St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica

(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

Index [<<� | >>]
First Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 87 [ << | >> ]

HOW THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS ITSELF AND ALL WITHIN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)

Deinde considerandum est quomodo anima intellectiva cognoscat seipsam, et ea quae in se sunt. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. We have now to consider how the intellectual soul knows itself and all within itself. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
Primo, utrum cognoscat seipsam per suam essentiam. (1) Whether the soul knows itself by its own essence?
Secundo, quomodo cognoscat habitus in se existentes. (2) Whether it knows its own habits?
Tertio, quomodo intellectus cognoscat proprium actum. (3) How does the intellect know its own act?
Quarto, quomodo cognoscat actum voluntatis. (4) How does it know the act of the will?

Index [<<� | >>]
First Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 87 [ << | >> ]
Article: 1  [ << | >> ]

Whether the intellectual soul knows itself by its essence?

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima intellectiva seipsam cognoscat per suam essentiam. Dicit enim Augustinus, IX de Trin., quod mens seipsam novit per seipsam, quoniam est incorporea. Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul knows itself by its own essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), that "the mind knows itself, because it is incorporeal."
Praeterea, Angelus et anima humana conveniunt in genere intellectualis substantiae. Sed Angelus intelligit seipsum per essentiam suam. Ergo et anima humana. Objection 2: Further, both angels and human souls belong to the genus of intellectual substance. But an angel understands itself by its own essence. Therefore likewise does the human soul.
Praeterea, in his quae sunt sine materia, idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur, ut dicitur III de anima. Sed mens humana est sine materia, non enim est actus corporis alicuius, ut supra dictum est. Ergo in mente humana est idem intellectus et quod intelligitur. Ergo intelligit se per essentiam suam. Objection 3: Further, "in things void of matter, the intellect and that which is understood are the same" (De Anima iii, 4). But the human mind is void of matter, not being the act of a body as stated above (Question [76], Article [1]). Therefore the intellect and its object are the same in the human mind; and therefore the human mind understands itself by its own essence.
Sed contra est quod dicitur in III de anima, quod intellectus intelligit seipsum sicut et alia. Sed alia non intelligit per essentias eorum, sed per eorum similitudines. Ergo neque se intelligit per essentiam suam. On the contrary, It is said (De Anima iii, 4) that "the intellect understands itself in the same way as it understands other things." But it understands other things, not by their essence, but by their similitudes. Therefore it does not understand itself by its own essence.
Respondeo dicendum quod unumquodque cognoscibile est secundum quod est in actu, et non secundum quod est in potentia, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys., sic enim aliquid est ens et verum, quod sub cognitione cadit, prout actu est. Et hoc quidem manifeste apparet in rebus sensibilibus, non enim visus percipit coloratum in potentia, sed solum coloratum in actu. Et similiter intellectus manifestum est quod, inquantum est cognoscitivus rerum materialium, non cognoscit nisi quod est actu, et inde est quod non cognoscit materiam primam nisi secundum proportionem ad formam, ut dicitur in I Physic. Unde et in substantiis immaterialibus, secundum quod unaquaeque earum se habet ad hoc quod sit in actu per essentiam suam, ita se habet ad hoc quod sit per suam essentiam intelligibilis. I answer that, Everything is knowable so far as it is in act, and not, so far as it is in potentiality (Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 9): for a thing is a being, and is true, and therefore knowable, according as it is actual. This is quite clear as regards sensible things, for the eye does not see what is potentially, but what is actually colored. In like manner it is clear that the intellect, so far as it knows material things, does not know save what is in act: and hence it does not know primary matter except as proportionate to form, as is stated Phys. i, 7. Consequently immaterial substances are intelligible by their own essence according as each one is actual by its own essence.
Essentia igitur Dei, quae est actus purus et perfectus, est simpliciter et perfecte secundum seipsam intelligibilis. Unde Deus per suam essentiam non solum seipsum, sed etiam omnia intelligit. Angeli autem essentia est quidem in genere intelligibilium ut actus, non tamen ut actus purus neque completus. Unde eius intelligere non completur per essentiam suam, etsi enim per essentiam suam se intelligat Angelus, tamen non omnia potest per essentiam suam cognoscere, sed cognoscit alia a se per eorum similitudines. Intellectus autem humanus se habet in genere rerum intelligibilium ut ens in potentia tantum, sicut et materia prima se habet in genere rerum sensibilium, unde possibilis nominatur. Sic igitur in sua essentia consideratus, se habet ut potentia intelligens. Unde ex seipso habet virtutem ut intelligat, non autem ut intelligatur, nisi secundum id quod fit actu. Sic enim etiam Platonici posuerunt ordinem entium intelligibilium supra ordinem intellectuum, quia intellectus non intelligit nisi per participationem intelligibilis; participans autem est infra participatum, secundum eos. Si igitur intellectus humanus fieret actu per participationem formarum intelligibilium separatarum, ut Platonici posuerunt per huiusmodi participationem rerum incorporearum intellectus humanus seipsum intelligeret. Sed quia connaturale est intellectui nostro, secundum statum praesentis vitae, quod ad materialia et sensibilia respiciat, sicut supra dictum est; consequens est ut sic seipsum intelligat intellectus noster, secundum quod fit actu per species a sensibilibus abstractas per lumen intellectus agentis, quod est actus ipsorum intelligibilium, et eis mediantibus intellectus possibilis. Non ergo per essentiam suam, sed per actum suum se cognoscit intellectus noster. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, particulariter, secundum quod Socrates vel Plato percipit se habere animam intellectivam, ex hoc quod percipit se intelligere. Alio modo, in universali, secundum quod naturam humanae mentis ex actu intellectus consideramus. Sed verum est quod iudicium et efficacia huius cognitionis per quam naturam animae cognoscimus, competit nobis secundum derivationem luminis intellectus nostri a veritate divina, in qua rationes omnium rerum continentur, sicut supra dictum est. Unde et Augustinus dicit, in IX de Trin., intuemur inviolabilem veritatem, ex qua perfecte, quantum possumus, definimus non qualis sit uniuscuiusque hominis mens, sed qualis esse sempiternis rationibus debeat. Est autem differentia inter has duas cognitiones. Nam ad primam cognitionem de mente habendam, sufficit ipsa mentis praesentia, quae est principium actus ex quo mens percipit seipsam. Et ideo dicitur se cognoscere per suam praesentiam. Sed ad secundam cognitionem de mente habendam, non sufficit eius praesentia, sed requiritur diligens et subtilis inquisitio. Unde et multi naturam animae ignorant, et multi etiam circa naturam animae erraverunt. Propter quod Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., de tali inquisitione mentis, non velut absentem se quaerat mens cernere; sed praesentem quaerat discernere, idest cognoscere differentiam suam ab aliis rebus, quod est cognoscere quidditatem et naturam suam. Therefore it is that the Essence of God, the pure and perfect act, is simply and perfectly in itself intelligible; and hence God by His own Essence knows Himself, and all other things also. The angelic essence belongs, indeed, to the genus of intelligible things as "act," but not as a "pure act," nor as a "complete act," and hence the angel's act of intelligence is not completed by his essence. For although an angel understands himself by his own essence, still he cannot understand all other things by his own essence; for he knows things other than himself by their likenesses. Now the human intellect is only a potentiality in the genus of intelligible beings, just as primary matter is a potentiality as regards sensible beings; and hence it is called "possible" [*Possibilis—elsewhere in this translation rendered "passive"—Ed.]. Therefore in its essence the human mind is potentially understanding. Hence it has in itself the power to understand, but not to be understood, except as it is made actual. For even the Platonists asserted than an order of intelligible beings existed above the order of intellects, forasmuch as the intellect understands only by participation of the intelligible; for they said that the participator is below what it participates. If, therefore, the human intellect, as the Platonists held, became actual by participating separate intelligible forms, it would understand itself by such participation of incorporeal beings. But as in this life our intellect has material and sensible things for its proper natural object, as stated above (Question [84], Article [7]), it understands itself according as it is made actual by the species abstracted from sensible things, through the light of the active intellect, which not only actuates the intelligible things themselves, but also, by their instrumentality, actuates the passive intellect. Therefore the intellect knows itself not by its essence, but by its act. This happens in two ways: In the first place, singularly, as when Socrates or Plato perceives that he has an intellectual soul because he perceives that he understands. In the second place, universally, as when we consider the nature of the human mind from knowledge of the intellectual act. It is true, however, that the judgment and force of this knowledge, whereby we know the nature of the soul, comes to us according to the derivation of our intellectual light from the Divine Truth which contains the types of all things as above stated (Question [84], Article [5]). Hence Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 6): "We gaze on the inviolable truth whence we can as perfectly as possible define, not what each man's mind is, but what it ought to be in the light of the eternal types." There is, however, a difference between these two kinds of knowledge, and it consists in this, that the mere presence of the mind suffices for the first; the mind itself being the principle of action whereby it perceives itself, and hence it is said to know itself by its own presence. But as regards the second kind of knowledge, the mere presence of the mind does not suffice, and there is further required a careful and subtle inquiry. Hence many are ignorant of the soul's nature, and many have erred about it. So Augustine says (De Trin. x, 9), concerning such mental inquiry: "Let the mind strive not to see itself as if it were absent, but to discern itself as present"—i.e. to know how it differs from other things; which is to know its essence and nature.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod mens seipsam per seipsam novit, quia tandem in sui ipsius cognitionem pervenit, licet per suum actum, ipsa enim est quae cognoscitur, quia ipsa seipsam amat, ut ibidem subditur. Potest enim aliquid dici per se notum dupliciter, vel quia per nihil aliud in eius notitiam devenitur, sicut dicuntur prima principia per se nota; vel quia non sunt cognoscibilia per accidens, sicut color est per se visibilis, substantia autem per accidens. Reply to Objection 1: The mind knows itself by means of itself, because at length it acquires knowledge of itself, though led thereto by its own act: because it is itself that it knows since it loves itself, as he says in the same passage. For a thing can be called self-evident in two ways, either because we can know it by nothing else except itself, as first principles are called self-evident; or because it is not accidentally knowable, as color is visible of itself, whereas substance is visible by its accident.
Ad secundum dicendum quod essentia Angeli est sicut actus in genere intelligibilium, et ideo se habet et ut intellectus, et ut intellectum. Unde Angelus suam essentiam per seipsum apprehendit. Non autem intellectus humanus, qui vel est omnino in potentia respectu intelligibilium, sicut intellectus possibilis; vel est actus intelligibilium quae abstrahuntur a phantasmatibus, sicut intellectus agens. Reply to Objection 2: The essence of an angel is an act in the genus of intelligible things, and therefore it is both intellect and the thing understood. Hence an angel apprehends his own essence through itself: not so the human mind, which is either altogether in potentiality to intelligible things—as is the passive intellect—or is the act of intelligible things abstracted from the phantasms—as is the active intellect.
Ad tertium dicendum quod verbum illud philosophi universaliter verum est in omni intellectu. Sicut enim sensus in actu est sensibile, propter similitudinem sensibilis, quae est forma sensus in actu; ita intellectus in actu est intellectum in actu, propter similitudinem rei intellectae, quae est forma intellectus in actu. Et ideo intellectus humanus, qui fit in actu per speciem rei intellectae, per eandem speciem intelligitur, sicut per formam suam. Idem autem est dicere quod in his quae sunt sine materia, idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur, ac si diceretur quod in his quae sunt intellecta in actu, idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur, per hoc enim aliquid est intellectum in actu, quod est sine materia. Sed in hoc est differentia, quia quorundam essentiae sunt sine materia, sicut substantiae separatae quas Angelos dicimus, quarum unaquaeque et est intellecta et est intelligens, sed quaedam res sunt quarum essentiae non sunt sine materia, sed solum similitudines ab eis abstractae. Unde et Commentator dicit, in III de anima, quod propositio inducta non habet veritatem nisi in substantiis separatis, verificatur enim quodammodo in eis quod non verificatur in aliis, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 3: This saying of the Philosopher is universally true in every kind of intellect. For as sense in act is the sensible in act, by reason of the sensible likeness which is the form of sense in act, so likewise the intellect in act is the object understood in act, by reason of the likeness of the thing understood, which is the form of the intellect in act. So the human intellect, which becomes actual by the species of the object understood, is itself understood by the same species as by its own form. Now to say that in "things without matter the intellect and what is understood are the same," is equal to saying that "as regards things actually understood the intellect and what is understood are the same." For a thing is actually understood in that it is immaterial. But a distinction must be drawn: since the essences of some things are immaterial—as the separate substances called angels, each of which is understood and understands, whereas there are other things whose essences are not wholly immaterial, but only the abstract likenesses thereof. Hence the Commentator says (De Anima iii) that the proposition quoted is true only of separate substances; because in a sense it is verified in their regard, and not in regard of other substances, as already stated (Reply OBJ 2).

Index [<<� | >>]
First Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 87 [ << | >> ]
Article: 2  [ << | >> ]

Whether our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence?

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster cognoscat habitus animae per essentiam eorum. Dicit enim Augustinus, XIII de Trin., non sic videtur fides in corde in quo est, sicut anima alterius hominis ex motibus corporis videtur; sed eam tenet certissima scientia, clamatque conscientia. Et eadem ratio est de aliis habitibus animae. Ergo habitus animae non cognoscuntur per actus, sed per seipsos. Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 1): "Faith is not seen in the heart wherein it abides, as the soul of a man may be seen by another from the movement of the body; but we know most certainly that it is there, and conscience proclaims its existence"; and the same principle applies to the other habits of the soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are not known by their acts, but by themselves.
Praeterea, res materiales, quae sunt extra animam, cognoscuntur per hoc quod similitudines earum sunt praesentialiter in anima; et ideo dicuntur per suas similitudines cognosci. Sed habitus animae praesentialiter per suam essentiam sunt in anima. Ergo per suam essentiam cognoscuntur. Objection 2: Further, material things outside the soul are known by their likeness being present in the soul, and are said therefore to be known by their likenesses. But the soul's habits are present by their essence in the soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are known by their essence.
Praeterea, propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis. Sed res aliae cognoscuntur ab anima propter habitus et species intelligibiles. Ergo ista magis per seipsa ab anima cognoscuntur. Objection 3: Further, "whatever is the cause of a thing being such is still more so." But habits and intelligible species cause things to be known by the soul. Therefore they are still more known by the soul in themselves.
Sed contra, habitus sunt principia actuum, sicut et potentiae. Sed sicut dicitur II de anima, priores potentiis, secundum rationem, actus et operationes sunt. Ergo eadem ratione sunt priores habitibus. Et ita habitus per actus cognoscuntur, sicut et potentiae. On the contrary, Habits like powers are the principles of acts. But as is said (De Anima ii, 4), "acts and operations are logically prior to powers." Therefore in the same way they are prior to habits; and thus habits, like the powers, are known by their acts.
Respondeo dicendum quod habitus quodammodo est medium inter potentiam puram et purum actum. Iam autem dictum est quod nihil cognoscitur nisi secundum quod est actu. Sic ergo inquantum habitus deficit ab actu perfecto, deficit ab hoc, ut non sit per seipsum cognoscibilis, sed necesse est quod per actum suum cognoscatur, sive dum aliquis percipit se habere habitum, per hoc quod percipit se producere actum proprium habitus; sive dum aliquis inquirit naturam et rationem habitus, ex consideratione actus. Et prima quidem cognitio habitus fit per ipsam praesentiam habitus, quia ex hoc ipso quod est praesens, actum causat, in quo statim percipitur. Secunda autem cognitio habitus fit per studiosam inquisitionem, sicut supra dictum est de mente. I answer that, A habit is a kind of medium between mere power and mere act. Now, it has been said (Article [1]) that nothing is known but as it is actual: therefore so far as a habit fails in being a perfect act, it falls short in being of itself knowable, and can be known only by its act; thus, for example, anyone knows he has a habit from the fact that he can produce the act proper to that habit; or he may inquire into the nature and idea of the habit by considering the act. The first kind of knowledge of the habit arises from its being present, for the very fact of its presence causes the act whereby it is known. The second kind of knowledge of the habit arises from a careful inquiry, as is explained above of the mind (Article [1]).
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, etsi fides non cognoscatur per exteriores corporis motus, percipitur tamen etiam ab eo in quo est, per interiorem actum cordis. Nullus enim fidem se habere scit, nisi per hoc quod se credere percipit. Reply to Objection 1: Although faith is not known by external movement of the body, it is perceived by the subject wherein it resides, by the interior act of the heart. For no one knows that he has faith unless he knows that he believes.
Ad secundum dicendum quod habitus sunt praesentes in intellectu nostro, non sicut obiecta intellectus (quia obiectum intellectus nostri, secundum statum praesentis vitae, est natura rei materialis, ut supra dictum est); sed sunt praesentes in intellectu ut quibus intellectus intelligit. Reply to Objection 2: Habits are present in our intellect, not as its object since, in the present state of life, our intellect's object is the nature of a material thing as stated above (Question [84], Article [7]), but as that by which it understands.
Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum dicitur, propter quod unumquodque, illud magis, veritatem habet, si intelligatur in his quae sunt unius ordinis, puta in uno genere causae, puta si dicatur quod sanitas est propter vitam, sequitur quod vita sit magis desiderabilis. Si autem accipiantur ea quae sunt diversorum ordinum, non habet veritatem, ut si dicatur quod sanitas est propter medicinam, non ideo sequitur quod medicina sit magis desiderabilis, quia sanitas est in ordine finium, medicina autem in ordine causarum efficientium. Sic igitur si accipiamus duo, quorum utrumque sit per se in ordine obiectorum cognitionis; illud propter quod aliud cognoscitur, erit magis notum, sicut principia conclusionibus. Sed habitus non est de ordine obiectorum, inquantum est habitus; nec propter habitum aliqua cognoscuntur sicut propter obiectum cognitum, sed sicut propter dispositionem vel formam qua cognoscens cognoscit, et ideo ratio non sequitur. Reply to Objection 3: The axiom, "whatever is the cause of a thing being such, is still more so," is true of things that are of the same order, for instance, of the same kind of cause; for example, we may say that health is desirable on account of life, and therefore life is more desirable still. But if we take things of different orders the axiom is not true: for we may say that health is caused by medicine, but it does not follow that medicine is more desirable than health, for health belongs to the order of final causes, whereas medicine belongs to the order of efficient causes. So of two things belonging essentially to the order of the objects of knowledge, the one which is the cause of the other being known, is the more known, as principles are more known than conclusions. But habit as such does not belong to the order of objects of knowledge; nor are things known on account of the habit, as on account of an object known, but as on account of a disposition or form whereby the subject knows: and therefore the argument does not prove.

Index [<<� | >>]
First Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 87 [ << | >> ]
Article: 3  [ << | >> ]

Whether our intellect knows its own act?

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non cognoscat proprium actum. Illud enim proprie cognoscitur, quod est obiectum cognoscitivae virtutis. Sed actus differt ab obiecto. Ergo intellectus non cognoscit suum actum. Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect does not know its own act. For what is known is the object of the knowing faculty. But the act differs from the object. Therefore the intellect does not know its own act.
Praeterea, quidquid cognoscitur, aliquo actu cognoscitur. Si igitur intellectus cognoscit actum suum, aliquo actu cognoscit illum; et iterum illum actum alio actu. Erit ergo procedere in infinitum, quod videtur impossibile. Objection 2: Further, whatever is known is known by some act. If, then, the intellect knows its own act, it knows it by some act, and again it knows that act by some other act; this is to proceed indefinitely, which seems impossible.
Praeterea, sicut se habet sensus ad actum suum, ita et intellectus. Sed sensus proprius non sentit actum suum, sed hoc pertinet ad sensum communem, ut dicitur in libro de anima. Ergo neque intellectus intelligit actum suum. Objection 3: Further, the intellect has the same relation to its act as sense has to its act. But the proper sense does not feel its own act, for this belongs to the common sense, as stated De Anima iii, 2. Therefore neither does the intellect understand its own act.
Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., intelligo me intelligere. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), "I understand that I understand."
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, unumquodque cognoscitur secundum quod est actu. Ultima autem perfectio intellectus est eius operatio, non enim est sicut actio tendens in alterum, quae sit perfectio operati, sicut aedificatio aedificati; sed manet in operante ut perfectio et actus eius, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys. Hoc igitur est primum quod de intellectu intelligitur, scilicet ipsum eius intelligere. Sed circa hoc diversi intellectus diversimode se habent. Est enim aliquis intellectus, scilicet divinus, qui est ipsum suum intelligere. Et sic in Deo idem est quod intelligat se intelligere et quod intelligat suam essentiam, quia sua essentia est suum intelligere. Est autem alius intellectus, scilicet angelicus, qui non est suum intelligere, sicut supra dictum est, sed tamen primum obiectum sui intelligere est eius essentia. Unde etsi aliud sit in Angelo, secundum rationem, quod intelligat se intelligere, et quod intelligat suam essentiam, tamen simul et uno actu utrumque intelligit, quia hoc quod est intelligere suam essentiam, est propria perfectio suae essentiae; simul autem et uno actu intelligitur res cum sua perfectione. Est autem alius intellectus, scilicet humanus, qui nec est suum intelligere, nec sui intelligere est obiectum primum ipsa eius essentia, sed aliquid extrinsecum, scilicet natura materialis rei. Et ideo id quod primo cognoscitur ab intellectu humano, est huiusmodi obiectum; et secundario cognoscitur ipse actus quo cognoscitur obiectum; et per actum cognoscitur ipse intellectus, cuius est perfectio ipsum intelligere. Et ideo philosophus dicit quod obiecta praecognoscuntur actibus, et actus potentiis. I answer that, As stated above (Articles [1],2) a thing is intelligible according as it is in act. Now the ultimate perfection of the intellect consists in its own operation: for this is not an act tending to something else in which lies the perfection of the work accomplished, as building is the perfection of the thing built; but it remains in the agent as its perfection and act, as is said Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8. Therefore the first thing understood of the intellect is its own act of understanding. This occurs in different ways with different intellects. For there is an intellect, namely, the Divine, which is Its own act of intelligence, so that in God the understanding of His intelligence, and the understanding of His Essence, are one and the same act, because His Essence is His act of understanding. But there is another intellect, the angelic, which is not its own act of understanding, as we have said above (Question [79], Article [1]), and yet the first object of that act is the angelic essence. Wherefore although there is a logical distinction between the act whereby he understands that he understands, and that whereby he understands his essence, yet he understands both by one and the same act; because to understand his own essence is the proper perfection of his essence, and by one and the same act is a thing, together with its perfection, understood. And there is yet another, namely, the human intellect, which neither is its own act of understanding, nor is its own essence the first object of its act of understanding, for this object is the nature of a material thing. And therefore that which is first known by the human intellect is an object of this kind, and that which is known secondarily is the act by which that object is known; and through the act the intellect itself is known, the perfection of which is this act of understanding. For this reason did the Philosopher assert that objects are known before acts, and acts before powers (De Anima ii, 4).
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectum intellectus est commune quoddam, scilicet ens et verum, sub quo comprehenditur etiam ipse actus intelligendi. Unde intellectus potest suum actum intelligere. Sed non primo, quia nec primum obiectum intellectus nostri, secundum praesentem statum, est quodlibet ens et verum; sed ens et verum consideratum in rebus materialibus, ut dictum est; ex quibus in cognitionem omnium aliorum devenit. Reply to Objection 1: The object of the intellect is something universal, namely, "being" and "the true," in which the act also of understanding is comprised. Wherefore the intellect can understand its own act. But not primarily, since the first object of our intellect, in this state of life, is not every being and everything true, but "being" and "true," as considered in material things, as we have said above (Question [84], Article [7]), from which it acquires knowledge of all other things.
Ad secundum dicendum quod ipsum intelligere humanum non est actus et perfectio naturae intellectae materialis, ut sic possit uno actu intelligi natura rei materialis et ipsum intelligere, sicut uno actu intelligitur res cum sua perfectione. Unde alius est actus quo intellectus intelligit lapidem, et alius est actus quo intelligit se intelligere lapidem, et sic inde. Nec est inconveniens in intellectu esse infinitum in potentia, ut supra dictum est. Reply to Objection 2: The intelligent act of the human intellect is not the act and perfection of the material nature understood, as if the nature of the material thing and intelligent act could be understood by one act; just as a thing and its perfection are understood by one act. Hence the act whereby the intellect understands a stone is distinct from the act whereby it understands that it understands a stone; and so on. Nor is there any difficulty in the intellect being thus potentially infinite, as explained above (Question [86], Article [2]).
Ad tertium dicendum quod sensus proprius sentit secundum immutationem materialis organi a sensibili exteriori. Non est autem possibile quod aliquid materiale immutet seipsum; sed unum immutatur ab alio. Et ideo actus sensus proprii percipitur per sensum communem. Sed intellectus non intelligit per materialem immutationem organi, et ideo non est simile. Reply to Objection 3: The proper sense feels by reason of the immutation in the material organ caused by the external sensible. A material object, however, cannot immute itself; but one is immuted by another, and therefore the act of the proper sense is perceived by the common sense. The intellect, on the contrary, does not perform the act of understanding by the material immutation of an organ; and so there is no comparison.

Index [<<� | >>]
First Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 87 [ << | >> ]
Article: 4  [ << | >> ]

Whether the intellect understands the act of the will?

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non intelligat actum voluntatis. Nihil enim cognoscitur ab intellectu, nisi sit aliquo modo praesens in intellectu. Sed actus voluntatis non est praesens in intellectu, cum sint diversae potentiae. Ergo actus voluntatis non cognoscitur ab intellectu. Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect does not understand the act of the will. For nothing is known by the intellect, unless it be in some way present in the intellect. But the act of the will is not in the intellect; since the will and the intellect are distinct. Therefore the act of the will is not known by the intellect.
Praeterea, actus habet speciem ab obiecto. Sed obiectum voluntatis differt ab obiecto intellectus. Ergo et actus voluntatis speciem habet diversam ab obiecto intellectus. Non ergo cognoscitur ab intellectu. Objection 2: Further, the act is specified by the object. But the object of the will is not the same as the object of the intellect. Therefore the act of the will is specifically distinct from the object of the intellect, and therefore the act of the will is not known by the intellect.
Praeterea, Augustinus, in libro X Confess., attribuit affectionibus animae quod cognoscuntur neque per imagines, sicut corpora; neque per praesentiam, sicut artes, sed per quasdam notiones. Non videtur autem quod possint esse aliae notiones rerum in anima nisi vel essentiae rerum cognitarum, vel earum similitudines. Ergo impossibile videtur quod intellectus cognoscat affectiones animae, quae sunt actus voluntatis. Objection 3: Augustine (Confess. x, 17) says of the soul's affections that "they are known neither by images as bodies are known; nor by their presence, like the arts; but by certain notions." Now it does not seem that there can be in the soul any other notions of things but either the essences of things known or the likenesses thereof. Therefore it seems impossible for the intellect to known such affections of the soul as the acts of the will.
Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., intelligo me velle. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), "I understand that I will."
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, actus voluntatis nihil aliud est quam inclinatio quaedam consequens formam intellectam, sicut appetitus naturalis est inclinatio consequens formam naturalem. Inclinatio autem cuiuslibet rei est in ipsa re per modum eius. Unde inclinatio naturalis est naturaliter in re naturali; et inclinatio quae est appetitus sensibilis, est sensibiliter in sentiente; et similiter inclinatio intelligibilis, quae est actus voluntatis, est intelligibiliter in intelligente, sicut in principio et in proprio subiecto. Unde et philosophus hoc modo loquendi utitur in III de anima, quod voluntas in ratione est. Quod autem intelligibiliter est in aliquo intelligente, consequens est ut ab eo intelligatur. Unde actus voluntatis intelligitur ab intellectu, et inquantum aliquis percipit se velle; et inquantum aliquis cognoscit naturam huius actus, et per consequens naturam eius principii, quod est habitus vel potentia. I answer that, As stated above (Question [59], Article [1]), the act of the will is nothing but an inclination consequent on the form understood; just as the natural appetite is an inclination consequent on the natural form. Now the inclination of a thing resides in it according to its mode of existence; and hence the natural inclination resides in a natural thing naturally, and the inclination called the sensible appetite is in the sensible thing sensibly; and likewise the intelligible inclination, which is the act of the will, is in the intelligent subject intelligibly as in its principle and proper subject. Hence the Philosopher expresses himself thus (De Anima iii, 9)—that "the will is in the reason." Now whatever is intelligibly in an intelligent subject, is understood by that subject. Therefore the act of the will is understood by the intellect, both inasmuch as one knows that one wills; and inasmuch as one knows the nature of this act, and consequently, the nature of its principle which is the habit or power.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si voluntas et intellectus, sicut sunt diversae potentiae, ita etiam subiecto differrent, sic enim quod est in voluntate, esset absens ab intellectu. Nunc autem, cum utrumque radicetur in una substantia animae, et unum sit quodammodo principium alterius, consequens est ut quod est in voluntate, sit etiam quodammodo in intellectu. Reply to Objection 1: This argument would hold good if the will and the intellect were in different subjects, as they are distinct powers; for then whatever was in the will would not be in the intellect. But as both are rooted in the same substance of the soul, and since one is in a certain way the principle of the other, consequently what is in the will is, in a certain way, also in the intellect.
Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum et verum, quae sunt obiecta voluntatis et intellectus, differunt quidem ratione, verumtamen unum eorum continetur sub alio, ut supra dictum est, nam verum est quoddam bonum, et bonum est quoddam verum. Et ideo quae sunt voluntatis cadunt sub intellectu; et quae sunt intellectus possunt cadere sub voluntate. Reply to Objection 2: The "good" and the "true" which are the objects of the will and of the intellect, differ logically, but one is contained in the other, as we have said above (Question [82], Article [4], ad 1; Question [16], Article [4], ad 1); for the true is good and the good is true. Therefore the objects of the will fall under the intellect, and those of the intellect can fall under the will.
Ad tertium dicendum quod affectus animae non sunt in intellectu neque per similitudinem tantum, sicut corpora; neque per praesentiam ut in subiecto, sicut artes; sed sicut principiatum in principio, in quo habetur notio principiati. Et ideo Augustinus dicit affectus animae esse in memoria per quasdam notiones. Reply to Objection 3: The affections of the soul are in the intellect not by similitude only, like bodies; nor by being present in their subject, as the arts; but as the thing caused is in its principle, which contains some notion of the thing caused. And so Augustine says that the soul's affections are in the memory by certain notions.

This document converted to HTML on Fri Jan 02 19:10:10 1998.