur. Ad 18. It should be said that motion is said to be natural because of the natural aptitude of the moveable when the mover moves to one determinate thing in the manner of nature, as do the generator of the elements and the mover of the heavenly bodies. But that is not how it is in the case in point, so the argument does not work. Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod illa inclinatio naturalis ad virtutem, secundum quam quidam mox a nativitate sunt fortes et temperati, non sufficit ad perfectam virtutem, ut dictum est. Ad 19. It should be said that the natural inclination to virtue, thanks to which some almost from birth are brave and temperate, does not suffice for perfect virtue, as has been said. Ad vicesimum dicendum, quod natura non deficit homini in necessariis; licet enim non det omnia quae sunt ei necessaria, tamen dat ei unde possit omnia necessaria acquirere secundum rationem, et quae ei deserviunt. Ad 20. It should be said that nature does not fail man in necessary things, for although it does not provide everything that is necessary for him, it enables him to acquire all necessary things by means of reason and the powers that obey it.
Nono quaeritur utrum virtutes acquirantur ex actibus
Are virtues acquired by acts?
Et videtur quod non. And it seems that they are not. Dicit enim Augustinus, quod virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Sed illud quod fit ex actibus nostris, non operatur Deus in nobis. Ergo virtus non causatur ex actibus nostris. 1. Augustine calls virtue a good quality of mind whereby one acts rightly, which one never uses badly, and which God brings about in us without us. But that which comes about by our acts is not brought about in us by God. Therefore, virtue is not caused by our acts. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit: omnium infidelium vita peccatum est, et nihil est bonum sine summo bono, ubi deest cognitio veritatis, falsa est virtus etiam in optimis moribus. Ex quo habetur quod virtus non potest esse sine fide. Fides autem non est ex operibus nostris, sed ex gratia, ut patet Ephes. cap. II, 8: gratia estis salvati per fidem, et non ex vobis: nec quis glorietur; Dei enim donum est. Ergo virtus non potest causari ex actibus nostris. 2. Moreover, Augustine says that the life of all infidels is sin and that there is no good apart from the supreme good; where knowledge of the truth is lacking, the virtue of even the best is false. From which it follows that virtue cannot be without faith. But faith is not from our doing, but from grace, as is clear in Ephesians 2:18, “For by grace you have been saved through faith; and that not from yourselves, for it is the gift of God, not as the outcome of works, lest anyone may boast.” Therefore ‘ virtue cannot be caused by our acts. Praeterea, Bernardus dicit, quod incassum quis ad virtutem laborat, nisi a domino eam sperandam putet. Quod autem speratur obtinendum a Deo, non causatur ex actibus nostris. Virtus ergo non causatur ex actibus nostris. 3. Moreover, Bernard says that he labors in vain for virtue who does not know he must hope for it from the Lord. But what one hopes to obtain from God is not caused by our acts. Therefore, virtue is not caused by our acts. Praeterea, continentia est minus virtute, ut patet per philosophum in VII Ethic. Sed continentia non est in nobis nisi ex divino munere; dicitur enim Sapient. cap. VIII, 21: scio quod non possum esse continens, nisi Deus det. Ergo nec virtutes possumus acquirere ex nostris actibus, sed solum ex dono Dei. 4. Moreover, continence is less than virtue, as is clear from the Philosopher in Ethics 7. But we only have continence as a divine gift, for it is said in Wisdom 8:21, “I know that I cannot be continent unless God grants it.” So much the less are we capable of acquiring virtue by our acts, but it must come solely as the gift of God. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, quod homo non potest vitare peccatum sine gratia. Sed per virtutem vitatur peccatum; non enim potest esse homo simul vitiosus et virtuosus. Ergo virtus non potest esse sine gratia; non ergo potest acquiri ex actibus. 5. Moreover, Augustine says that man cannot avoid sin without grace. But sin is avoided by virtue, since a man cannot simultaneously be vicious and virtuous. Therefore, virtue cannot be without grace and thus is not acquired by acts. Praeterea, per virtutem pervenitur ad felicitatem. Nam felicitas virtutis est praemium, ut philosophus dicit in I Ethic. Si ergo ex actibus nostris acquiratur virtus, ex actibus nostris possumus pervenire ad vitam aeternam, quae est hominis ultima felicitas, sine gratia; quod est contra apostolum, Rom. VI, 23: gratia Dei vita aeterna. 6. Moreover, it is through virtue that we come to happiness, for happiness is the reward of virtue, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 1. Therefore, if virtue were acquired by our acts, by our acts without grace we could attain life eternal, which is man’s ultimate happiness, but that goes against the Apostle in Romans 6:23, “The gift of God is life everlasting.” Praeterea, virtus computatur inter maxima bona, secundum Augustinum, Lib. de libero arbitrio, quia virtute nullus male utitur. Sed maxima bona sunt a Deo, secundum illud Iacob. I, 17: omne datum optimum et omne donum perfectum de sursum est, descendens a patre luminum. Ergo videtur quod virtus non sit in nobis nisi ex dono Dei. 7. Moreover, Augustine in Onfree will counts virtue among the greatest goods because no one uses virtue badly. But the greatest goods are from God, according to James 1:17, “Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights.” Therefore, it seems that virtue is only in us as a gift of God. Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit in Lib. de libero arbitrio, nihil potest formare seipsum. Sed virtus est quaedam forma animae. Ergo homo non potest in se per suos actus causare virtutem. 8. Moreover, as Augustine says in On free will 3, nothing can form tsclf. But virtue is a kind of form of the soul. Therefore, a man cannot cause virtue in himself by his acts. Praeterea, sicut intellectus a principio est in potentia essentiali ad scientiam, ita vis affectiva ad virtutem. Sed intellectus in potentia essentiali existens, ad hoc ut reducatur in actum scientiae, indiget motore extrinseco, scilicet doctore ad hoc quod scientiam acquirat in actu. Ergo similiter ad hoc quod homo virtutem acquirat, indiget aliquo agente exteriori, et non sufficiunt ad hoc actus proprii. 9. Moreover, just as from the outset intellect is in essential potency to knowledge, so the affective power is to virtue. But the intellect existing in a state of essential potency needs an external mover, namely, a teacher in order that it might actually know. Similarly therefore, in order for a man to acquire virtue he needs an external agent, and thus his own acts do not suffice. Praeterea, acquisitio fit per receptionem. Actio autem non fit per receptionem, sed magis per emissionem vel exitum actionis ab agente. Ergo per hoc quod aliquid agimus, non acquiritur virtus in nobis. 10. Moreover, acquisition comes about by receiving. But action does nox come about by receiving but rather by a sending forth or emergence of action from the agent. Therefore, we do not acquire virtues by the fact that we do things. Praeterea, si per actum nostrum virtus in nobis acquiritur; aut acquiritur per unum, aut per plures. Non per unum; quia ex uno non efficitur aliquis studiosus, ut dicitur II Ethic.; similiter etiam nec ex multis; quia multi actus, cum non sint simul, non possunt simul aliquem effectum inducere. Ergo videtur quod nullo modo virtus in nobis causetur ex actibus nostris. 11. Moreover, If virtue were acquired by us by our acts, it would be acquired by either one or many. But not by one, since no one is made learned by one act, as is said in Ethics 2. Similarly too not by many, because many acts, since they are not simultaneous, cannot together bring about a single effect. Therefore, it seems that there is no way in which virtue could be caused in us by our acts. Praeterea, Avicenna dicit, quod virtus est potentia essentialiter rebus attributa ad suas peragendas operationes. Sed id quod essentialiter attribuitur rei, non causatur ex actu eius. Ergo virtus non causatur ex actu habentis virtutem. 12. Moreover, Avicenna says that virtue is the power essentially attributed to things for performing their works. But that which is essentially attributed to a thing is not caused by its act. Therefore, virtue is not caused by the act of the one having virtue. Praeterea, si virtus causatur ex actibus nostris: aut ex actibus virtuosis, aut ex actibus vitiosis. Non ex vitiosis quia illi magis destruunt virtutem; similiter nec ex virtuosis, quia illi praesupponunt virtutem. Ergo nullo modo causatur ex actibus nostris virtus in nobis. 13. Moreover, if virtue were caused by our acts, this would be either by virtuous or by vicious acts. But not by vicious acts, since they destroy virtue; similarly not by virtuous acts, because they presuppose virtue. Therefore, there is no way that virtue is caused in us by our acts. Sed dicendum, quod virtus causatur ex actibus virtuosis imperfectis. —Sed contra nihil agit ultra suam speciem. Si ergo actus praecedentes virtutem sunt imperfecti, videtur quod non possunt causare virtutem perfectam. 14. If it should be said that virtue is caused by imperfect virtuous acts, on the contrary: Nothing acts beyond its species. Therefore, if the acts preceding virtue are imperfect, it seems that they cannot cause perfect virtue. Praeterea, virtus est ultimum potentiae, ut dicitur in I caeli et mundi. Sed potentia est naturalis. Ergo virtus est naturalis, et non ex operibus acquisita. 15. Moreover, virtue is the utmost of a power, as is said in On the heavens 1. But a power is natural. Therefore, virtue is natural and not acquired by works. Praeterea, ut dicitur in II Ethic., virtus est quae bonum reddit habentem. Sed homo est bonus secundum suam naturam. Ergo virtus hominis est ei a natura, et non ex actibus acquisita. 16. Moreover, virtue is that which makes the one having it good, as is said in Ethics 2. But a man is good according to his nature. Therefore, a man’s virtue is his from nature and is not acquired by acts. Praeterea, ex frequentia actus naturalis non acquiritur novus habitus. 17. Moreover, a new habit is not acquired by the frequency of a natural act. Praeterea, omnia habent esse a sua forma. Sed gratia est forma virtutum: nam sine gratia virtutes dicuntur esse informes. Ergo virtutes sunt a gratia, et non ab actibus. 18. Moreover, a thing has existence through its form, but grace is the form of the virtues, for without grace the virtues are said to be unformed. Therefore, virtues are from grace and not from acts. Praeterea, secundum apostolum, II Cor. XII, 9, virtus in infirmitate perficitur. Sed infirmitas magis est passio quam actio. Ergo virtus magis causatur ex passione quam ex actibus. 19. Moreover, according to the Apostle [in] 2 Corinthians 12:9 “strength is made perfect in weakness.” But weakness is more of a passion than an act. Therefore, virtue is caused from passion rather than by acts. Praeterea, cum virtus sit qualitas, mutatio quae est secundum virtutem, videtur esse alteratio: nam alteratio est motus in qualitate. Sed alteratio passio tantum est in parte animae sensitivae, ut patet per philosophum in VII Physic. Si ergo virtus acquiritur ex actibus nostris per quamdam passionem et alterationem; sequetur quod virtus sit in parte sensitiva: quod est contra Augustinum, qui dicit, quod est bona qualitas mentis. 20. Moreover, since virtue is a quality, the change brought about by virtue seems to be an alteration, for alteration is change of quality. But alteration is only a passion in the sensitive part of the soul, as is evident from the Philosopher in Physics 7. Therefore, if virtue were acquired by our acts by way of some passion and alteration, it would follow that virtue is in the sensitive part. Which conflicts with Augustine who calls it a good quality of mind. Praeterea, per virtutem habet aliquis rectam electionem de fine, ut dicitur X Ethicorum. Sed habere rectam electionem de fine, non videtur esse in potestate nostra: quia qualis unusquisque est, talis finis ei videtur, ut dicitur III Ethic. Hoc autem contingit nobis ex naturali complexione, vel ex impressione corporis caelestis. Ergo non est in potestate nostra acquirere virtutes: non ergo causantur ex actibus nostris. 21. Moreover, a person chooses correctly concerning the end thanks to virtue, as is said in Ethics 10, but to do this does not seem to be in our power because as one is, so does the end appear to him, as is said in Etbi. cs 3, and this is due to natural make-up or the influence of the heavenly bodies. Therefore, it is not in our power to acquire virtues, and they cannot accordingly be caused by our acts. Praeterea, ea quae sunt naturalia, neque assuescimus neque dissuescimus. Sed quibusdam hominibus insunt naturales inclinationes ad aliqua vitia, sicut et ad virtutes. Ergo huiusmodi inclinationes non possunt tolli per assuetudinem actuum. Eis autem manentibus non possunt in nobis esse virtutes. Ergo virtutes non possunt in nobis acquiri per actus. 22. Moreover, we do not become accustomed or unaccustomed with regard to natural things. But in some men there are natural dispositions to some vices, as in others to virtue. Therefore, such inclinations to virtue cannot be wholly taken away by the accustoming due to acts. Thus, while they remain, virtue cannot be in us. Therefore, the virtues cannot be acquired by us through acting. Sed contra. Dionysius dicit, quod bonum est virtuosius quam malum. Sed ex malis actibus causantur in nobis habitus vitiorum. Ergo ex bonis actibus causantur in nobis habitus virtutum. ON THE CONTRARY. 1. Dionysius says the good is more virtuous than evil, but habits of vice are caused in us by bad acts. Therefore, the habit of virtue is caused in us by good acts. Praeterea, secundum philosophum in II Ethic., operationes sunt causae eius quod est nos studiosos esse. Hoc autem est per virtutem. Ergo virtus causatur in nobis ex actibus. 2. Moreover, according to the Philosopher in Ethics 2, activities cause us to be skilled. But this is through virtue. Therefore, virtue is caused in us by acts. Praeterea, ex contrariis sunt generationes et corruptiones. Sed virtus corrumpitur ex malis actibus. Ergo ex bonis actibus generatur. 3. Moreover, generation and corruption take place between contraries. But virtue is corrupted by bad acts. Therefore, it is generated by good acts. Respondeo. Dicendum quod cum virtus sit ultimum potentiae, ad quod quaelibet potentia se extendit ut faciat operationem, quod est operationem esse bonam; manifestum est quod virtus uniuscuiusque rei est per quam operationem bonam producit. Quia vero omnis res est propter suam operationem; unumquodque autem bonum est secundum quod bene se habet ad suum finem; oportet quod per virtutem propriam unaquaeque res sit bona, et bene operetur. Bonum autem proprium uniuscuiusque rei est aliud ab eo quod est proprium alterius: diversorum enim perfectibilium sunt diversae perfectiones; unde et bonum hominis est aliud a bono equi et a bono lapidis. RESPONSE. It should be said that since virtue is the utmost of a power, that toward which any power tends in acting, which is that the activity be good, it is manifest that the virtue of anything is that by which it produces its good activity, since anything is for the sake of its activity. A thing is good insofar as it is well related to its end. Thus, a thing must be good and act well because of its own virtue. But the proper good of a thing differs from the proper good of another, different perfections relating to different perfectible things, which is why the good of man is different from the good of a horse or the good of a rock. Ipsius etiam hominis secundum diversas sui considerationes accipitur diversimode bonum. Non enim idem est bonum hominis in quantum est homo, et in quantum est civis. Nam bonum hominis in quantum est homo, est ut ratio sit perfecta in cognitione veritatis, et inferiores appetitus regulentur secundum regulam rationis: nam homo habet quod sit homo per hoc quod sit rationalis. Bonum autem hominis in quantum est civis, est ut ordinetur secundum civitatem quantum ad omnes: et propter hoc philosophus dicit, III Politic., quod non est eadem virtus hominis in quantum est bonus et hominis in quantum est bonus civis. Homo autem non solum est civis terrenae civitatis, sed est particeps civitatis caelestis Ierusalem, cuius rector est dominus, et cives Angeli et sancti omnes, sive regnent in gloria et quiescant in patria, sive adhuc peregrinentur in terris, secundum illud apostoli, Ephes. II, 19: estis cives sanctorum, et domestici Dei, et cetera. But the good of man varies according to different ways of considering him. For there is not the same good of a man as such and as citizen, for the former is the perfection of reason in the knowledge of truth and that the lower powers be regulated by the rule of reason: A man is a man because he is rational. But a man’s good insofar as he is a citizen is that he be ordered in all things according to the city, which is why the Philosopher says in Politics 3 that the virtue of man as a good man is not the same as the virtue of man as good citizen. But man is not only a citizen of the earthly city, but is also a participant in the heavenly city of Jerusalem whose ruler is the Lord and whose citizens are the angels and all the saints, whether they reign in glory and are at rest in the heaven or are still pilgrims on earth, according to what the Apostle says Ephesians 2:19, “You are citizens with the saints and members of God’s household.” Ad hoc autem quod homo huius civitatis sit particeps, non sufficit sua natura, sed ad hoc elevatur per gratiam Dei. Nam manifestum est quod virtutes illae quae sunt hominis in quantum est huius civitatis particeps, non possunt ab eo acquiri per sua naturalia; unde non causantur ab actibus nostris, sed ex divino munere nobis infunduntur. Virtutes autem quae sunt hominis in eo quod est homo, vel in eo quod est terrenae civitatis particeps, non excedunt facultatem humanae naturae; unde eas per sua naturalia homo potest acquirere, ex actibus propriis: quod sic patet. Dum enim aliquis habet naturalem aptitudinem ad perfectionem aliquam; si haec aptitudo sit secundum principium passivum tantum, potest eam acquirere; sed non ex actu proprio, sed ex actione alicuius exterioris naturalis agentis; sicut aer recipit lumen a sole. Si vero habeat aptitudinem naturalem ad perfectionem aliquam secundum activum principium et passivum simul; tunc per actum proprium potest ad illam pervenire; sicut corpus hominis infirmi habet naturalem aptitudinem ad sanitatem. Et quia subiectum est naturaliter receptivum sanitatis, propter virtutem naturalem activam quae inest ad sanandum, ideo absque actione exterioris agentis infirmus interdum sanatur. Ostensum est autem in praecedenti quaestione, quod aptitudo naturalis ad virtutem quam habet homo, est secundum principia activa et passiva; quod quidem ex ipso ordine potentiarum apparet. Nam in parte intellectiva est principium quasi passivum intellectus possibilis, qui reducitur in suam perfectionem per intellectum agentem. Intellectus autem in actu movet voluntatem: nam bonum intellectus est finis qui movet appetitum; voluntas autem mota a ratione, nata est movere appetitum sensitivum, scilicet irascibilem et concupiscibilem, quae natae sunt obedire rationi. Unde etiam manifestum est, quod quaelibet virtus faciens operationem hominis bonam, habet proprium actum in homine, qui sui actione potest ipsam reducere in actum; sive sit in intellectu, sive in voluntate, sive in irascibili et concupiscibili. A man’s nature does not suffice for him to be a participant of this city; he must be elevated by the grace of God. For it is manifest that the virtues that are man’s as a participant in this city cannot be acquired by him through his natural powers; hence they are not caused by our acts but are infused in us as a divine gift. But the virtues of a man as man, insofar as he is a citizen of the earthly city, do not exceed the capacity of human nature; hence, a man can acquire them through his natural capacities, by his own acts. This is clear from the fact that everyone has a natural aptitude to some perfection, and if this aptitude is only due to a passive principle, he can acquire it, not by his own act but rather by the act of some external agent, as air receives light from the sun. But if he has a natural aptitude to a perfection due to both an active and passive principle, then he can arrive at it by his own act, as the body of a sick man has a natural aptitude for health. The subject is naturally receptive to health on account of the natural power in him to heal, so even without the action of an external agent, the sick are sometimes made well. But it was shown in the preceding article that man’s natural aptitude for virtue is due to active and passive principles, which is clear from the very order of the powers. For in the intellective part there is the quasi-passive power of the possible intellect which is brought to perfection by the agent intellect. But the actualized intellect moves the will, for the known good is the end that moves appetite. But will as moved by reason is so fashioned that it moves the sensitive appetite, namely, the irascible and concupiscible, which are so fashioned as to obey reason. Hence, it is also manifest that any virtue causing good operation in a man has its proper act in man, who by his own action can actualize it, whether it be in intellect, in will or in the irascible and concupiscible. Diversimode tamen reducitur in actum virtus quae est in parte intellectiva, et quae est in parte appetitiva. Nam actio intellectus, et cuiuslibet cognoscitivae virtutis, est secundum quod aliqualiter assimilatur cognoscibili; unde virtus intellectualis fit in parte intellectiva, secundum quod per intellectum agentem fiunt species intellectae in ipsa vel actu vel habitu. Actio autem virtutis appetitivae consistit in quadam inclinatione ad appetibile; unde ad hoc quod fiat virtus in parte appetitiva, oportet quod detur ei inclinatio ad aliquid determinatum. The virtue of the intellective part does not become actual in the same way as does the virtue of the appetitive part. The action of intellect, or of any other cognitive power, assimilates it to what is known: Intellectual virtue is generated in the intellect when the understood species comes to be in it either actually or habitually thanks to the agent intellect. But the action of the appetitive power inclines us toward the desirable. Hence, in order for virtue to come to be in the appetitive part, it must acquire an inclination to something determinate. Sciendum est autem, quod inclinatio rerum naturalium consequitur formam; et ideo est ad unum, secundum exigentiam formae: qua remanente, talis inclinatio tolli non potest, nec contraria induci. Et propter hoc, res naturales neque assuescunt aliquid neque dissuescunt; quantumcumque enim lapis sursum feratur nunquam hoc assuescet, sed semper inclinatur ad motum deorsum. Sed ea quae sunt ad utrumlibet, non habent aliquam formam ex qua declinent ad unum determinate; sed a proprio movente determinantur ad aliquid unum; et hoc ipso quod determinantur ad ipsum, quodammodo disponuntur in idem; et cum multoties inclinantur, determinantur ad idem a proprio movente, et firmatur in eis inclinatio determinata in illud, ita quod ista dispositio superinducta, est quasi quaedam forma per modum naturae tendens in unum. Et propter hoc dicitur, quod consuetudo est altera natura. Notice should be taken of the fact that the inclinations of natural things follow their forms, which is why they are ordered to one thing following the demands of the form, and as long as it remains, this inclination cannot be taken from them nor can they be urged toward the opposite. For this reason natural things do not become accustomed or unaccustomed. No matter how often a stone is tossed in the air it will never grow accustomed to height but will always fall. But that which is indifferent in object has no form thanks to which it is inclined determinately; only by its proper mover is it determined to some one thing. Moreover, its being so determined in a way disposes it to the same thing, such that when it is often inclined it is determined to the same effect by its proper agent and a definite inclination is strengthened in it. This superimposed disposition is like a form tending to one in the manner of nature. That is why it is said that custom is a second nature. Quia igitur vis appetitiva se habet ad utrumlibet; non tendit in unum nisi secundum quod a ratione determinatur in illud. Cum igitur ratio multoties inclinet virtutem appetitivam in aliquid unum, fit quaedam dispositio firmata in vi appetitiva, per quam inclinatur in unum quod consuevit; et ista dispositio sic firmata est habitus virtutis. Unde, si recte consideretur, virtus appetitivae partis nihil est aliud quam quaedam dispositio, sive forma, sigillata et impressa in vi appetitiva a ratione. Et propter hoc, quantumcumque sit fortis dispositio in vi appetitiva ad aliquid, non potest habere rationem virtutis, nisi sit ibi id quod est rationis. Unde et in definitione virtutis ponitur ratio: dicit enim philosophus, II Ethicorum, quod virtus est habitus electivus in mente consistens determinata specie, prout sapiens determinabit. It is because the appetitive power is indifferent that it does not tend to one object unless it is determined to do so by reason. When reason repeatedly inclines the apperitive power to some one thing, a disposition is implanted in it by which it is inclined to the thing to which it has become accustomed. It is this implanted disposition that is the habit of virtue. Rightly considered, therefore, the virtue of the appetitive part is nothing other than a disposition or form which is sealed and impressed on it by reason. Because of this, no matter how strong a disposition to something there may be in the appetitive power, it win only be a virtue if it is the result of reason. That is why reason is put into the definition of virtue. Aristotle says in Ethics 2 virtue is a habit of choice in the mind determined in the way that the wise man would determine it. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur de virtutibus secundum quod ordinantur ad aeternam beatitudinem. Ad 1. It should be said that Augustine is speaking of the virtues ordered to eternal happiness. Et sic dicendum ad secundum, tertium et quartum. Ad 2, 3, 4. The same remark applies to these. Ad quintum dicendum, quod virtus acquisita facit declinare a peccato non semper, sed ut in pluribus: quia et ea quae naturaliter accidunt, ut in pluribus eveniunt. Nec propter hoc sequitur, quod simul aliquis sit virtuosus et vitiosus; quia unus actus potentiae neque habitum vitii neque habitum virtutis acquisitae tollit; et non potest per virtutem acquisitam declinare ab omni peccato. Non enim per eas vitatur peccatum infidelitatis; et alia peccata quae virtutibus infusis opponuntur. Ad 5. It should be said that acquired virtue does not cause us always to turn from sin, but only for the most part, just as things that come about naturally are only for the most part. But it does not follow from this that anyone is simultaneously vicious and virtuous, because one act of a power does not remove the acquired habit of vice or virtue, and one cannot by acquired virtue avoid every sin. Through acquired virtue, the sin of infidelity is not avoided, nor the other sins opposed to the infused virtues. Ad sextum dicendum, quod per virtutes acquisitas non pervenitur ad felicitatem caelestem, sed ad quamdam felicitatem quam homo natus est acquirere per propria naturalia in hac vita secundum actum perfectae virtutis, de qua Aristoteles tractat in X Metaph. Ad 6. It should be said that we do not arrive at heavenly bliss by means of the acquired virtues, but at a certain happiness that a man has been fashioned to achieve in this life by what is naturally proper to him according to the act of perfect virtue of which Aristotle treats in Ethics 10. Ad septimum dicendum, quod virtus acquisita non est maximum bonum simpliciter, sed maximum in genere humanorum bonorum; virtus autem infusa est maximum bonum simpliciter, in quantum per eam homo ad summum bonum ordinatur, quod est Deus. Ad 7. It should be said that acquired virtue is not the greatest good simply speaking, but the greatest among human goods; infused virtue is the greatest good simply speaking, since by it a man is ordered to the highest good, which is God. Ad octavum dicendum, quod idem secundum idem non potest seipsum formare. Sed quando in aliquo uno est aliquod principium activum et aliud passivum, seipsum formare potest secundum partes: ita scilicet quod una pars eius sit formans, et alia formata; sicut aliquid movet seipsum, ita quod una pars eius est movens, et alia mota, ut dicitur VIII Phys. Sic autem est in generatione virtutis ut ostensum est. Ad 8. It should be said that a thing considered in the same way cannot form itself, but when there is in a thing one principle that is active and another that is passive, it can form itself partly, namely, such that one of its parts forms and another is formed, just as something moves itself insofar as one of its parts is mover and another moved, as is said in Physics 8. So it is in the generation of virtue, as has been shown. Ad nonum dicendum, quod sicut in intellectu scientia acquiritur non solum per inventionem, sed etiam per doctrinam, quae est ab alio; ita etiam in acquisitione virtutis homo iuvatur per correctionem et disciplinam, quae est ab alio; qua aliquis tanto minus indiget, quanto de se est magis dispositus ad virtutem; sicut et aliquis quanto perspicacioris est ingenii, tanto minus indiget exteriori doctrina. Ad 9. It should be said that science is acquired by intellect not only by discovery but also by teaching, which is from another; so too in the acquisition of virtue, a man is helped by correction and discipline, which are from another. The less one needs these, the more disposed to virtue he is, just as the more one is ingenious of mind, the less need he has of external doctrine. Ad decimum dicendum, quod ad actionem hominis concurrunt virtutes activae et passivae; et licet a virtutibus, in quantum activae, fiat emissio, et in eis nihil recipiatur; tamen passivis in quantum passivae, competit acquirere aliquid per receptionem. Unde in potentia quae est tantum activa, ut in intellectu agente, non acquiritur aliquis habitus per actionem. Ad 10. It should be said that active and passive powers come together in man’s action, and something comes forth from the powers insofar as they are active and nothing is received by them; to the passive as passive it falls to acquire something by way of receiving. Hence, in a power which is active alone, such as the agent intellect, no habit is acquired by action. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod quanto actio agentis est efficacior, tanto velocius inducit formam. Et ideo videmus in intellectualibus, quod per unam demonstrationem, quae est efficax, causatur in nobis scientia; opinio autem, licet sit minor scientia, non causatur in nobis per unum syllogismum dialecticum; sed requiruntur plures propter eorum debilitatem. Unde et in agibilibus, quia operationes animae non sunt efficaces sicut in demonstrationibus, propter hoc quod agibilia sunt contingentia et probabilia, ideo unus actus non sufficit ad causandum virtutem, sed requiruntur plures. Et licet illi plures non sint simul, tamen habitum virtutis causare possunt: quia primus actus facit aliquam dispositionem, et secundus actus inveniens materiam dispositam adhuc eam magis disponit, et tertius adhuc amplius; et sic ultimus actus agens in virtute omnium praecedentium complet generationem virtutis, sicut accidit de multis guttis cavantibus lapidem. Ad 11. It should be said that the more efficacious the action of the agent, the quicker it induces the form. Thus, in intellectual matters we see that one powerful demonstration can cause science in us. But opinion, though it is less than science, is not caused in us by one dialectical syllogism, but requires many because of their weakness. Hence, in things to be done, because activities of the soul are not efficacious as are demonstrations, because things to be done are contingent and probable, one act does not suffice to cause virtue but many are required. And though these many are not simultaneous, they still cause a habit, because the first act causes some disposition and the second act, finding the matter disposed, disposes it even more, and third yet more and thus the ultimate act acting in virtue of all the preceding completes the generation of virtue, like the many drops that hollow the stone. Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod Avicenna intendit definire virtutem naturalem, quae sequitur formam quae est principium essentiale; unde illa definitio non est ad propositum. Ad 12. It should be said that Avicenna intends to define natural virtue which follows on the form which is an essential principle; hence, his definition is not apropos. Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod virtus generatur ex actibus quodammodo virtuosis et quodammodo non virtuosis. Actus enim praecedentes virtutem, sunt quidem virtuosi quantum ad id quod agitur, in quantum scilicet homo agit fortia et iusta; non autem quantum ad modum agendi: quia ante habitum virtutis acquisitum non agit homo opera virtutis eo modo quo virtuosus agit, scilicet prompte absque dubitatione et delectabiliter absque difficultate. Ad 13. It should be said that virtue is generated by acts that are in a way virtuous and in a way vicious. For the acts preceding virtue are indeed virtuous with respect to what is done, insofar as a man does brave and just things, but not with respect to the manner of acting, because before acquiring the habit of virtue a man does not do the works of virtue as the virtuous man does, namely, promptly and without doubt and with pleasure and easily. Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod ratio est nobilior virtute generata in parte appetitiva, cum talis virtutis non sit nisi quaedam participatio rationis. Actus igitur qui virtutem praecedit, potest causare virtutem, in quantum est a ratione, a qua habet id quod perfectionis in ea est. Imperfectio enim eius est in potentia appetitiva, in qua nondum est causatus habitus, per quem homo delectabiliter et expedite id quod est ex imperio rationis consequatur. Ad 14. It should be said that reason is more noble than the virtue generated in the appetitive part, since such a virtue is only caused by a certain participation in reason. Therefore, the act which precedes virtue can cause virtue insofar as it is from reason, which confers that which is of perfection in it. For its imperfection is in the appetitive power in which the habit is not yet caused by which a man with pleasure and with expedition brings off that which is commanded by reason. Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod virtus dicitur esse ultimum potentiae, non quia semper sit aliquid de essentia potentiae; sed quia inclinat ad id quod ultimo potentia potest. Ad 15. It should be said that virtue is said to be the utmost of a power, not because it is always something of the essence of the power, but because it inclines to that of which the power is ultimately capable. Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod homo secundum naturam suam est bonus secundum quid, non autem simpliciter. Ad hoc autem quod aliquid sit bonum simpliciter, requiritur quod sit totaliter perfectum; sicut ad hoc quod aliquid sit pulchrum simpliciter requiritur quod in nulla parte sit aliqua deformitas vel turpitudo. Simpliciter autem et totaliter bonus dicitur aliquis ex hoc quod habet voluntatem bonam, quia per voluntatem homo utitur omnibus aliis potentiis. Et ideo bona voluntas facit hominem bonum simpliciter; et propter hoc virtus appetitivae partis secundum quam voluntas fit bona, est quae simpliciter bonum facit habentem. Ad 16. It should be said that man is good according to his own nature in a manner of speaking, not absolutely. In order for something to be absolutely good it must be totally perfected, just as in order for something to be beautiful absolutely there must be no deformity or defilement in any part. Someone is called simply and totally good because he has a good will, because it is by will that a man uses all the other powers. Therefore, a good will makes a man good simply speaking, and because of this the virtue of the appetitive part, thanks to which the Will becomes good, is that which simply speaking makes the one having it good. Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod actus qui sunt ante virtutem, possunt quidem dici naturales, secundum quod a naturali ratione procedunt, prout naturale dividitur contra acquisitum; non autem possunt naturales dici, prout naturale dividitur contra id quod est ex ratione. Sic autem dicitur quod naturalia non dissuescimus neque assuescimus, secundum quod natura contra rationem dividitur. Ad 17. It should be said that the acts which are prior to virtue can indeed be called natural because they proceed from natural reason, insofar as natural is distinguished from acquired. But they cannot be called natural insofar as natural is distingu’ ished from what is of reason. Thus, it is said that we do not become accustomed, or the opposite, to what is natural, insofar as nature is distinguished from reason. Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod gratia dicitur esse forma virtutis infusae; non tamen ita quod ei det esse specificum; sed in quantum per eam informatur aliqualiter actus eius. Unde non oportet quod virtus politica sit per infusionem gratiae. Ad 18. It should be said that grace is called the form of infused virtue, not because it gives it its specific being, but insofar as by it its act is informed in a certain way. Hence, there is no need that political virtue be had by the infusion of grace. Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod virtus perficitur in infirmitate, non quia infirmitas causat virtutem, sed quia dat occasionem alicui virtuti, scilicet humilitati. Est etiam materia alicuius virtutis, scilicet patientiae, et etiam caritatis, in quantum aliquis infirmitati proximi subvenit. Et naturaliter est signum virtutis, quia tanto anima virtuosior demonstratur, quanto infirmius corpus ad actum virtutis movet. Ad 19. It should be said that virtue is made strong in weakness, not because weakness causes virtue, but because it provides an occasion for some virtue, namely, humility. It is also the matter of a virtue, namely, patience, and even of charity, insofar as someone ministers to the weakness of his neighbor. And it is naturally a sign of virtue, because the more virtuous the soul the less effort is required to move the body to the act of virtue. Ad vicesimum dicendum, quod proprie loquendo non dicitur aliquid alterari secundum quod adipiscitur propriam perfectionem. Unde, cum virtus sit propria perfectio hominis, non dicitur homo alterari secundum quod acquirit virtutem; nisi forte per accidens secundum quod immutatio sensibilis partis animae in qua sunt animae passiones, pertinet ad virtutem. Ad 20. It should be said that properly speaking a thing is not said to be altered when it acquires its proper perfection. Thus, since virtue is man’s proper perfection, a man is not said to be altered when he acquires virtue, save perhaps incidentally, insofar as the alteration of the sensible part of the soul which is the seat of the soul’s emotions pertains to virtue. Ad vicesimumprimum dicendum, quod homo potest dici qualis vel secundum qualitatem quae est in parte intellectiva: et sic non dicitur qualis ex naturali complexione corporis, neque ex impressione corporis caelestis, cum pars intellectiva sit absoluta ab omni corpore; vel potest dici homo qualis secundum dispositionem quae est in parte sensitiva: quae quidem potest esse ex naturali complexione corporis, vel ex impressione corporis caelestis. Tamen quia haec pars naturaliter obedit rationi, ideo potest per assuetudinem diminui, vel totaliter tolli. Ad 21. It should be said that a man can be said to be such and such [qualis] or according to a quality which is in the intellective part, and this is not.from the natural make-up of the body nor the influence of the heavenly bodies since the intellective part is free of any body. Or a man can be called such and such according to a disposition in the sensitive part, which can indeed be due to the natural make-up of the body, or from the influence of celestial bodies. However, since this part naturally obeys reason, it can be diminished by custom or even totally removed. Et per hoc patet responsio ad vicesimumsecundum; nam secundum hanc dispositionem quae est in parte sensitiva, dicuntur aliqui habere naturalem inclinationem ad vitium vel virtutem et cetera. Ad 22. From this the response to 22 is evident, for according to the disposition that is in the sensitive part, some are said to have a natural inclination to vice or virtue, etc.
Decimo quaeritur utrum sint aliquae virtutes homini ex infusione
Does a man have any infused virtues?
Et videtur quod non. It seems that he does not. Quia in VII Physic. dicitur: unumquodque perfectum est quando attingit propriam virtutem. Propria autem virtus uniuscuiusque est eius naturalis perfectio. Ergo ad perfectionem hominis sufficit sibi virtus connaturalis. Haec autem est quae per principia naturalia causari potest. Non igitur requiritur ad perfectionem hominis quod habeat aliquam virtutem ex infusione. 1. In Physics 7 it is said that a thing is perfect when it has achieved its proper virtue. But the proper virtue of anything is its natural perfection. Therefore, for man’s perfection the virtue connatural to him is sufficient, and this is what can be brought about by natural principles. Therefore, man does not require for his perfection any virtue had by infusion. Sed dicebatur, quod oportet hominem perfici per virtutem non solum in ordine ad connaturalem finem, sed etiam in ordine ad supernaturalem, qui est beatitudo vitae aeternae, ad quam ordinatur homo per virtutes infusas. —Sed contra, natura non deficit in necessariis. Sed illud quo indiget homo ad consecutionem ultimi finis, est sibi necessarium. Ergo hoc potest habere per principia naturalia; non ergo indiget ad hoc infusione virtutis. 2. But it might be said that man must be perfected not only with respect to the connatural end, but also to the supernatural, which is the happiness of eternal life, to which a man is ordered by the infused virtues. On the contrary: Nature is not deficient in what is necessary. What a man needs for the attainment of the ultimate end is necessary for him. Therefore, he can attain it through natural principles and has no need of the infusion of virtue. Praeterea, semen agit in virtute eius a quo emittitur. Aliter enim semen animalis cum sit imperfectum, non posset sua actione perducere ad speciem perfectam. Sed semina virtutum sunt nobis immissa a Deo; ut enim dicitur in Glossa, Deus inseminavit omni animae initia intellectus et sapientiae. Ergo huiusmodi semina agunt in virtute Dei. Cum igitur ex huiusmodi seminibus causetur virtus acquisita, videtur quod virtus acquisita possit ducere ad fruitionem Dei, in qua consistit beatitudo vitae aeternae. 3. Moreover, seed acts by the power of that which emits it; otherwise animal seed, since it is imperfect, could not by its action produce something perfect in species. But the seeds of the virtues are put into us by God, for as we read in the gloss, God sowed in every soul the beginning of understanding and wisdom. Therefore, seeds of this sort act with the power of God, and since acquired virtues are caused by these seeds, it seems that acquired virtue can lead to the enjoyment of God, in which the happiness of eternal life consists. Praeterea, virtus ordinat hominem ad beatitudinem vitae aeternae, in quantum est actus meritorius. Sed actus virtutis acquisitae potest esse meritorius vitae aeternae, si sit gratia informatus. Ergo ad beatitudinem vitae aeternae non est necessarium habere virtutes infusas. 4. Insofar as it is meritorious, virtue orders man to the happiness of eternal life. But the acts of the acquired virtues can merit eternal life insofar as they are informed by grace. Therefore, infused virtues are not necessary in order to attain the happiness of eternal life. Praeterea, radix merendi caritas est. Si igitur necessarium esset habere virtutes infusas ad merendum vitam aeternam, videtur quod sola caritas sufficeret; et ita non oportet habere aliquas alias virtutes infusas. 5. Moreover, at the root of meriting is charity. Therefore, if it were necessary to have infused virtues to merit eternal life, it seems that charity alone would suffice, and then it would be unnecessary to have the other infused virtues. Praeterea, virtutes morales necessariae sunt ad hoc quod inferiores vires rationi subdantur. Sed per virtutes acquisitas sufficienter rationi subduntur. Non ergo necessarium est quod sint aliquae virtutes infusae morales ad hoc quod ratio ordinetur ad aliquem specialem finem; sed sufficit quod ratio hominis in illum supernaturalem finem dirigatur. Hoc autem sufficienter fit per fidem. Ergo non oportet habere aliquas alias virtutes infusas. 6. Moreover, moral virtues are necessary if the lower powers are to be subject to reason, but they are sufficiently subjected to reason by acquired virtues. Therefore, it is not necessary that there should be any infused moral virtues in order that reason be ordered to some special end, but it suffices that man’s reason be directed to that supernatural end. But this comes about sufficiently through faith. Therefore, it is not necessary to have any other infused virtues. Praeterea, id quod fit virtute divina, non differt specie ab eo quod fit operatione naturae. Eadem enim specie est sanitas quam aliquis miraculose recuperat, et quam natura operatur. Si igitur sit aliqua virtus infusa, quae a Deo esset in nobis, et aliqua acquisita per actus nostros, non propter hoc specie differrent; puta, si sit temperantia acquisita, et temperantia infusa. Duae autem formae quae sunt unius speciei, non possunt simul esse in eodem subiecto. Ergo non potest esse quod ille qui habet temperantiam acquisitam, habeat temperantiam infusam. 7. Moreover, that which comes about by divine power does not differ in species from that which comes about by the operation of nature. For the health whereby someone is miraculously cured and that which nature produces are of the same species. Therefore, if there were some infused virtue, which is in us from God, and one acquired by our actions, they would not differ specifically; for example, if there is an acquired and an infused temperance. But two forms of the same species cannot simultaneously be in the same subject. Therefore, it cannot be that someone who has acquired temperance should have infused temperance. Praeterea, species virtutis ex actibus cognoscitur. Sed sunt idem specie actus temperantiae infusae et acquisitae. Ergo et virtutes specie eaedem. Probatio mediae. Quaecumque conveniunt in materia et forma, sunt unius speciei. Sed actus temperantiae infusae et acquisitae conveniunt in materia: uterque enim est circa delectabilia tactus; conveniunt etiam in forma, quia uterque in medietate consistit. Ergo actus temperantiae infusae et actus temperantiae acquisitae sunt eiusdem speciei. 8. Moreover, the species of a virtue is known from its acts. But the acts of infused and acquired temperance are specifically the same; therefore, the virtues are specifically the same. But the acts of infused and of acquired temperance agree in matter, for both concern things pleasant to touch. But they also agree in form, because each consists in the mean. Therefore, the act of infused temperance and the act of acquired temperance are specifically the same. Sed dicendum, quod differunt specie, eo quod ordinantur ad alium et ad alium finem: ex fine enim sumuntur species in moralibus. Sed contra, secundum id aliqua possunt specie differre a quo sumitur species rei. Sed species in moralibus non sumitur a fine ultimo, sed a fine proximo: aliter enim omnes virtutes essent unius speciei, cum omnes ad beatitudinem ordinentur sicut ad ultimum finem. Ergo ex ordine ad ultimum finem non possunt dici in moralibus aliqua esse eiusdem speciei, vel specie differre; et ita temperantia infusa non differt specie a temperantia acquisita, ex hoc quod ordinat hominem in beatitudinem altiorem. 9. But it might be said that they differ specifically because they are ordered to different ends and in moral matters the species is derived from the end. On the contrary: Things will differ specifically in terms of that from which the species is derived. But species in moral matters is not taken from ultimate end, but from the proximate end, otherwise all virtues would be specifically the same, since they are all ordered to happiness as to their ultimate end. Therefore, it cannot be said that in morals things are of the same species, or of different species, because of their order to ultimate end, and thus infused temperance does not specifically differ from acquired temperance from the fact that it orders man to a higher happiness. Praeterea, nullus habitus moralis consequitur speciem ex hoc quod ab aliquo habitu movetur. Contingit enim unum habitum moralem moveri vel imperari a diversis secundum speciem; sicut habitus intemperantiae movetur ab habitu avaritiae, cum quis moechatur ut furetur; ab habitu autem crudelitatis, cum quis moechatur ut occidat. Et e converso diversi habitus secundum speciem ab eodem habitu imperantur; puta cum unus moechatur ut furetur, alter vero occidit ut furetur. Sed temperantia vel fortitudo, aut aliqua aliarum virtutum moralium non habet actum ordinatum ad beatitudinem vitae aeternae, nisi in quantum imperatur a virtute quae ultimum finem habet pro obiecto. Ergo ex hoc non consequitur speciem; et ita per hoc virtus infusa moralis non differt specie a virtute acquisita per hoc quod ordinatur ad finem vitae aeternae. 10. Moreover, no moral habit takes its species from the fact that it is moved by some habit, for it happens that one moral habit is moved or commanded by others which are specifically different, as the habit of intemperance is moved by the habit of avarice when a person commits adultery in order to steal and another kills in order to steal. But temperance or courage or any other moral virtue does not have an act ordered to the happiness of eternal life unless it is commanded by a virtue which has the ultimate end for its object. Therefore, it does not takes its species from that, and thus the infused moral virtue does not specifically differ from acquired virtue because through it one is ordered to the end of eternal life. Praeterea, virtus infusa est in mente sicut in subiecto: dicit enim Augustinus, quod virtus est bona qualitas mentis, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Sed virtutes morales non sunt in mente sicut in subiecto: nam temperantia et fortitudo sunt irrationabilium partium, ut philosophus dicit III Ethic. Ergo virtutes morales non sunt infusae. 11. Moreover, infused virtue is in mind as in a subject, for Augustine says that virtue is the good quality of mind which God brings about in us without us. But moral virtues are not in mind as in subject, for temperance and fortitude are in the irrational parts, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 3. Therefore, moral virtues are not infused. Praeterea, contraria sunt unius rationis. Sed vitium quod est contrarium virtuti, nunquam infunditur, sed solum ex actibus nostris causatur. Ergo nec virtutes infunduntur, sed solum ex actibus nostris causantur. 12. Moreover, contraries share the same notion. But vice which is the contrary of virtue is never infused, but is only caused by our acts. Therefore, neither are virtues infused, but they too are caused only by our acts. Praeterea, homo ante acquisitionem virtutis est in potentia ad virtutes. Sed potentia et actus sunt unius generis: omne enim genus dividitur per potentiam et actum, ut patet in III Physic. Cum ergo potentia ad virtutem non sit ex infusione, videtur quod nec virtus ex infusione sit. 13. Moreover, before acquiring it a man is in potency to virtue, but potency and act are in the same genus, for every genus is divided by potency and act, as is evident in the Physics. Therefore, since the potentiality for virtue is not in us by infusion, it seems that neither is virtue in us from infusion. Praeterea, si virtutes infunduntur, oportet quod simul infunduntur. Cum gratia autem infunditur homini qui in peccato fuit, in actu; tunc non infunduntur sibi habitus virtutum moralium: adhuc enim post contritionem patitur passionum molestias; quod non est virtuosi, sed forte continentis: differt enim continens a temperato per hoc quod continens patitur quidem, sed non deducitur; temperatus autem non patitur, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Ergo videtur quod virtutes non sint nobis ex infusione gratiae. 14. Moreover, if the virtues are infused, it is necessary that they be infused at the same time. But when grace is actually infused in a man who was in sin, the moral virtues are not then infused in him, for he can still be bothered by the passions after contrition, which is not true of the virtuous person though perhaps of the continent: The continent man differs from the temperate in this, that the former is still affected though not misled, whereas the temperate is no longer affected, as is said in Ethics 7. Therefore, it seems that virtues are not in us by the infusion of grace. Praeterea, dicit philosophus II Ethic., quod signum generati habitus oportet accipere fientem in operatione delectationem. Sed post contritionem non statim delectabiliter aliquis operatur ea quae sunt virtutum moralium. Ergo nondum habet habitum virtutum; non ergo virtutes morales causantur in nobis ex infusione gratiae. 15. Moreover, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 2, it is sign that a habit has been acquired that it causes pleasant activity; but after contrition one does not immediately take pleasure in the acts of moral virtue. Therefore, he does not yet have the habit of the virtues and moral virtues are not caused in us by the infusion of grace. Praeterea, ponamus quod in aliquo ex multis actibus malis causatus sit aliquis habitus vitiosus: manifestum est quod in uno actu contritionis dimittuntur sibi peccata et infunditur gratia. Per unum autem actum non destruitur habitus acquisitus, sicut nec per unum generatur. Cum igitur cum gratia simul infundantur virtutes morales, sequitur quod habitus virtutis moralis simul sit cum habitu vitii oppositi; quod est impossibile. 16. Moreover, we hold that a vicious habit is caused in a person by many bad acts. It is manifest that by one act of contrition sins are taken away and grace infused, whereas an acquired habit is not destroyed by one act, nor acquired by one act. Therefore, since the moral virtues are infused at the same time as grace, it follows that the habits of moral virtues must coexist with their opposite habits, which is impossible. Praeterea, ex eodem generatur virtus et corrumpitur, ut dicitur III Ethic. Si igitur virtus non causetur in nobis ex actibus nostris, videtur sequi quod neque ex actibus nostris corrumpatur; et ita sequitur quod aliquis peccando mortaliter non amittat virtutem: quod est inconveniens. 17. Moreover, a virtue is generated and corrupted by the same thing, as is said in Ethics 3. Therefore, if virtue is not caused in us by our acts, it would seem to follow that it cannot be corrupted by our acts, and it would then follow that one sinning mortally does not lose virtue, which is absurd. Praeterea, idem videtur esse mos et consuetudo. Ergo et eadem est virtus moralis et consuetudinalis. Sed virtus consuetudinalis dicitur ex consuetudine; causatur enim ex frequenti bene agere. Ergo omnis virtus moralis causatur ex actibus, et non ex infusione gratiae. 18. Moreover, mores and customs seem to be the same. Therefore, moral virtue and custom are the same. But virtue is called custom from ‘becoming accustomed,’ for it is caused by often acting well. Therefore, every moral virtue is caused by acts and none by the infusion of grace. Praeterea, si aliquae virtutes sunt infusae, oportet quod earum actus sint efficaciores quam actus hominis non habentis virtutes. Sed ex huiusmodi actibus causatur aliquis habitus virtutis in nobis. Ergo et ex actibus virtutum infusarum, si aliquae sunt tales. Sed sicut dicitur II Ethic., quales sunt habitus, tales actus reddunt; et quales sunt actus, tales habitus causant. Habitus igitur causati ex actibus virtutum infusarum, sunt eiusdem speciei cum virtutibus infusis. Sequitur igitur quod duae formae eiusdem speciei sunt simul in eodem subiecto. Hoc est autem impossibile. Ergo impossibile videtur quod sint in nobis aliquae virtutes infusae. 19. Moreover, if some virtues are infused, it is necessary that their acts are more efficacious than the acts of a man not having virtues. But it is from acts of the same kind that a habit of virtue is caused in us. Therefore, from the acts of infused virtues, if there are any, the same would be true. But it is said in Ethics 2 that as the habits, so the acts, and as the acts, so the habits they cause. Therefore, the habits caused by acts of infused virtues are of the same species as the infused virtues, and it would follow that two forms of the same species are simultaneously in the same subject, which is impossible. Therefore it seems to be impossible that there are any infused virtues in us. Sed contra. Lucae, XXIV, 49, dicitur: sedete hic in civitate donec induamini virtute ex alto. ON THE CONTRARY. 1. It is said in Luke 24:49, “But wait here in the city, until you are clothed with power from on high.” Praeterea, Sap., VIII, 7, de divina sapientia dicitur, quod sobrietatem et iustitiam docet, et cetera. Docet autem spiritus sapientiae virtutem, eam causando. Ergo videtur quod virtutes morales sint nobis infusae a Deo. 2. Moreover, in Wisdom 8:7, speaking of divine wisdom, the author says, “For she teaches temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude...” by causing them. Therefore, it seems that there are moral virtues infused in us by God. Praeterea, actus virtutum quarumlibet debent esse meritorii, ad hoc quod per eas in beatitudinem ducamur. Sed meritum non potest esse nisi ex gratia. Ergo videtur quod virtutes causantur in nobis ex infusione gratiae. 3. Moreover, the acts of any virtue ought to be meritorious in order that we might be led by them to happiness. But there can be no merit except irom grace. ‘Therefore, it seems that the virtues are caused in us by the infusion of grace. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod praeter virtutes acquisitas ex actibus nostris, sicut iam dictum est, oportet ponere alias virtutes in homine a Deo infusas. Cuius ratio hinc accipi potest, quod virtus, ut dicit philosophus, est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit. Secundum igitur quod bonum diversificatur in homine, oportet etiam quod et virtus diversificetur; sicut patet quod aliud est bonum hominis in quantum et homo, et aliud in quantum civis. Et manifestum est quod aliquae operationes possent esse convenientes homini in quantum est homo, quae non essent convenientes ei secundum quod est civis. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit in III Politic., quod alia est virtus quae facit hominem bonum, et alia quae facit civem bonum. Considerandum est autem, quod est duplex hominis bonum; unum quidem quod est proportionatum suae naturae; aliud autem quod suae naturae facultatem excedit. Cuius ratio est, quia oportet quod passivum consequatur perfectiones ab agente diversimode secundum diversitatem virtutis agentis; unde videmus quod perfectiones et formae quae causantur ex actione naturalis agentis, non excedunt naturalem facultatem recipientis: potentiae enim passivae naturali proportionatur virtus activa naturalis. RESPONSE. It should be said that, over and above the virtues that are acquired by our acts, it is necessary to recognize other virtues infused in man by God, as has been said. The reason for this can be sought in this, that virtue, as the Philosopher says, is what makes the one having it good and makes his work good. Therefore, insofar as the good is diversified in man, it is necessary that virtue too be diversified, since it is clear that the good of man as man is different from the good of man as citizen. It is manifest that some operations can be fitting to man insofar as he is man which are not fitting to him insofar as he is a citizen. For this reason the Philosopher says in Politics 3 that the virtue that makes a man good is other than that which makes the good citizen. It should be noticed, however, that there is a twofold good of man, one which is proportioned to his nature, another which exceeds the capacity of his nature. The reason for this is that what is passive must acquire perfections from the agent differently according to the diversity of the agent’s power. Hence, we see that the perfections and forms which are caused by the action of the natural agent do not exceed the natural capacity of the recipient, for the natural active power is proportioned to the potencies of the natural recipient. Sed perfectiones et formae quae proveniunt ab agente supernaturali infinitae virtutis, quod Deus est, excedunt facultatem naturae recipientis. Unde anima rationalis, quae immediate a Deo causatur, excedit capacitatem suae materiae, ita quod materia corporalis non totaliter potest comprehendere et includere ipsam; sed remanet aliqua virtus eius et operatio in qua non communicat materia corporalis; quod non contingit de aliqua aliarum formarum quae causantur ab agentibus naturalibus. Sicut autem homo suam primam perfectionem, scilicet animam, acquirit ex actione Dei; ita et ultimam suam perfectionem, quae est perfecta hominis felicitas, immediate habet a Deo, et in ipso quiescit: quod quidem ex hoc patet quod naturale hominis desiderium in ullo alio quietari potest, nisi in solo Deo. But the perfections and forms which come from a supernatural agent of infinite power, that is, from God, exceed the capacity of the receiving nature. Hence, the rational soul, which is immediately caused by God, exceeds the capacity of its matter, such that bodily matter cannot completely comprehend and include it, but there remains some power and operation of it in which bodily matter does not share, which is not the case with any of the other forms which are caused by natural agents. But just as man acquires his first perfection, that is, his soul, by the action of God, so too he has his ultimate perfection, which is his perfect happiness, immediately from God, and rests in it. Indeed this is obvious from the fact that man’s natural desire cannot rest in anything else save in God alone. Innatum est enim homini ut ex causatis desiderio quodam moveatur ad inquirendum causas; nec quiescit istud desiderium quousque perventum fuerit ad primam causam, quae Deus est. Oportet igitur quod, sicut prima perfectio hominis, quae est anima rationalis, excedit facultatem materiae corporalis; ita ultima perfectio ad quam homo potest pervenire, quae est beatitudo vitae aeternae, excedat facultatem totius humanae naturae. Et quia unumquodque ordinatur ad finem per operationem aliquam; et ea quae sunt ad finem, oportet esse aliqualiter fini proportionata; necessarium est esse aliquas hominis perfectiones quibus ordinetur ad finem supernaturalem, quae excedant facultatem principiorum naturalium hominis. For it is innate in man that he be moved by a desire to go on from what has been caused and inquire into causes, nor does this desire rest until it arrives at the first cause, which is God. Therefore, it is necessary that, just as man’s first perfection, which is the rational soul, exceeds the capacity of bodily matter, so the ultimate perfection to which a man can come, which is the happiness of eternal life should exceed the entire capacity of human nature. And because a thing is ordered to its end by some activity, and those things which are for the sake of the end must be proportioned to the end, it is necessary that there should be some perfections of man whereby he is ordered to the supernatural end which exceeds the capacity of man’s natural principles. Hoc autem esse non posset, nisi supra principia naturalia aliqua supernaturalia operationum principia homini infundantur a Deo. Naturalia autem operationum principia sunt essentia animae, et potentiae eius, scilicet intellectus et voluntas, quae sunt principia operationum hominis, in quantum huiusmodi; nec hoc esse posset, nisi intellectus haberet cognitionem principiorum per quae in aliis dirigeretur, et nisi voluntas haberet naturalem inclinationem ad bonum naturae sibi proportionatum; sicut in praecedenti quaestione dictum est. Infunditur igitur divinitus homini ad peragendas actiones ordinatas in finem vitae aeternae primo quidem gratia, per quam habet anima quoddam spirituale esse, et deinde fides, spes et caritas; ut per fidem intellectus illuminetur de aliquibus supernaturalibus cognoscendis, quae se habent in isto ordine sicut principia naturaliter cognita in ordine connaturalium operationum; per spem autem et caritatem acquirit voluntas quamdam inclinationem in illud bonum supernaturale ad quod voluntas humana per naturalem inclinationem non sufficienter ordinatur. But this can only be if over and above the natural principles there are supernatural principles of action infused in man by God. The natural principles of operation are the essence of the soul and its powers, namely, intellect and will, which are the principles of man’s activity as such. And this is so because intellect has knowledge of the principles by which it might be directed to other things and will has a natural inclination to the good proportioned to its nature, as was argued in the preceding question. Therefore, in order that a man might perform actions ordered to the end of eternal life, there is divinely infused in him first grace, by which the soul has a kind of spiritual existence, and then faith, hope, and charity, so that by faith the intellect is iflumined by certain things known supernaturally, which are in this order as the principles naturally known in the order of connatural activities, and by hope and charity the will acquires a certain inclination to that supernatural good to which the human will is insufficiently ordered by its natural inclination. Et sicut praeter ista principia naturalia requiruntur habitus virtutum ad perfectionem hominis secundum modum sibi connaturalem, ut supra dictum est; ita ex divina influentia consequitur homo, praeter praemissa supernaturalia principia, aliquas virtutes infusas, quibus perficitur ad operationes ordinandas in finem vitae aeternae. Thus, over and above the natural principles by which the habits of virtue are acquired for man’s natural perfection in a manner connatural to him, as has been said above, man acquired by divine influence, beyond the supernatural principles mentioned, certain infused virtues by which he is perfected in operations ordered to the end of eternal life. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut secundum primam perfectionem homo est perfectus dupliciter; uno modo secundum nutritivam et sensitivam, quae quidem perfectio non excedit capacitatem materiae corporalis; alio modo secundum partem intellectivam, quae naturalem et corporalem excedit: et secundum hanc simpliciter est homo perfectus, primo autem modo secundum quid; ita et quantum ad perfectionem finis, dupliciter homo potest esse perfectus: uno modo secundum capacitatem suae naturae, alio modo secundum quamdam supernaturalem perfectionem: et sic dicitur homo perfectus esse simpliciter; primo autem modo secundum quid. Unde duplex competit virtus homini; una quae respondet primae perfectioni, quae non est completa virtus; alia quae respondet suae perfectioni ultimae: et haec est vera et perfecta hominis virtus. Ad 1. It should be said that a man is perfected in two ways when he first comes into being. First, with respect to the nutritive and sensitive powers, by a perfection that does not indeed exceed the capacity of corporeal matter. Second, with respect to the intellective part which does exceed the natural and bodily. It is by the latter that a man is perfect simply speaking, but by the former only in a certain respect. So too a man can be perfected in two ways with respect to the perfection of the end of man, first, according to the capacity of his nature and, second, by a supernatural perfection. It is by the latter that a man is called perfect simply speaking, but by the former only in a certain respect. So it is that man has a twofold virtue, one that answers to the first perfection, which is not virtue in the fullest sense, and another that answers to ultimate perfection, and this is the true and perfect virtue of man. Ad secundum dicendum, quod natura providit homini in necessariis secundum suam virtutem; unde respectu eorum quae facultatem naturae non excedunt, habet homo a natura non solum principia receptiva, sed etiam principia activa. Respectu autem eorum quae facultatem naturae excedunt, habet homo a natura aptitudinem ad recipiendum. Ad 2. It should be said that nature provides man with what is necessary according to his power; hence, with respect to the things which do not exceed the capacity of nature, a man has from nature not only receptive principles but also active principles. But with respect to the things which exceed the capacity of his nature, a man has from nature only an aptitude to receive. Ad tertium dicendum, quod semen hominis agit secundum totam virtutem hominis. Semina autem virtutum animae humanae naturaliter indita non agunt secundum totam virtutem Dei; unde non sequitur quod ex eis possit causari quidquid potest causare Deus. Ad 3. It should be said that man’s seed acts according to the whole power of man, but the seeds of the virtues naturally placed in human nature do not act according to the whole power of God; hence, it does not follow that they can cause whatever God can cause. Ad quartum dicendum, quod cum nullum meritum sit sine caritate, actus virtutis acquisitae, non potest esse meritorius sine caritate. Cum caritate autem simul infunduntur aliae virtutes; unde actus virtutis acquisitae non potest esse meritorius nisi mediante virtute infusa. Nam virtus ordinata in finem inferiorem non facit actus ordinatum ad finem superiorem, nisi mediante virtute superiori; sicut fortitudo, quae est virtus hominis qua homo, non ordinat actum suum ad bonum politicum, nisi mediante fortitudine quae est virtus hominis in quantum est civis. Ad 4. It should be said that since there is no merit without charity, the act of acquired virtue cannot be meritorious without charity. But other virtues are infused along with charity; hence, the act of acquired virtue can only be meritorious by the mediation of infused virtue. For the virtue ordered to an inferior end does not produce an act ordered to the superior end without the mediation of the superior virtue. just as courage, which is a virtue of man as man, does not order its act to the political good except by the mediation of the courage, which is the virtue of man insofar as he is a citizen. Ad quintum dicendum, quod quando aliqua actio procedit ex pluribus agentibus ad invicem ordinatis, eius perfectio et bonitas impediri potest per impedimentum unius agentium, etiam si aliud fuerit perfectum: quantumcumque enim artifex sit perfectus, non faciet operationem perfectam, si instrumentum fuerit defectivum. In operationibus autem hominis quas oportet bonas fieri per virtutem, hoc considerandum est: quod actio superioris potentiae non dependet ab inferiori potentia; sed actio inferioris dependet a superiori. Et ideo ad hoc quod actus inferiorum virium sint perfecti, scilicet irascibilis et concupiscibilis, requiritur quod non solum intellectus sit ordinatus in finem ultimum per fidem, et voluntas per caritatem; sed etiam quod inferiores vires, scilicet irascibilis et concupiscibilis, habeant proprias operationes, ad hoc quod earum actus sint boni, et ordinabiles in finem ultimum. Ad 5. It should be said that when an action proceeds from several agents ordered to one another, its perfection and goodness can be impeded by one of those agents, even if the other is perfect; however perfect the artisan he does not cause perfect operation if there is a defective instrument. In human activities which become good thanks to virtue, this must be taken into account: The action of the higher power does not depend on the inferior power, but the action of the inferior depends on the superior. Therefore, in order for the acts of the inferior powers – the irascible and concupiscible – to be perfect, not only must intellect he ordered to the ultimate end by faith, and the will by charity, but the inferior powers too, namely, the irascible and concupiscible, have their own activities in order that their acts might be good and orderable to the ultimate end. Unde etiam patet solutio ad sextum. Ad 6. The response to the sixth is clear from this. Ad septimum dicendum, quod omnem formam quam operatur natura, potest etiam eamdem specie Deus operari per seipsum sine operatione naturae: et secundum hoc, sanitas quae a Deo miraculose perficitur, est eiusdem speciei cum sanitate quam facit natura. Unde non sequitur quod omnem formam quam Deus potest facere, possit etiam natura perficere; unde non oportet quod virtus infusa, quae est immediate a Deo, sit eiusdem speciei cum virtute acquisita. Ad 7. It should be said that God can produce a form of the same kind that nature produces by himself without the operation of nature. For this reason, the health which is brought about miraculously by God is of the same species as the health that nature causes. Hence, it does not follow that every form that God can make can also be made by nature, nor is it necessary that infused virtue, which is immediately from God, should be of the same species as acquired virtue. Ad octavum dicendum, quod temperantia infusa et acquisita conveniunt in materia, utraque enim est circa delectabilia tactus; sed non conveniunt in forma effectus vel actus: licet enim utraque quaerat medium, tamen alia ratione requirit medium temperantia infusa quam temperantia acquisita. Nam temperantia infusa exquirit medium secundum rationes legis divinae, quae accipiuntur ex ordine ad ultimum finem; temperantia autem acquisita accipit medium secundum inferiores rationes, in ordine ad bonum praesentis vitae. Ad 8. It should be said that infused and acquired temperance agree in matter, for both are concerned with what is pleasant to touch, but they do not agree in the form of their effects or acts, for although each seeks the mean, infused temperance attains it in one way and acquired temperance in another. For infused temperance seeks the mean according to the reasons of divine law, which are taken from their order to the ultimate end, but acquired temperance takes its mean according to inferior reasons, as ordered to the good of the present life. Ad nonum dicendum, quod ultimus finis non dat speciem in moralibus nisi quatenus in fine proximo est debita proportio ad ultimum finem; oportet enim ea quae sunt ad finem, esse proportionata fini. Et hoc etiam bonitas consilii requirit, ut quis convenienti medio finem sortiatur, ut patet per philosophum VI Metaph. Ad 9. It should be said that the ultimate end does not specify in moral matters except insofar as there is a due proportion to the ultimate end on the part of the proximate end. For the things which are for the sake of the end must be proportioned to the end, something the goodness of counsel also requires in order that one might decide on the fitting means to the end, as is clear from the Philosopher in Metaphysics 6 Ad decimum dicendum, quod actus alicuius habitus, prout imperatur ab illo habitu, accipit quidem speciem moralem, formaliter loquendo, de ipso actu; unde cum quis fornicatur ut furetur, actus iste licet materialiter sit intemperantiae, tamen formaliter est avaritiae. Sed licet actus intemperantiae accipiat aliqualiter speciem, prout imperatur ab avaritia; non tamen ex hoc intemperantia speciem accipit secundum quod actus est ab avaritia imperatus. Ex hoc ergo quod actus temperantiae vel fortitudinis imperantur a caritate ordinante eos in ultimum finem; ipsi quidem actus formaliter speciem sortiuntur: nam formaliter loquendo fiunt actus caritatis; non tamen ex hoc sequeretur quod temperantia vel fortitudo speciem sortiantur. Non igitur temperantia et fortitudo infusae differunt specie ab acquisitis ex hoc quod imperantur a caritate earum actus; sed ex hoc quod earum actus secundum eam rationem sunt in medio constituti, prout ordinabiles ad ultimum finem qui est caritatis obiectum. Ad 10. It should be said that the act of any habit, as commanded by that habit, takes its moral species, formally speaking, from the act itself. Hence, when one fornicates in order to steal, although his act is materially one of intemperance, it is formally one of avarice, for it is not specific to intemperance that its act be commanded by avarice. But insofar as an act of temperance or courage is commanded by charity ordering it to the ultimate end, the acts formally are specified and formally speaking become acts of charity, but it does not follow that it is from this that temperance and courage are specified. Therefore, infused temperance and courage do not differ specifically from the acquired in this, that their acts are commanded by charity, but rather because their acts are constituted in a mean orderable to the ultimate end which is the object of charity. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod temperantia infusa est in irascibili, irascibilis autem et concupiscibilis sic accipiunt nomen rationis vel rationalis, in quantum participant aliqualiter ratione, in quantum obediunt ei. Illa ergo secundum eumdem modum accipiunt nomen mentis, prout obediunt menti; ut verum sit quod Augustinus dicit, quod virtus infusa est bona qualitas mentis. Ad 11. It should be said that infused temperance is in the irascible, but the irascible and concupiscible take on the name of reason or rational insofar as they share in some way in reason, that is, by obeying it. Therefore, they have the name of mind in the same way, insofar as they obey mind, so what Augustine says is true: Infused virtue is a good quality of mind. Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod vitium hominis est per hoc quod ad inferiora reducitur; sed virtus eius est per hoc quod in superiora elevatur; et ideo vitium non potest esse ex infusione, sed solum virtus. Ad 12. It should be said that man’s vice comes about when he is reduced to inferior things, but his virtue when he is elevated to the higher. That is why only virtue, and not vice, can be from infusion. Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod quando aliquod passivum natum est consequi diversas perfectiones a diversis agentibus ordinatis, secundum differentiam et ordinem potentiarum activarum in agentibus, est differentia et ordo potentiarum passivarum in passivo; quia potentiae passivae respondet potentia activa: sicut patet quod aqua vel terra habet aliquam potentiam secundum quam nata est moveri ab igne; et aliam secundum quam nata est moveri a corpore caelesti; et ulterius aliam secundum quam nata est moveri a Deo. Sicut enim ex aqua vel terra potest aliquid fieri virtute corporis caelestis, quod non potest fieri virtute ignis; ita ex eis potest aliquid fieri virtute supernaturalis agentis quod non potest fieri virtute alicuius naturalis agentis; et secundum hoc dicimus, quod in tota creatura est quaedam obedientialis potentia, prout tota creatura obedit Deo ad suscipiendum in se quidquid Deus voluerit. Sic igitur et in anima est aliquid in potentia, quod natum est reduci in actum ab agente connaturali; et hoc modo sunt in potentia in ipsa virtutes acquisitae. Alio modo aliquid est in potentia in anima quod non est natum educi in actum nisi per virtutem divinam; et sic sunt in potentia in anima virtutes infusae. Ad 13. It should be said that when something passive is fashioned to acquire different perfections from different ordered agents, there is a difference and order of passive powers in the recipient responding to the difference and order of the active powers of the agents, because the passive power responds to the active. Thus, it is that water or earth have a potency according to which they are moved by fire, and another insofar as they are fashioned to be moved by the heavenly body, and yet another according to which they can be moved by God. For water or earth can become something in virtue of a supernatural agent that they cannot become by the power of a natural agent. For this reason we say that in every creature there is an obediential potency, insofar as every creature obeys God in receiving whatever God wills. There is in the soul a potency fashioned to be actuated by a connatural agent, and in this way it is in potency to acquired virtues. In another way there is a potency in the soul which is fashioned to be actuated only by the divine power, and in this way the infused virtues are potentially in the soul. Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod passiones ad malum inclinantes non totaliter tolluntur neque per virtutem acquisitam neque per virtutem infusam, nisi forte miraculose; quia semper remanet colluctatio carnis contra spiritum, etiam post moralem virtutem; de qua dicit apostolus, Gal., V, 17, quod caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, spiritus autem adversus carnem. Sed tam per virtutem acquisitam quam infusam huiusmodi passiones modificantur, ut ab his homo non effrenate moveatur. Sed quantum ad aliquid praevalet in hoc virtus acquisita, et quantum ad aliquid virtus infusa. Virtus enim acquisita praevalet quantum ad hoc quod talis impugnatio minus sentitur. Et hoc habet ex causa sua: quia per frequentes actus quibus homo est assuefactus ad virtutem, homo iam dissuevit talibus passionibus obedire, cum consuevit eis resistere; ex quo sequitur quod minus earum molestias sentiat. Sed praevalet virtus infusa quantum ad hoc quod facit quod huiusmodi passiones etsi sentiantur, nullo tamen modo dominentur. Virtus enim infusa facit quod nullo modo obediatur concupiscentiis peccati; et facit hoc infallibiliter ipsa manente. Sed virtus acquisita deficit in hoc, licet in paucioribus, sicut et aliae inclinationes naturales deficiunt in minori parte; unde apostolus, Rom., VII, 5: cum essemus in carne, passiones peccatorum quae per legem erant, operabantur in membris nostris, ut fructificarent morti; nunc autem soluti sumus a lege mortis in qua detinebamur, ita ut serviamus in novitate spiritus, et non in vetustate litterae. Ad 14. It should be said that passions inclining to evil are not completely taken away by either acquired or infused virtue, except maybe miraculously. There always remains the struggle between the flesh and the spirit, even with moral virtue. The Apostle speaks of this in Galatians 5:17: “For the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh.” But these passions are modified by both acquired and infused virtue, such that a man is not moved by them in an unbridled way, but acquired virtue in some degree prevails and so too infused virtue. Acquired virtue prevails in this, that the struggle is felt less, and this is due to its cause, since it is by frequent acts that a man is accustomed to virtue, and a man becomes unaccustomed to obey such passions when he has learned to resist them and that is why he feels their troubling less. But infused virtue prevails in this, that while such passions are felt they in no way dominate, for infused virtue brings it about that the concupiscence of sin is in no way obeyed, and while it remains, it does this infallibly. But acquired virtue fails in this, though rarely, just as other natural inclinations fail infrequently. Hence, the Apostle says in Romans 7:5, “For when we were in the flesh, the sinful passions which were aroused by the Law, were at work in our members so that they brought forth fruit unto death. But now we have been set free from the Law, having died to that by which we were held down, so that we may serve in a new spirit and not according to the outworn letter.” Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod quia a principio virtus infusa non semper ita tollit sensum passionum sicut virtus acquisita, propter hoc a principio non ita delectabiliter operatur. Non tamen hoc est contra rationem virtutis, quia quandoque ad virtutem sufficit sine tristitia operari; nec requiritur quod delectabiliter operetur propter molestias quae sentiuntur; sicut philosophus dicit III Ethic., quod forti sufficit sine tristitia operari. Ad 15. It should be said that because from the outset infused virtue does not always take away the feeling of the passions like acquired virtue, they are not from the outset performed with pleasure, but this is not out of keeping with what is meant by virtue, because sometimes it suffices for virtue that we act without sadness, and it is not required that we act with pleasure or fail to feel annoyance. The Philosopher says in Ethics 3 that it is enough if the brave man acts without sadness. Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod licet per actum unum simplicem non corrumpatur habitus acquisitus, tamen actus contritionis habet quod corrumpat habitum vitii generatum ex virtute gratiae; unde in eo qui habuit habitum intemperantiae, cum conteritur, non remanet cum virtute temperantiae infusa habitus intemperantiae in ratione habitus, sed in via corruptionis, quasi dispositio quaedam. Dispositio autem non contrariatur habitui perfecto. Ad 16. It should be said that an acquired habit is not corrupted by one simple act; still the act of contrition corrupts the habit of vice through the power of grace. Thus, in one who has the habit of intemperance and is contrite there does not remain with the virtue of infused temperance the habit of intemperance in the sense of a habit, but it is on the way to corruption, as a certain disposition. But a disposition is not the contrary of a perfect habit. Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod licet virtus infusa non causetur ex actibus, tamen actus possunt ad eam disponere; unde non est inconveniens quod per actus corrumpatur; quia per indispositionem materiae tollitur forma, sicut propter indispositionem corporis anima separatur. Ad 17. It should be said that, although infused virtue is not caused by acts, still acts can dispose to it, hence it is not unfitting that it be corrupted by acts, because form is taken away by the indisposition of matter, as the soul separated from body because of the indisposition of matter. Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod virtus moralis non dicitur a more secundum quod mos non significat consuetudinem appetitivae virtutis; secundum hoc enim virtutes infusae possent dici morales, licet non causentur ex consuetudine. Ad 18. It should be said that moral virtue is not named from Mos insofar as it signifies the accustoming of the appetitive power, for in this way the infused virtue could be called moral, although they are not caused by accustoming. Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod actus virtutis infusae non causant aliquem habitum, sed per eos augetur habitus praeexistens: quia nec ex actibus virtutis acquisitae aliquis habitus generatur; alias multiplicarentur habitus in infinitum. Ad 19. It should be said that the acts of infused virtue do not cause a habit, but due to them pre-existing habits are increased. No more by the acts of acquired virtue is any habit generated, otherwise habits would be multiplied ad infinitum.
Undecimo quaeritur utrum virtus infusa augeatur
Whether infused virtue can increase
Et videtur quod non. It seems that it cannot. Nihil enim augetur nisi quantum. Virtus autem non est quantitas, sed qualitas. Ergo non augetur. 1. Only what is quantified increases. But virtue is a quality, is not a quantity. Therefore it does not increase. Praeterea, virtus est forma accidentalis. Sed forma est simplicissima et invariabili essentia consistens. Ergo virtus non variatur secundum suam essentiam; ergo nec secundum essentiam augetur. 2. Moreover, virtue is an accidental form, but form is most Simple and consists of an invariable essence. Therefore, virtue does not vary in its essence and cannot increase in its essence. Praeterea, quod augetur movetur. Quod igitur secundum essentiam augetur, secundum essentiam movetur. Sed quod mutatur secundum suam essentiam, corrumpitur vel generatur. Sed generatio et corruptio sunt mutationes in substantia. Ergo caritas non augetur per essentiam, nisi cum corrumpitur vel generatur. 3. Moreover, that which increases, changes. Therefore, what increases in its essence changes in its essence, and what changes in its essence is corrupted or generated. But generation and corruption are changes in substance. Therefore, charity is not increased in essence except when it is generated or corrupted. Praeterea, essentialia non augentur nec minuuntur. Manifestum est autem quod essentia virtutis est essentialis. Ergo virtus secundum essentiam non augetur. 4. Moreover, essentials do not increase or diminish. But it is manifest that the essence of virtue is essential. Therefore, virtue does not increase in its essence. Praeterea, contraria nata sunt fieri circa idem. Augmentum autem et diminutio sunt contraria. Ergo nata sunt fieri circa idem. Virtus autem infusa non diminuitur: quia neque diminuitur per actum virtutis, quia per eum magis roboratur; neque per actum peccati venialis, quia sic multa peccata venialia tollerent totaliter caritatem et alias virtutes infusas, quod est impossibile; sic enim multa venialia aequipollerent uni peccato mortali; neque etiam minuitur per peccatum mortale: quia mortale peccatum tollit caritatem et alias virtutes infusas. Ergo virtus infusa non augetur. 5. Moreover, contraries are such as to come to be in the same subject. But increase and decrease are contraries which come about in the same thing. But infused virtue does not diminish since it is neither diminished by the act of virtue, which rather strengthens it, nor by the fact of venial sin, since then many venial sins would totally take away charity and the other infused virtues, which is impossible, for then many venial sins would equal one mortal sin, nor are they diminished by mortal sin, since mortal sin takes away charity and the other infused virtues. Therefore, an infused virtue does not increase. Praeterea, simile simili augetur, ut dicitur in II de anima. Si ergo virtus infusa augetur, oportet quod augeatur per additionem virtutis. Sed hoc non potest esse, quia virtus simplex est. Simplex autem simplici additum non facit maius; sicut punctum additum puncto non facit lineam maiorem. Ergo virtus infusa augeri non potest. 6. Moreover, a thing is increased by something similar to itself, as is said in On the Soul 2. Therefore, if the infused virtue increased, it would have to increase by the addition of virtue. But this cannot be, because virtue is simple, and a simple added to the simple does not make it greater, as a point added to a point does not make a greater fine. Therefore, infused virtue cannot be increased. Praeterea, I de generatione dicitur, quod augmentum est praeexistentis magnitudinis additamentum. Si ergo virtus augetur, oportet quod aliquid sibi addatur; et sic erit magis composita, et magis recedens a divina similitudine, et per consequens minus bona; quod est inconveniens. Relinquitur ergo quod virtus non augetur. 7. Moreover, in On generation and corruption 1 it is said that growth is addition to a pre-existent magnitude. Therefore, if virtue increased, something would have to be added to it, and thus it would be a greater composite and more distant from the divine similitude and consequently less good, which is ridiculous. Therefore, virtue does not increase. Praeterea, omne quod augetur, movetur; omne quod movetur, est corpus; virtus non est corpus. Ergo non augetur. 8. Moreover, whatever is increased is moved, and whatever is moved is a body. But virtue is not a body. Therefore, it is not increased. Praeterea, cuius causa est invariabilis, et ipsum est invariabile. Sed causa virtutis infusae, quae est Deus, invariabilis est. Ergo virtus infusa est invariabilis; ergo non recipit magis et minus; et ita non augetur. 9. Moreover, that whose cause is invariable is itself invariable. But the cause of infused virtue, which is God, is invariable. Therefore, infused virtue is invariable and is not susceptible of more or less and does not increase. Praeterea, virtus est in genere habitus, sicut et scientia. Si ergo virtus augetur, oportet quod augeatur sicut et scientia augetur. Scientia autem augetur per multiplicationem obiectorum, prout scilicet ad plura se extendit. Sic autem non augetur virtus, ut patet in caritate: quia minima caritas se extendit ad omnia diligenda secundum caritatem. Ergo virtus nullo modo augetur. 10. Moreover, virtue like science is in the genus of habit. Therefore, if virtue increased, it would be necessary that it increase in the way that science does. But science is increased by the multiplication of objects, that is, it extends to more things. That this is not how virtue increases is clear from charity, since the least charity extends to loving all things charitably. Therefore, virtue in no way increases. Praeterea, si virtus augetur, oportet quod ad aliquam speciem motus, eius augmentum reducatur. Sed non potest reduci nisi ad alterationem, quae est motus in qualitate. Alteratio autem, secundum philosophum, VII Physic., non est in anima nisi secundum partem sensitivam: in qua non est caritas, neque plures aliarum virtutum infusarum. Ergo non omnis virtus infusa augetur. 11. Moreover, if virtue increased, its increase would have to belong to some type of change. But it could only belong to alteration, which is change according to quality, but alteration, according to the Philosopher in Physics 7, is only in the sensitive part of the soul which is not where charity or any of the other infused virtues resides. Therefore, not every infused virtue increases. Praeterea, si virtus infusa augetur, oportet quod augeatur a Deo, qui eam causat. Si autem Deus eam auget, oportet quod hoc fiat per alium eius influxum. Sed novus influxus non potest esse, nisi sit nova virtus infusa. Ergo virtus infusa non potest augeri nisi per additionem novae virtutis. Sic autem non potest augeri, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo virtus infusa nullo modo augetur. 12. Moreover, if infused virtue increased, it would have to be increased by God, who causes it, but if God increased it, this would have to be by a new infusion, but this can only be a new infused virtue. Therefore, an infused virtue can only be increased by the addition of a new virtue, but that it cannot be increased in this way was shown above. Therefore, the infused virtue cannot be increased in any way. Praeterea, habitus maxime augentur ex actibus. Cum igitur virtus sit habitus; si augetur, maxime augetur per suum actum. Sed hoc non potest esse, ut videtur; cum actus egrediatur ab habitu. Nihil autem augetur per hoc quod aliquid ab eo egreditur, sed per hoc quod aliquid in eo recipitur. Ergo virtus nullo modo augetur. 13. Moreover, it is by its acts that a habit is maximally increased. But this, it seems, cannot be, since the act comes forth from the habit, and nothing is increased by what goes forth from it but rather by what it receives. Therefore, virtue can in no way increase. Praeterea, omnes actus virtutis unius sunt rationis. Si igitur aliqua virtus per suum actum augetur, oportet quod per quemlibet actum augeatur; quod videtur esse falsum ex experimento: non enim experimur quod virtus in quolibet actu crescat. 14. Moreover, the acts of the same virtue are the same. Therefore, if a virtue were increased by its acts, it would have to be increased by each of them, which seems falsified by experience. We do not experience an increase of virtue from each of its acts. Praeterea, illud cuius ratio in superlativo consistit, non potest augeri: optimo enim non est aliquid melius, nec albissimo est aliquid albius. Sed ratio virtutis in superlatione consistit: est enim virtus ultimum potentiae. Ergo virtus non potest augeri. 15. Moreover, things whose notion consists in the superlative cannot be increased: There is no better than the best, nor whiter than the whitest. But the notion of virtue consists in the superlative, for it is the utmost of a power. Therefore, virtue cannot be increased. Praeterea, omne illud cuius ratio consistit in aliquo indivisibili, caret intensione et remissione; sicut forma substantialis, et numerus, et figura. Sed ratio virtutis consistit in quodam indivisibili: est enim in medietate consistens. Ergo virtus non intenditur neque remittitur. 16. Moreover, that whose definition consists in some indivisible lacks intension or remission, for example, substantial form, number, and figure. But the notion of virtue consists in something indivisible, for it lies in the mean. Therefore, virtue is neither intensified not lessened. Praeterea, nullum infinitum potest augeri; quia infinito non est aliquid magis. Sed virtus infusa est infinita, quia per eam meretur homo infinitum bonum, scilicet Deum. Ergo virtus infusa augeri non potest. 17. Moreover, nothing that is infinite can be increased, since there is nothing greater than it. But infused virtue is infinite because through it a man meni ts an infinite good, namely, God. Therefore, infused virtue cannot be increased. Praeterea, nulla res procedit ultra suam perfectionem, quia perfectio est terminus rei. Sed virtus est perfectio habentis eam; dicitur enim VII Physic., quod virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum. Ergo virtus non augetur. 18. Moreover, nothing extends beyond its own perfection because its perfection is the limit of the thing, but virtue is the perfection of the one having it, for it is said in Physics 7 that virtue is the disposition of the perfect to the best. Therefore, virtue does not increase. Sed contra. ON THE CONTRARY Est quod dicitur I Petr., II, v. 2: sicut modo geniti infantes, rationabiles et sine dolo, lac concupiscite, ut in eo crescatis in salutem. Non autem crescit aliquis in salutem nisi per augmentum virtutis, per quam homo in salutem ordinatur. Ergo virtus augetur. 1. In 1 Peter 2:2, “Crave, as newborn babes, pure spiritual milk, that by it you may grow to salvation.” But no one grows in health save through an increase of virtue by which man is ordered to salvation. Therefore, virtue increases. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, quod caritas augetur, ut aucta mereatur et perfici. 2. Moreover, Augustine says that charity increases in order that as increased it might merit perfection. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod multis error accidit circa formas ex hoc quod de eis iudicant sicut de substantiis iudicatur. Quod quidem ex hoc contingere videtur, quod formae per modum substantiarum signantur in abstracto, ut albedo, vel virtus, aut aliquid huiusmodi; unde aliqui modum loquendi sequentes, sic de eis iudicant ac si essent substantiae. Et ex hinc processit error tam eorum qui posuerunt latitationem formarum, quam eorum qui posuerunt formas esse a creatione. Aestimaverunt enim quod formis competeret fieri sicut competit substantiis; et ideo non invenientes ex quo formae generentur, posuerunt eas vel creari, vel praeexistere in materia; non attendentes, quod sicut esse non est formae, sed subiecti per formam, ita nec fieri, quod terminatur ad esse, est formae, sed subiecti. Sicut enim forma ens dicitur, non quia ipsa sit, si proprie loquamur, sed quia aliquid ea est; ita et forma fieri dicitur, non quia ipsa fiat, sed quia ea aliquid fit: dum scilicet subiectum reducitur de potentia in actum. RESPONSE. It should be said that many errors are made about forms when they are thought of as substances. This seems to happen because forms are abstractly signified in the mode of substance, e.g., whiteness, or virtue and the like. So some following the mode of expression judge them as if they were substances and from this arises the error both of those which held the latency of forms and of those who held forms to have been from creation, for they thought that becoming belonged to forms as it does to substances, and thus unable to find anything from which forms could be generated, they held that they were created or pre-existed in matter, not taking into account that just as existence is not of the form but of the subject through the form, neither does the becoming that terminates in existence pertain to form but to the subject. For just as form is called being, not because it exists, properly speaking, but because something exists by it, so form is said to come to be, not because it becomes, but because by it something comes to be, namely, when the subject is reduced from potency to act. Sic autem et circa augmentum qualitatum accidit; de quo aliqui locuti sunt ac si qualitates et formae substantiae essent. Substantia autem augeri dicitur, in quantum ipsa est subiectum motus quo pervenitur de minori quantitate in maiorem, qui motus augmenti dicitur. Et quia augmentum substantiae fit per additionem substantiae ad substantiam; quidam aestimaverunt, quod hoc modo caritas, sive quaelibet virtus infusa, augeatur per additionem caritatis ad caritatem, vel virtutis ad virtutem, aut albedinis ad albedinem: quod omnino stare non potest. Nam non potest intelligi additio unius ad alterum nisi praeintellecta dualitate. Dualitas autem in formis unius speciei non potest intelligi nisi per alietatem subiecti. Formae enim unius speciei non diversificantur numero nisi per subiectum. Si igitur qualitas additur qualitati, oportet alterum duorum esse: vel quod subiectum addatur subiecto, ut puta quod unum album addatur alteri albo; aut quod aliquid in subiecto fiat album, quod prius non fuit album, ut quidam posuerunt circa qualitates corporeas; quod etiam improbat philosophus in IV physicorum. Cum enim aliquid fit magis curvum, non curvatur aliquid quod prius curvum non fuit, sed totum fit magis curvum. Circa qualitates autem spirituales, quarum subiectum est anima, vel pars animae impossibile est etiam hoc fingere. Unde quidam alii dixerunt caritatem, et alias virtutes infusas, non augeri essentialiter; sed quod dicuntur augeri, vel in quantum radicantur fortius in subiecto, vel in quantum ferventius vel intensius operantur. Sed hoc quidem dictum aliquam rationem haberet, si caritas esset quaedam substantia habens per se esse absque substantia; unde et Magister sententiarum, aestimans caritatem esse aliquam substantiam, scilicet ipsum spiritum sanctum, non irrationabiliter hunc modum augmenti posuisse videtur. Sed alii, aestimantes caritatem esse qualitatem quamdam, penitus irrationabiliter sunt locuti. Nihil enim est aliud qualitatem aliquam augeri, quam subiectum magis participare qualitatem; non enim est aliquod esse qualitatis nisi quod habet in subiecto. So it is with respect to increase of qualities, of which some have spoken as if qualities and forms were substances; substance is said to increase insofar as it is the subject of a motion going from a lesser to a greater quantity, a motion called increase. And because the increase of substance comes about by the addition of substance to substance, some thought that in this way charity or any infused virtue is increased by the addition of charity to charity, or of virtue to virtue, or of whiteness to whiteness, which can in no way be defended. For the addition of one to another can only be understood if duality is presupposed. But the duality of forms of the same species can only be understood as the otherness of subject. Therefore, if quality were added to quality, one of these must exist: Either such that subject is added to subject, for example one white thing is added to another white thing, or that something in the subject becomes white which previously was not, as some held of bodily qualities, which the Philosopher disproved in Physics 4. For when something becomes more curved, it is not that something that previously was not curved becomes curved, but that a whole becomes more curved. With regard to spiritual qualities, whose subject is the soul, or a part of the soul, it is impossible to imagine this. Hence, others said that charity and the other infused virtues are not increased essentially, but that they are said to be increased either insofar as they are more strongly rooted in the subject or insofar as they are more fervently or intensely performed. This would make sense if charity were a substance having existence of itself apart from substance. Hence, the Master of the Sentences, thinking charity to be a substance, namely, the Holy Spirit himself, not unreasonably seems to posit this manner of increase; but others, thinking charity to be a quality, spoke quite unreasonably. For a quality to be increased is nothing other than for a subject to participate more in a quality, for the quality has no existence save in a subject. Ex hoc autem ipso quod subiectum magis participat qualitatem, vehementius operatur; quia unumquodque agit in quantum est actu; unde quod magis est reductum in actum, perfectius agit. Ponere igitur quod aliqua qualitas non augeatur secundum essentiam, sed augeatur secundum radicationem in subiecto, vel secundum intensionem actus, est ponere contradictoria esse simul. Et ideo considerandum restat quomodo aliquae qualitates et formae augeri dicuntur; et quae sunt quae augeri possunt. Sciendum est ergo, quod cum nomina sint signa intellectuum, ut dicitur I Periher.; sicut ex magis notis cognoscimus minus nota, ita etiam ex magis notis minus nota nominamus. Et inde est quod, quia motus localis est notior inter omnes motus, ex contrarietate secundum locum derivatur nomen distantiae ad omnia contraria inter quae potest esse aliquis motus; ut dicit philosophus X Metaph. Because a subject participates more in a quality, it acts more vehemently and since anything acts insofar as it is in act, that which is more reduced to act acts more perfectly. Therefore, to hold that a quality does not increase in essence, but increases by rootedness in its subject or according to intension of act is to hold that contradictories simultaneously exist. So it remains to be asked how some qualities and forms are said to increase, and which of them can. Note, therefore, that since names are signs of concepts, as is said in On interpretation, just as from the more known we know the less known, so too we name the less known from the more known. Hence, it is that because local motion is the most obvious of the motions, from the contrariety of place the word distance is extended to all contraries between which there can be some motion, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 10. Et similiter, quia motus substantiae secundum quantitatem est sensibilior quam motus secundum alterationem; inde est quod nomina convenientia motui secundum quantitatem derivantur ad alterationem. Et inde est quod, sicut corpus quod movetur ad quantitatem perfectam dicitur augeri, et ipsa quantitas perfecta dicitur magna respectu imperfectae; ita illud quod movetur de qualitate imperfecta ad perfectam, dicitur augeri secundum qualitatem; et ipsa qualitas perfecta dicitur magna respectu imperfectae. Et quia perfectio uniuscuiusque rei est eius bonitas; ideo Augustinus dicit, quod in his quae non magna mole sunt, idem est esse maius quod melius. Moveri autem de forma imperfecta ad perfectam, nihil est aliud quam subiectum magis reduci in actum: nam forma actus est; unde subiectum magis percipere formam, nihil aliud est quam ipsum reduci magis in actum illius formae. Et sicut ab agente reducitur aliquid de pura potentia in actum formae; ita etiam per actionem agentis reducitur de actu imperfecto in actum perfectum. Similarly, because the quantitative change of a substance is more sensible than its alteration, names appropriate to quantitative change are extended to alteration. So it is that, just as a body that moves to its perfect quantity is said to increase in quantity, and the perfect quantity is said to be large with respect to the imperfect, so too what is changed from imperfect to perfect quality is said to increase in quality, and its perfect quality is called greater with respect to the imperfect. And, because a thing’s perfection is its goodness, Augustine says that greater is better in things that are not much. To be changed from imperfect to perfect form is nothing other than for the subject to become more actual, for its act is form, and for a subject to receive more form is for it to be more actual with respect to that form. And just as it is brought by an agent from pure potency to the act of the form, so it is by the action of the agent also that it is brought from imperfect to perfect act. Sed hoc non contingit in omnibus formis, propter duo. But this is not true of all forms, and for two reasons. Primo quidem ex ipsa ratione formae; eo scilicet quod id quod perficit rationem formae, est aliquid indivisibile, puta numerus. Nam unitas addita constituit speciem: unde binarius aut trinarius non dicitur secundum magis et minus; et per consequens non invenitur magis et minus neque in quantitatibus quae denominantur a numeris, puta bicubitum vel tricubitum, neque in figuris, puta triangulare et quadratum; et in proportionibus, puta duplum et triplum. First, because of the very meaning of form. What completes the definition of a form is something indivisible, like a number, for an added unit constitutes a species, which is why there is not more or less of two and three. Consequently, more and less are not found in quantities denominated from numbers, for example, two inches or three inches, nor in figures, for example, triangle and square, nor in proportions, for example, double and triple. Alio modo ex comparatione formae ad subiectum; quia inhaeret ei modo indivisibili. Et propter hoc forma substantialis non recipit intensionem vel remissionem, quia dat esse substantiale, quod est uno modo: ubi enim est aliud esse substantiale, est alia res; et propter hoc philosophus, VIII Metaphys., assimilat definitiones numeris. Et inde est etiam quod nihil quod substantialiter de altero praedicatur, etiam si sit in genere accidentis, praedicatur secundum magis et minus; non enim dicitur albedo magis et minus color. Et propter hoc etiam qualitates in abstracto signatae, quia signantur per modum substantiae, nec intenduntur nec remittuntur; non enim dicitur albedo magis et minus, sed album. Second, because of the comparison of form to its subject, in which it inheres in an indivisible manner. For this reason a substantial form is not subject to intensification or diminution, because it gives substantial existence, which is in a single manner: where there is a different substantial existence, there is a different thing. That is why Aristotle in Metaphysics 8 likens definitions to numbers. Likewise, nothing that is predicated substantially of another, even if it is in a category of accident, is predicated according to more or less. For example, whiteness is not said to be more or less color. Because of this, even qualities abstractly signified, which is for them to be signified in the manner of substance, are not subject to intensification or its opposite: It is not whiteness that is said to be more or less, but a white thin. Neutra autem istarum causarum est in caritate et in aliis virtutibus infusis, quare non intendantur et remittantur; quia neque earum ratio in indivisibili consistit, sicut ratio numeri; neque dant esse substantiale subiecto, sicut formae substantiales; et ideo intenduntur et remittuntur, in quantum subiectum reducitur magis in actum ipsarum per actionem agentis causantis eas. Unde sicut virtutes acquisitae augentur ex actibus per quos causantur, ita virtutes infusae augentur per actionem Dei, a quo causantur. However, neither of these is applicable to charity or the other infused virtues, preventing them to be more or less intense. Their definition does not consist in an indivisible, nor do they give substantial existence to their subjects, as substantial forms do. Therefore they can be more or less intense insofar as their subject is made more or less actual by them thanks to the agent causing them. Hence, just as acquired virtues are increased by the acts which cause them, so infused virtues are increased by the action of God by whom they are caused. Actus autem nostri comparantur ad augmentum caritatis et virtutum infusarum, ut disponentes, sicut ad caritatem a principio obtinendam; homo enim faciens quod in se est, praeparat se, ut a Deo recipiat caritatem. Ulterius autem actus nostri possunt esse meritorii respectu augmenti caritatis; quia praesupponunt caritatem, quae est principium merendi. Sed nullus potest mereri, quin a principio obtineat caritatem; quia meritum sine caritate esse non potest. Sic igitur caritatem augeri per intensionem dicimus. Our actions dispose to the increase of charity and the infused virtues, in the way that charity is obtained from the outset. A man who does what it is in his power prepares himself so that he might receive charity from God. Furthermore, our acts can merit an increase of charity, insofar as they presuppose charity which is the principle of meriting. But no one can merit charity at the outset, because without charity there can be no merit. It is in this way, then, that we say that charity can be increased in intensity. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut in caritate et aliis qualitatibus dicitur augmentum per similitudinem, ita et quantitas, ut ex dictis, in corp. art., patet. Ad 1. It should be said that just as we speak of increase in charity and other qualities by way of similarity, so too do we attribute quantity to them, as is clear from what has been said. Ad secundum dicendum, quod forma est invariabilis, quia non est variationis subiectum; potest tamen dici variabilis, prout subiectum secundum eam variatum, plus et minus eam participat. Ad 2. It should be said that form is invariable because it is not subject to variation, but it can be called variable insofar as its subject is varied and participates in it more and less. Ad tertium dicendum, quod motus alicuius rei potest intelligi secundum essentiam dupliciter. Uno modo quantum ad id quod est proprium, esse scilicet essentialis, vel non esse; et sic motus secundum essentiam non est nisi motus secundum esse et non esse, qui est generatio et corruptio. Alio modo, potest intelligi motus secundum essentiam, si sit motus secundum quodcumque adhaerens essentiae; sicut dicimus corpus essentialiter moveri quando movetur secundum locum, quia de loco ad locum eius subiectum transfertur; sicut etiam et aliqua qualitas dicitur suo modo moveri essentialiter, prout variatur secundum perfectum et imperfectum, vel magis subiectum secundum eam ut ex dictis, in corp. art., patet. Ad 3. It should be said that the motion of a thing can be understood to be according to essence in two ways. In one way, with respect to that which is proper, namely, essential existence or non-existence, and this motion according to essence is nothing other than motion with respect to existence and non-existence, that is, generation and corruption. In another way motion according to essence can be understood to be according to something adhering to the essence, as we say that a body is moved essentially when it is moved according to place, because its subject is transferred from place to place. just so a quality is said to be changed essentially in its own way insofar as it varies when the subject has more or less of it, as has been explained in the Response. Ad quartum dicendum, quod id quod praedicatur essentialiter de caritate, non praedicatur de ea secundum magis et minus: non enim dicitur magis vel minus virtus; sed maior caritas dicitur magis virtus propter modum significandi, quia significatur ut substantia. Sed quia ipsa non praedicatur essentialiter de suo subiecto, subiectum secundum eam recipit magis et minus: ut dicatur subiectum habens magis caritatis vel minus; et quod est habens magis caritatem est magis virtuosum. Ad 4. It should be said that what is predicated essentially of charity is not predicated according to more and less, for it is not said to be more or less a virtue, But greater charity is said to be more a virtue on account of the mode of signifying, because it is signified as a substance; still, because it is not predicated essentially of its subject, what is subject to it receives more and less, as a subject having more or less charity, and what has more charity is more virtuous. Ad quintum dicendum, quod caritas non diminuitur, quia non habet causam diminutionis, ut Ambrosius probat; habet autem causam augmenti, scilicet Deum. Ad 5. It should be said that charity is not diminished because it does not have a cause of decrease, as Ambrose proves. But it has a cause of increase, namely, God. Ad sextum dicendum, quod augmentum quod fit per additionem, est augmentum substantiae quantae. Sic autem caritas non augetur, ut dictum est in corp. art. Ad 6. It should be said that the increase that comes about through ad dition is increase of the quantified substance. But charity does not increase in this way, as was said in the body of the article. Et per hoc patet solutio ad septimum. Ad 7. From which the answer to 7 is clear. Ad octavum dicendum, quod caritas dicitur augeri vel moveri, non quia ipsa sit subiectum motus, sed quia eius subiectum secundum ipsam movetur et augetur. Ad 8. It should be said that charity is said to be increased or changed, not because it is the subject of motion, but because its subject is moved or increased in its regard. Ad nonum dicendum, quod licet Deus sit invariabilis, tamen absque sua variatione variat res; non enim est necessarium ut omne movens moveatur, ut probatur in Lib. Physic. Et hoc praecipue Deo competit, quia non agit per necessitatem naturae, sed per voluntatem. Ad 9. It should be said that although God is invariable yet he varies things without varying himself. For it is not necessary that every mover be moved, as is proved in the Physics. And this belongs chiefly to God, because he does not act from any necessity of nature, but by his will. Ad decimum dicendum, quod omnibus qualitatibus et formis est communis ratio magnitudinis quae dicta est, scilicet perfectio earum in subiecto. Aliquae tamen qualitates, praeter istam magnitudinem seu quantitatem quae competit eis per se, habent aliam magnitudinem vel quantitatem quae competit eis per accidens; et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo ratione subiecti; sicut albedo dicitur quanta per accidens, quia subiectum eius est quantum; unde augmentato subiecto, augmentatur albedo per accidens. Sed secundum hoc augmentum, non dicitur aliquid magis album, sed maior albedo, sicut et dicitur aliquid maius album: non enim aliter praedicantur ea quae pertinent ad hoc augmentum, de albedine, et de subiecto ratione cuius albedo per accidens augeri dicitur. Sed hic modus quantitatis et augmenti non competit qualitatibus animae, scilicet scientiis et virtutibus. Ad 10. It should be said that the notion of magnitude mentioned is common to all qualities and forms, namely, their perfection in the subject. Other qualities, apart from this magnitude or the quality belonging to them as such, have another magnitude or quantity which belongs to them accidentally. And this in two ways. In one way, by reason of the subject, as whiteness is quantified incidentally because its subject is quantified; hence, when the subject is increased, the whiteness increases incidentally. But on this basis when something is called whiter, it is not said to be more of a white thing but of a greater whiteness. For what pertains to increase in this sense is not said otherwise of white and of the subject, because its whiteness is said accidentally to increase. But this kind of quantity and increase does not belong to qualities of the soul such as sciences and virtues. Alio modo quantitas et augmentum attribuitur alicui qualitati per accidens, ex parte obiecti in quod agit: et haec dicitur quantitas virtutis; quae magis dicitur propter quantitatem obiecti vel continentiam; sicut dicitur magnae virtutis qui magnum pondus potest ferre, vel qualitercumque potest magnam rem facere, sive magnitudine dimensiva, sive magnitudine perfectionis, vel secundum quantitatem discretam; sicut dicitur aliquis magnae virtutis qui potest multa facere. Et hoc modo quantitas per accidens potest attribui qualitatibus animae, scilicet scientiis et virtutibus. Sed tamen hoc interest inter scientiam et virtutem: quia de ratione scientiae non est quod se extendat in actum respectu omnium obiectorum: non enim est necesse quod sciens omnia scibilia cognoscat. Sed de ratione virtutis est quod in omnibus virtuose se agat. Unde scientia potest augeri vel secundum numerum obiectorum, vel secundum intensionem eius in subiecto; virtus autem uno modo tantum. Sed considerandum est, quod eiusdem rationis est quod aliqua qualitas in aliquid magnum possit, et quod ipsa sit magna, sicut ex supradictis patet; unde etiam magnitudo perfectionis potest dici magnitudo virtutis. In another way quantity and increase are attributed incidentally to a quality because of the object on which it acts, and this is called the quantity of virtue or power, which refers to the quantity of the object or container, as that is said to be of great power which can bear a great weight, or can do something big in whatever sense, whether by dimensive magnitude or the magnitude of perfection, or according to discrete quantity, as that is said to be of great power which can do many things. In this way quantity can be incidentally attributed to the qualities of the soul, that is, to sciences and virtues. But there is this difference between science and virtue, that it is not of the notion of science that it actually extend to all objects, for it is not necessary that the knower know all knowable things. But it is of the essence of virtue that it always acts virtuously. Hence, science can be increased either according to the number of objects or according to its intensity in the subject, but virtue in one way only. But it should be considered that it is for the same reason that some quality can be referred to something great, and that it is itself great, as is clear from the foregoing; hence, the magnitude of perfection can also be called the magnitude of virtue. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod motus augmenti caritatis reducitur ad alterationem, non secundum quod alteratio est inter contraria, prout est tantum in sensibilibus, et in sensibili parte animae; sed prout alteratio et passio dicitur secundum receptionem et perfectionem; sicut sentire et intelligere est quoddam pati et alterari. Et sic distinguit philosophus alterationem et passionem in II de anima. Ad 11. It should be said that the motion of increase of charity is reduced to alteration, not insofar as alteration is between contraries, as it always is in sensible things, and in the sensible part of the soul, but insofar as alteration and passion refer to reception and perfection, as sensing and understanding are a kind of receiving and being altered. Thus, the Philosopher distinguishes alteration and passion in On the Soul 2. Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod Deus auget caritatem, non novam caritatem infundendo, sed eam quae praeexistebat, perficiendo. Ad 12. It should be said that God increases charity not by infusing new charity but by perfecting that which already exists. Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod sicut actus egrediens ab agente potest causare virtutem acquisitam propter impressionem virtutum activarum in passivis, ut supra dictum est; ita et potest eam augere. Ad 13. It should be said that just as the act coming forth from an agent can cause acquired virtue because of the impression of active powers on the passive, as was said above, so too it can increase it. Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod caritas et aliae virtutes infusae non augentur active ex actibus, sed tantum dispositive et meritorie, ut dictum est. Nec tamen oportet quod quilibet actus perfectus correspondeat quantitati virtutis: non enim oportet quod habens caritatem, semper operetur secundum totum posse caritatis; usus enim habituum subiacet voluntati. Ad 14. It should be said that charity and the other infused virtues are not increased actively by acts, but only dispositively and meritoriously, as has been said. However, it is not necessary that any perfect act correspond to the quantity of virtue, for it is not necessary that one having charity should always act according to the full force of charity; the use of habits is subject to will. Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod ratio virtutis non consistit in superlatione quantum ad se, sed quantum ad suum obiectum: quia per virtutem ordinatur homo ad ultimum potentiae, quod est bene operari; unde philosophus dicit, VII Phys., quod virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum. Tamen ad hoc optimum aliquis potest esse magis, vel minus dispositus; et secundum hoc, virtus recipit magis vel minus. Vel dicendum, quod ultimum non dicitur simpliciter, sed ultimum specie; sicut ignis est specie subtilissimum corporum, et homo dignissima creaturarum; et tamen unus homo est dignior altero. Ad 15. It should be said that the notion of virtue does not consist in the superlative with respect to itself, but with respect to its object, because by virtue a man is ordered to the utmost of a power, which is to act well; hence, the Philosopher says in Physics 7 that virtue is the disposition of the perfected to the best. However, one can be more or less disposed to this optimum, and in this respect, virtue receives more or less. Or it might be said that it is not called the utmost simply, but the utmost of a kind, as fire is in kind the most subtle body and man the most worthy of creatures, yet one man is more worthy than another. Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod ratio virtutis non consistit in indivisibili secundum se, sed ratione sui subiecti, in quantum quaerit medium: ad quod quaerendum potest aliquis diversimode se habere, vel peius vel melius. Et tamen ipsum medium non est omnino indivisibile; habet enim aliquam latitudinem: sufficit enim ad virtutem quod appropinquet ad medium, ut dicitur II Ethic.; et propter hoc unus actus altero virtuosior dicitur. Ad 16. It should be said that the notion of virtue does not consist in the indivisible in itself, but by reason of its subject, insofar as it seeks the mean, for the seeking of which it can comport itself in different ways, well or badly. However, the mean itself is not in every way indivisible, but has a certain latitude, since it suffices for virtue that it approach the mean, as is said in Ethics 2, and for this reason one act is said to be more virtuous than another. Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod virtus caritatis est infinita ex parte Dei, vel finis; sed ad illum infinitum caritas finite disponit; unde potest magis vel minus esse. Ad 17. It should be said that the virtue of charity with respect to its end, God, is infinite, but charity finitely disposes to that end and hence is susceptible of more or less. Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod non omne perfectum est perfectissimum, sed solum illud quod est in ultimo actualitatis; et ideo nihil prohibet, quod est perfectum secundum virtutem, adhuc magis perfici. Ad 18. Not every perfect thing is most perfect, but only that which is in ultimate actuality; thus there is no impediment to someone already perfected by virtue to become more perfect.
Duodecimo quaeritur utrum virtutes inter se distinguantur. Quaeritur de distinctione virtutum
The distinction of the virtues
Et videtur quod non recte virtutes distinguantur. It seems that the virtues are not rightly distinguished. Moralia enim recipiunt speciem ex fine. Si igitur virtutes distinguantur secundum speciem, oportet quod hoc sit ex parte finis. Sed non ex parte finis proximi: quia sic essent infinitae virtutes secundum speciem. Ergo ex parte finis ultimi. Sed finis ultimus virtutum est unus tantum, scilicet Deus, sive felicitas. Ergo est una tantum virtus. 1. Moral matters are specified by the end. Therefore, if virtues are specifically different, this must be on the part of the end. But not of the proximate end, because thus there would be an infinity of species of virtues. Therefore, of the ultimate end. But the ultimate end of the virtues is one alone, namely, God, or happiness. Therefore, there is only one virtue. Praeterea, ad unum finem pervenitur una operatione. Una autem operatio est ex una forma. Ergo ad unum finem ordinatur homo per unam formam. Finis autem hominis est unus: scilicet felicitas. Ergo et virtus, quae est forma per quam homo ordinatur ad felicitatem, est una tantum. 2. Moreover, one activity has one end. But an activity is one from one form; therefore, a man is ordered to one end by one form. But man’s end is one, namely, happiness. So virtue too is one, which is the form by which a man is ordered to happiness. Praeterea, formae et accidentia recipiunt numerum secundum materiam vel subiectum. Subiectum autem virtutis est anima, vel potentia animae. Ergo videtur quod virtus sit una tantum, quia anima est una; vel saltem quod virtutes non excedant numerum potentiarum animae. 3. Moreover, forms and accidents are numbered according to matter or subject. But the subject of virtue is the soul or a power of the soul. It seems, therefore, that virtue is one alone, because the soul is one, or, at least, that virtues do not exceed in number the powers of the soul. Praeterea, habitus distinguuntur per obiecta, sicut et potentiae. Cum ergo virtutes sint quidam habitus: videtur quod eadem sit ratio distinctionis virtutum et potentiarum animae; et sic, virtutes non excedunt numerum potentiarum animae. 4. Moreover, habits are distinguished by objects, as powers are. Therefore, since the virtues are habits, it seems that there should be the same basis for distinguishing virtues and powers of the soul, and thus the virtues would not exceed the powers of the soul in number. Sed dicendum, quod habitus distinguuntur per actus, et non per potentias. —Sed contra, principiata distinguuntur secundum principia, et non e converso; quia ab eodem res habent esse et unitatem. Sed habitus sunt principia actuum. Ergo magis distinguuntur actus penes habitus quam e converso. 5. Moreover, it might be said that habits are distinguished by acts and not by powers, but on the contrary: What derive from principles are distinguished by the principles and not the reverse, because a thing has existence and unity from the same cause, but habits are the principles of acts. Therefore, acts are distinguished according to habits rather than conversely. Praeterea, virtus necessaria est ad hoc quod homo inclinetur ad id quod est virtutis per modum naturae: est enim virtus, ut Tullius dicit, habitus in modum naturae rationi consentaneus. Ad id igitur ad quod ipsa potentia naturaliter inclinatur, non indiget homo virtute. Sed voluntas hominis naturaliter inclinatur ad ultimum finem. Ergo circa ultimum finem non est necessarius homini aliquis habitus virtutis; propter quod nec philosophi posuerunt aliquas virtutes quarum obiectum esset felicitas. Nec ergo nos debemus ponere aliquas virtutes theologicas, cuius obiectum sit Deus, qui est ultimus finis. 6. Moreover, virtue is necessary if a man is to be inclined naturally to that with which the virtue is concerned. For, as Cicero says, virtue is a habit in the manner of nature and in harmony with reason. In order for this power to be inclined naturally, therefore, a man does not need virtue, for man’s will is naturally inclined to the ultimate end. Therefore, with respect to the ultimate end, man does not need any habit of virtue, for which reason philosophers do not posit any virtues whose object would be happiness. Therefore, we should not posit such theological virtues either, whose object is God, the ultimate end. Praeterea, virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum. Sed fides et spes imperfectionem quamdam important; quia fides est de non visis, spes de non habitis, propter quod, cum venerit quod perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est, ut dicitur I Cor. XIII, v. 10. Ergo fides et spes non debent poni virtutes. 7. Moreover, virtue is the disposition of that which is already somewhat perfected for the best, but faith and hope imply imperfection, because faith is concerned with what is not seen and hope with what is not had, because of which, when it comes to be perfected, “that which is imperfect will be done away with,” is said in 1 Corinthians 13:10. Therefore, faith and hope ought not be placed among the virtues. Praeterea, ad Deum non potest aliquis ordinari nisi per intellectum et affectum. Sed fides sufficienter ordinat intellectum hominis in Deum, caritas autem affectum. Ergo praeter fidem et caritatem non debet poni spes virtus theologica. 8. Moreover, no one can be ordered to God except through intellect and will. But faith sufficiently orders a man’s intellect to God and charity his will. Therefore, we ought not posit the theological virtue of hope beyond faith and charity. Praeterea, id quod est generale omni virtuti, non debet poni specialis virtus. Sed caritas videtur esse communis omnibus virtutibus; quia ut dicit Augustinus in Lib. de moribus Ecclesiae, nihil aliud est virtus quam ordo amoris: ipsa etiam caritas dicitur esse forma omnium virtutum. Ergo non debet poni una specialis virtus inter theologicas. 9. Moreover, that which is general to every virtue ought not to be posited as a special virtue. But charity seems to be common to all the virtues, because as Augustine says in On the customs oftbe cburch, virtue is nothing but the order of love. Charity itself is also said to be the form of all virtues, therefore, it ought not be numbered as a special theological virtue. Praeterea, in Deo non solum consideratur veritas quam respicit fides, vel sublimitas quam respicit spes, vel bonitas quam respicit caritas; sed sunt plura alia quae Deo attribuuntur: ut sapientia, potentia et huiusmodi. Ergo videtur quod sit vel una tantum virtus theologica, quia omnia illa unum sunt in Deo; vel quod sint tot virtutes theologicae, quot sunt quae attribuuntur Deo. 10. Moreover, in God should be considered not only truth, which faith looks to, or sublimity which, hope looks to, or goodness, which charity looks to – there are many others things attributed to God, such as wisdom, power, and the like. Therefore, it seems that either there is only one theological virtue because all these are one in God, or that there should be as many theological virtues as there are things attributed to God. Praeterea, virtus theologica est cuius actus immediate ordinatur in Deum. Sed plura alia sunt talia: sicut sapientia quae contemplatur Deum, timor qui reveretur ipsum, religio quae colit eum. Ergo non sunt tantum tres virtutes theologicae. 11. Moreover, a theological virtue is one whose act is ordered immediately to God, but many other things are like that, such as wisdom which contemplates God, fear which reveres him, religion which honors him. Therefore, there are not just three theological virtues. Praeterea, finis est ratio eorum quae sunt ad finem. Habitis igitur virtutibus theologicis, quibus homo recte ordinatur ad Deum, videtur superfluum ponere alias virtutes. 12. Moreover, the end is the reason for the things that are for the sake of the end. Therefore, once the theological virtues, whereby man is rightly ordered to God, are had, it seems superfluous to posit other virtues. Praeterea, virtus ordinatur ad bonum: est enim virtus quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit. Sed bonum est tantum in voluntate et in appetitiva parte; et sic videtur quod non sint aliquae virtutes intellectuales. 13. Moreover, virtue is ordered to the good, for virtue is what makes the one having it good and makes his work good. But since good is in the will and appetitive part, it seems that there cannot be any intellectual virtues. Praeterea, prudentia est quaedam virtus intellectualis. Ipsa autem ponitur inter morales. Ergo videtur quod morales virtutes non distinguantur ab intellectualibus. 14. Moreover, prudence Is an intellectual virtue. But it is numbered among the moral virtues, so it seems that moral virtues are not distinguished from the intellectual. Praeterea, scientia moralis non tractat nisi moralia. Tractat autem scientia moralis de virtutibus intellectualibus. Ergo virtutes intellectuales sunt morales. 15. Moreover, moral science deals only with moral matters, but moral science treats of the intellectual virtues; therefore, the intellectual virtues are moral. Praeterea, id quod ponitur in definitione alicuius, non distinguitur ab eo. Sed prudentia ponitur in definitione virtutis moralis: est enim virtus moralis, habitus electivus in medietate consistens determinata secundum rectam rationem, ut dicitur II Ethic.: ratio enim agibilium est prudentia, ut dicitur VI Ethic. Ergo morales virtutes non distinguuntur a prudentia. 16. Moreover, what is put into the definition of a thing is not distinguished from it, but prudence is put into the definition of moral virtue, for moral virtue is an elective habit consisting in a mean determined by right reason, as is said in Ethics 2. But right reason with respect to things to be done is prudence, as is said in Ethics 6. Therefore, the moral virtues are not distinguished from prudence. Praeterea, sicut prudentia pertinet ad cognitionem practicam, ita et ars. Sed praeter artem non sunt aliqui habitus in appetitiva parte ordinati ad operandum artificialia. Ergo pari ratione nec praeter prudentiam sunt aliqui habitus virtuosi in appetitu ad operandum agibilia; et ita videtur quod non sint aliquae virtutes morales distinctae a prudentia. 17. Both art and prudence pertain to practical knowledge. But art does not require habits in the appetitive part ordered to effecting artificial things. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, there should be no need for virtuous habits in the appetitive part in order that prudence might be effective. Thus, it seems that not are no moral virtues distinct from prudence. Sed dicendum, quod ideo arti non respondet aliqua virtus in appetitu, quia appetitus est singularium, ars autem universalium. —Sed contra, Aristoteles dicit II Ethic., quod ira semper est circa singularia: sed odium est etiam universalium; habemus enim odio omne latronum genus. Odium autem ad appetitum pertinet. Ergo appetitus est respectu universalium. 18. Moreover, should it be said that no virtue in appetite answers to art because appetite is of singulars, on the contrary, Aristotle says in Ethics 2 that wrath deals with singulars, but hate is also of universals, for we hate the whole genus of thieves. But hate pertains to aPpetite. Therefore, appetite deals with universals. Praeterea, unaquaeque potentia naturaliter tendit in suum obiectum. Obiectum autem appetitus est bonum apprehensum. Ergo appetitus naturaliter tendit in bonum ex quo est apprehensum. Sed ad apprehendendum bonum sufficienter nos perficit prudentia. Ergo praeter prudentiam non est necessarium nos habere aliquam virtutem aliam moralem in appetitu, cum ad hoc sufficiat inclinatio naturalis 19. Moreover, every power naturally tends to its object, but the object of appetite is the known good. Therefore, appetite naturally tends to the good insofar as it is known, but prudence sufficiently perfects us for knowing the good. Therefore, we have no need of any other moral virtue than prudence in appetite, since the natural inclination suffices for this. Praeterea, ad virtutem sufficit cognitio et operatio. Sed utrumque horum habetur per prudentiam. Ergo praeter prudentiam non oportet ponere alias virtutes morales. 20. Moreover, knowledge and action suffice for virtue, but both of these are had in prudence. Therefore, there is no need to posit other moral virtues besides prudence. Praeterea, sicut appetitivi habitus distinguuntur penes obiecta, ita et habitus cognoscitivi. Sed de omnibus moralibus est unus habitus cognoscitivus, vel scientia moralis circa omnia moralia, vel etiam prudentia. Ergo et una tantum est in appetitu virtus moralis. 21. Moreover, the habits of the cognitive part, like those of the appetitive, are distinguished by their objects. But there is one cognitive habit of all the moral virtues, either one moral science which concerns all moral matters, or prudence. Therefore, there is only one moral virtue in the appetite. Praeterea, ea quae conveniunt in forma, et differunt solum in materia, sunt unum specie. Sed omnes virtutes morales conveniunt secundum id quod est formale in eis, quia in omnibus est medium acceptum secundum rationem rectam; non autem differunt nisi penes materias. Ergo non differunt specie, sed numero tantum. 22. Moreover, things which agree in form and differ only in matter are specifically the same. But all moral virtues agree in that which is formal in them, because in all of them there is a mean accepted from right reason; and they differ only in their matters. Therefore, they do not differ in species but only in number. Praeterea, ea quae differunt specie, non denominantur ad invicem. Sed virtutes morales denominant se ad invicem: quia, ut Augustinus dicit, oportet quod iustitia sit fortis et temperata, et temperantia iusta et fortis, et sic de aliis. Ergo virtutes non distinguuntur ad invicem. 23. Moreover, specifically different things are not named from one another. But the moral virtues are denominated from one another. Augustine says that justice must be brave and temperate and temperance just and brave, and so with the rest. Therefore, virtues are not distinct from one another. Praeterea, virtutes theologicae et cardinales, sunt principaliores quam morales. Sed virtutes intellectuales non dicuntur cardinales, neque theologicae. Ergo nec morales debent dici cardinales, quasi principales. 24. Moreover, the theological and cardinal virtues rank higher than moral virtues. But the intellectual, not the theological, virtues are said to be cardinal. No more then should the moral virtues be called cardinal, as if they ranked higher. Praeterea, tres ponuntur animae partes; scilicet rationalis, irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Ergo si sunt aliquae virtutes principales, videtur quod sint tres tantum. 25. Moreover, the soul has three parts, namely, the rational, the irascible, and the concupiscible. Therefore, if there are principal virtues, it seems that they should be only three in number. Praeterea, aliae virtutes videntur istis principaliores; sicut est magnanimitas, quae operatur magnum in omnibus virtutibus, ut dicitur IV Ethic.; et humilitas, quae est custos virtutum; mansuetudo etiam videtur esse principalior quam fortitudo, cum sit circa iram, a qua denominatur irascibilis; liberalitas et magnificentia, quae dant de suo, videntur esse principaliores quam iustitia quae reddit alteri debitum. Ergo istae non sunt virtutes cardinales, sed magis aliae. 26. Moreover, other virtues seem to rank higher, such as magnanimity which does great things in all the virtues, as is said in Ethics 6, and humility, which is the guardian of virtue. Even meekness seems superior to courage, since it governs wrath from which the irascible is denominated; liberality and magnificence, which give of themselves, seem higher than justice, which renders another his due. Therefore, these rather than the others should be the cardinal virtues. Praeterea, pars non distinguitur a suo toto. Sed aliae virtutes ponuntur a Tullio, partes istarum quatuor: scilicet prudentiae, iustitiae, fortitudinis, et temperantiae. Ergo saltem aliae virtutes morales non distinguuntur ab istis; et sic videntur virtutes non recte distingui. 27. Moreover, a part is not distinguished from its whole. But Cicero says that the other virtues are parts of these, namely, of prudence, justice, courage, and temperance. Therefore, at the least the other virtues ought not be distinguished from these, and thus the virtues do not seem to be correctly distinguished. Sed contra, est quod I Cor. XIII, 13, dicitur: nunc autem manent fides, spes, caritas, tria haec; et Sap. VIII, 7: sobrietatem et prudentiam docet, et iustitiam, et virtutem. ON THE CONTRARY. In 1 Corinthians 13:13, we read, “there remain now these three, faith, hope and charity,” and Wisdom 8:7. “For she teaches temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude.” Respondeo. Dicendum quod unumquodque diversificatur secundum speciem secundum id quod est formale in ipso. Formale autem in unoquoque est id quod est completivum definitionis eius. Ultima enim differentia constituit speciem: unde per eam differt definitum secundum speciem ab aliis; et si ipsa sit multiplicabilis formaliter secundum diversas rationes, definitum in species diversas dividitur secundum ipsius diversitatem. Illud autem quod est completivum et ultimum formale in definitione virtutis, est bonum: nam virtus universaliter accepta sic definitur: virtus est, quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit: ut patet in Lib. Ethic. Unde et virtus hominis, de qua loquimur, oportet quod diversificetur secundum speciem, secundum quod bonum ratione diversificatur. Cum autem homo sit homo in quantum rationalis est; oportet hominis bonum esse eius quod est aliqualiter rationale. Rationalis autem pars, sive intellectiva, comprehendit et cognitivam et appetitivam. Pertinet autem ad rationalem partem non solum appetitus, qui est in ipsa parte rationali, consequens apprehensionem intellectus, qui dicitur voluntas: sed etiam appetitus qui est in parte sensitiva hominis, et dividitur per irascibilem et concupiscibilem. Nam etiam hic appetitus in homine sequitur apprehensionem rationis, in quantum imperio rationis obedit; unde et participare dicitur aliqualiter rationem. Bonum igitur hominis est et bonum cognitivae et bonum appetitivae partis. RESPONSE. It should be said that a thing is specified by that which is formal in it, and what is formal in a thing is that which completes its definition, for the ultimate difference constitutes the species, which is why the defined differs specifically from others because of it. If this could be formally multiplied according to different notions, the defined would be divided into different species. But what completes and is ultimately formal in the definition of virtue is the good. For taken generally virtue is that which makes the one having it good and makes his action good, as is clear from the Ethics. Hence, man’s virtue, which is what we are speaking of, will be specifically different insofar as the good is differentiated by reason. But since man is man insofar as he is rational, his good must be in some way rational. But the rational or intellective part comprises both the cognitive and appetitive. However, it is not just the appetite which is in the rational part which follows on the grasp of intellect, that is, will, that pertains to the rational part, but also the appetite in man’s sensitive part which is divided into the irascible and concupiscible. For in man this appetite too follows the lead of reason insofar as it obeys the command of reason. That is why it is said to participate in reason. Therefore, man’s good is the good of both the cognitive and the appetitive Parts. Non autem secundum eamdem rationem utrique parti bonum attribuitur. Nam bonum appetitivae parti attribuitur formaliter, ipsum enim bonum est appetitivae partis obiectum: sed intellectivae parti attribuitur bonum non formaliter, sed materialiter tantum. Nam cognoscere verum, est quoddam bonum cognitivae partis; licet sub ratione boni non comparetur ad cognitivam, sed magis ad appetitivam: nam ipsa cognitio veri est quoddam appetibile. Oportet igitur alterius rationis esse virtutem quae perficit partem cognoscitivam ad cognoscendum verum, et quae perficit rationem appetitivam ad apprehendendum bonum; et propter hoc philosophus in Lib. Ethic., distinguit virtutes intellectuales a moralibus: et intellectuales dicuntur quae perficiunt partem intellectualem ad cognoscendum verum, morales autem quae perficiunt partem appetitivam ad appetendum bonum. Et quia bonum magis congrue competit parti appetitivae quam intellectivae, propter hoc, nomen virtutis convenientius et magis proprie competit virtutibus appetitivae partis quam virtutibus intellectivae; licet virtutes intellectivae sint nobiliores perfectiones quam virtutes morales, ut probatur VI Ethic. But good is not attributed to each part in the same sense, for good is formally attributed to the appetitive part, since good is the object of the appetitive part. Good is not attributed formally to the intellective part, but only materially for to know the true is a good of the cognitive part, although it does not relate to the cognitive part under the formality of the good as it does to the appetitive, for knowledge of truth is desirable. Therefore, the virtue which perfects the cognitive part in knowledge of the true must have a different sense than that which perfects the appetitive in attaining the good, for which reason the Philosopher in the Ethics distinguishes the intellectual from the moral virtues. Those are called intellectual which perfect the intellectual part in knowing the true, and those that perfect the appetitive part in seeking the good are called moral. And because the good belongs to the appetitive part more properly than to the intellective, the term virtue more fittingly and properly belongs to the virtues of the appetitive than to the virtues of the intellective, although intellectual virtues are more noble perfections than are the moral virtues, as is said in Ethics 6. Cognitio autem veri non est respectu omnium unius rationis. Alia enim ratione cognoscitur verum necessarium, et verum contingens: et iterum verum necessarium alia ratione cognoscitur si sit per se notum, sicut intellectu cognoscuntur prima principia; alia ratione si fiat notum ex alio, sicut fiunt notae conclusiones per scientiam vel sapientiam circa altissima: in quibus etiam est alia ratio cognoscendi, eo quod ex hac homo dirigitur in aliis cognoscendis. But knowledge of the true does not always have the same sense. To know necessary truth is one thing, to know the contingent another, and necessary truth is further subdivided into the self-evident (as when the intellect knows first principles) and that which is known by inference (as intellect knows conclusions by science and the highest things by wisdom: means something different when a man is led on to know other things). Et similiter circa contingentia operabilia non est eadem ratio cognoscendi ea quae sunt in nobis, quae dicuntur agibilia, ut sunt operationes nostrae, circa quas frequenter contingit errare, propter aliquam passionem; quarum est prudentia: et ea quae sunt extra nos a nobis factibilia, in quibus dirigit ars aliqua; quorum rectam aestimationem passiones animae non corrumpunt. Et ideo philosophus ponit VI Ethic., virtutes intellectuales, scilicet sapientiam, et scientiam et intellectum, prudentiam et artem. There is also another notion of knowing in them, from the fact that by this a man is directed in knowing other things. And similarly, with respect to contingent things to be done, there is not a single sense of knowing  the things that remain in us and are called do-able, as being our operations, concerning which we often err on account of passion and with which prudence is concerned, and [21 things outside us but makeable by us where art is directive and in which the passions of the soul do not vitiate estimation. Therefore, in Ethics 6 the Philosopher posits intellectual virtues, namely, wisdom, science, and understanding, prudence and art. Similiter etiam bonum appetitivae partis non secundum eamdem rationem se habet in omnibus rebus humanis. Huiusmodi autem bonum in tripartita materia quaeritur; scilicet in passionibus irascibilis et in passionibus concupiscibilis, et in operationibus nostris quae sunt circa res exteriores quae veniunt in usum nostrum, sicut est emptio et venditio, locatio et conductio, et huiusmodi alia. Bonum enim hominis in passionibus est, ut sic homo in eis se habeat, quod per earum impetum a rationis iudicio non declinet; unde si aliquae passiones sunt quae bonum rationis natae sint impedire per modum incitationis ad agendum vel prosequendum, bonum virtutis praecipue consistit in quadam refrenatione et retractione; sicut patet de temperantia, quae refrenat et compescit concupiscentias. Si autem passio nata sit praecipue bonum rationis impedire in retrahendo, sicut timor, bonum virtutis circa huiusmodi passionem erit in sustinendo; quod facit fortitudo. Circa res vero exteriores bonum rationis consistit in hoc quod debitam proportionem suscipiant, secundum quod pertinent ad communicationem humanae vitae; et ex hoc imponitur nomen iustitiae, cuius est dirigere, et aequalitatem in huiusmodi invenire. No more does the good of the appetitive part always have the same sense in all human affairs. This good is sought in three kinds of matter, namely, in the passions of the irascible and in the passions of the concupiscible and in our acts which are concerned with external things or things which come into our use, as in buying and selling, placing, guiding, and other like things. Man’s good in the case of the passions is that he be so related to them that he does not turn from the judgment of reason because of their influence; hence, if there are passions which are such as to impede the good of reason by mode of inciting to action or pursuit, the good of virtue consists chiefly in a restraint and holding back, as is evident in temperance, which refrains and holds back desires. If, however, a passion is such that it chiefly impedes the good of reason in withdrawal, as in fear, the good of virtue with respect to such a passion consists in sustaining, which is what courage does. With respect to external things, the good of reason consists in this, that they receive a fitting proportion, insofar as they pertain to the sharing of human life, and the word justice is imposed from this, since it directs and discovers equality in such things. Sed considerandum est, quod tam bonum intellectivae partis quam appetitivae est duplex: scilicet bonum quod est ultimus finis, et bonum quod est propter finem; nec est eadem ratio utriusque. Et ideo praeter omnes virtutes praedictas, secundum quas homo bonum consequitur in his quae sunt ad finem, oportet esse alias virtutes secundum quas homo bene se habet circa ultimum finem, qui Deus est; unde et theologicae dicuntur, quia Deum habent non solum pro fine, sed etiam pro obiecto. But it should be considered that both the good of the intellectual and of the appetitive part are twofold, namely, the good which is the ultimate end and the good that is for the sake of the end, and these do not have the same sense. Therefore, beyond the virtues mentioned, thanks to which a man pursues the good which is for the sake of the end, there must be other virtues thanks to which he is well related to the ultimate end which is God. That is why they are called theological: They have God not only for their end, but for their object. Ad hoc autem quod moveamur recte in finem, oportet finem esse et cognitum et desideratum. Desiderium autem finis duo exigit: scilicet fiduciam de fine obtinendo, quia nullus sapiens movetur ad id quod consequi non potest; et amorem finis, quia non desideratur nisi amatum. Et ideo virtutes theologicae sunt tres: scilicet fides, qua Deum cognoscimus; spes, qua ipsum nos obtenturos esse speramus; et caritas, qua eum diligimus. Sic ergo patet quod sunt tria genera virtutum: theologicae, intellectuales et morales et quodlibet genus sub se plures species habet. In order that we be moved correctly to the end, the end must be known and desired. But the desire of the end requires two things, namely, trust concerning the end to be obtained, because no wise man moves toward that which he cannot attain, and love of the end, because only the loved is desired. There are accordingly three theological virtues, namely, faith, by which we know God, hope, whereby we hope to attain him, and charity, by which we love him. It is clear then that there are three kinds of virtue: theological, intellectual, and moral and that there are several species of each kind. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod moralia recipiunt speciem a finibus proximis; qui tamen non sunt infiniti, si in eis sola differentia formalis consideretur: nam finis proximus uniuscuiusque virtutis est bonum quod ipsa operatur, quod differt ratione, ut ostensum est in corp. art. Ad 1. It should be said that moral matters are specified by proximate ends, which, however, are not infinite if we consider in them only their formal difference. For the proximate end of any virtue is the good that is done by means of it, which goods provide their different definitions, as was shown in the body of the article. Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit in his quae agunt per necessitatem naturae, quia ea consequuntur finem una actione et una forma: homo autem ideo habet rationem, quia per plura et diversa oportet quod ad finem suum perveniat; unde sunt ei necessariae plures virtutes. Ad 2. It should be said that the argument works in things which act from the necessity of their nature, since they attain the end by one action and one form. But man has reason because he must reach his end by many different ways, and that is why many virtues are necessary for him. Ad tertium dicendum, quod accidentia non multiplicantur in uno secundum numerum, sed tantum secundum speciem; unde non oportet unitatem vel multitudinem in virtutibus considerari secundum subiectum, quod est anima, vel potentiae eius, nisi quatenus diversitatem potentiarum consequitur diversa ratio boni, secundum quam distinguuntur virtutes, ut dictum est. Ad 3. It should be said that accidents are not multiplied numerically in the same thing, but only specifically; hence, the unity or multitude of virtues ought not be looked for according to their subject, which is the soul, or its potencies, unless a different notion of good follows on the diversity of powers, since virtues are distinguished according to that, as has been said. Ad quartum dicendum, quod non secundum eamdem rationem est aliquid obiectum potentiae et habitus. Nam potentia est secundum quam simpliciter possumus aliquid, puta irasci vel confidere; habitus autem est secundum quem aliquid possumus bene vel male, ut dicitur in Ethic. Et ideo ubi est alia ratio boni, est alia ratio obiecti quantum ad habitum, sed non quantum ad potentiam; propter quod contingit in una potentia multos habitus esse. Ad 4. It should be said that a thing is not the object of a power and of a habit for the same reason, for a power is that thanks to which we can do something, simply, for example, wax wrathful or trust, but a habit is that thanks to which we do something wen or badly, as is said in the Ethics. Therefore, where there is a different sense of the good, there is a difference sense of object with respect to habit, but not with respect to power, since there are many habits in one Potency. Ad quintum dicendum, quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse causam effectivam alterius, quod tamen est causa finalis illius; sicut medicina est causa effectiva sanitatis, quae est finis medicinae, ut philosophus dicit I Ethic. Habitus igitur sunt causae effectivae actuum; sed actus sunt fines habituum; et ideo habitus formaliter secundum actus distinguuntur. Ad 5. It should be said that nothing prevents a thing from being the efficient cause of that which is its final cause, as medicine is the efficient cause of health, which is the end of medicine, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 1. Therefore, habits are the efficient cause of acts, but acts are the ends of habits, and, therefore, habits are formally distinguished according to their acts. Ad sextum dicendum, quod respectu finis qui est naturae humanae proportionatus, sufficit homini ad bene se habendum naturalis inclinatio; et ideo philosophi posuerunt aliquas virtutes, quarum obiectum esset felicitas, de qua ipsi tractabant. Sed finis in quo beatitudinem speramus, Deus, est naturae nostrae excedens proportionem; et ideo supra naturalem inclinationem necessariae sunt nobis virtutes, quibus in finem ultimum elevemur. Ad 6. It should be said that with respect to the end proportioned to human nature, natural inclination suffices in order for a man to be well related to it; that is why the philosophers spoke of various virtues whose object is happiness. But the end in which we hope for happiness, God, exceeds the proportion of our nature, which is why above the natural inclination virtues are necessary which raise us to the ultimate end. Ad septimum dicendum, quod attingere ad Deum qualitercumque et imperfecte, maioris perfectionis est quam perfecte alia attingere; unde philosophus dicit de proprietatibus animalium, et in II de Cael. et Mund.: quod de sublimioribus rebus percipimus, est dignius, quam quod de aliis rebus multum cognoscimus. Et ideo nihil prohibet et fidem et spem esse virtutes, quamvis per eas imperfecte attingamus ad Deum. Ad 7. It should be said that to attain God in whatever imperfect way is of greater perfection that to attain other things perfectly. Hence, the Philosopher says in the Properties ofanimals and On the heatens 2, that what we grasp of higher things is more worthy than to know much of other things. Therefore, nothing prevents faith and hope from being virtues although by means of them we attain God imperfectly. Ad octavum dicendum, quod affectus in Deum ordinatur et per spem in quantum confidit de Deo, et per caritatem in quantum diligit ipsum. Ad 8. It should be said that the affections are ordered to God both through hope, whereby we trust in him, and through charity, whereby we love him. Ad nonum dicendum, quod amor est principium et radix omnium affectuum: non enim gaudemus de praesentia boni nisi in quantum est amatum; et similiter patet in omnibus aliis affectionibus. Sic igitur omnis virtus quae est ordinativa alicuius passionis, est etiam ordinativa amoris. Nec etiam sequitur quod caritas, quae est amor, non sit virtus specialis; sed oportet quod sit principium quodammodo omnium virtutum, in quantum omnes movet ad suum finem. Ad 9. It should be said that love is the principle and root of all affections, for we do not rejoice in a present good if it is not loved, and the same thing is clear in other affections. Therefore, every virtue which orders some passion also orders love, nor does it follow that charity which is love is not a special virtue, but it must be, as it were, the principle of all the virtues insofar as it moves them all to its end. Ad decimum dicendum, quod non oportet secundum omnia attributa divina accipi virtutes theologicas, sed solum secundum illa secundum quae appetitum nostrum movet ut finis; et secundum hoc sunt tres virtutes theologicae, ut dictum est art. 10 huius quaestionis. Ad 10. It should be said that it is not necessary that all the divine attributes give rise to theological virtues, but only insofar as they move our appetite as an end, and in this respect there are three theological virtues, as was said in article 10 of this question. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod religio habet Deum pro fine, non autem pro obiecto, sed ea quae offert colendo ipsum; et ideo non est virtus theologica. Similiter etiam sapientia, qua nunc contemplamur Deum, non immediate respicit ipsum Deum, sed effectus ex quibus ipsum in praesenti contemplamur. Timor etiam respicit pro obiecto aliquid aliud quam Deum; vel poenas vel propriam parvitatem, ex cuius consideratione homo Deo reverenter se subiicit. Ad 11. It should be said that God is the end of religion, not its object; its object is those things involved in reverencing Him. So it is not a theological virtue. Likewise, the wisdom whereby we contemplate God now does not look immediately to God, but to His effects which are the present means of contemplating him. Moreover, fear looks to something other than God for its object - either punishments or one’s insignificance, by thinking of which a man is brought reverently to submit himself to God. Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod sicut in speculativis sunt principia et conclusiones: ita et in operativis sunt fines et ea quae sunt ad finem. Sicut igitur ad perfectam cognitionem et expeditam non sufficit quod homo bene se habeat circa principia per intellectum, sed ulterius requiritur scientia ad conclusiones; ita in operativis praeter virtutes theologicas, quibus bene nos habemus ad ultimum finem, sunt necessariae virtutes aliae, quibus bene ordinemur ad ea quae sunt ad finem. Ad 12. It should be said that just as in speculative matters there are principles and conclusions, so in action there are ends and means. Therefore, for perfect and expeditious knowledge it does not suffice that a man have true knowledge of principles, he also needs knowledge of conclusions. So it is that in action, over and above the theological virtues by which we are well related to the ultimate end, there must be other virtues which order us to the means. Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod licet bonum, in quantum huiusmodi, sit obiectum appetitivae virtutis et non intellectivae; tamen id quod est bonum, potest inveniri etiam in intellectiva. Nam cognoscere verum, quoddam bonum est; et sic habitus perficiens intellectum ad verum cognoscendum, habet virtutis rationem. Ad 13. It should be said that, although the good as such is the object of the appetite and not the intellectual part, the good can be found in the intellectual part as well, for to know the true is a kind of good, and thus the habit perfecting intellect in knowledge of the truth has the note of virtue. Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod prudentia secundum essentiam suam intellectualis est, sed habet materiam moralem; et ideo quandoque cum moralibus numeratur, quodammodo media existens inter intellectuales et morales. Ad 14. It should be said that in its essence prudence is an intellectual virtue, but it has moral matter; therefore, sometimes it is numbered with the moral as existing in a way between intellectual and moral virtues. Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod virtutes intellectuales licet distinguantur a moralibus, pertinent tamen ad scientiam moralem in quantum actus earum voluntati subduntur: utimur enim scientia cum volumus, et aliis virtutibus intellectualibus. Ex hoc autem aliquid morale dicitur, quod se habet aliquo modo ad voluntatem. Ad 15. It should be said that, although intellectual virtues are distinguished from the moral, they fall to moral science insofar as their acts are subject to will, for we use science when we want to, and likewise with the other intellectual virtues. Something is called moral because it is related in some way to the will. Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod ratio recta prudentiae non ponitur in definitione virtutis moralis, quasi aliquid de essentia eius existens; sed sicut causa quodammodo effectiva ipsius, vel per participationem. Nam virtus moralis nihil aliud est quam participatio quaedam rationis rectae in parte appetitiva, ut in superioribus dictum est. Ad 16. It should be said that the right reason of prudence is not put in the definition of moral virtue as something of its essence but either as its efficient cause or because of participation, for moral virtue is nothing other than the appetitive part’s participation in right reason, as was said in what has gone before. Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod materia artis sunt exteriora factibilia; materia autem prudentiae sunt agibilia in nobis existentia. Sicut igitur ars requirit rectitudinem quamdam in rebus exterioribus, quae ars disponit secundum aliquam formam; ita prudentia requirit rectam dispositionem in passionibus et affectionibus nostris; et propter hoc prudentia requirit aliquos habitus morales in parte appetitiva, non autem ars. Ad 17. It should be said that external makeables are the matter of art whereas the matter of prudence are things to be done which are within us. Therefore, just as art requires rectitude in exterior things, which it disposes according to some form, so prudence requires a correct disposition in our passions and affections. For this reason prudence needs moral virtues in the appetitive part, but art does not. Ad decimumoctavum concedimus. Appetitus enim intellectivae partis, qui est voluntas, potest esse universalis boni, quod per intellectum apprehenditur; non autem appetitus qui est in parte sensitiva, quia nec sensus universale apprehendit. Ad 18. We concede. The appetite of the intellective part, that is, will, bears on a universal good grasped by intellect, but the appetite of the sensitive part does not bear on a universal good anymore than sense can grasp the universal. Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod licet appetitus naturaliter moveatur in bonum apprehensum; ad hoc tamen quod faciliter inclinetur in hoc bonum, quod ratio consequitur per prudentiam perfectam, requiritur in parte appetitiva aliquis habitus virtutis; et praecipue vera ratio deliberans et demonstrans aliquod bonum, in cuius contrarium appetitus natus est ferri absolute; sicut concupiscibilis nata est moveri in delectabile sensus, et irascibilis in vindictam, quae tamen interdum ratio prohibet per suam deliberationem. Similiter etiam voluntas, ea quae in usum hominis veniunt, nata est appetere sibi ad necessitatem vitae, sed ratio deliberans aliquando praecipit alteri communicanda. Et ideo in parte appetitiva necessarium est ponere habitus virtutum ad hoc quod faciliter obediat rationi. Ad 19. It should be said that although appetite is naturally moved by the good as apprehended, in order for it to be inclined easily to the good that reason perfected by prudence grasps, it must have virtue. Particularly when appetite left to itself is drawn to the opposite, it needs true reason deliberating about and showing the good. For example, the is fashioned to be moved by what is delightful to sense and the irascible by revenge, but sometimes, after deliberation, reason forbids these. Likewise the will, with respect to the things that fall to man’s use, is so fashioned as to desire what is necessary for its life, but reason after deliberation sometimes commands that it be shared with another. That is why a habit of virtue is needed in the appetitive part in order for it to obey reason with ease. Ad vicesimum dicendum est, quod cognitio ad prudentiam immediate pertinet; sed operatio pertinet ad eam mediante appetitiva virtute; et ideo debent in appetitiva etiam virtute esse aliqui habitus, qui dicuntur virtutes morales. Ad 20. It. should be said that knowledge pertains immediately to prudence, but action pertains to it through the mediation of the appetitive power; therefore, in the appetitive power there must be the habits that are called moral virtues. Ad vicesimumprimum dicendum, quod in omnibus moralibus est una ratio veri: in omnibus enim moralibus est verum contingens agibile; non tamen in eis est una ratio boni, quod est obiectum virtutis. Et ideo respectu omnium moralium est unus habitus cognoscitivus, sed non una virtus moralis. Ad 21. It should be said that there is one notion of truth in an moral virtues, for in all there is the true contingent thing to be done, but there is not the same notion of good, which is the object of virtue. Therefore, there is one knowing habit for all moral matters, but not one moral virtue. Ad vicesimumsecundum dicendum, quod medium in diversis materiis diversimode invenitur; et ideo diversitas materiae in virtutibus moralibus causat diversitatem formalem secundum quam virtutes morales specie differunt. Ad 22. It should be said that the mean is found differently in different matter, and therefore, the diversity of matter in the moral virtues causes a formal difference insofar as moral virtues differ in species. Ad vicesimumtertium dicendum, quod quaedam virtutes morales speciales, et circa materiam specialem existentes, appropriant sibi illud quod est commune omni virtuti, et ab eo denominantur: propterea quod illud quod est omnibus commune in aliqua speciali materia, praecipue difficultatem et laudem habet. Manifestum est enim quod ad quamlibet virtutem requiritur quod actus eius sit modificatus secundum debitas circumstantias, quibus in medio constituitur, et quod sit directus in ordine ad finem, vel ad quodcumque aliud exterius; et iterum quod habeat firmitatem. Immobiliter enim operari est una de conditionibus virtutis, ut patet III Ethic.; persistere autem firmiter praecipue habet difficultatem et laudem in periculis mortis, et ideo virtus quae est circa hanc materiam, nomen sibi fortitudinis vindicat. Continere autem, specialiter habet difficultatem et laudem in delectabilibus tactus; unde virtus quae est circa hanc materiam, temperantia nominatur. In usu autem rerum exteriorum praecipue requiritur et laudatur rectitudo, quia in huiusmodi bonis homines sibi communicant; et ideo hoc est bonum virtutis in eis, quia quantum ad ea homo directe secundum aequalitatem quamdam se habet ad alios; et ab hoc denominatur iustitia. Quandoque ergo homines de virtutibus loquentes, utuntur nomine fortitudinis et temperantiae et iustitiae, non secundum quod sunt virtutes speciales in determinata materia, sed secundum conditiones generales a quibus denominantur. Et per hoc dicitur quod temperantia debet esse fortis, id est firmitatem habere; et fortitudo debet esse temperata, id est modum servare, et eadem ratio est in aliis. De prudentia vero manifestum est quod quodammodo est generalis, in quantum habet pro materia omnia moralia, et in quantum omnes virtutes morales quodammodo eam participant, ut ostensum est in isto art. ad 16 arg., et hac ratione dicitur quod omnis virtus moralis debet esse prudens. Ad 23. It should be said that some special moral virtues with their own special matter appropriate to themselves what is common to all virtues and are denominated from it. Moreover, that which is common to all has a special difficulty and praise in some special matter. For it is clear that every virtue requires that its act be modified according to fitting circumstances by which it is constituted in a mean, and that it be ordered to the end or to something else outside, and again that it have firmness, for to act unchangingly is one of the conditions of virtue, as is clear in Ethics 3, and firmly to persist has especial difficulty and praise in mortal danger, and then the virtue bearing on this matter claims for its name fortitude. Restraint in the matter of the pleasures of touch especially involves difficulty and merits praise: the virtue bearing on this is called temperance. In the use of external things rectitude is especially needed and praised in the goods that men share. Therefore, the good of virtue in these is that a man be related to others according to equality, and justice is named from this. Therefore, speaking of virtues, men sometimes use the name of fortitude and temperance and justice, not insofar as they are special virtues with a determinate matter, but with respect to the general conditions from which they are named. That is why it is said that temperance should be brave, that is, have firmness, and fortitude be tempered, that is, to keep to a measure, and so too with the others. It is clear in the case of prudence that it is in some way general, insofar as it has all morals for its matter, and insofar as all moral virtues in a way participate in it, as was shown in this article and in ad 16. For this reason every moral virtue ought to be identical with prudence. Ad vicesimumquartum dicendum, quod virtus aliqua dicitur cardinalis, quasi principalis, quia super eam aliae virtutes firmantur sicut ostium in cardine. Et quia ostium est per quod introitur in domum, ratio cardinalis virtutis non competit virtutibus theologicis, quae sunt circa ultimum finem, ex quo non est introitus vel motus ad aliquid interius. Convenit enim virtutibus theologicis quod super eas aliae virtutes firmentur, sicut supra aliquid immobile; et ideo fides dicitur fundamentum, I Corinth., III, 11: fundamentum enim aliud nemo potest ponere praeter id quod positum est; spes ancora, Heb. VI, 19: sicut anima ancoram etc.; caritas radix, Ephes. III, 17: in caritate radicati et fundati. Similiter etiam intellectuales non dicuntur cardinales, quia perficiunt in vita contemplativa quaedam earum, scilicet sapientia, scientia, et intellectus: vita autem contemplativa est finis, unde non habet rationem ostii. Sed vita activa, in qua perficiuntur morales, est ut ostium ad contemplativam. Ars autem non habet virtutes sibi cohaerentes, ut cardinalis dici possit. Sed prudentia, quae dirigit in vita activa, inter cardinales virtutes computatur. Ad 24. It should be said that a virtue is called cardinal, or principal, because other virtues are fixed on it as a door is on its hinges. And since the door is that through which one enters the house, the notion of cardinal virtue does not belong to the theological virtues, which look to the ultimate end from which there is no movement or going into the interior. It does belong to the theological virtues that other virtues are fixed on them as on something unchangeable, which is why faith is called a foundation, 1 Corinthians 3:11, “For other foundation no one can lay but that which has been laid...” and hope an anchor, Hebrews 6:19, “as a sure and firm anchor of the soul... “ charity a root, Ephesians 3:17, “being rooted and grounded in love...” Similarly, the intellectual virtues are not called cardinal because some of them are perfective of the contemplative life, namely, wisdom, science, and understanding, but the contemplative fife is the end; hence, it does not have the notion of a door. The active life, which moral virtues perfect, is a door to the contemplative. Although art does not have virtues attached to it that it might be called cardinal, prudence which is directive in the active life is counted among the cardinal virtues. Ad vicesimumquintum dicendum, quod in parte rationali sunt duae virtutes, scilicet appetitiva, quae vocatur voluntas; et apprehensiva, quae vocatur ratio. Unde in parte rationali sunt duae virtutes cardinales: prudentia quantum ad rationem, iustitia quantum ad voluntatem. In concupiscibili autem temperantia; sed in irascibili fortitudo. Ad 25. It should be said that there are two powers of the rational part, namely, the appetitive, which is called will, and the apprehensive, which is called reason. So there are two cardinal virtues in the rational part, prudence with respect to reason and justice with respect to will. In the concupiscible there is temperance and in the irascible fortitude. Ad vicesimumsextum dicendum, quod in unaquaque materia oportet esse cardinalem virtutem circa id quod est principalius in materia illa. Virtutes autem quae sunt circa alia quae pertinent ad illam materiam, dicuntur secundariae vel adiectae. Sicut in passionibus concupiscibilis, principaliores sunt concupiscentiae et delectationes quae sunt secundum tactum, circa quas est temperantia; et ideo in materia ista temperantia ponitur cardinalis; eutrapelia vero, quae est circa delectationes quae sunt in ludis, potest poni secundaria vel adiuncta. Similiter inter passiones irascibilis, praecipuum est quod pertinet ad timores et audacias circa pericula mortis, circa quae est fortitudo: unde fortitudo ponitur virtus cardinalis in irascibili; non mansuetudo, quae est circa iras, licet ab ira denominetur, irascibilis propter hoc quod est ultima inter passiones irascibilis; nec etiam magnanimitas et humilitas, quae quodammodo se habent ad spem vel fiduciam alicuius magni: non enim ita movent hominem ira et spes, sicut timor mortis. In actionibus autem quae sunt respectu exteriorum quae veniunt in usum vitae, primum et praecipuum est quod unicuique quod suum est, reddatur: quod facit iustitia. Hoc enim subtracto, neque liberalitas neque magnificentia locum habet, et ideo iustitia est cardinalis virtus, et aliae sunt adiunctae. In actibus etiam rationis praecipuum est praecipere, sive eligere, quod facit prudentia: ad hoc enim ordinatur et consultiva, in quo dirigit eubulia, et iudicium de consiliatis, in quo dirigit synesis. Unde prudentia est cardinalis, aliae vero virtutes sunt adiunctae. Ad 26. It should be said that in any matter there should be a cardinal virtue bearing on that which is principal in that matter. Virtues concerned with other less principal aspects of the matter are called secondary or adjunct virtues. E.g, in concupiscible passions, desires and pleasure, are the chief things with respect to touch, and temperance is concerned with them and is called the cardinal virtue in such matter. But pleasantness (eutrapelia), which concerns the pleasures of games, can be posited as a secondary or adjunct virtue. Similarly with the irascible passions: Fear and boldness are the chief things which pertain to mortal peril, and fortitude deals with them, which is why it is called the cardinal virtue in irascible matters, and not meekness, which concerns anger, even though the irascible is denominated from anger: Fortitude concerns that which is ultimate in irascible passions. Magnanimity and humility, which are concerned with hope, and faithfulness is concerned with something greater. Hope and anger do not move a man as does the fear of death With regard to actions concerned with external things useful for fife, the first and foremost is that each be accorded what is his own, and this justice does. Absent this, neither liberality nor magnificence can occur, and, therefore, justice is a cardinal virtue and the others adjunct. To command or to choose is the principal act of reason, and this prudence does and to it are ordered eubulia, which is deliberative, and then judgment about what has been deliberated, which is the work of synesis. That is why prudence is the cardinal virtue and the others adjunct. Ad vicesimumseptimum dicendum, quod aliae virtutes adiunctae vel secundariae ponuntur partes cardinalium, non integrales vel subiectivae, cum habeant materiam determinatam et actum proprium; sed quasi partes potentiales, in quantum particulariter participant, et deficienter medium quod principaliter et perfectius convenit virtuti cardinali. Ad 27. It should be said that other adjunct or secondary virtues are listed as integral or subjective parts of the cardinal virtues when they have a matter determined to a proper act, but as potential parts insofar as they participate in a particular way and bear in a lesser way on the mean which belongs principally and more perfectly to the cardinal virtue.
Decimotertio quaeritur utrum virtus sit in medio
Whether virtue lies in a mean
Et videtur quod non. It seems not. Quia, ut dicitur in I de caelo, virtus est ultimum potentiae. Sed ultimum non est medium, sed magis extremum. Ergo virtus non est in medio, sed in extremo. 1. As is said in On the heavens 1, virtue is the utmost of a power. But the utmost is not a mean, but rather an extreme. Therefore, virtue does not lie in the mean, but in the extreme. Praeterea, virtus habet rationem boni; est enim bona qualitas, ut Augustinus dicit. Bonum autem habet rationem finis, quod est ultimum, et ita extremum. Ergo magis virtus est in extremo quam in medio. 2. Moreover, virtue has the mark of the good, for it is a good quality; Augustine says that the good has the mark of an end, which is the utmost. Therefore, virtue lies in the extreme rather than in the mean. Praeterea, bonum est contrarium malo, inter quae nullum est medium, quod neque bonum neque malum est, ut dicitur in postpraedicamentis. Ergo bonum habet rationem extremi; et sic virtus, quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit, ut dicitur in II Ethic., non est in medio sed in extremo. 3. Moreover, good is contrary to evil, and there is no mean between them which would be neither good nor evil, as is said in the Post-Predicaments. Therefore, good has the mark of the extreme, and thus virtue, which makes the one having it good and makes his work good, as is said in Ethics 2, lies in the extreme not in the mean. Praeterea virtus est bonum rationis; hoc enim est virtuosum quod secundum rationem est. Ratio autem in homine non se habet ut medium, sed ut supremum. Ergo ratio medii non competit virtuti. 4. Moreover, virtue is the good of reason, for the virtuous is what is in accord with reason. But reason does not relate to man as a mean but as supreme. Therefore, it is not the note of virtue to he in the mean. Praeterea, omnis virtus, aut est theologica, aut intellectualis, aut moralis, ut ex superioribus patet. Sed virtus theologica non est in medio; quia Bernardus dicit quod modus caritatis est non habere modum. Caritas autem praecipua est inter alias virtutes theologicas, et radix earum. Similiter etiam nec intellectualibus virtutibus videtur competere ratio medii: quia medium est inter contraria; res autem, prout sunt in intellectu non sunt contrariae, nec intellectus corrumpitur ex excellenti intelligibili, ut dicitur in III de anima. Similiter etiam nec virtutes morales videntur esse in medio: quia quaedam virtutes consistunt in maximo: sicut fortitudo est circa maxima pericula, quae sunt pericula mortis; et magnanimitas circa magnum in honoribus; et magnificentia circa magnum in sumptibus; et pietas circa maximam reverentiam quae debetur parentibus, quibus nihil aequivalens reddere possumus; et simile est de religione, quae circa magnum est in cultu divino, cui non possumus sufficienter servire. Ergo virtus non est in medio. 5. Moreover, every virtue is either theological or intellectual or moral, as is clear from the foregoing. But theological virtue does not lie in the mean: Bernard says that the mode of charity is not to have a mode. But charity is chief among the theological virtues and their root. So too it is not the case that intellectual virtues lie in the mean, because a mean lies between contraries. But things are not contraries as they exist in intellect, nor is intellect destroyed by the excessive intelligible, as is said in On the Soul 2. So too moral virtues do not seem to he in the mean, because some virtues consist in the maximum, as bravery is concerned with the greatest peril, which is the peril of death, and magnanimity concerns the highest in honors, and magnificence the greatest in consurnables, and piety the greatest reverence, which is owed to parents, to whom we can return nothing equivalent, and the same is true of religion, which is concerned with what is the highest in the divine cult, which we cannot sufficiently serve. Therefore, virtue does lie in the mean. Praeterea, si perfectio virtutis consistit in medio, oportet quod perfectiores virtutes magis in medio consistant. Sed virginitas et paupertas sunt perfectiores virtutes, quia cadunt sub consilio, quod non est nisi de meliori bono. Ergo virginitas et paupertas essent in medio: quod videtur esse falsum; quia virginitas in materia venereorum abstinet ab omni venereo, et ita tenet extremum; et similiter in possessionibus paupertas, quia renuntiat omnibus. Non ergo videtur quod ratio virtutis sit consistere in medio. 6. Moreover, if the perfection of virtue consists in the mean, the more perfect virtues would most consist in the mean, but virginity and poverty are more perfect virtues, because they are counsels which deal only with the greater good. Therefore, virginity and poverty are in the mean, which seems false, because virginity abstains from all venereal pleasure, and this is an extreme, and thus it is with poverty with respect to possessions, which rejects them all. Therefore, it is does not seem to be the mark of virtue to he in the mean. Praeterea, Boetius in arithmetica assignat triplex medium: scilicet arithmeticum, ut 6 inter 4 et 8, quia secundum aequalem quantitatem distat ab utroque; et medium geometricum, sicut 6 inter 9 et 4, quia secundum eamdem proportionem, scilicet sesquialteram, ab utroque extremo distat, licet non secundum eamdem quantitatem; et medium harmonicum, sive musicum, sicut 3 est medium inter 6 et 2, quia quae proportio est unius extremi ad alterum, scilicet 6 ad 2, eadem est proportio 3 (quod est differentia inter 6 et 3) ad 1, quod est differentia inter 2 et 3. Nullum autem istorum mediorum salvatur in virtute; quia non oportet quod medium virtutis aequaliter se habeat ad extremum neque secundum quantitatem, neque secundum proportionem et terminorum et differentiarum. Ergo virtus non est in medio. 7. Moreover, Boethius in On arithmetic speaks of a threefold mean, the arithmetical, as 6 between 4 and 8, which is an equal distance from both, and the geometrical, as 6 between 9 and 4, which is proportionally the same distance from both, namely, two-thirds, though not the same quantity, and the harmonic or musical mean, as 3 between 6 and 2 because there is the same proportion of one extreme to the other, namely, 3 (which is the difference between 6 and 3) to 1, which is the difference between 2 and 3. But none of these means is found in virtue, since the mean of virtue does not relate equally to extremes, nor in a quantitative way nor according to some proportion of the extremes and differences. Therefore, virtue does not he in the mean. Sed dicendum, quod virtus consistit in medio rationis, et non in medio rei, de quo dicit Boetius. —Sed contra, virtus, secundum Augustinum, computatur inter maxima bona, quibus nullus male utitur. Si ergo bonum virtutis est in medio, oportet quod medium virtutis maxime habeat rationem medii. Sed medium rei perfectius habet rationem medii quam medium rationis. Ergo medium virtutis magis est medium rei quam medium rationis. 8. But it might be replied that virtue consists in the mean of reason, not the real mean of which Boethius speaks. On the contrary, virtue, according to Augustine, is counted among the greatest goods and no one can use them badly. Therefore, if the good of virtue lies in the mean, it would be necessary that the mean of virtue be a mean in the fullest sense of the term. But the real mean has the note of mean more perfectly than does the mean of virtue. Therefore, the mean of virtue would have to be the real mean rather than the mean of reason. Praeterea, virtus moralis est circa passiones et operationes animae, quae sunt indivisibiles. In indivisibili autem non est accipere medium et extrema. Ergo virtus non consistit in medio. 9. Moreover, moral virtue is concerned with the passions and activities of the soul, and they are indivisible. But mean and extremes have no place in the indivisible. Therefore, virtue does not consist in the mean. Praeterea, philosophus dicit in Lib. topicorum, quod in voluptatibus melius est facere quam fecisse, vel fieri quam factum esse. Sed virtus aliqua est circa voluptates, scilicet temperantia. Ergo, cum virtus semper quaerat quod melius est; semper temperantia quaeret voluptates fieri, quod est tenere extremum, et non medium. Non ergo virtus moralis consistit in medio. 10. Moreover, the Philosopher says in the Topics that in pleasures present enjoyment is better than past, to be happening than to have happened. But there is a virtue, namely, temperance, that deals with pleasures. Therefore, since virtue always seeks what is best, temperance always seeks present pleasure, which is to bear on an extreme, not a mean. Therefore moral virtue does not lie in a mean. Praeterea, ubi est invenire magis et minus, ibi est invenire medium. Sed in vitiis est invenire magis et minus; est enim aliquis magis vel minus luxuriosus vel gulosus. Ergo in gula et luxuria, et in aliis vitiis, est invenire medium. Si ergo ratio virtutis est esse in medio, videtur quod in vitiis sit invenire virtutem. 11. Moreover, where there is more and less, there is a mean. But in vices there is more and less, since one is more or less carnal or gluttonous. Therefore, in gluttony and lust and in the other vices, there is a mean. Therefore, if it is the note of virtue to lie in the mean, it would seem that virtue must be found in vice. Praeterea, si virtus consistit in medio, non nisi in medio duorum vitiorum. Hoc autem non convenit omni virtuti morali; iustitia enim non est inter duo vitia, sed habet unum tantum vitium oppositum: accipere enim plus quam suum est, hoc vitiosum est; sed quod auferatur alicui de eo quod suum est, absque suo vitio est. Ergo ratio virtutis moralis non est ut in medio consistat. 12. Moreover, if virtue consists of a mean, it can only be the mean between two vices. But this is not true of moral virtue, since justice is not between two vices but has only one opposed vice; to take more than is one’s due is vicious, but to take from another what is one’s own is not a vice. Therefore, it is not the mark of moral virtue to he in the mean. Praeterea, medium aequaliter distat ab extremis. Sed virtus non aequaliter distat ab extremis. Fortis enim propinquior est audaci quam timido, et liberalis prodigo quam tenaci; et similiter patet in aliis. Ergo virtus moralis non consistit in medio. 13. Moreover, the mean lies at an equal distance between extremes, but virtue is not equidistant from extremes, since the courageous man is closer to the bold man than to the timid, and the liberal man to the prodigal than to the stingy, and the same is obvious in the others. Therefore, moral virtue does not he in the mean. Praeterea, de extremo in extremum non transitur nisi per medium. Si ergo virtus sit in medio, non erit de uno vitio opposito in aliud transitus nisi per virtutem; quod patet esse falsum. 14. Moreover, one goes from extreme to extreme only via the mean. Therefore, if virtue lies in the mean, the only transition from a vice to its opposite would be by way of virtue, which is patently false. Praeterea, medium et extrema sunt in eodem genere. Sed fortitudo et timiditas et audacia non sunt in eodem genere: nam fortitudo est in genere virtutis; timiditas et audacia in genere vitii. Ergo fortitudo non est medium inter ea. Et similiter potest obiici de aliis virtutibus. 15. Moreover, the mean and the extremes are in the same genus, but courage and timidity and boldness are not in the same genus, since courage is in the genus of virtue and timidity and foolhardiness in the genus of vice. Therefore, courage is not a mean between them. And the same can be said of the other virtues. Praeterea, in quantitatibus sicut extrema sunt indivisibilia, ita et medium; nam punctum est et medium et terminus lineae. Si ergo virtus consistit in medio, consistit in indivisibili. Et hoc etiam videtur per hoc quod philosophus dicit in II Ethic., quod difficile est esse virtuosum; sicut difficile est attingere signum, vel invenire centrum in circulo. Si ergo virtus in indivisibili consistit, videtur quod virtus non augeatur et minuatur; quod est manifeste falsum. 16. Moreover, just as the extremes in quantity are indivisible, so is the mean, for the point is both the mean and the term of the line. Therefore, if virtue lies in the mean, it lies in the indivisible. This is also apparent from the Philosopher’s statement in Ethics 2 that it is difficult to be virtuous, just as it is difficult to hit the target or to find the center of the circle. However, if virtue lies in the indivisible, it seems that virtue neither increases nor decreases, which is manifestly false. Praeterea, in indivisibili non est aliqua diversitas. Si ergo virtus sit in medio sicut in quodam indivisibili, videtur quod in virtute non sit aliqua diversitas, ita quod id quod est virtuosum uni, sit virtuosum alteri; quod est manifeste falsum: nam aliquis laudatur in uno, qui vituperatur in altero. 17. Moreover, there is no diversity in the indivisible. Therefore, if virtue lies in the mean as in a kind of indivisible, it seems that there is no diversity in virtue, such that what is virtuous vor one is virtuous for another, which is manifestly false, for something is praised in one and blamed in another. Praeterea, quidquid vel ad modicum elongatur ab indivisibili, puta a centro, est extra indivisibile, et extra centrum. Si igitur virtus sit in medio sicut in quodam indivisibili, videtur quod quodcumque vel ad modicum declinet ab eo quod est rectum fieri, sit extra virtutem; et sic rarissime homo operatur secundum virtutem. Non ergo virtus est in medio. 18. Moreover, whatever is a little bit removed from the indivisible, for example, from the center, is outside the indivisible and outside the center. Therefore, if virtue lies in the mean as in an indivisible, it seems that whatever would fall off a little bit from what it is right to do, would be outside virtue, and thus the man who acts virtuously would be extremely rare. Therefore, virtue does not he in the mean. Sed contra, est quod omnis virtus vel est moralis, vel intellectualis, vel theologica. Virtus autem moralis est in medio; nam virtus moralis, secundum philosophum in VII Ethic., est habitus electivus in medietate consistens. Virtus etiam intellectualis videtur esse in medio, propter id quod apostolus dicit, Rom., XII, 3: non plus sapere quam oportet sapere, sed sapere ad sobrietatem. Similiter etiam virtus theologica videtur esse in medio; nam fides incedit media inter duas haereses, ut dicit Boetius in Lib. de duabus naturis; spes etiam est media inter praesumptionem et desperationem. Ergo omnis virtus est in medio. ON THE CONTRARY. A virtue is either moral, intellectual, or theological. But the moral virtue lies in the mean, for moral according the Philosopher in Ethics 7 is a habit of choice lying in the mean. Intellectual virtue too seems to lie in the mean, which is why the Apostle says in Romans 12:3, “Let no one rate himself more than he ought, but let him rate himself according to moderation.” So too theological virtue seems to lie in a mean, for faith falls between two heresies, as Boethius says in On the two natures; and hope is a mean between presumption and despair. Therefore, every virtue lies in a mean. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod virtutes morales et intellectuales sunt in medio, licet aliter et aliter; virtutes autem theologicae non sunt in medio, nisi forte per accidens. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod cuiuslibet habentis regulam et mensuram bonum consistit in hoc quod est adaequari suae regulae vel mensurae; unde dicimus illud bonum esse quod neque plus neque minus habet quam debet habere. Considerandum autem est quod materia virtutum moralium sunt passiones et operationes humanae, sicut factibilia sunt materia artis. Sicut igitur bonum in his quae fiunt per artem, consistit in hoc quod artificiata accipiant mensuram secundum quod exigit ars, quae est regula artificiatorum; ita bonum in passionibus et operationibus humanis est quod attingatur modus rationis, qui est mensura et regula omnium passionum et operationum humanarum. Nam cum homo sit homo per hoc quod rationem habet, oportet quod bonum hominis sit secundum rationem esse. Quod autem in passionibus et operationibus humanis aliquis excedat modum rationis vel deficiat ab eo, hoc est malum. Cum igitur bonum hominis sit virtus humana, consequens est quod virtus moralis consistat in medio inter superabundantiam et defectum; ut superabundantia et defectus et medium accipiantur secundum respectum ad regulam rationis. Virtutum autem intellectualium, quae sunt in ipsa ratione, quaedam sunt practicae, ut prudentia et ars; quaedam speculativae, ut sapientia, scientia et intellectus. Et practicarum quidem virtutum materia sunt passiones et operationes humanae, vel ipsa artificialia; materia autem virtutum speculativarum sunt res ipsae necessariae. RESPONSE. It should be said that moral and intellectual virtues lie in a mean, although differently, but theological virtues do not lie in a mean, except accidentally. In order to see this, one should notice that the good of anything having a rule and a measure lies in its being adequate to its rule or measure; hence, we call that good which has neither more nor less than it should. Notice that human passions and activities are the matter of the moral virtues as things to be done just as things to be made are the matter of art. Therefore, the good in things that come about from art lies in this, that the artifacts are measured by the demands of art, which is the rule of artifacts. So too the good in human passions and activities is to attain the mode of reason, which is the rule and measure of human passions and activities. Since a man is a man because he has reason, his good lies in living in accord with reason. For one to exceed or fall short of the measure of reason in human passions and activities is evil. Therefore, since the human good is human virtue, it follows that moral virtue lies in the mean between too much and too little, insofar as too much, too little, and the mean are read in relation to the rule of reason. Intellectual virtues, which are in reason itself, are either practical, such as prudence and art, or speculative, such as wisdom, science, and understanding. The matter of the practical virtues is human passions and activities or artificial things, whereas the matter of the speculative virtues is necessary things. Aliter autem se habet ratio ad utraque. Nam ad ea circa quae ratio operatur, se habet ratio ut regula et mensura, sicut iam dictum est; ad ea vero quae speculatur, se habet ratio sicut mensuratum et regulatum ad regulam et mensuram: bonum enim intellectus nostri est verum, quod quidem sequitur intellectus noster quando adaequatur rei. Reason relates differently to the two. In those where reason is concerned with works, it is a rule and measure, as has been said. But with respect to the objects of theory, reason is measured and ruled by another rule and measure: The true is our intellect’s good and intellect has it when it is adequated to the thing. Sicut igitur virtutes morales consistunt in medio determinato per rationem; ita ad prudentiam, quae est virtus intellectualis practica circa moralia, pertinet idem medium in quantum ponit ipsum circa actiones et passiones. Et hoc patet per definitionem virtutis moralis, quae, ut in II Ethic. dicitur, est habitus electivus, in medietate consistens, ut sapiens determinabit. Idem ergo est medium prudentiae et virtutis moralis; sed prudentiae est sicut imprimentis, virtutis moralis sicut impressi; sicut eadem est rectitudo artis ut rectificantis, et artificiati ut rectificati. Therefore, just as moral virtues consist in a mean determined by reason, the same mean pertains to prudence, which is the practical intellectual virtue concerned with moral matters, insofar as it imposes it on actions and emotions. This is clear from the definition of moral virtue in Ethics 2: a choosing habit, consisting in the mean as the wise man would define it. The mean of prudence and of moral virtue is the same, but prudence impresses it, and it is impressed on moral virtue, just as in art reason rules and the artifact is ruled. In virtutibus autem intellectualibus speculativis medium erit ipsum verum, quod consideratur in eo secundum quod attingit suam mensuram. Quod quidem non est medium inter aliquam contrarietatem quae sit ex parte rei: contraria enim inter quae accipitur medium virtutis, non sunt ex parte mensurae, sed ex parte mensurati, secundum quod excedit vel deficit a mensura; sicut patet ex hoc quod dictum est de virtutibus moralibus. Oportet igitur contraria inter quae est hoc medium virtutum intellectualium, accipere ex parte ipsius intellectus. In speculative intellectual virtues, the mean is the true itself, which is found in it insofar as it attains its measure. This mean does not lie between contraries as read from the side of things; the contrariety relevant to moral virtue is not that of the measure but of the measured, insofar as it exceeds or falls short of the measure, something clear from what has been said of moral virtues. The contraries between which the mean of intellectual virtues lies is taken from the side of intellect. Contraria autem intellectus sunt opposita secundum affirmationem et negationem, ut patet in II Periher. Inter affirmationes ergo et negationes oppositas accipitur medium virtutum intellectualium speculativarum, quod est verum: ut puta, quia verum est cum dicitur esse quod est, et non esse quod non est; falsum autem secundum excessum erit, ut dicitur esse quod non est; secundum defectum vero, cum dicitur non esse quod est. Si igitur in intellectu non esset aliqua propria contrarietas praeter contrarietatem rerum, non esset accipere in virtutibus intellectualibus medium et extrema. Manifestum est autem, quod in voluntate non est accipere aliquam contrarietatem propriam, sed solum secundum ordinem ad res volitas contrarias: quia intellectus cognoscit aliquid secundum quod est in ipso; voluntas autem movetur ad rem secundum quod in se est. Unde si aliqua virtus sit in voluntate secundum comparationem ad eius mensuram et regulam, talis virtus non consistet in medio: non enim est accipere extrema ex parte mensurae, sed ex parte mensurati tantum, prout excedit vel diminuitur a mensura. Virtutes autem theologicae ordinantur ad suam materiam vel obiectum, quod est Deus, mediante voluntate. Et quod de caritate et spe manifestum est, hoc circa fidem similiter dicitur. Nam licet fides sit in intellectu, est tamen in eo secundum quod imperatur a voluntate: nullus enim credit nisi volens. Unde, cum Deus sit regula et mensura voluntatis humanae, manifestum est quod virtutes theologicae non sunt in medio, per se loquendo; etsi contingat quandoque aliquam earum esse in medio per accidens, ut postea exponetur. The contraries of intellect are opposed on the basis of affirmation and negation, as is clear from On Interpretation. The mean of the speculative intellectual virtues, which is the true, is taken from affirmations and their opposed negations. For example, it is true when it is said that what is is and what is not is not. The false involves excess when what is not is said to be and defect when what is is said not to be. If there were no contrariety proper to intellect which differs from the contrariety of things, there would be no mean between extremes in intellectual virtues. It is clear that there is no contrariety proper to will, but only its relation to contrary willed things. The intellect knows something insofar as it is within it whereas will moves toward the thing as it exists in itself So if there is a virtue in will based on its comparison to a measure and rule, such a virtue would not consist in a mean, for the extremes must be read from the side of the measured alone, not from that of the measure, insofar as it exceeds or fans short of the measure. Theological virtues, however, are ordered to their matter or object, which is God, by the mediation of will, for no one believes unless he is willing. Hence, since God is the rule and measure of the human will, it is manifest that the theological virtues do not lie in a mean, speaking per se, although it sometimes happens that some of them he in a mean accidentally, as will be explained below. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ultimum potentiae dicitur in quod ultimo potentia extenditur, et hoc est difficillimum: quia difficillimum est invenire medium, facile autem est divertere ab eo. Et ex hoc ipso virtus est ultimum potentiae, quod est in medio. Ad 1. It should be said that the utmost of a power is taken from the utmost to which the power extends, and this is the most difficult, because it is most difficult to find the mean but easy to deviate from it. Thus, virtue is the utmost of a power because it lies in the mean. Ad secundum dicendum, quod bonum habet rationem ultimi per comparationem ad motum appetitus, non autem per comparationem ad materiam in qua aliquod bonum constituitur; quod oportet esse in medio materiae, ut neque excedat, neque excedatur a debita regula et mensura. Ad 2. It should be said that the good has the note of the ultimate by comparison to the movement of appetite, not by comparison to the matter in which that good is constituted, because it must lie in the mean of the matter, such that it neither exceeds nor is exceeded by the fitting rule and measure. Ad tertium dicendum, quod virtus quantum ad formam quam a sua mensura sortitur, habet rationem extremi; et sic opponitur malo ut formatum informi, et commensuratum incommensurato. Sed secundum materiam in qua talis mensura imprimitur, sic virtus est in medio. Ad 3. It should be said that virtue, with respect to the form which it takes from its measure, has the note of an extreme, and thus is opposed to evil as the formed to the unformed, and the commensurate to the incommensurate. But with respect to the matter in which such a measure is impressed, virtue lies in a mean. Ad quartum dicendum, quod ratio illa accipit supremum et medium, secundum ordinem potentiarum animae, non secundum materiam in qua ponitur modus virtutis quasi medium quoddam. Ad 4. It should be said that this argument takes supreme and mean according to the order of the powers of the soul and not according to the matter on which the mode of virtue, that is, the mean, is impressed. Ad quintum dicendum, quod in virtutibus theologicis non est medium ut dictum est: sed in virtutibus intellectualibus est medium non inter contrarietatem rerum, prout sunt in intellectu, sed inter contrarietatem affirmationis et negationis, ut dictum est. In virtutibus autem moralibus omnibus commune invenitur quod sunt in medio. Et hoc ipsum quod quaedam attingunt ad maximum, pertinet in eis ad rationem medii, in quantum maximum attingunt secundum regulam rationis; sicut fortis attingit maxima pericula secundum rationem, scilicet quando debet, ut debet, et propter quod debet. Superfluum autem et diminutum accipitur non secundum quantitatem rei, sed per comparationem ad regulam rationis; ut puta superfluum esset, si quando non debet, vel propter quod non debet, periculis se ingereret; diminutum autem si se non ingereret quando et qualiter deberet. Ad 5. It should be said that there is no mean in theological virtues, as has been said, but there is a mean in intellectual virtues, not between a contrariety in things, but as they are in intellect, according to the contrariety of affirmation and negation, as has been said. But in all moral virtues there is the common note that they he in a mean. to Although some of them attain a maximum, they do so according to the rule of reason, as the brave man faces the greatest peril following reason, namely, when he ought, as he ought, and because he ought. The too much and too little are not read from the quantity of the thing, but by comparison to the rule of reason, as for example it would be too much were one to face dangers when he ought not or for the wrong reason; too little if he does not face them when and how he should. Ad sextum dicendum, quod virginitas et paupertas licet sint in extremo rei, sunt tamen in medio rationis: quia virgo abstinet a venereis omnibus propter quod debet et secundum quod debet; quia propter Deum, et delectabiliter. Si autem abstineret propter quod non deberet, utpote quia esset ei odiosum secundum se vel filios generare, vel mulierem habere, esset vitium insensibilitatis. Sed abstinere omnino a venereis propter debitum finem, est virtuosum: quia etiam qui abstinent ab huiusmodi, ut se exercitiis bellicis dent ad utilitatem reipublicae, secundum politicam virtutem laudantur. Ad 6. It should be said that virginity and poverty although they are extremes in reality he in the mean of reason because the virgin abstains from all venereal pleasure as she ought, namely, for the sake of God, and easily. If she should abstain for the wrong reason, for example, because she finds it hateful as such to have children or to have a spouse, this would be the vice of insensitiveness. But to abstain completely from venereal pleasure for a fitting end is virtuous; those who abstain from such things in order to devote themselves to military matters for the good of the republic are praised for their political virtue. Ad septimum dicendum, quod media illa quae Boetius ponit, sunt media rei; et ideo non conveniunt medio virtutis, quod est secundum rationem; nisi forte in iustitia, in qua est simul medium rei et medium rationis, cui competit medium rationis arithmeticum in commutationibus, et medium geometricum in distributionibus, ut patet in V Ethicorum. Ad 7. It should be said that the means spoken of by Boethius he in things and thus are not relevant to the mean of virtue which is determined by reason. justice seems to be an exception since it involves both a mean in things and another according to reason: The arithmetical mean is relevant to exchange and the geometrical to distribution, as is clear from Ethics 5. Ad octavum dicendum, quod medium competit virtuti non in quantum medium, sed in quantum medium rationis: quia virtus est bonum hominis, quod est secundum rationem esse. Unde non oportet quod id quod plus habet de ratione medii, magis pertineat ad virtutem, sed quod est medium rationis. Ad 8. It should be said that mean belongs to virtue not as mean but as the mean of reason, because virtue is the good of man, which is to live according to reason. Hence, it is not necessary that what saves the notion of mean best should pertain to virtue, but what is the mean of reason. Ad nonum dicendum, quod passiones et operationes animae sunt indivisibiles per se sed divisibiles per accidens, in quantum est in eis invenire magis et minus secundum diversas circumstantias; et sic virtus in eis medium tenet. Ad 9. It should be said that the passions and activities of the soul are indivisible as such but divisible incidentally, insofar as more and less are found in them in diverse circumstances. And it is thus that virtue holds the mean in them. Ad decimum dicendum, quod in voluptatibus est melius fieri quam factum esse, ut per melius non intelligatur operatio boni honesti, quod pertinet ad virtutem, sed boni delectabilis, quod pertinet ad voluptatem: voluptas enim est in fieri. Quorum autem esse est in fieri, quando facta sunt, non sunt; unde bonum voluptatis magis consistit in fieri quam in factum esse. Ad 10. It should be said that in voluptuous matters it is better to be doing than to have done, but ‘better’ here is not to be understood in terms of the true good, which pertains to virtue, but of the pleasurable good, which pertains to lust. That whose existence lies in its being done no longer exists after it has been done; hence pleasure lies in its occurrence, not in its having occurred. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod non quodcumque medium competit virtuti, sed medium rationis: quod quidem medium non contingit invenire in vitiis, quia secundum propriam rationem non oportet quod in vitiis sit virtus. Ad 11. It should be said that not just any means belongs to virtue, but the mean of reason, and this mean is not found in vices, and there cannot be virtue in vice in the proper sense of the term. Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod iustitia non attingit medium in rebus exterioribus, in quibus homo plus sibi accipit ex inordinatione voluntatis; unde vitiosum est. Sed quod de suis rebus aliquid ab eo auferatur, hoc praeter bonitatem eius est; unde inordinationem vitiosam in ipso non importat. Sed passiones animae, circa quas sunt aliae virtutes, in nobis sunt; unde et earum superfluitas et diminutio in vitium homini cedit. Et ideo aliae virtutes morales sunt inter duo vitia; non autem iustitia, quae tamen medium in propria materia tenet, quod per se pertinet ad virtutem. Ad 12. It should be said that justice does not attain the mean in external things when a man takes more for himself, for this disorder of his will is vicious. But that one’s property be taken by another is outside his goodness and does not involve the disorder of vice. But the passions of the soul with which the other virtues are concerned are within us; hence their superfluity or falling short amounts to vice in man. Therefore, the other moral virtues are between two vices, but justice is not, because it takes its mean in its proper matter, which pertains per se to virtue. Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod medium virtutis est medium rationis, et non medium rei; et ideo non oportet quod aequaliter distet ab utroque extremo, sed secundum quod ratio habet. Unde in quibus bonum rationis praecipue consistit in refrenando passionem, virtus propinquior est diminuto quam superfluo; sicut patet in temperantia et mansuetudine. In quibus autem bonum est inducere ad id quod passio impellit, virtus similior est superfluo, ut patet in fortitudine. Ad 13. The mean of virtue, it should be said, is the mean of reason and not of things; it is not necessary, therefore, that it be equidistant between extremes, but rather it should be what reason determines. Thus when the good of reason consists chiefly in the restraint of passion, virtue is closer to the less than to the more, as is evident in temperance and patience, but when the good consists in that to which passion leads, virtue is closer to the more, as is clear from courage. Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod sicut dicit philosophus in V Physic., medium est in quod continue mutans primum mutat, in quod mutat ultimo; unde solum in motu continuo requiritur quod de extremo ad extremum non transeatur nisi per medium. Motus autem qui est de vitio in vitium, non est motus continuus, sicut nec motus voluntatis aut intellectus, secundum quod fertur in diversa; unde non oportet quod de vitio in vitium transeatur per virtutem. Ad 14. It should be said that, as the Philosopher writes in Physics 5, the mean is that which something undergoing continuous change reaches first and the ultimate what it reaches last. Hence it is only in continuous motion that there is passage from one extreme to the other through the mean. But the movement from vice to vice is not a continuous motion and neither are those of will and intellect as they bear on diverse things. So it is not necessary that one move from vice to vice through virtue. Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod virtus etsi sit medium quantum ad materiam in qua invenit medium; tamen secundum formam suam, prout collocatur in genere boni, est extremum, ut philosophus dicit in II Ethicor. Ad 15. It should be said that even when virtue is in a mean as regards the matter, where the mean is found, still as regards its form -thanks to which it is placed in the genus of the good - it is an extreme, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 2. Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod licet medium in quo consistit virtus, sit quodammodo indivisibile, tamen virtus intendi et remitti potest, secundum quod homo magis vel minus disponitur ad attingendum indivisibile; sicut et arcus minus vel magis extenditur ad percutiendum signum indivisibile. Ad 16. It should be said that although the mean in which virtue lies is in some way indivisible, still virtue can be more or less intense insofar as a man is more or less disposed to attaining the indivisible, as the bow is pulled more or less in order to hit the indivisible target. Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod medium virtutis non est medium rei, sed rationis, ut dictum est. Et hoc quidem medium consistit in proportione sive mensuratione rerum et passionum ad hominem. Quae quidem commensuratio diversificatur secundum diversos homines: quia aliquid est multum uni quod est parum alteri. Et ideo non eodem modo sumitur virtuosum in omnibus hominibus. Ad 17. It should be said that the mean of virtue is of reason not of things, as has been mentioned, a mean which lies in the proportion or measuring of things and of emotions to man, and this differs from man to man since something that is a lot for one is a little to another. This is why the virtuous is not the same for everyone. Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod cum medium virtutis sit medium rationis, accipienda est indivisibilitas huius medii secundum rationem. Accipitur autem indivisibile secundum rationem quod imperceptibilem distantiam habet, et quod errorem facere non potest; sicut totum corpus terrae accipitur loco puncti indivisibilis per comparationem ad totum caelum. Et ideo medium virtutis aliquam latitudinem habet. Ad 18. It should be said that since the mean of virtue is the mean of reason, its indivisibility should be understood with reference to reason. But reason takes as indivisible what has only an imperceptible distance that cannot cause an error, for example, the whole body of the earth is taken as an indivisible point in comparison to the whole heaven. Therefore, the mean of virtue has some latitude. Quod vero in contrarium obiicitur, concedendum et quantum ad virtutem moralem et intellectualem, sed non quantum ad theologicam. Accidit enim fidei quod sit in medio duarum haeresum, at non est per se in quantum est virtus. Et sic dicendum est de spe, quod est inter duo extrema, non secundum quod comparatur ad suum obiectum, sed secundum dispositionem subiecti ad sperandum superna. As for what is said ON THE CONTRARY, it should be conceded with respect to both moral and intellectual virtue, but not theological virtue. For it happens that faith lies between two heresies, but this does not belong to it as such insofar as it is a virtue. And the same should be said of hope, which is between two extremes, not as compared to its own object, but according to the subject’s disposition to hope for the supernal.