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Deinde considerandum est de ipsa fidei virtute.
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We must now consider the virtue itself of faith, and,
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| Circa primum quaeruntur octo. | Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: |
| Primo, quid sit fides. | (1) What is faith? |
| Secundo, in qua vi animae sit sicut in subiecto. | (2) In what power of the soul does it reside? |
| Tertio, utrum forma eius sit caritas. | (3) Whether its form is charity? |
| Quarto, utrum eadem numero sit fides formata et informis. |
(4) Whether living [formata] faith and lifeless [informis] faith are one identically? |
| Quinto, utrum fides sit virtus. | (5) Whether faith is a virtue? |
| Sexto, utrum sit una virtus. | (6) Whether it is one virtue? |
| Septimo, de ordine eius ad alias virtutes. | (7) Of its relation to the other virtues; |
| Octavo, de comparatione certitudinis eius ad certitudinem virtutum intellectualium. |
(8) Of its certitude as compared with the certitude of the intellectual virtues. |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sit incompetens fidei definitio quam apostolus ponit, ad Heb. XI, dicens, est autem fides substantia sperandarum rerum, argumentum non apparentium. Nulla enim qualitas est substantia. Sed fides est qualitas, cum sit virtus theologica, ut supra dictum est. Ergo non est substantia. |
Objection 1: It would seem that the Apostle gives an unfitting definition of faith (Heb. 11:1) when he says: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not." For no quality is a substance: whereas faith is a quality, since it is a theological virtue, as stated above (FS, Question [62], Article [3]). Therefore it is not a substance. |
| Praeterea, diversarum virtutum diversa sunt obiecta. Sed res speranda est obiectum spei. Non ergo debet poni in definitione fidei tanquam eius obiectum. | Objection 2: Further, different virtues have different objects. Now things to be hoped for are the object of hope. Therefore they should not be included in a definition of faith, as though they were its object. |
| Praeterea, fides magis perficitur per caritatem quam per spem, quia caritas est forma fidei, ut infra dicetur. Magis ergo poni debuit in definitione fidei res diligenda quam res speranda. |
Objection 3: Further, faith is perfected by charity rather than by hope, since charity is the form of faith, as we shall state further on (Article [3]). Therefore the definition of faith should have included the thing to be loved rather than the thing to be hoped for. |
| Praeterea, idem non debet poni in diversis generibus. Sed substantia et argumentum sunt diversa genera non subalternatim posita. Ergo inconvenienter fides dicitur esse substantia et argumentum. | Objection 4: Further, the same thing should not be placed in different genera. Now "substance" and "evidence" are different genera, and neither is subalternate to the other. Therefore it is unfitting to state that faith is both "substance" and "evidence." |
| Praeterea, per argumentum veritas manifestatur eius ad quod inducitur argumentum. Sed illud dicitur esse apparens cuius veritas est manifestata. Ergo videtur implicari oppositio in hoc quod dicitur argumentum non apparentium. Inconvenienter ergo describitur fides. | Objection 5: Further, evidence manifests the truth of the matter for which it is adduced. Now a thing is said to be apparent when its truth is already manifest. Therefore it seems to imply a contradiction to speak of "evidence of things that appear not": and so faith is unfittingly defined. |
| In contrarium sufficit auctoritas apostoli. | On the contrary, The authority of the Apostle suffices. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, licet quidam dicant praedicta apostoli verba non esse fidei definitionem, tamen, si quis recte consideret, omnia ex quibus fides potest definiri in praedicta descriptione tanguntur, licet verba non ordinentur sub forma definitionis, sicut etiam apud philosophos praetermissa syllogistica forma syllogismorum principia tanguntur. | I answer that, Though some say that the above words of the Apostle are not a definition of faith, yet if we consider the matter aright, this definition overlooks none of the points in reference to which faith can be defined, albeit the words themselves are not arranged in the form of a definition, just as the philosophers touch on the principles of the syllogism, without employing the syllogistic form. |
| Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod, cum habitus cognoscantur per actus et actus per obiecta, fides, cum sit habitus quidam, debet definiri per proprium actum in comparatione ad proprium obiectum. Actus autem fidei est credere, qui, sicut supra dictum est, actus est intellectus determinati ad unum ex imperio voluntatis. Sic ergo actus fidei habet ordinem et ad obiectum voluntatis, quod est bonum et finis; et ad obiectum intellectus, quod est verum. Et quia fides, cum sit virtus theologica, sicut supra dictum est, habet idem pro obiecto et fine, necesse est quod obiectum fidei et finis proportionaliter sibi correspondeant. Dictum est autem supra quod veritas prima est obiectum fidei secundum quod ipsa est non visa et ea quibus propter ipsam inhaeretur. Et secundum hoc oportet quod ipsa veritas prima se habeat ad actum fidei per modum finis secundum rationem rei non visae. Quod pertinet ad rationem rei speratae, secundum illud apostoli, ad Rom. VIII, quod non videmus speramus, veritatem enim videre est ipsam habere; non autem sperat aliquis id quod iam habet, sed spes est de hoc quod non habetur, ut supra dictum est. Sic igitur habitudo actus fidei ad finem, qui est obiectum voluntatis, significatur in hoc quod dicitur, fides est substantia rerum sperandarum. Substantia enim solet dici prima inchoatio cuiuscumque rei, et maxime quando tota res sequens continetur virtute in primo principio, puta si dicamus quod prima principia indemonstrabilia sunt substantia scientiae, quia scilicet primum quod in nobis est de scientia sunt huiusmodi principia, et in eis virtute continetur tota scientia. Per hunc ergo modum dicitur fides esse substantia rerum sperandarum, quia scilicet prima inchoatio rerum sperandarum in nobis est per assensum fidei, quae virtute continet omnes res sperandas. In hoc enim speramus beatificari quod videbimus aperta visione veritatem cui per fidem adhaeremus, ut patet per ea quae supra de felicitate dicta sunt. |
In order to make this clear, we must observe that since habits are known by their acts, and acts by their objects, faith, being a habit, should be defined by its proper act in relation to its proper object. Now the act of faith is to believe, as stated above (Question [2], Articles [2],3), which is an act of the intellect determinate to one object of the will's command. Hence an act of faith is related both to the object of the will, i.e. to the good and the end, and to the object of the intellect, i.e. to the true. And since faith, through being a theological virtues, as stated above (FS, Question [62], Article [2]), has one same thing for object and end, its object and end must, of necessity, be in proportion to one another. Now it has been already stated (Question [1], Articles [1],4) that the object of faith is the First Truth, as unseen, and whatever we hold on account thereof: so that it must needs be under the aspect of something unseen that the First Truth is the end of the act of faith, which aspect is that of a thing hoped for, according to the Apostle (Rm. 8:25): "We hope for that which we see not": because to see the truth is to possess it. Now one hopes not for what one has already, but for what one has not, as stated above (FS, Question [67], Article [4]). Accordingly the relation of the act of faith to its end which is the object of the will, is indicated by the words: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for." For we are wont to call by the name of substance, the first beginning of a thing, especially when the whole subsequent thing is virtually contained in the first beginning; for instance, we might say that the first self-evident principles are the substance of science, because, to wit, these principles are in us the first beginnings of science, the whole of which is itself contained in them virtually. In this way then faith is said to be the "substance of things to be hoped for," for the reason that in us the first beginning of things to be hoped for is brought about by the assent of faith, which contains virtually all things to be hoped for. Because we hope to be made happy through seeing the unveiled truth to which our faith cleaves, as was made evident when we were speaking of happiness (FS, Question [3], Article [8]; FS, Question [4], Article [3]). |
| Habitudo autem actus fidei ad obiectum intellectus, secundum quod est obiectum fidei, designatur in hoc quod dicitur, argumentum non apparentium. Et sumitur argumentum pro argumenti effectu, per argumentum enim intellectus inducitur ad adhaerendum alicui vero; unde ipsa firma adhaesio intellectus ad veritatem fidei non apparentem vocatur hic argumentum. Unde alia littera habet convictio, quia scilicet per auctoritatem divinam intellectus credentis convincitur ad assentiendum his quae non videt. Si quis ergo in formam definitionis huiusmodi verba reducere velit, potest dicere quod fides est habitus mentis, qua inchoatur vita aeterna in nobis, faciens intellectum assentire non apparentibus. Per hoc autem fides ab omnibus aliis distinguitur quae ad intellectum pertinent. | The relationship of the act of faith to the object of the intellect, considered as the object of faith, is indicated by the words, "evidence of things that appear not," where "evidence" is taken for the result of evidence. For evidence induces the intellect to adhere to a truth, wherefore the firm adhesion of the intellect to the non-apparent truth of faith is called "evidence" here. Hence another reading has "conviction," because to wit, the intellect of the believer is convinced by Divine authority, so as to assent to what it sees not. Accordingly if anyone would reduce the foregoing words to the form of a definition, he may say that "faith is a habit of the mind, whereby eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect assent to what is non-apparent." |
| Per hoc enim quod dicitur argumentum, distinguitur fides ab opinione, suspicione et dubitatione, per quae non est prima adhaesio intellectus firma ad aliquid. Per hoc autem quod dicitur non apparentium, distinguitur fides a scientia et intellectu, per quae aliquid fit apparens. Per hoc autem quod dicitur substantia sperandarum rerum, distinguitur virtus fidei a fide communiter sumpta, quae non ordinatur ad beatitudinem speratam. | In this way faith is distinguished from all other things pertaining to the intellect. For when we describe it as "evidence," we distinguish it from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, which do not make the intellect adhere to anything firmly; when we go on to say, "of things that appear not," we distinguish it from science and understanding, the object of which is something apparent; and when we say that it is "the substance of things to be hoped for," we distinguish the virtue of faith from faith commonly so called, which has no reference to the beatitude we hope for. |
| Omnes autem aliae definitiones quaecumque de fide dantur, explicationes sunt huius quam apostolus ponit. Quod enim dicit Augustinus, fides est virtus qua creduntur quae non videntur; et quod dicit Damascenus, quod fides est non inquisitus consensus; et quod alii dicunt, quod fides est certitudo quaedam animi de absentibus supra opinionem et infra scientiam; idem est ei quod apostolus dicit, argumentum non apparentium. Quod vero Dionysius dicit, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod fides est manens credentium fundamentum, collocans eos in veritate et in ipsis veritatem, idem est ei quod dicitur, substantia sperandarum rerum. | Whatever other definitions are given of faith, are explanations of this one given by the Apostle. For when Augustine says (Tract. xl in Joan.: Questions. Evang. ii, qu. 39) that "faith is a virtue whereby we believe what we do not see," and when Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 11) that "faith is an assent without research," and when others say that "faith is that certainty of the mind about absent things which surpasses opinion but falls short of science," these all amount to the same as the Apostle's words: "Evidence of things that appear not"; and when Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is the solid foundation of the believer, establishing him in the truth, and showing forth the truth in him," comes to the same as "substance of things to be hoped for." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod substantia non sumitur hic secundum quod est genus generalissimum contra alia genera divisum, sed secundum quod in quolibet genere invenitur quaedam similitudo substantiae, prout scilicet primum in quolibet genere, continens in se alia virtute, dicitur esse substantia illorum. | Reply to Objection 1: "Substance" here does not stand for the supreme genus condivided with the other genera, but for that likeness to substance which is found in each genus, inasmuch as the first thing in a genus contains the others virtually and is said to be the substance thereof. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum fides pertineat ad intellectum secundum quod imperatur a voluntate, oportet quod ordinetur, sicut ad finem, ad obiecta illarum virtutum quibus perficitur voluntas. Inter quas est spes, ut infra patebit. Et ideo in definitione fidei ponitur obiectum spei. |
Reply to Objection 2: Since faith pertains to the intellect as commanded by the will, it must needs be directed, as to its end, to the objects of those virtues which perfect the will, among which is hope, as we shall prove further on (Question [18], Article [1]). For this reason the definition of faith includes the object of hope. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod dilectio potest esse et visorum et non visorum, et praesentium et absentium. Et ideo res diligenda non ita proprie adaptatur fidei sicut res speranda, cum spes sit semper absentium et non visorum. | Reply to Objection 3: Love may be of the seen and of the unseen, of the present and of the absent. Consequently a thing to be loved is not so adapted to faith, as a thing to be hoped for, since hope is always of the absent and the unseen. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod substantia et argumentum, secundum quod in definitione fidei ponuntur, non important diversa genera fidei neque diversos actus, sed diversas habitudines unius actus ad diversa obiecta, ut ex dictis patet. | Reply to Objection 4: "Substance" and "evidence" as included in the definition of faith, do not denote various genera of faith, nor different acts, but different relationships of one act to different objects, as is clear from what has been said. |
| Ad quintum dicendum quod argumentum quod sumitur ex propriis principiis rei facit rem esse apparentem. Sed argumentum quod sumitur ex auctoritate divina non facit rem in se esse apparentem. Et tale argumentum ponitur in definitione fidei. | Reply to Objection 5: Evidence taken from the proper principles of a thing, make it apparent, whereas evidence taken from Divine authority does not make a thing apparent in itself, and such is the evidence referred to in the definition of faith. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fides non sit in intellectu sicut in subiecto. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Praed. Sanct., quod fides in credentium voluntate consistit. Sed voluntas est alia potentia ab intellectu. Ergo fides non est in intellectu sicut in subiecto. | Objection 1: It would seem that faith does not reside in the intellect. For Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that "faith resides in the believer's will." Now the will is a power distinct from the intellect. Therefore faith does not reside in the intellect. |
| Praeterea, assensus fidei ad aliquid credendum provenit ex voluntate Deo obediente. Tota ergo laus fidei ex obedientia esse videtur. Sed obedientia est in voluntate. Ergo et fides. Non ergo est in intellectu. | Objection 2: Further, the assent of faith to believe anything, proceeds from the will obeying God. Therefore it seems that faith owes all its praise to obedience. Now obedience is in the will. Therefore faith is in the will, and not in the intellect. |
| Praeterea, intellectus est vel speculativus vel practicus. Sed fides non est in intellectu speculativo, qui, cum nihil dicat de imitabili et fugiendo, ut dicitur in III de anima, non est principium operationis, fides autem est quae per dilectionem operatur, ut dicitur ad Gal. V. Similiter etiam nec in intellectu practico, cuius obiectum est verum contingens factibile vel agibile, obiectum enim fidei est verum aeternum, ut ex supradictis patet. Non ergo fides est in intellectu sicut in subiecto. |
Objection 3: Further, the intellect is either speculative or practical. Now faith is not in the speculative intellect, since this is not concerned with things to be sought or avoided, as stated in De Anima iii, 9, so that it is not a principle of operation, whereas "faith... worketh by charity" (Gal. 5:6). Likewise, neither is it in the practical intellect, the object of which is some true, contingent thing, that can be made or done. For the object of faith is the Eternal Truth, as was shown above (Question [1], Article [1]). Therefore faith does not reside in the intellect. |
| Sed contra est quod fidei succedit visio patriae, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIII, videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem. Sed visio est in intellectu. Ergo et fides. | On the contrary, Faith is succeeded by the heavenly vision, according to 1 Cor. 13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face." Now vision is in the intellect. Therefore faith is likewise. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, cum fides sit quaedam virtus, oportet quod actus eius sit perfectus. Ad perfectionem autem actus qui ex duobus activis principiis procedit requiritur quod utrumque activorum principiorum sit perfectum, non enim potest bene secari nisi et secans habeat artem et serra sit bene disposita ad secandum. Dispositio autem ad bene agendum in illis potentiis animae quae se habent ad opposita est habitus, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo oportet quod actus procedens ex duabus talibus potentiis sit perfectus habitu aliquo praeexistente in utraque potentiarum. Dictum est autem supra quod credere est actus intellectus secundum quod movetur a voluntate ad assentiendum, procedit enim huiusmodi actus et a voluntate et ab intellectu. Quorum uterque natus est per habitum perfici, secundum praedicta. Et ideo oportet quod tam in voluntate sit aliquis habitus quam in intellectu, si debeat actus fidei esse perfectus, sicut etiam ad hoc quod actus concupiscibilis sit perfectus, oportet quod sit habitus prudentiae in ratione et habitus temperantiae in concupiscibili. Credere autem est immediate actus intellectus, quia obiectum huius actus est verum, quod proprie pertinet ad intellectum. Et ideo necesse est quod fides, quae est proprium principium huius actus, sit in intellectu sicut in subiecto. |
I answer that, Since faith is a virtue, its act must needs be perfect. Now, for the perfection of an act proceeding from two active principles, each of these principles must be perfect: for it is not possible for a thing to be sawn well, unless the sawyer possess the art, and the saw be well fitted for sawing. Now, in a power of the soul, which is related to opposite objects, a disposition to act well is a habit, as stated above (FS, Question [49], Article [4], ad 1,2,3). Wherefore an act that proceeds from two such powers must be perfected by a habit residing in each of them. Again, it has been stated above (Question [2], Articles [1],2) that to believe is an act of the intellect inasmuch as the will moves it to assent. And this act proceeds from the will and the intellect, both of which have a natural aptitude to be perfected in this way. Consequently, if the act of faith is to be perfect, there needs to be a habit in the will as well as in the intellect: even as there needs to be the habit of prudence in the reason, besides the habit of temperance in the concupiscible faculty, in order that the act of that faculty be perfect. Now, to believe is immediately an act of the intellect, because the object of that act is "the true," which pertains properly to the intellect. Consequently faith, which is the proper principle of that act, must needs reside in the intellect. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus fidem accipit pro actu fidei, qui dicitur consistere in credentium voluntate inquantum ex imperio voluntatis intellectus credibilibus assentit. | Reply to Objection 1: Augustine takes faith for the act of faith, which is described as depending on the believer's will, in so far as his intellect assents to matters of faith at the command of the will. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod non solum oportet voluntatem esse promptam ad obediendum, sed etiam intellectum esse bene dispositum ad sequendum imperium voluntatis, sicut oportet concupiscibilem esse bene dispositam ad sequendum imperium rationis. Et ideo non solum oportet esse habitum virtutis in voluntate imperante, sed etiam in intellectu assentiente. | Reply to Objection 2: Not only does the will need to be ready to obey but also the intellect needs to be well disposed to follow the command of the will, even as the concupiscible faculty needs to be well disposed in order to follow the command of reason; hence there needs to be a habit of virtue not only in the commanding will but also in the assenting intellect. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod fides est in intellectu speculativo sicut in subiecto, ut manifeste patet ex fidei obiecto. Sed quia veritas prima, quae est fidei obiectum, est finis omnium desideriorum et actionum nostrarum, ut patet per Augustinum, in I de Trin.; inde est quod per dilectionem operatur. Sicut etiam intellectus speculativus extensione fit practicus, ut dicitur in III de anima. | Reply to Objection 3: Faith resides in the speculative intellect, as evidenced by its object. But since this object, which is the First Truth, is the end of all our desires and actions, as Augustine proves (De Trin. i, 8), it follows that faith worketh by charity just as "the speculative intellect becomes practical by extension" (De Anima iii, 10). |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas non sit forma fidei. Unumquodque enim sortitur speciem per suam formam. Eorum ergo quae ex opposito dividuntur sicut diversae species unius generis, unum non potest esse forma alterius. Sed fides et caritas dividuntur ex opposito, I ad Cor. XIII, sicut diversae species virtutis. Ergo caritas non potest esse forma fidei. |
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the form of faith. For each thing derives its species from its form. When therefore two things are opposite members of a division, one cannot be the form of the other. Now faith and charity are stated to be opposite members of a division, as different species of virtue (1 Cor. 13:13). Therefore charity is not the form of faith. |
| Praeterea, forma et id cuius est forma sunt in eodem, quia ex eis fit unum simpliciter. Sed fides est in intellectu, caritas autem in voluntate. Ergo caritas non est forma fidei. | Objection 2: Further, a form and the thing of which it is the form are in one subject, since together they form one simply. Now faith is in the intellect, while charity is in the will. Therefore charity is not the form of faith. |
| Praeterea, forma est principium rei. Sed principium credendi ex parte voluntatis magis videtur esse obedientia quam caritas, secundum illud ad Rom. I, ad obediendum fidei in omnibus gentibus. Ergo obedientia magis est forma fidei quam caritas. | Objection 3: Further, the form of a thing is a principle thereof. Now obedience, rather than charity, seems to be the principle of believing, on the part of the will, according to Rm. 1:5: "For obedience to the faith in all nations." Therefore obedience rather than charity, is the form of faith. |
| Sed contra est quod unumquodque operatur per suam formam. Fides autem per dilectionem operatur. Ergo dilectio caritatis est forma fidei. | On the contrary, Each thing works through its form. Now faith works through charity. Therefore the love of charity is the form of faith. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex superioribus patet, actus voluntarii speciem recipiunt a fine, qui est voluntatis obiectum. Id autem a quo aliquid speciem sortitur se habet ad modum formae in rebus naturalibus. Et ideo cuiuslibet actus voluntarii forma quodammodo est finis ad quem ordinatur, tum quia ex ipso recipit speciem; tum etiam quia modus actionis oportet quod respondeat proportionaliter fini. Manifestum est autem ex praedictis quod actus fidei ordinatur ad obiectum voluntatis, quod est bonum, sicut ad finem. Hoc autem bonum quod est finis fidei, scilicet bonum divinum, est proprium obiectum caritatis. Et ideo caritas dicitur forma fidei, inquantum per caritatem actus fidei perficitur et formatur. |
I answer that, As appears from what has been said above (FS, Question [1], Article [3]; FS, Question [18], Article [6]), voluntary acts take their species from their end which is the will's object. Now that which gives a thing its species, is after the manner of a form in natural things. Wherefore the form of any voluntary act is, in a manner, the end to which that act is directed, both because it takes its species therefrom, and because the mode of an action should correspond proportionately to the end. Now it is evident from what has been said (Article [1]), that the act of faith is directed to the object of the will, i.e. the good, as to its end: and this good which is the end of faith, viz. the Divine Good, is the proper object of charity. Therefore charity is called the form of faith in so far as the act of faith is perfected and formed by charity. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caritas dicitur esse forma fidei inquantum informat actum ipsius. Nihil autem prohibet unum actum a diversis habitibus informari, et secundum hoc ad diversas species reduci ordine quodam, ut supra dictum est, cum de actibus humanis in communi ageretur. |
Reply to Objection 1: Charity is called the form of faith because it quickens the act of faith. Now nothing hinders one act from being quickened by different habits, so as to be reduced to various species in a certain order, as stated above (FS, Question [18], Articles [6],7; FS, Question [61], Article [2]) when we were treating of human acts in general. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de forma intrinseca. Sic autem caritas non est forma fidei, sed prout informat actum eius, ut supra dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2: This objection is true of an intrinsic form. But it is not thus that charity is the form of faith, but in the sense that it quickens the act of faith, as explained above. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam ipsa obedientia, et similiter spes et quaecumque alia virtus posset praecedere actum fidei, formatur a caritate, sicut infra patebit. Et ideo ipsa caritas ponitur forma fidei. |
Reply to Objection 3: Even obedience, and hope likewise, and whatever other virtue might precede the act of faith, is quickened by charity, as we shall show further on (Question [23], Article [8]), and consequently charity is spoken of as the form of faith. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fides informis non fiat formata, nec e converso. Quia ut dicitur I ad Cor. XIII, cum venerit quod perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est. Sed fides informis est imperfecta respectu formatae. Ergo, adveniente fide formata, fides informis excluditur, ut non sit unus habitus numero. | Objection 1: It would seem that lifeless faith does not become living, or living faith lifeless. For, according to 1 Cor. 13:10, "when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away." Now lifeless faith is imperfect in comparison with living faith. Therefore when living faith comes, lifeless faith is done away, so that they are not one identical habit. |
| Praeterea, illud quod est mortuum non fit vivum. Sed fides informis est mortua, secundum illud Iac. II, fides sine operibus mortua est. Ergo fides informis non potest fieri formata. | Objection 2: Further, a dead thing does not become a living thing. Now lifeless faith is dead, according to James 2:20: "Faith without works is dead." Therefore lifeless faith cannot become living. |
| Praeterea, gratia Dei adveniens non habet minorem effectum in homine fideli quam in infideli. Sed adveniens homini infideli causat in eo habitum fidei. Ergo etiam adveniens fideli qui habebat prius habitum fidei informis causat in eo alium habitum fidei. | Objection 3: Further, God's grace, by its advent, has no less effect in a believer than in an unbeliever. Now by coming to an unbeliever it causes the habit of faith. Therefore when it comes to a believer, who hitherto had the habit of lifeless faith, it causes another habit of faith in him. |
| Praeterea, sicut Boetius dicit, accidentia alterari non possunt. Sed fides est quoddam accidens. Ergo non potest eadem fides quandoque esse formata et quandoque informis. | Objection 4: Further, as Boethius says (In Categ. Arist. i), "accidents cannot be altered." Now faith is an accident. Therefore the same faith cannot be at one time living, and at another, lifeless. |
| Sed contra est quod Iac. II, super illud, fides sine operibus mortua est, dicit Glossa, quibus reviviscit. Ergo fides quae erat prius mortua et informis fit formata et vivens. |
On the contrary, A gloss on the words, "Faith without works is dead" (James 2:20) adds, "by which it lives once more." Therefore faith which was lifeless and without form hitherto, becomes formed and living. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc fuerunt diversae opiniones. Quidam enim dixerunt quod alius est habitus fidei formatae et informis, sed, adveniente fide formata, tollitur fides informis. Et similiter, homine post fidem formatam peccante mortaliter, succedit alius habitus fidei informis a Deo infusus. Sed hoc non videtur esse conveniens quod gratia adveniens homini aliquod Dei donum excludat, neque etiam quod aliquod Dei donum homini infundatur propter peccatum mortale. | I answer that, There have been various opinions on this question. For some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, iii, 15] have said that living and lifeless faith are distinct habits, but that when living faith comes, lifeless faith is done away, and that, in like manner, when a man sins mortally after having living faith, a new habit of lifeless faith is infused into him by God. But it seems unfitting that grace should deprive man of a gift of God by coming to him, and that a gift of God should be infused into man, on account of a mortal sin. |
| Et ideo alii dixerunt quod sunt quidem diversi habitus fidei formatae et informis, sed tamen, adveniente fide formata, non tollitur habitus fidei informis, sed simul manet in eodem cum habitu fidei formatae. Sed hoc etiam videtur inconveniens quod habitus fidei informis in habente fidem formatam remaneat otiosus. | Consequently others [*Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. iii, 64] have said that living and lifeless faith are indeed distinct habits, but that, all the same, when living faith comes the habit of lifeless faith is not taken away, and that it remains together with the habit of living faith in the same subject. Yet again it seems unreasonable that the habit of lifeless faith should remain inactive in a person having living faith. |
| Et ideo aliter dicendum quod idem est habitus fidei formatae et informis. Cuius ratio est quia habitus diversificatur secundum illud quod per se ad habitum pertinet. Cum autem fides sit perfectio intellectus, illud per se ad fidem pertinet quod pertinet ad intellectum, quod autem pertinet ad voluntatem non per se pertinet ad fidem, ita quod per hoc diversificari possit habitus fidei. Distinctio autem fidei formatae et informis est secundum id quod pertinet ad voluntatem, idest secundum caritatem, non autem secundum illud quod pertinet ad intellectum. Unde fides formata et informis non sunt diversi habitus. | We must therefore hold differently that living and lifeless faith are one and the same habit. The reason is that a habit is differentiated by that which directly pertains to that habit. Now since faith is a perfection of the intellect, that pertains directly to faith, which pertains to the intellect. Again, what pertains to the will, does not pertain directly to faith, so as to be able to differentiate the habit of faith. But the distinction of living from lifeless faith is in respect of something pertaining to the will, i.e. charity, and not in respect of something pertaining to the intellect. Therefore living and lifeless faith are not distinct habits. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum apostoli est intelligendum quando imperfectio est de ratione imperfecti. Tunc enim oportet quod, adveniente perfecto, imperfectum excludatur, sicut, adveniente aperta visione, excluditur fides, de cuius ratione est ut sit non apparentium. Sed quando imperfectio non est de ratione rei imperfectae, tunc illud numero idem quod erat imperfectum fit perfectum, sicut pueritia non est de ratione hominis, et ideo idem numero qui erat puer fit vir. Informitas autem fidei non est de ratione fidei, sed per accidens se habet ad ipsam, ut dictum est. Unde ipsamet fides informis fit formata. | Reply to Objection 1: The saying of the Apostle refers to those imperfect things from which imperfection is inseparable, for then, when the perfect comes the imperfect must needs be done away. Thus with the advent of clear vision, faith is done away, because it is essentially "of the things that appear not." When, however, imperfection is not inseparable from the imperfect thing, the same identical thing which was imperfect becomes perfect. Thus childhood is not essential to man and consequently the same identical subject who was a child, becomes a man. Now lifelessness is not essential to faith, but is accidental thereto as stated above. Therefore lifeless faith itself becomes living. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod illud quod facit vitam animalis est de ratione ipsius, quia est forma essentialis eius, scilicet anima. Et ideo mortuum vivum fieri non potest, sed aliud specie est quod est mortuum et quod est vivum. Sed id quod facit fidem esse formatam vel vivam non est de essentia fidei. Et ideo non est simile. | Reply to Objection 2: That which makes an animal live is inseparable from an animal, because it is its substantial form, viz. the soul: consequently a dead thing cannot become a living thing, and a living and a dead thing differ specifically. On the other hand that which gives faith its form, or makes it live, is not essential to faith. Hence there is no comparison. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod gratia facit fidem non solum quando fides de novo incipit esse in homine, sed etiam quandiu fides durat, dictum est enim supra quod Deus semper operatur iustificationem hominis, sicut sol semper operatur illuminationem aeris. Unde gratia non minus facit adveniens fideli quam adveniens infideli, quia in utroque operatur fidem, in uno quidem confirmando eam et perficiendo, in alio de novo creando. | Reply to Objection 3: Grace causes faith not only when faith begins anew to be in a man, but also as long as faith lasts. For it has been said above (FP, Question [104], Article [1]; FS, Question [109], Article [9]) that God is always working man's justification, even as the sun is always lighting up the air. Hence grace is not less effective when it comes to a believer than when it comes to an unbeliever: since it causes faith in both, in the former by confirming and perfecting it, in the latter by creating it anew. |
| Vel potest dici quod hoc est per accidens, scilicet propter dispositionem subiecti, quod gratia non causat fidem in eo qui habet. Sicut e contrario secundum peccatum mortale non tollit gratiam ab eo qui eam amisit per peccatum mortale praecedens. | We might also reply that it is accidental, namely on account of the disposition of the subject, that grace does not cause faith in one who has it already: just as, on the other hand, a second mortal sin does not take away grace from one who has already lost it through a previous mortal sin. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod per hoc quod fides formata fit informis non mutatur ipsa fides, sed mutatur subiectum fidei, quod est anima, quod quandoque quidem habet fidem sine caritate, quandoque autem cum caritate. | Reply to Objection 4: When living faith becomes lifeless, faith is not changed, but its subject, the soul, which at one time has faith without charity, and at another time, with charity. |
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| Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fides non sit virtus. Virtus enim ordinatur ad bonum, nam virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, ut dicit philosophus, in II Ethic. Sed fides ordinatur ad verum. Ergo fides non est virtus. | Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not a virtue. For virtue is directed to the good, since "it is virtue that makes its subject good," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 6). But faith is directed to the true. Therefore faith is not a virtue. |
| Praeterea, perfectior est virtus infusa quam acquisita. Sed fides, propter sui imperfectionem, non ponitur inter virtutes intellectuales acquisitas, ut patet per philosophum, in VI Ethic. Ergo multo minus potest poni virtus infusa. | Objection 2: Further, infused virtue is more perfect than acquired virtue. Now faith, on account of its imperfection, is not placed among the acquired intellectual virtues, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 3). Much less, therefore, can it be considered an infused virtue. |
| Praeterea, fides formata et informis sunt eiusdem speciei, ut dictum est. Sed fides informis non est virtus, quia non habet connexionem cum aliis virtutibus. Ergo nec fides formata est virtus. |
Objection 3: Further, living and lifeless faith are the same species, as stated above (Article [4]). Now lifeless faith is not a virtue, since it is not connected with the other virtues. Therefore neither is living faith a virtue. |
| Praeterea, gratiae gratis datae et fructus distinguuntur a virtutibus. Sed fides enumeratur inter gratias gratis datas, I ad Cor. XII, et similiter inter fructus, ad Gal. V. Ergo fides non est virtus. |
Objection 4: Further, the gratuitous graces and the fruits are distinct from the virtues. But faith is numbered among the gratuitous graces (1 Cor. 12:9) and likewise among the fruits (Gal. 5:23). Therefore faith is not a virtue. |
| Sed contra est quod homo per virtutes iustificatur, nam iustitia est tota virtus, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Sed per fidem homo iustificatur, secundum illud ad Rom. V, iustificati ergo ex fide pacem habemus et cetera. Ergo fides est virtus. | On the contrary, Man is justified by the virtues, since "justice is all virtue," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 1). Now man is justified by faith according to Rm. 5:1: "Being justified therefore by faith let us have peace," etc. Therefore faith is a virtue. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, virtus humana est per quam actus humanus redditur bonus. Unde quicumque habitus est semper principium boni actus, potest dici virtus humana. Talis autem habitus est fides formata. Cum enim credere sit actus intellectus assentientis vero ex imperio voluntatis, ad hoc quod iste actus sit perfectus duo requiruntur. Quorum unum est ut infallibiliter intellectus tendat in suum bonum, quod est verum, aliud autem est ut infallibiliter ordinetur ad ultimum finem, propter quem voluntas assentit vero. Et utrumque invenitur in actu fidei formatae. Nam ex ratione ipsius fidei est quod intellectus semper feratur in verum, quia fidei non potest subesse falsum, ut supra habitum est, ex caritate autem, quae format fidem, habet anima quod infallibiliter voluntas ordinetur in bonum finem. Et ideo fides formata est virtus. |
I answer that, As shown above, it is by human virtue that human acts are rendered good; hence, any habit that is always the principle of a good act, may be called a human virtue. Such a habit is living faith. For since to believe is an act of the intellect assenting to the truth at the command of the will, two things are required that this act may be perfect: one of which is that the intellect should infallibly tend to its object, which is the true; while the other is that the will should be infallibly directed to the last end, on account of which it assents to the true: and both of these are to be found in the act of living faith. For it belongs to the very essence of faith that the intellect should ever tend to the true, since nothing false can be the object of faith, as proved above (Question [1], Article [3]): while the effect of charity, which is the form of faith, is that the soul ever has its will directed to a good end. Therefore living faith is a virtue. |
| Fides autem informis non est virtus, quia etsi habeat perfectionem debitam actus fidei informis ex parte intellectus, non tamen habet perfectionem debitam ex parte voluntatis. Sicut etiam si temperantia esset in concupiscibili et prudentia non esset in rationali, temperantia non esset virtus, ut supra dictum est, quia ad actum temperantiae requiritur et actus rationis et actus concupiscibilis, sicut ad actum fidei requiritur actus voluntatis et actus intellectus. |
On the other hand, lifeless faith is not a virtue, because, though the act of lifeless faith is duly perfect on the part of the intellect, it has not its due perfection as regards the will: just as if temperance be in the concupiscible, without prudence being in the rational part, temperance is not a virtue, as stated above (FS, Question [65], Article [1]), because the act of temperance requires both an act of reason, and an act of the concupiscible faculty, even as the act of faith requires an act of the will, and an act of the intellect. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ipsum verum est bonum intellectus, cum sit eius perfectio. Et ideo inquantum per fidem intellectus determinatur ad verum, fides habet ordinem in bonum quoddam. Sed ulterius, inquantum fides formatur per caritatem, habet etiam ordinem ad bonum secundum quod est voluntatis obiectum. | Reply to Objection 1: The truth is itself the good of the intellect, since it is its perfection: and consequently faith has a relation to some good in so far as it directs the intellect to the true. Furthermore, it has a relation to the good considered as the object of the will, inasmuch as it is formed by charity. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod fides de qua philosophus loquitur innititur rationi humanae non ex necessitate concludenti, cui potest subesse falsum. Et ideo talis fides non est virtus. Sed fides de qua loquimur innititur veritati divinae quae est infallibilis, et ita non potest ei subesse falsum. Et ideo talis fides potest esse virtus. | Reply to Objection 2: The faith of which the Philosopher speaks is based on human reasoning in a conclusion which does not follow, of necessity, from its premisses; and which is subject to be false: hence such like faith is not a virtue. On the other hand, the faith of which we are speaking is based on the Divine Truth, which is infallible, and consequently its object cannot be anything false; so that faith of this kind can be a virtue. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod fides formata et informis non differunt specie sicut in diversis speciebus existentes, differunt autem sicut perfectum et imperfectum in eadem specie. Unde fides informis, cum sit imperfecta, non pertingit ad perfectam rationem virtutis, nam virtus est perfectio quaedam, ut dicitur in VII Physic. | Reply to Objection 3: Living and lifeless faith do not differ specifically, as though they belonged to different species. But they differ as perfect and imperfect within the same species. Hence lifeless faith, being imperfect, does not satisfy the conditions of a perfect virtue, for "virtue is a kind of perfection" (Phys. vii, text. 18). |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod quidam ponunt quod fides quae connumeratur inter gratias gratis datas est fides informis. Sed hoc non convenienter dicitur. Quia gratiae gratis datae, quae ibi enumerantur, non sunt communes omnibus membris Ecclesiae, unde apostolus ibi dicit, divisiones gratiarum sunt; et iterum, alii datur hoc, alii datur illud. Fides autem informis est communis omnibus membris Ecclesiae, quia informitas non est de substantia eius, secundum quod est donum gratuitum. Unde dicendum est quod fides ibi sumitur pro aliqua fidei excellentia, sicut pro constantia fidei, ut dicit Glossa, vel pro sermone fidei. | Reply to Objection 4: Some say that faith which is numbered among the gratuitous graces is lifeless faith. But this is said without reason, since the gratuitous graces, which are mentioned in that passage, are not common to all the members of the Church: wherefore the Apostle says: "There are diversities of graces," and again, "To one is given" this grace and "to another" that. Now lifeless faith is common to all members of the Church, because its lifelessness is not part of its substance, if we consider it as a gratuitous gift. We must, therefore, say that in that passage, faith denotes a certain excellency of faith, for instance, "constancy in faith," according to a gloss, or the "word of faith." |
| Fides autem ponitur fructus secundum quod habet aliquam delectationem in suo actu, ratione certitudinis. Unde ad Gal. V, ubi enumerantur fructus, exponitur fides de invisibilibus certitudo. | Faith is numbered among the fruits, in so far as it gives a certain pleasure in its act by reason of its certainty, wherefore the gloss on the fifth chapter to the Galatians, where the fruits are enumerated, explains faith as being "certainty about the unseen." |
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| Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit una fides. Sicut enim fides est donum Dei, ut dicitur ad Ephes. II, ita etiam sapientia et scientia inter dona Dei computantur, ut patet Isaiae XI. Sed sapientia et scientia differunt per hoc quod sapientia est de aeternis, scientia vero de temporalibus, ut patet per Augustinum, XII de Trin. Cum igitur fides sit et de aeternis et de quibusdam temporalibus, videtur quod non sit una fides, sed distinguatur in partes. | Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not one. For just as faith is a gift of God according to Eph. 2:8, so also wisdom and knowledge are numbered among God's gifts according to Is. 11:2. Now wisdom and knowledge differ in this, that wisdom is about eternal things, and knowledge about temporal things, as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 14,15). Since, then, faith is about eternal things, and also about some temporal things, it seems that faith is not one virtue, but divided into several parts. |
| Praeterea, confessio est actus fidei, ut supra dictum est. Sed non est una et eadem confessio fidei apud omnes, nam quod nos confitemur factum antiqui patres confitebantur futurum, ut patet Isaiae VII, ecce virgo concipiet. Ergo non est una fides. |
Objection 2: Further, confession is an act of faith, as stated above (Question [3], Article [1]). Now confession of faith is not one and the same for all: since what we confess as past, the fathers of old confessed as yet to come, as appears from Is. 7:14: "Behold a virgin shall conceive." Therefore faith is not one. |
| Praeterea, fides est communis omnibus fidelibus Christi. Sed unum accidens non potest esse in diversis subiectis. Ergo non potest esse una fides omnium. | Objection 3: Further, faith is common to all believers in Christ. But one accident cannot be in many subjects. Therefore all cannot have one faith. |
| Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. IV, unus dominus, una fides. | On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 4:5): "One Lord, one faith." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod fides, si sumatur pro habitu, dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo, ex parte obiecti. Et sic est una fides, obiectum enim formale fidei est veritas prima, cui inhaerendo credimus quaecumque sub fide continentur. Alio modo, ex parte subiecti. Et sic fides diversificatur secundum quod est diversorum. Manifestum est autem quod fides, sicut et quilibet alius habitus, ex formali ratione obiecti habet speciem, sed ex subiecto individuatur. Et ideo, si fides sumatur pro habitu quo credimus, sic fides est una specie, et differens numero in diversis. | I answer that, If we take faith as a habit, we can consider it in two ways. First on the part of the object, and thus there is one faith. Because the formal object of faith is the First Truth, by adhering to which we believe whatever is contained in the faith. Secondly, on the part of the subject, and thus faith is differentiated according as it is in various subjects. Now it is evident that faith, just as any other habit, takes its species from the formal aspect of its object, but is individualized by its subject. Hence if we take faith for the habit whereby we believe, it is one specifically, but differs numerically according to its various subjects. |
| Si vero sumatur pro eo quod creditur, sic etiam est una fides. Quia idem est quod ab omnibus creditur, et si sint diversa credibilia quae communiter omnes credunt, tamen omnia reducuntur ad unum. | If, on the other hand, we take faith for that which is believed, then, again, there is one faith, since what is believed by all is one same thing: for though the things believed, which all agree in believing, be diverse from one another, yet they are all reduced to one. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod temporalia quae in fide proponuntur non pertinent ad obiectum fidei nisi in ordine ad aliquod aeternum, quod est veritas prima, sicut supra dictum est. Et ideo fides una est de temporalibus et aeternis. Secus autem est de sapientia et scientia, quae considerant temporalia et aeterna secundum proprias rationes utrorumque. |
Reply to Objection 1: Temporal matters which are proposed to be believed, do not belong to the object of faith, except in relation to something eternal, viz. the First Truth, as stated above (Question [1], Article [1]). Hence there is one faith of things both temporal and eternal. It is different with wisdom and knowledge, which consider temporal and eternal matters under their respective aspects. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod illa differentia praeteriti et futuri non contingit ex aliqua diversitate rei creditae, sed ex diversa habitudine credentium ad unam rem creditam, ut etiam supra habitum est. | Reply to Objection 2: This difference of past and future arises, not from any difference in the thing believed, but from the different relationships of believers to the one thing believed, as also we have mentioned above (FS, Question [103], Article [4]; FS, Question [107], Article [1], ad 1). |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod illa ratio procedit ex diversitate fidei secundum numerum. | Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers numerical diversity of faith. |
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| Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fides non sit prima inter virtutes. Dicitur enim Luc. XII, in Glossa super illud, dico vobis amicis meis, quod fortitudo est fidei fundamentum. Sed fundamentum est prius eo cuius est fundamentum. Ergo fides non est prima virtus. | Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not the first of the virtues. For a gloss on Lk. 12:4, "I say to you My friends," says that fortitude is the foundation of faith. Now the foundation precedes that which is founded thereon. Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues. |
| Praeterea, quaedam Glossa dicit, super illum Psalmum, noli aemulari, quod spes introducit ad fidem. Spes autem est virtus quaedam, ut infra dicetur. Ergo fides non est prima virtutum. |
Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 36, "Be not emulous," says that hope "leads on to faith." Now hope is a virtue, as we shall state further on (Question [17], Article [1]). Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues. |
| Praeterea, supra dictum est quod intellectus credentis inclinatur ad assentiendum his quae sunt fidei ex obedientia ad Deum. Sed obedientia etiam est quaedam virtus. Non ergo fides est prima virtus. |
Objection 3: Further, it was stated above (Article [2]) that the intellect of the believer is moved, out of obedience to God, to assent to matters of faith. Now obedience also is a virtue. Therefore faith is not the first virtue. |
| Praeterea, fides informis non est fundamentum, sed fides formata, sicut in Glossa dicitur, I ad Cor. III. Formatur autem fides per caritatem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo fides a caritate habet quod sit fundamentum. Caritas ergo est magis fundamentum quam fides, nam fundamentum est prima pars aedificii. Et ita videtur quod sit prior fide. |
Objection 4: Further, not lifeless but living faith is the foundation, as a gloss remarks on 1 Cor. 3:11 [*Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi.]. Now faith is formed by charity, as stated above (Article [3]). Therefore it is owing to charity that faith is the foundation: so that charity is the foundation yet more than faith is (for the foundation is the first part of a building) and consequently it seems to precede faith. |
| Praeterea, secundum ordinem actuum intelligitur ordo habituum. Sed in actu fidei actus voluntatis, quem perficit caritas, praecedit actum intellectus, quem perficit fides, sicut causa, quae praecedit effectum. Ergo caritas praecedit fidem. Non ergo fides est prima virtutum. | Objection 5: Further, the order of habits is taken from the order of acts. Now, in the act of faith, the act of the will which is perfected by charity, precedes the act of the intellect, which is perfected by faith, as the cause which precedes its effect. Therefore charity precedes faith. Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues. |
| Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Heb. XI, quod fides est substantia sperandarum rerum. Sed substantia habet rationem primi. Ergo fides est prima inter virtutes. |
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that "faith is the substance of things to be hoped for." Now the substance of a thing is that which comes first. Therefore faith is first among the virtues. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid potest esse prius altero dupliciter, uno modo, per se; alio modo, per accidens. Per se quidem inter omnes virtutes prima est fides. Cum enim in agibilibus finis sit principium, ut supra dictum est, necesse est virtutes theologicas, quarum obiectum est ultimus finis, esse priores ceteris virtutibus. Ipse autem ultimus finis oportet quod prius sit in intellectu quam in voluntate, quia voluntas non fertur in aliquid nisi prout est in intellectu apprehensum. Unde cum ultimus finis sit quidem in voluntate per spem et caritatem, in intellectu autem per fidem, necesse est quod fides sit prima inter omnes virtutes, quia naturalis cognitio non potest attingere ad Deum secundum quod est obiectum beatitudinis, prout tendit in ipsum spes et caritas. |
I answer that, One thing can precede another in two ways: first, by its very nature; secondly, by accident. Faith, by its very nature, precedes all other virtues. For since the end is the principle in matters of action, as stated above (FS, Question [13], Article [3]; FS, Question [34], Article [4], ad 1), the theological virtues, the object of which is the last end, must needs precede all the others. Again, the last end must of necessity be present to the intellect before it is present to the will, since the will has no inclination for anything except in so far as it is apprehended by the intellect. Hence, as the last end is present in the will by hope and charity, and in the intellect, by faith, the first of all the virtues must, of necessity, be faith, because natural knowledge cannot reach God as the object of heavenly bliss, which is the aspect under which hope and charity tend towards Him. |
| Sed per accidens potest aliqua virtus esse prior fide. Causa enim per accidens est per accidens prior. Removere autem prohibens pertinet ad causam per accidens, ut patet per philosophum, in VIII Physic. Et secundum hoc aliquae virtutes possunt dici per accidens priores fide, inquantum removent impedimenta credendi, sicut fortitudo removet inordinatum timorem impedientem fidem; humilitas autem superbiam, per quam intellectus recusat se submittere veritati fidei. Et idem potest dici de aliquibus aliis virtutibus, quamvis non sint verae virtutes nisi praesupposita fide, ut patet per Augustinum, in libro contra Iulianum. | On the other hand, some virtues can precede faith accidentally. For an accidental cause precedes its effect accidentally. Now that which removes an obstacle is a kind of accidental cause, according to the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 4): and in this sense certain virtues may be said to precede faith accidentally, in so far as they remove obstacles to belief. Thus fortitude removes the inordinate fear that hinders faith; humility removes pride, whereby a man refuses to submit himself to the truth of faith. The same may be said of some other virtues, although there are no real virtues, unless faith be presupposed, as Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv, 3). |
| Unde patet responsio ad primum. | This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod spes non potest universaliter introducere ad fidem. Non enim potest spes haberi de aeterna beatitudine nisi credatur possibile, quia impossibile non cadit sub spe, ut ex supradictis patet. Sed ex spe aliquis introduci potest ad hoc quod perseveret in fide, vel quod fidei firmiter adhaereat. Et secundum hoc dicitur spes introducere ad fidem. |
Reply to Objection 2: Hope cannot lead to faith absolutely. For one cannot hope to obtain eternal happiness, unless one believes this possible, since hope does not tend to the impossible, as stated above (FS, Question [40], Article [1]). It is, however, possible for one to be led by hope to persevere in faith, or to hold firmly to faith; and it is in this sense that hope is said to lead to faith. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod obedientia dupliciter dicitur. Quandoque enim importat inclinationem voluntatis ad implendum divina mandata. Et sic non est specialis virtus, sed generaliter includitur in omni virtute, quia omnes actus virtutum cadunt sub praeceptis legis divinae, ut supra dictum est. Et hoc modo ad fidem requiritur obedientia. Alio modo potest accipi obedientia secundum quod importat inclinationem quandam ad implendam mandata secundum quod habent rationem debiti. Et sic obedientia est specialis virtus, et est pars iustitiae, reddit enim superiori debitum obediendo sibi. Et hoc modo obedientia sequitur fidem, per quam manifestatur homini quod Deus sit superior, cui debeat obedire. |
Reply to Objection 3: Obedience is twofold: for sometimes it denotes the inclination of the will to fulfil God's commandments. In this way it is not a special virtue, but is a general condition of every virtue; since all acts of virtue come under the precepts of the Divine law, as stated above (FS, Question [100], Article [2]); and thus it is requisite for faith. In another way, obedience denotes an inclination to fulfil the commandments considered as a duty. In this way it is a special virtue, and a part of justice: for a man does his duty by his superior when he obeys him: and thus obedience follows faith, whereby man knows that God is his superior, Whom he must obey. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod ad rationem fundamenti non solum requiritur quod sit primum, sed etiam quod sit aliis partibus aedificii connexum, non enim esset fundamentum nisi ei aliae partes aedificii cohaererent. Connexio autem spiritualis aedificii est per caritatem, secundum illud Coloss. III, super omnia caritatem habete, quae est vinculum perfectionis. Et ideo fides sine caritate fundamentum esse non potest, nec tamen oportet quod caritas sit prior fide. | Reply to Objection 4: To be a foundation a thing requires not only to come first, but also to be connected with the other parts of the building: since the building would not be founded on it unless the other parts adhered to it. Now the connecting bond of the spiritual edifice is charity, according to Col. 3:14: "Above all... things have charity which is the bond of perfection." Consequently faith without charity cannot be the foundation: and yet it does not follow that charity precedes faith. |
| Ad quintum dicendum quod actus voluntatis praeexigitur ad fidem, non tamen actus voluntatis caritate informatus, sed talis actus praesupponit fidem, quia non potest voluntas perfecto amore in Deum tendere nisi intellectus rectam fidem habeat circa ipsum. | Reply to Objection 5: Some act of the will is required before faith, but not an act of the will quickened by charity. This latter act presupposes faith, because the will cannot tend to God with perfect love, unless the intellect possesses right faith about Him. |
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| Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fides non sit certior scientia et aliis virtutibus intellectualibus. Dubitatio enim opponitur certitudini, unde videtur illud esse certius quod minus potest habere de dubitatione; sicut est albius quod est nigro impermixtius. Sed intellectus et scientia, et etiam sapientia, non habent dubitationem circa ea quorum sunt, credens autem interdum potest pati motum dubitationis et dubitare de his quae sunt fidei. Ergo fides non est certior virtutibus intellectualibus. | Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not more certain than science and the other intellectual virtues. For doubt is opposed to certitude, wherefore a thing would seem to be the more certain, through being less doubtful, just as a thing is the whiter, the less it has of an admixture of black. Now understanding, science and also wisdom are free of any doubt about their objects; whereas the believer may sometimes suffer a movement of doubt, and doubt about matters of faith. Therefore faith is no more certain than the intellectual virtues. |
| Praeterea, visio est certior auditu. Sed fides est ex auditu, ut dicitur ad Rom. X, in intellectu autem et scientia et sapientia includitur quaedam intellectualis visio. Ergo certior est scientia vel intellectus quam fides. | Objection 2: Further, sight is more certain than hearing. But "faith is through hearing" according to Rm. 10:17; whereas understanding, science and wisdom imply some kind of intellectual sight. Therefore science and understanding are more certain than faith. |
| Praeterea, quanto aliquid est perfectius in his quae ad intellectum pertinent, tanto est certius. Sed intellectus est perfectior fide, quia per fidem ad intellectum pervenitur, secundum illud Isaiae VII, nisi credideritis, non intelligetis, secundum aliam litteram. Et Augustinus dicit etiam de scientia, XIV de Trin., quod per scientiam roboratur fides. Ergo videtur quod certior sit scientia vel intellectus quam fides. | Further, in matters concerning the intellect, the more perfect is the more certain. Now understanding is more perfect than faith, since faith is the way to understanding, according to another version [*The Septuagint] of Is. 7:9: "If you will not believe, you shall not understand [Vulg.: 'continue']": and Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "faith is strengthened by science." Therefore it seems that science or understanding is more certain than faith. |
| Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Thess. II, cum accepissetis a nobis verbum auditus, scilicet per fidem, accepistis illud non ut verbum hominum, sed, sicut vere est, verbum Dei. Sed nihil certius verbo Dei. Ergo scientia non est certior fide, nec aliquid aliud. |
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Thess. 2:15): "When you had received of us the word of the hearing," i.e. by faith... "you received it not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the word of God." Now nothing is more certain than the word of God. Therefore science is not more certain than faith; nor is anything else. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutum intellectualium duae sunt circa contingentia, scilicet prudentia et ars. Quibus praefertur fides in certitudine, ratione suae materiae, quia est de aeternis, quae non contingit aliter se habere. Tres autem reliquae intellectuales virtutes, scilicet sapientia, scientia et intellectus, sunt de necessariis, ut supra dictum est. Sed sciendum est quod sapientia, scientia et intellectus dupliciter dicuntur, uno modo, secundum quod ponuntur virtutes intellectuales a philosopho, in VI Ethic.; alio modo, secundum quod ponuntur dona spiritus sancti. Primo igitur modo, dicendum est quod certitudo potest considerari dupliciter. Uno modo, ex causa certitudinis, et sic dicitur esse certius illud quod habet certiorem causam. Et hoc modo fides est certior tribus praedictis, quia fides innititur veritati divinae, tria autem praedicta innituntur rationi humanae. Alio modo potest considerari certitudo ex parte subiecti, et sic dicitur esse certius quod plenius consequitur intellectus hominis. Et per hunc modum, quia ea quae sunt fidei sunt supra intellectum hominis, non autem ea quae subsunt tribus praedictis, ideo ex hac parte fides est minus certa. Sed quia unumquodque iudicatur simpliciter quidem secundum causam suam; secundum autem dispositionem quae est ex parte subiecti iudicatur secundum quid, inde est quod fides est simpliciter certior, sed alia sunt certiora secundum quid, scilicet quoad nos. Similiter etiam, si accipiantur tria praedicta secundum quod sunt dona praesentis vitae, comparantur ad fidem sicut ad principium quod praesupponunt. Unde etiam secundum hoc fides est eis certior. |
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question [57], Article [4], ad 2) two of the intellectual virtues are about contingent matter, viz. prudence and art; to which faith is preferable in point of certitude, by reason of its matter, since it is about eternal things, which never change, whereas the other three intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science [*In English the corresponding 'gift' is called knowledge] and understanding, are about necessary things, as stated above (FS, Question [57], Article [5], ad 3). But it must be observed that wisdom, science and understanding may be taken in two ways: first, as intellectual virtues, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3); secondly, for the gifts of the Holy Ghost. If we consider them in the first way, we must note that certitude can be looked at in two ways. First, on the part of its cause, and thus a thing which has a more certain cause, is itself more certain. In this way faith is more certain than those three virtues, because it is founded on the Divine truth, whereas the aforesaid three virtues are based on human reason. Secondly, certitude may be considered on the part of the subject, and thus the more a man's intellect lays hold of a thing, the more certain it is. In this way, faith is less certain, because matters of faith are above the human intellect, whereas the objects of the aforesaid three virtues are not. Since, however, a thing is judged simply with regard to its cause, but relatively, with respect to a disposition on the part of the subject, it follows that faith is more certain simply, while the others are more certain relatively, i.e. for us. Likewise if these three be taken as gifts received in this present life, they are related to faith as to their principle which they presuppose: so that again, in this way, faith is more certain. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa dubitatio non est ex parte causae fidei, sed quoad nos, inquantum non plene assequimur per intellectum ea quae sunt fidei. | Reply to Objection 1: This doubt is not on the side of the cause of faith, but on our side, in so far as we do not fully grasp matters of faith with our intellect. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, ceteris paribus, visio est certior auditu. Sed si ille a quo auditur multum excedit visum videntis, sic certior est auditus quam visus. Sicut aliquis parvae scientiae magis certificatur de eo quod audit ab aliquo scientissimo quam de eo quod sibi secundum suam rationem videtur. Et multo magis homo certior est de eo quod audit a Deo, qui falli non potest, quam de eo quod videt propria ratione, quae falli potest. | Reply to Objection 2: Other things being equal sight is more certain than hearing; but if (the authority of) the person from whom we hear greatly surpasses that of the seer's sight, hearing is more certain than sight: thus a man of little science is more certain about what he hears on the authority of an expert in science, than about what is apparent to him according to his own reason: and much more is a man certain about what he hears from God, Who cannot be deceived, than about what he sees with his own reason, which can be mistaken. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod perfectio intellectus et scientiae excedit cognitionem fidei quantum ad maiorem manifestationem, non tamen quantum ad certiorem inhaesionem. Quia tota certitudo intellectus vel scientiae secundum quod sunt dona, procedit a certitudine fidei, sicut certitudo cognitionis conclusionum procedit ex certitudine principiorum. Secundum autem quod scientia et sapientia et intellectus sunt virtutes intellectuales, innituntur naturali lumini rationis, quod deficit a certitudine verbi Dei, cui innititur fides. | Reply to Objection 3: The gifts of understanding and knowledge are more perfect than the knowledge of faith in the point of their greater clearness, but not in regard to more certain adhesion: because the whole certitude of the gifts of understanding and knowledge, arises from the certitude of faith, even as the certitude of the knowledge of conclusions arises from the certitude of premisses. But in so far as science, wisdom and understanding are intellectual virtues, they are based upon the natural light of reason, which falls short of the certitude of God's word, on which faith is founded. |