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Deinde considerandum est de vitiis oppositis caritati.
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We must how consider the vices opposed to charity:
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| Circa primum quaeruntur sex, | Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: |
| primo, utrum Deus possit odio haberi. | (1) Whether it is possible to hate God? |
| Secundo, utrum odium Dei sit maximum peccatorum. | (2) Whether hatred of God is the greatest of sins? |
| Tertio, utrum odium proximi semper sit peccatum. | (3) Whether hatred of one's neighbor is always a sin? |
| Quarto, utrum sit maximum inter peccata quae sunt in proximum. | (4) Whether it is the greatest of all sins against our neighbor? |
| Quinto, utrum sit vitium capitale. | (5) Whether it is a capital sin? |
| Sexto, ex quo capitali vitio oriatur. | (6) From what capital sin does it arise? |
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Article: 1 [ << | >> ]
| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deum nullus odio habere possit. Dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod omnibus amabile et diligibile est ipsum bonum et pulchrum. Sed Deus est ipsa bonitas et pulchritudo. Ergo a nullo odio habetur. | Objection 1: It would seem that no man can hate God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the first good and beautiful is an object of love and dilection to all." But God is goodness and beauty itself. Therefore He is hated by none. |
| Praeterea, in apocryphis Esdrae dicitur quod omnia invocant veritatem, et benignantur in operibus eius. Sed Deus est ipsa veritas, ut dicitur Ioan. XIV. Ergo omnes diligunt Deum, et nullus eum odio habere potest. | Objection 2: Further, in the Apocryphal books of 3 Esdras 4:36,[39] it is written that "all things call upon truth... and (all men) do well like of her works." Now God is the very truth according to Jn. 14:6. Therefore all love God, and none can hate Him. |
| Praeterea, odium est aversio quaedam. Sed sicut Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom., Deus omnia ad seipsum convertit. Ergo nullus eum odio habere potest. | Objection 3: Further, hatred is a kind of aversion. But according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. i) God draws all things to Himself. Therefore none can hate Him. |
| Sed contra est, quod dicitur in Psalm., superbia eorum qui te oderunt ascendit semper; et Ioan. XV, nunc autem et viderunt et oderunt me et patrem meum. |
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 73:23): "The pride of them that hate Thee ascendeth continually," and (Jn. 15:24): "But now they have both seen and hated both Me and My Father." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, odium est quidam motus appetitivae potentiae, quae non movetur nisi ab aliquo apprehenso. Deus autem dupliciter ab homine apprehendi potest, uno modo, secundum seipsum, puta cum per essentiam videtur; alio modo, per effectus suos, cum scilicet invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur. Deus autem per essentiam suam est ipsa bonitas, quam nullus habere odio potest, quia de ratione boni est ut ametur. Et ideo impossibile est quod aliquis videns Deum per essentiam eum odio habeat. |
I answer that, As shown above (FS, Question [29], Article [1]), hatred is a movement of the appetitive power, which power is not set in motion save by something apprehended. Now God can be apprehended by man in two ways; first, in Himself, as when He is seen in His Essence; secondly, in His effects, when, to wit, "the invisible things" of God... "are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rm. 1:20). Now God in His Essence is goodness itself, which no man can hate—for it is natural to good to be loved. Hence it is impossible for one who sees God in His Essence, to hate Him. |
| Sed effectus eius aliqui sunt qui nullo modo possunt esse contrarii voluntati humanae, quia esse, vivere et intelligere est appetibile et amabile omnibus, quae sunt quidam effectus Dei. Unde etiam secundum quod Deus apprehenditur ut auctor horum effectuum, non potest odio haberi. Sunt autem quidam effectus Dei qui repugnant inordinatae voluntati, sicut inflictio poenae; et etiam cohibitio peccatorum per legem divinam, quae repugnat voluntati depravatae per peccatum. Et quantum ad considerationem talium effectuum, ab aliquibus Deus odio haberi potest, inquantum scilicet apprehenditur peccatorum prohibitor et poenarum inflictor. | Moreover some of His effects are such that they can nowise be contrary to the human will, since "to be, to live, to understand," which are effects of God, are desirable and lovable to all. Wherefore again God cannot be an object of hatred if we consider Him as the Author of such like effects. Some of God's effects, however, are contrary to an inordinate will, such as the infliction of punishment, and the prohibition of sin by the Divine Law. Such like effects are repugnant to a will debased by sin, and as regards the consideration of them, God may be an object of hatred to some, in so far as they look upon Him as forbidding sin, and inflicting punishment. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit quantum ad illos qui vident Dei essentiam, quae est ipsa essentia bonitatis. | Reply to Objection 1: This argument is true of those who see God's Essence, which is the very essence of goodness. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit quantum ad hoc quod apprehenditur Deus ut causa illorum effectuum qui naturaliter ab hominibus amantur, inter quos sunt opera veritatis praebentis suam cognitionem hominibus. | Reply to Objection 2: This argument is true in so far as God is apprehended as the cause of such effects as are naturally beloved of all, among which are the works of Truth who reveals herself to men. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus convertit omnia ad seipsum inquantum est essendi principium, quia omnia, inquantum sunt, tendunt in Dei similitudinem, qui est ipsum esse. | Reply to Objection 3: God draws all things to Himself, in so far as He is the source of being, since all things, in as much as they are, tend to be like God, Who is Being itself. |
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Article: 2 [ << | >> ]
| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod odium Dei non sit maximum peccatorum. Gravissimum enim peccatum est peccatum in spiritum sanctum, quod est irremissibile, ut dicitur Matth. XII. Sed odium Dei non computatur inter species peccati in spiritum sanctum; ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo odium Dei non est gravissimum peccatorum. |
Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of God is not the greatest of sins. For the most grievous sin is the sin against the Holy Ghost, since it cannot be forgiven, according to Mt. 12:32. Now hatred of God is not reckoned among the various kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost, as may be seen from what has been said above (Question [14], Article [2]). Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin. |
| Praeterea, peccatum consistit in elongatione a Deo. Sed magis videtur esse elongatus a Deo infidelis, qui nec Dei cognitionem habet, quam fidelis, qui saltem, quamvis Deum odio habet, eum tamen cognoscit. Ergo videtur quod gravius sit peccatum infidelitatis quam peccatum odii in Deum. | Objection 2: Further, sin consists in withdrawing oneself from God. Now an unbeliever who has not even knowledge of God seems to be further away from Him than a believer, who though he hate God, nevertheless knows Him. Therefore it seems that the sin of unbelief is graver than the sin of hatred against God. |
| Praeterea, Deus habetur odio solum ratione suorum effectuum qui repugnant voluntati, inter quos praecipuum est poena. Sed odire poenam non est maximum peccatorum. Ergo odium Dei non est maximum peccatorum. | Objection 3: Further, God is an object of hatred, only by reason of those of His effects that are contrary to the will: the chief of which is punishment. But hatred of punishment is not the most grievous sin. Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin. |
| Sed contra est quod optimo opponitur pessimum; ut patet per philosophum, in VIII Ethic. Sed odium Dei opponitur dilectioni Dei, in qua consistit optimum hominis. Ergo odium Dei est pessimum peccatum hominis. | On the contrary, The best is opposite to the worst, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). But hatred of God is contrary to the love of God, wherein man's best consists. Therefore hatred of God is man's worst sin. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod defectus peccati consistit in aversione a Deo, ut supra dictum est. Huiusmodi autem aversio rationem culpae non haberet nisi voluntaria esset. Unde ratio culpae consistit in voluntaria aversione a Deo. |
I answer that, The defect in sin consists in its aversion from God, as stated above (Question [10], Article [3]): and this aversion would not have the character of guilt, were it not voluntary. Hence the nature of guilt consists in a voluntary aversion from God. |
| Haec autem voluntaria aversio a Deo per se quidem importatur in odio Dei, in aliis autem peccatis quasi participative et secundum aliud. Sicut enim voluntas per se inhaeret ei quod amat, ita secundum se refugit id quod odit, unde quando aliquis odit Deum, voluntas eius secundum se ab eo avertitur. Sed in aliis peccatis, puta cum aliquis fornicatur, non avertitur a Deo secundum se, sed secundum aliud, inquantum scilicet appetit inordinatam delectationem, quae habet annexam aversionem a Deo. Semper autem id quod est per se est potius eo quod est secundum aliud. Unde odium Dei inter alia peccata est gravius. | Now this voluntary aversion from God is directly implied in the hatred of God, but in other sins, by participation and indirectly. For just as the will cleaves directly to what it loves, so does it directly shun what it hates. Hence when a man hates God, his will is directly averted from God, whereas in other sins, fornication for instance, a man turns away from God, not directly, but indirectly, in so far, namely, as he desires an inordinate pleasure, to which aversion from God is connected. Now that which is so by itself, always takes precedence of that which is so by another. Wherefore hatred of God is more grievous than other sins. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Gregorius dicit, XXV Moral., aliud est bona non facere, aliud est bonorum odisse datorem, sicut aliud est ex praecipitatione, aliud ex deliberatione peccare ex quo datur intelligi quod odire Deum, omnium bonorum datorem, sit ex deliberatione peccare, quod est peccatum in spiritum sanctum. Unde manifestum est quod odium Dei maxime est peccatum in spiritum sanctum, secundum quod peccatum in spiritum sanctum nominat aliquod genus speciale peccati. Ideo tamen non computatur inter species peccati in spiritum sanctum, quia generaliter invenitur in omni specie peccati in spiritum sanctum. | Reply to Objection 1: According to Gregory (Moral. xxv, 11), "it is one thing not to do good things, end another to hate the giver of good things, even as it is one thing to sin indeliberately, and another to sin deliberately." This implies that to hate God, the giver of all good things, is to sin deliberately, and this is a sin against the Holy Ghost. Hence it is evident that hatred of God is chiefly a sin against the Holy Ghost, in so far as the sin against the Holy Ghost denotes a special kind of sin: and yet it is not reckoned among the kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost, because it is universally found in every kind of that sin. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ipsa infidelitas non habet rationem culpae nisi inquantum est voluntaria. Et ideo tanto est gravior quanto est magis voluntaria. Quod autem sit voluntaria provenit ex hoc quod aliquis odio habet veritatem quae proponitur. Unde patet quod ratio peccati in infidelitate sit ex odio Dei, circa cuius veritatem est fides. Et ideo, sicut causa est potior effectu, ita odium Dei est maius peccatum quam infidelitas. | Reply to Objection 2: Even unbelief is not sinful unless it be voluntary: wherefore the more voluntary it is, the more it is sinful. Now it becomes voluntary by the fact that a man hates the truth that is proposed to him. Wherefore it is evident that unbelief derives its sinfulness from hatred of God, Whose truth is the object of faith; and hence just as a cause is greater than its effect, so hatred of God is a greater sin than unbelief. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod non quicumque odit poenas odit Deum, poenarum auctorem, nam multi odiunt poenas qui tamen patienter eas ferunt ex reverentia divinae iustitiae. Unde et Augustinus dicit, X Confess., quod mala poenalia Deus tolerare iubet, non amari. Sed prorumpere in odium Dei punientis, hoc est habere odio ipsam Dei iustitiam, quod est gravissimum peccatum. Unde Gregorius dicit, XXV Moral., sicut nonnunquam gravius est peccatum diligere quam perpetrare, ita nequius est odisse iustitiam quam non fecisse. | Reply to Objection 3: Not everyone who hates his punishment, hates God the author of punishments. For many hate the punishments inflicted on them, and yet they bear them patiently out of reverence for the Divine justice. Wherefore Augustine says (Confess. x) that God commands us to bear with penal evils, not to love them. On the other hand, to break out into hatred of God when He inflicts those punishments, is to hate God's very justice, and that is a most grievous sin. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxv, 11): "Even as sometimes it is more grievous to love sin than to do it, so is it more wicked to hate justice than, not to have done it." |
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Article: 3 [ << | >> ]
| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omne odium proximi sit peccatum. Nullum enim peccatum invenitur in praeceptis vel consiliis legis divinae, secundum illud Prov. VIII. Recti sunt omnes sermones mei, non est in eis pravum quid nec perversum. Sed Luc. XIV dicitur, si quis venit ad me et non odit patrem et matrem, non potest meus esse discipulus. Ergo non omne odium proximi est peccatum. |
Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of one's neighbor is not always a sin. For no sin is commanded or counselled by God, according to Prov. 8:8: "All My words are just, there is nothing wicked nor perverse in them." Now, it is written (Lk. 14:26): "If any man come to Me, and hate not his father and mother... he cannot be My disciple." Therefore hatred of one's neighbor is not always a sin. |
| Praeterea, nihil potest esse peccatum secundum quod Deum imitamur. Sed imitando Deum quosdam odio habemus, dicitur enim Rom. I, detractores, Deo odibiles. Ergo possumus aliquos odio habere absque peccato. |
Objection 2: Further, nothing wherein we imitate God can be a sin. But it is in imitation of God that we hate certain people: for it is written (Rm. 1:30): "Detractors, hateful to God." Therefore it is possible to hate certain people without committing a sin. |
| Praeterea, nihil naturalium est peccatum, quia peccatum est recessus ab eo quod est secundum naturam, ut Damascenus dicit, in II libro. Sed naturale est unicuique rei quod odiat id quod est sibi contrarium et quod nitatur ad eius corruptionem. Ergo videtur non esse peccatum quod aliquis habeat odio inimicum suum. | Objection 3: Further, nothing that is natural is a sin, for sin is a "wandering away from what is according to nature," according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 4,30; iv, 20). Now it is natural to a thing to hate whatever is contrary to it, and to aim at its undoing. Therefore it seems that it is not a sin to hate one's I enemy. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur I Ioan. II, qui fratrem suum odit in tenebris est. Sed tenebrae spirituales sunt peccata. Ergo odium proximi non potest esse sine peccato. |
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 2:9): "He that... hateth his brother, is in darkness." Now spiritual darkness is sin. Therefore there cannot be hatred of one's neighbor without sin. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod odium amori opponitur, ut supra dictum est. Unde tantum habet odium de ratione mali quantum amor habet de ratione boni. Amor autem debetur proximo secundum id quod a Deo habet, idest secundum naturam et gratiam, non autem debetur ei amor secundum id quod habet a seipso et Diabolo, scilicet secundum peccatum et iustitiae defectum. |
I answer that, Hatred is opposed to love, as stated above (FS, Question [29], Article [2]); so that hatred of a thing is evil according as the love of that thing is good. Now love is due to our neighbor in respect of what he holds from God, i.e. in respect of nature and grace, but not in respect of what he has of himself and from the devil, i.e. in respect of sin and lack of justice. |
| Et ideo licet habere odio in fratre peccatum et omne illud quod pertinet ad defectum divinae iustitiae, sed ipsam naturam et gratiam fratris non potest aliquis habere odio sine peccato. Hoc autem ipsum quod in fratre odimus culpam et defectum boni, pertinet ad fratris amorem, eiusdem enim rationis est quod velimus bonum alicuius et quod odimus malum ipsius. Unde, simpliciter accipiendo odium fratris, semper est cum peccato. | Consequently it is lawful to hate the sin in one's brother, and whatever pertains to the defect of Divine justice, but we cannot hate our brother's nature and grace without sin. Now it is part of our love for our brother that we hate the fault and the lack of good in him, since desire for another's good is equivalent to hatred of his evil. Consequently the hatred of one's brother, if we consider it simply, is always sinful. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod parentes, quantum ad naturam et affinitatem qua nobis coniunguntur, sunt a nobis secundum praeceptum Dei honorandi, ut patet Exod. XX. Odiendi autem sunt quantum ad hoc quod impedimentum praestant nobis accedendi ad perfectionem divinae iustitiae. |
Reply to Objection 1: By the commandment of God (Ex. 20:12) we must honor our parents—as united to us in nature and kinship. But we must hate them in so far as they prove an obstacle to our attaining the perfection of Divine justice. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus in detractoribus odio habet culpam, non naturam. Et sic sine culpa possumus odio detractores habere. | Reply to Objection 2: God hates the sin which is in the detractor, not his nature: so that we can hate detractors without committing a sin. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod homines secundum bona quae habent a Deo non sunt nobis contrarii, unde quantum ad hoc sunt amandi. Contrariantur autem nobis secundum quod contra nos inimicitias exercent, quod ad eorum culpam pertinet, et quantum ad hoc sunt odio habendi. Hoc enim in eis debemus habere odio, quod nobis sunt inimici. | Reply to Objection 3: Men are not opposed to us in respect of the goods which they have received from God: wherefore, in this respect, we should love them. But they are opposed to us, in so far as they show hostility towards us, and this is sinful in them. In this respect we should hate them, for we should hate in them the fact that they are hostile to us. |
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Question: 34 [ << | >> ]
Article: 4 [ << | >> ]
| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod odium proximi sit gravissimum peccatum eorum quae in proximo committuntur. Dicitur enim I Ioan. III, omnis qui odit fratrem suum homicida est. Sed homicidium est gravissimum peccatorum quae committuntur in proximum. Ergo et odium. |
Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of our neighbor is the most grievous sin against our neighbor. For it is written (1 Jn. 3:15): "Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer." Now murder is the most grievous of sins against our neighbor. Therefore hatred is also. |
| Praeterea, pessimum opponitur optimo. Sed optimum eorum quae proximo exhibemus est amor, omnia enim alia ad dilectionem referuntur. Ergo et pessimum est odium. | Objection 2: Further, worst is opposed to best. Now the best thing we give our neighbor is love, since all other things are referable to love. Therefore hatred is the worst. |
| Sed contra, malum dicitur quod nocet; secundum Augustinum, in Enchirid. Sed plus aliquis nocet proximo per alia peccata quam per odium, puta per furtum et homicidium et adulterium. Ergo odium non est gravissimum peccatum. | On the contrary, A thing is said to be evil, because it hurts, as Augustine observes (Enchiridion xii). Now there are sins by which a man hurts his neighbor more than by hatred, e.g. theft, murder and adultery. Therefore hatred is not the most grievous sin. |
| Praeterea, Chrysostomus, exponens illud Matth., qui solverit unum de mandatis istis minimis, dicit, mandata Moysi, non occides, non adulterabis, in remuneratione modica sunt, in peccato autem magna, mandata autem Christi, idest non irascaris, non concupiscas, in remuneratione magna sunt, in peccato autem minima. Odium autem pertinet ad interiorem motum, sicut et ira et concupiscentia. Ergo odium proximi est minus peccatum quam homicidium. | Moreover, Chrysostom [*Hom. x in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] commenting on Mt. 5:19, "He that shall break one of these least commandments," says: "The commandments of Moses, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not commit adultery, count for little in their reward, but they count for much if they be disobeyed. On the other hand the commandments of Christ such as, Thou shalt not be angry, Thou shalt not desire, are reckoned great in their reward, but little in the transgression." Now hatred is an internal movement like anger and desire. Therefore hatred of one's brother is a less grievous sin than murder. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum quod committitur in proximum habet rationem mali ex duobus, uno quidem modo, ex deordinatione eius qui peccat; alio modo, ex nocumento quod infertur ei contra quem peccatur. Primo ergo modo odium est maius peccatum quam exteriores actus qui sunt in proximi nocumentum, quia scilicet per odium deordinatur voluntas hominis, quae est potissimum in homine, et ex qua est radix peccati. Unde etiam si exteriores actus inordinati essent absque inordinatione voluntatis, non essent peccata, puta cum aliquis ignoranter vel zelo iustitiae hominem occidit. Et si quid culpae est in exterioribus peccatis quae contra proximum committuntur, totum est ex interiori odio. | I answer that, Sins committed against our neighbor are evil on two counts; first by reason of the disorder in the person who sins, secondly by reason of the hurt inflicted on the person sinned against. On the first count, hatred is a more grievous sin than external actions that hurt our neighbor, because hatred is a disorder of man's will, which is the chief part of man, and wherein is the root of sin, so that if a man's outward actions were to be inordinate, without any disorder in his will, they would not be sinful, for instance, if he were to kill a man, through ignorance or out of zeal for justice: and if there be anything sinful in a man's outward sins against his neighbor, it is all to be traced to his inward hatred. |
| Sed quantum ad nocumentum quod proximo infertur peiora sunt exteriora peccata quam interius odium. | On the other hand, as regards the hurt inflicted on his neighbor, a man's outward sins are worse than his inward hatred. |
| Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. | This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. |
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| Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod odium sit vitium capitale. Odium enim directe opponitur caritati. Sed caritas est principalissima virtutum et mater aliarum. Ergo odium est maxime vitium capitale, et principium omnium aliorum. | Objection 1: It would seem that hatred is a capital sin. For hatred is directly opposed to charity. Now charity is the foremost among the virtues, and the mother of all others. Therefore hatred is the chief of the capital sins, and the origin of all others. |
| Praeterea, peccata oriuntur in nobis secundum inclinationem passionum, secundum illud ad Rom. VII, passiones peccatorum operabantur in membris nostris, ut fructificarent morti. Sed in passionibus animae ex amore et odio videntur omnes aliae sequi, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo odium debet poni inter vitia capitalia. | Objection 2: Further, sins arise in us on account of the inclinations of our passions, according to Rm. 7:5: "The passions of sins... did work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death." Now all other passions of the soul seem to arise from love and hatred, as was shown above (FS, Question [25], Articles [1],2). Therefore hatred should be reckoned one of the capital sins. |
| Praeterea, vitium est malum morale. Sed odium principalius respicit malum quam alia passio. Ergo videtur quod odium debet poni vitium capitale. | Objection 3: Further, vice is a moral evil. Now hatred regards evil more than any other passion does. Therefore it seems that hatred should be reckoned a capital sin. |
| Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., non enumerat odium inter septem vitia capitalia. | On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) does not reckon hatred among the seven capital sins. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, vitium capitale est ex quo ut frequentius alia vitia oriuntur. Vitium autem est contra naturam hominis inquantum est animal rationale. In his autem quae contra naturam fiunt paulatim id quod est naturae corrumpitur. Unde oportet quod primo recedatur ab eo quod est minus secundum naturam, et ultimo ab eo quod est maxime secundum naturam, quia id quod est primum in constructione est ultimum in resolutione. Id autem quod est maxime et primo naturale homini est quod diligat bonum, et praecipue bonum divinum et bonum proximi. Et ideo odium, quod huic dilectioni opponitur, non est primum in deletione virtutis, quae fit per vitia, sed ultimum. Et ideo odium non est vitium capitale. |
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question [84], Articles [3],4), a capital vice is one from which other vices arise most frequently. Now vice is contrary to man's nature, in as much as he is a rational animal: and when a thing acts contrary to its nature, that which is natural to it is corrupted little by little. Consequently it must first of all fail in that which is less in accordance with its nature, and last of all in that which is most in accordance with its nature, since what is first in construction is last in destruction. Now that which, first and foremost, is most natural to man, is the love of what is good, and especially love of the Divine good, and of his neighbor's good. Wherefore hatred, which is opposed to this love, is not the first but the last thing in the downfall of virtue resulting from vice: and therefore it is not a capital vice. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in VII Physic., virtus uniuscuiusque rei consistit in hoc quod sit bene disposita secundum suam naturam. Et ideo in virtutibus oportet esse primum et principale quod est primum et principale in ordine naturali. Et propter hoc caritas ponitur principalissima virtutum. Et eadem ratione odium non potest esse primum in vitiis, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Phys. vii, text. 18, "the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed in accordance with its nature." Hence what is first and foremost in the virtues must be first and foremost in the natural order. Hence charity is reckoned the foremost of the virtues, and for the same reason hatred cannot be first among the vices, as stated above. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod odium mali quod contrariatur naturali bono est primum inter passiones animae, sicut et amor naturalis boni. Sed odium boni connaturalis non potest esse primum, sed habet rationem ultimi, quia tale odium attestatur corruptioni naturae iam factae, sicut et amor extranei boni. | Reply to Objection 2: Hatred of the evil that is contrary to one's natural good, is the first of the soul's passions, even as love of one's natural good is. But hatred of one's connatural good cannot be first, but is something last, because such like hatred is a proof of an already corrupted nature, even as love of an extraneous good. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod duplex est malum. Quoddam verum, quia scilicet repugnat naturali bono, et huius mali odium potest habere rationem prioritatis inter passiones. Est autem aliud malum non verum, sed apparens, quod scilicet est verum bonum et connaturale, sed aestimatur ut malum propter corruptionem naturae. Et huiusmodi mali odium oportet quod sit in ultimo. Hoc autem odium est vitiosum, non autem primum. | Reply to Objection 3: Evil is twofold. One is a true evil, for the reason that it is incompatible with one's natural good, and the hatred of such an evil may have priority over the other passions. There is, however, another which is not a true, but an apparent evil, which, namely, is a true and connatural good, and yet is reckoned evil on account of the corruption of nature: and the hatred of such an evil must needs come last. This hatred is vicious, but the former is not. |
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| Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod odium non oriatur ex invidia. Invidia enim est tristitia quaedam de alienis bonis. Odium autem non oritur ex tristitia, sed potius e converso, tristamur enim de praesentia malorum quae odimus. Ergo odium non oritur ex invidia. | Objection 1: It seems that hatred does not arise from envy. For envy is sorrow for another's good. Now hatred does not arise from sorrow, for, on the contrary, we grieve for the presence of the evil we hate. Therefore hatred does not arise from envy. |
| Praeterea, odium dilectioni opponitur. Sed dilectio proximi refertur ad dilectionem Dei, ut supra habitum est. Ergo et odium proximi refertur ad odium Dei. Sed odium Dei non causatur ex invidia, non enim invidemus his qui maxime a nobis distant, sed his qui propinqui videntur, ut patet per philosophum, in II Rhet. Ergo odium non causatur ex invidia. |
Objection 2: Further, hatred is opposed to love. Now love of our neighbor is referred to our love of God, as stated above (Question [25], Article [1]; Question [26], Article [2]). Therefore hatred of our neighbor is referred to our hatred of God. But hatred of God does not arise from envy, for we do not envy those who are very far removed from us, but rather those who seem to be near us, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii). Therefore hatred does not arise from envy. |
| Praeterea, unius effectus una est causa. Sed odium causatur ex ira, dicit enim Augustinus, in regula, quod ira crescit in odium. Non ergo causatur odium ex invidia, | Objection 3: Further, to one effect there is one cause. Now hatred is caused by anger, for Augustine says in his Rule that "anger grows into hatred." Therefore hatred does not arise from envy. |
| Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, XXXI Moral., quod de invidia oritur odium. | On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "out of envy cometh hatred." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, odium proximi est ultimum in progressu peccati, eo quod opponitur dilectioni qua naturaliter proximus diligitur. Quod autem aliquis recedat ab eo quod est naturale, contingit ex hoc quod intendit vitare aliquid quod est naturaliter fugiendum. Naturaliter autem omne animal fugit tristitiam, sicut et appetit delectationem; sicut patet per philosophum, in VII et X Ethic. Et ideo sicut ex delectatione causatur amor, ita ex tristitia causatur odium, sicut enim movemur ad diligendum ea quae nos delectant, inquantum ex hoc ipso accipiuntur sub ratione boni; ita movemur ad odiendum ea quae nos contristant, inquantum ex hoc ipso accipiuntur sub ratione mali. Unde cum invidia sit tristitia de bono proximi, sequitur quod bonum proximi reddatur nobis odiosum. Et inde est quod ex invidia oritur odium. |
I answer that, As stated above (Article [5]), hatred of his neighbor is a man's last step in the path of sin, because it is opposed to the love which he naturally has for his neighbor. Now if a man declines from that which is natural, it is because he intends to avoid that which is naturally an object to be shunned. Now every animal naturally avoids sorrow, just as it desires pleasure, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, x). Accordingly just as love arises from pleasure, so does hatred arise from sorrow. For just as we are moved to love whatever gives us pleasure, in as much as for that very reason it assumes the aspect of good; so we are moved to hate whatever displeases us, in so far as for this very reason it assumes the aspect of evil. Wherefore, since envy is sorrow for our neighbor's good, it follows that our neighbor's good becomes hateful to us, so that "out of envy cometh hatred." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quia vis appetitiva, sicut et apprehensiva, reflectitur super suos actus, sequitur quod in motibus appetitivae virtutis sit quaedam circulatio. Secundum igitur primum processum appetitivi motus, ex amore consequitur desiderium, ex quo consequitur delectatio, cum quis consecutus fuerit quod desiderabat. Et quia hoc ipsum quod est delectari in bono amato habet quandam rationem boni, sequitur quod delectatio causet amorem. Et secundum eandem rationem sequitur quod tristitia causet odium. | Reply to Objection 1: Since the appetitive power, like the apprehensive power, reflects on its own acts, it follows that there is a kind of circular movement in the actions of the appetitive power. And so according to the first forward course of the appetitive movement, love gives rise to desire, whence follows pleasure when one has obtained what one desired. And since the very fact of taking pleasure in the good one loves is a kind of good, it follows that pleasure causes love. And in the same way sorrow causes hatred. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod alia ratio est de dilectione et odio. Nam dilectionis obiectum est bonum, quod a Deo in creaturas derivatur, et ideo dilectio per prius est Dei, et per posterius est proximi. Sed odium est mali, quod non habet locum in ipso Deo, sed in eius effectibus, unde etiam supra dictum est quod Deus non habetur odio nisi inquantum apprehenditur secundum suos effectus. Et ideo per prius est odium proximi quam odium Dei. Unde, cum invidia ad proximum sit mater odii quod est ad proximum, fit per consequens causa odii quod est in Deum. |
Reply to Objection 2: Love and hatred are essentially different, for the object of love is good, which flows from God to creatures, wherefore love is due to God in the first place, and to our neighbor afterwards. On the other hand, hatred is of evil, which has no place in God Himself, but only in His effects, for which reason it has been stated above (Article [1]), that God is not an object of hatred, except in so far as He is considered in relation to His effects, and consequently hatred is directed to our neighbor before being directed to God. Therefore, since envy of our neighbor is the mother of hatred of our neighbor, it becomes, in consequence, the cause of hatred towards God. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod nihil prohibet secundum diversas rationes aliquid oriri ex diversis causis. Et secundum hoc odium potest oriri et ex ira et ex invidia. Directius tamen oritur ex invidia, per quam ipsum bonum proximi redditur contristabile et per consequens odibile. Sed ex ira oritur odium secundum quoddam augmentum. Nam primo per iram appetimus malum proximi secundum quandam mensuram, prout scilicet habet rationem vindictae, postea autem per continuitatem irae pervenitur ad hoc quod homo malum proximi absolute desideret, quod pertinet ad rationem odii. Unde patet quod odium ex invidia causatur formaliter secundum rationem obiecti; ex ira autem dispositive. | Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents a thing arising from various causes in various respects, and accordingly hatred may arise both from anger and from envy. However it arises more directly from envy, which looks upon the very good of our neighbor as displeasing and therefore hateful, whereas hatred arises from anger by way of increase. For at first, through anger, we desire our neighbor's evil according to a certain measure, that is in so far as that evil has the aspect of vengeance: but afterwards, through the continuance of anger, man goes so far as absolutely to desire his neighbor's evil, which desire is part of hatred. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is caused by envy formally as regards the aspect of the object, but dispositively by anger. |