St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica

(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

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(B) BY WORDS UTILIZED IN A COURT OF LAW (Questions [67]-71)

OF THE INJUSTICE OF A JUDGE, IN JUDGING (FOUR ARTICLES)

Deinde considerandum est de vitiis oppositis commutativae iustitiae quae consistunt in verbis in quibus laeditur proximus.
  • Et primo, de his quae pertinent ad iudicium;
  • secundo, de nocumentis verborum quae fiunt extra iudicium.
We must now consider those vices opposed to commutative justice, that consist in words injurious to our neighbors. We shall consider
  • (1) those which are connected with judicial proceedings, and
  • (2) injurious words uttered extra-judicially.
Circa primum quinque consideranda occurrunt,
  • primo quidem, de iniustitia iudicis in iudicando;
  • secundo, de iniustitia accusatoris in accusando;
  • tertio, de iniustitia ex parte rei in sua defensione;
  • quarto, de iniustitia testis in testificando;
  • quinto, de iniustitia advocati in patrocinando.
Under the first head five points occur for our consideration:
  • (1) The injustice of a judge in judging;
  • (2) The injustice of the prosecutor in accusing;
  • (3) The injustice of the defendant in defending himself;
  • (4) The injustice of the witnesses in giving evidence;
  • (5) The injustice of the advocate in defending.
Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
Primo, utrum aliquis possit iuste iudicare eum qui non est sibi subditus. (1) Whether a man can justly judge one who is not his subject?
Secundo, utrum liceat iudicium ferre contra veritatem quam novit, propter ea quae sibi proponuntur. (2) Whether it is lawful for a judge, on account of the evidence, to deliver judgment in opposition to the truth which is known to him?
Tertio, utrum iudex possit aliquem iuste condemnare non accusatum. (3) Whether a judge can justly sentence a man who is not accused?
Quarto, utrum licite possit poenam relaxare. (4) Whether he can justly remit the punishment?

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Article: 1  [ << | >> ]

Whether a man can justly judge one who is not subject to his jurisdiction?

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis possit iuste iudicare eum qui non est sibi subditus. Dicitur enim Dan. XIII quod Daniel seniores de falso testimonio convictos suo iudicio condemnavit. Sed illi seniores non erant subditi Danieli, quinimmo ipsi erant iudices populi. Ergo aliquis potest licite iudicare sibi non subditum. Objection 1: It would seem that a man can justly judge one who is not subject to his jurisdiction. For it is stated (Dan. 13) that Daniel sentenced the ancients who were convicted of bearing false witness. But these ancients were not subject to Daniel; indeed they were judges of the people. Therefore a man may lawfully judge one that is not subject to his jurisdiction.
Praeterea, Christus non erat alicuius hominis subditus, quinimmo ipse erat rex regum et dominus dominantium. Sed ipse exhibuit se iudicio hominis. Ergo videtur quod aliquis licite possit iudicare aliquem qui non est subditus eius. Objection 2: Further, Christ was no man's subject, indeed He was "King of kings and Lord of lords" (Apoc. 19:16). Yet He submitted to the judgment of a man. Therefore it seems that a man may lawfully judge one that is not subject to his jurisdiction.
Praeterea, secundum iura quilibet sortitur forum secundum rationem delicti. Sed quandoque ille qui delinquit non est subditus eius ad quem pertinet forum illius loci, puta cum est alterius dioecesis, vel cum est exemptus. Ergo videtur quod aliquis possit iudicare eum qui non est sibi subditus. Objection 3: Further, according to the law [*Cap. Licet ratione, de Foro Comp.] a man is tried in this or that court according to his kind of offense. Now sometimes the defendant is not the subject of the man whose business it is to judge in that particular place, for instance when the defendant belongs to another diocese or is exempt. Therefore it seems that a man may judge one that is not his subject.
Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, super illud Deut. XXIII, si intraveris segetem et cetera. Falcem iudicii mittere non potest in eam rem quae alteri videtur esse commissa. On the contrary, Gregory [*Regist. xi, epist. 64] in commenting on Dt. 23:25, "If thou go into thy friend's corn," etc. says: "Thou mayest not put the sickle of judgment to the corn that is entrusted to another."
Respondeo dicendum quod sententia iudicis est quasi quaedam particularis lex in aliquo particulari facto. Et ideo sicut lex generalis debet habere vim coactivam, ut patet per philosophum, in X Ethic.; ita etiam et sententia iudicis debet habere vim coactivam, per quam constringatur utraque pars ad servandam sententiam iudicis, alioquin iudicium non esset efficax. Potestatem autem coactivam non habet licite in rebus humanis nisi ille qui fungitur publica potestate. Et qui ea funguntur superiores reputantur respectu eorum in quos, sicut in subditos, potestatem accipiunt, sive habeant ordinarie, sive per commissionem. Et ideo manifestum est quod nullus potest iudicare aliquem nisi sit aliquo modo subditus eius, vel per commissionem vel per potestatem ordinariam. I answer that, A judge's sentence is like a particular law regarding some particular fact. Wherefore just as a general law should have coercive power, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 9), so too the sentence of a judge should have coercive power, whereby either party is compelled to comply with the judge's sentence; else the judgment would be of no effect. Now coercive power is not exercised in human affairs, save by those who hold public authority: and those who have this authority are accounted the superiors of those over whom they preside whether by ordinary or by delegated authority. Hence it is evident that no man can judge others than his subjects and this in virtue either of delegated or of ordinary authority.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Daniel accepit potestatem ad iudicandum illos seniores quasi commissam ex instinctu divino. Quod significatur per hoc quod ibi dicitur, quod suscitavit dominus spiritum pueri iunioris. Reply to Objection 1: In judging those ancients Daniel exercised an authority delegated to him by Divine instinct. This is indicated where it is said (Dan. 13:45) that "the Lord raised up the... spirit of a young boy."
Ad secundum dicendum quod in rebus humanis aliqui propria sponte possunt se subiicere aliorum iudicio, quamvis non sint eis superiores, sicut patet in his qui compromittunt in aliquos arbitros. Et inde est quod necesse est arbitrium poena vallari, quia arbitri, qui non sunt superiores, non habent de se plenam potestatem coercendi. Sic igitur et Christus propria sponte humano iudicio se subdidit, sicut etiam et Leo Papa iudicio imperatoris se subdidit. Reply to Objection 2: In human affairs a man may submit of his own accord to the judgment of others although these be not his superiors, an example of which is when parties agree to a settlement by arbitrators. Wherefore it is necessary that the arbitrator should be upheld by a penalty, since the arbitrators through not exercising authority in the case, have not of themselves full power of coercion. Accordingly in this way did Christ of his own accord submit to human judgment: and thus too did Pope Leo [*Leo IV] submit to the judgment of the emperor [*Can. Nos si incompetenter, caus. ii, qu. 7].
Ad tertium dicendum quod episcopus in cuius dioecesi aliquis delinquit, efficitur superior eius ratione delicti, etiam si sit exemptus, nisi forte delinquat in re aliqua exempta, puta in administratione bonorum alicuius monasterii exempti. Sed si aliquis exemptus committat furtum vel homicidium vel aliquid huiusmodi, potest per ordinarium iuste condemnari. Reply to Objection 3: The bishop of the defendant's diocese becomes the latter's superior as regards the fault committed, even though he be exempt: unless perchance the defendant offend in a matter exempt from the bishop's authority, for instance in administering the property of an exempt monastery. But if an exempt person commits a theft, or a murder or the like, he may be justly condemned by the ordinary.

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Article: 2  [ << | >> ]

Whether it is lawful for a judge to pronounce judgment against the truth that he knows, on account of evidence to the contrary?

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod iudici non liceat iudicare contra veritatem quam novit, propter ea quae in contrarium proponuntur. Dicitur enim Deut. XVII, venies ad sacerdotes levitici generis, et ad iudicem qui fuerit in illo tempore, quaeresque ab eis, qui indicabunt tibi iudicii veritatem. Sed quandoque aliqua proponuntur contra veritatem, sicut cum aliquid per falsos testes probatur. Ergo non licet iudici iudicare secundum ea quae proponuntur et probantur, contra veritatem quam ipse novit. Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for a judge to pronounce judgment against the truth that he knows, on account of evidence to the contrary. For it is written (Dt. 17:9): "Thou shalt come to the priests of the Levitical race, and to the judge that shall be at that time; and thou shalt ask of them, and they shall show thee the truth of the judgment." Now sometimes certain things are alleged against the truth, as when something is proved by means of false witnesses. Therefore it is unlawful for a judge to pronounce judgment according to what is alleged and proved in opposition to the truth which he knows.
Praeterea, homo in iudicando debet divino iudicio conformari, quia Dei iudicium est, ut dicitur Deut. I. Sed iudicium Dei est secundum veritatem, ut dicitur Rom. II, et Isaiae XI praedicitur de Christo, non secundum visionem oculorum iudicabit, neque secundum auditum aurium arguet, sed iudicabit in iustitia pauperes, et arguet in aequitate pro mansuetis terrae. Ergo iudex non debet, secundum ea quae coram ipso probantur, sententiam ferre contra ea quae ipse novit. Objection 2: Further, in pronouncing judgment a man should conform to the Divine judgment, since "it is the judgment of God" (Dt. 1:17). Now "the judgment of God is according to the truth" (Rm. 2:2), and it was foretold of Christ (Is. 11:3,4): "He shall not judge according to the sight of the eyes, nor reprove according to the hearing of the ears. But He shall judge the poor with justice, and shall reprove with equity for the meek of the earth." Therefore the judge ought not to pronounce judgment according to the evidence before him if it be contrary to what he knows himself.
Praeterea, idcirco in iudicio probationes requiruntur ut fides fiat iudici de rei veritate, unde in his quae sunt notoria non requiritur iudicialis ordo, secundum illud I ad Tim. V, quorundam hominum peccata manifesta sunt, praecedentia ad iudicium. Si ergo iudex per se cognoscat veritatem, non debet attendere ad ea quae probantur, sed sententiam ferre secundum veritatem quam novit. Objection 3: Further, the reason why evidence is required in a court of law, is that the judge may have a faithful record of the truth of the matter, wherefore in matters of common knowledge there is no need of judicial procedure, according to 1 Tim. 5:24, "Some men's sins are manifest, going before to judgment." Consequently, if the judge by his personal knowledge is aware of the truth, he should pay no heed to the evidence, but should pronounce sentence according to the truth which he knows.
Praeterea, nomen conscientiae importat applicationem scientiae ad aliquid agibile, ut in primo habitum est. Sed facere contra conscientiam est peccatum. Ergo iudex peccat si sententiam ferat, secundum allegata, contra conscientiam veritatis quam habet. Objection 4: Further, the word "conscience" denotes application of knowledge to a matter of action as stated in the FP, Question [79], Article [13]. Now it is a sin to act contrary to one's knowledge. Therefore a judge sins if he pronounces sentence according to the evidence but against his conscience of the truth.
Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, super Psalt., bonus iudex nihil ex arbitrio suo facit, sed secundum leges et iura pronuntiat. Sed hoc est iudicare secundum ea quae in iudicio proponuntur et probantur. Ergo iudex debet secundum huiusmodi iudicare, et non secundum proprium arbitrium. On the contrary, Augustine [*Ambrose, Super Ps. 118, serm. 20] says in his commentary on the Psalter: "A good judge does nothing according to his private opinion but pronounces sentence according to the law and the right." Now this is to pronounce judgment according to what is alleged and proved in court. Therefore a judge ought to pronounce judgment in accordance with these things, and not according to his private opinion.
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, iudicare pertinet ad iudicem secundum quod fungitur publica potestate. Et ideo informari debet in iudicando non secundum id quod ipse novit tanquam privata persona, sed secundum id quod sibi innotescit tanquam personae publicae. Hoc autem innotescit sibi et in communi, et in particulari. In communi quidem, per leges publicas vel divinas vel humanas, contra quas nullas probationes admittere debet. In particulari autem negotio aliquo, per instrumenta et testes et alia huiusmodi legitima documenta, quae debet sequi in iudicando magis quam id quod ipse novit tanquam privata persona. Ex quo tamen ad hoc adiuvari potest ut districtius discutiat probationes inductas, ut possit earum defectum investigare. Quod si eas non possit de iure repellere, debet, sicut dictum est, eas in iudicando sequi. I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]; Question [60], Articles [2],6) it is the duty of a judge to pronounce judgment in as much as he exercises public authority, wherefore his judgment should be based on information acquired by him, not from his knowledge as a private individual, but from what he knows as a public person. Now the latter knowledge comes to him both in general and in particular —in general through the public laws, whether Divine or human, and he should admit no evidence that conflicts therewith—in some particular matter, through documents and witnesses, and other legal means of information, which in pronouncing his sentence, he ought to follow rather than the information he has acquired as a private individual. And yet this same information may be of use to him, so that he can more rigorously sift the evidence brought forward, and discover its weak points. If, however, he is unable to reject that evidence juridically, he must, as stated above, follow it in pronouncing sentence.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ideo praemittitur in verbis illis de quaestione iudicibus facienda, ut intelligatur quod iudices debent veritatem iudicare secundum ea quae fuerunt sibi proposita. Reply to Objection 1: The reason why, in the passage quoted, it is stated that the judges should first of all be asked their reasons, is to make it clear that the judges ought to judge the truth in accordance with the evidence.
Ad secundum dicendum quod Deo competit iudicare secundum propriam potestatem. Et ideo in iudicando informatur secundum veritatem quam ipse cognoscit, non secundum hoc quod ab aliis accipit. Et eadem ratio est de Christo, qui est verus Deus et homo. Alii autem iudices non iudicant secundum propriam potestatem. Et ideo non est similis ratio. Reply to Objection 2: To judge belongs to God in virtue of His own power: wherefore His judgment is based on the truth which He Himself knows, and not on knowledge imparted by others: the same is to be said of Christ, Who is true God and true man: whereas other judges do not judge in virtue of their own power, so that there is no comparison.
Ad tertium dicendum quod apostolus loquitur in casu quando aliquid non solum est manifestum iudici, sed sibi et aliis, ita quod reus nullo modo crimen infitiari potest, sed statim ex ipsa evidentia facti convincitur. Si autem sit manifestum iudici et non aliis, vel aliis et non iudici, tunc est necessaria iudicii discussio. Reply to Objection 3: The Apostle refers to the case where something is well known not to the judge alone, but both to him and to others, so that the guilty party can by no means deny his guilt (as in the case of notorious criminals), and is convicted at once from the evidence of the fact. If, on the other hand, it be well known to the judge, but not to others, or to others, but not to the judge, then it is necessary for the judge to sift the evidence.
Ad quartum dicendum quod homo in his quae ad propriam personam pertinent, debet informare conscientiam suam ex propria scientia. Sed in his quae pertinent ad publicam potestatem, debet informare conscientiam suam secundum ea quae in publico iudicio sciri possunt, et cetera. Reply to Objection 4: In matters touching his own person, a man must form his conscience from his own knowledge, but in matters concerning the public authority, he must form his conscience in accordance with the knowledge attainable in the public judicial procedure.

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Article: 3  [ << | >> ]

Whether a judge may condemn a man who is not accused?

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod iudex possit aliquem iudicare etiam si non sit alius accusator. Humana enim iustitia derivatur a iustitia divina. Sed Deus peccatores iudicat etiam si nullus sit accusator. Ergo videtur quod homo possit in iudicio alium condemnare etiam si non adsit accusator. Objection 1: It would seem that a judge may pass sentence on a man who is not accused. For human justice is derived from Divine justice. Now God judges the sinner even though there be no accuser. Therefore it seems that a man may pass sentence of condemnation on a man even though there be no accuser.
Praeterea, accusator requiritur in iudicio ad hoc quod deferat crimen ad iudicem. Sed quandoque potest crimen ad iudicem devenire alio modo quam per accusationem, sicut per denuntiationem vel per infamiam, vel etiam si ipse iudex videat. Ergo iudex potest aliquem condemnare absque accusatore. Objection 2: Further, an accuser is required in judicial procedure in order that he may relate the crime to the judge. Now sometimes the crime may come to the judge's knowledge otherwise than by accusation; for instance, by denunciation, or by evil report, or through the judge himself being an eye-witness. Therefore a judge may condemn a man without there being an accuser.
Praeterea, facta sanctorum in Scripturis narrantur quasi quaedam exemplaria humanae vitae. Sed Daniel simul fuit accusator et iudex contra iniquos senes, ut patet Dan. XIII. Ergo non est contra iustitiam si aliquis aliquem damnet tanquam iudex, et ipsemet sit accusator. Objection 3: Further, the deeds of holy persons are related in Holy Writ, as models of human conduct. Now Daniel was at the same time the accuser and the judge of the wicked ancients (Dan. 13). Therefore it is not contrary to justice for a man to condemn anyone as judge while being at the same time his accuser.
Sed contra est quod, I ad Cor. V, Ambrosius, exponens sententiam apostoli de fornicatore, dicit quod iudicis non est sine accusatore damnare, quia dominus Iudam, cum fuisset fur, quia non est accusatus, minime abiecit. On the contrary, Ambrose in his commentary on 1 Cor. 5:2, expounding the Apostle's sentence on the fornicator, says that "a judge should not condemn without an accuser, since our Lord did not banish Judas, who was a thief, yet was not accused."
Respondeo dicendum quod iudex est interpres iustitiae, unde sicut philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., ad iudicem confugiunt sicut ad quandam iustitiam animatam. Iustitia autem, sicut supra habitum est, non est ad seipsum, sed ad alterum. Et ideo oportet quod iudex inter aliquos duos diiudicet, quod quidem fit cum unus est actor et alius est reus. Et ideo in criminibus non potest aliquem iudicio condemnare iudex nisi habeat accusatorem, secundum illud Act. XXV, non est consuetudo Romanis damnare aliquem hominem prius quam is qui accusatur praesentes habeat accusatores, locumque defendendi accipiat ad abluenda crimina quae ei obiiciebantur. I answer that, A judge is an interpreter of justice. Wherefore, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have recourse to a judge as to one who is the personification of justice." Now, as stated above (Question [58], Article [2]), justice is not between a man and himself but between one man and another. Hence a judge must needs judge between two parties, which is the case when one is the prosecutor, and the other the defendant. Therefore in criminal cases the judge cannot sentence a man unless the latter has an accuser, according to Acts 25:16: "It is not the custom of the Romans to condemn any man, before that he who is accused have his accusers present, and have liberty to make his answer, to clear himself of the crimes" of which he is accused.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus in suo iudicio utitur conscientia peccantis quasi accusatore, secundum illud Rom. II, inter se invicem cogitationum accusantium, aut etiam defendentium. Vel etiam evidentia facti quantum ad ipsum, secundum illud Gen. IV vox sanguinis fratris tui Abel clamat ad me de terra. Reply to Objection 1: God, in judging man, takes the sinner's conscience as his accuser, according to Rm. 2:15, "Their thoughts between themselves accusing, or also defending one another"; or again, He takes the evidence of the fact as regards the deed itself, according to Gn. 4:10, "The voice of thy brother's blood crieth to Me from the earth."
Ad secundum dicendum quod publica infamia habet locum accusatoris. Unde super illud Gen. IV, vox sanguinis fratris tui etc., dicit Glossa, evidentia patrati sceleris accusatore non eget. In denuntiatione vero, sicut supra dictum est, non intenditur punitio peccantis, sed emendatio, et ideo nihil agitur contra eum cuius peccatum denuntiatur, sed pro eo. Et ideo non est ibi necessarius accusator. Poena autem infertur propter rebellionem ad Ecclesiam, quae, quia est manifesta, tenet locum accusatoris. Ex eo autem quod ipse iudex videt, non potest procedere ad sententiam ferendam, nisi secundum ordinem publici iudicii. Reply to Objection 2: Public disgrace takes the place of an accuser. Hence a gloss on Gn. 4:10, "The voice of thy brother's blood," etc. says: "There is no need of an accuser when the crime committed is notorious." In a case of denunciation, as stated above (Question [33], Article [7]), the amendment, not the punishment, of the sinner is intended: wherefore when a man is denounced for a sin, nothing is done against him, but for him, so that no accuser is required. The punishment that is inflicted is on account of his rebellion against the Church, and since this rebellion is manifest, it stands instead of an accuser. The fact that the judge himself was an eye-witness, does not authorize him to proceed to pass sentence, except according to the order of judicial procedure.
Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus in suo iudicio procedit ex propria notitia veritatis, non autem homo, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo homo non potest esse simul accusator, iudex et testis, sicut Deus. Daniel autem accusator fuit simul et iudex quas Reply to Objection 3: God, in judging man, proceeds from His own knowledge of the truth, whereas man does not, as stated above (Article [2]). Hence a man cannot be accuser, witness and judge at the same time, as God is. Daniel was at once accuser and judge, because he was the executor of the sentence of God, by whose instinct he was moved, as stated above (Article [1], ad 1).

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Article: 4  [ << | >> ]

Whether the judge can lawfully remit the punishment?

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod iudex licite possit poenam relaxare. Dicitur enim Iac. II, iudicium sine misericordia ei qui non facit misericordiam. Sed nullus punitur propter hoc quod non facit illud quod licite facere non potest. Ergo quilibet iudex potest licite misericordiam facere, relaxando poenam. Objection 1: It would seem that the judge can lawfully remit the punishment. For it is written (James 2:13): "Judgment without mercy" shall be done "to him that hath not done mercy." Now no man is punished for not doing what he cannot do lawfully. Therefore any judge can lawfully do mercy by remitting the punishment.
Praeterea, iudicium humanum debet imitari iudicium divinum. Sed Deus poenitentibus relaxat poenam, quia non vult mortem peccatoris, ut dicitur Ezech. XVIII. Ergo etiam homo iudex potest poenitenti licite laxare poenam. Objection 2: Further, human judgment should imitate the Divine judgment. Now God remits the punishment to sinners, because He desires not the death of the sinner, according to Ezech. 18:23. Therefore a human judge also may lawfully remit the punishment to one who repents.
Praeterea, unicuique licet facere quod alicui prodest et nulli nocet. Sed absolvere reum a poena prodest ei et nulli nocet. Ergo iudex licite potest reum a poena absolvere. Objection 3: Further, it is lawful for anyone to do what is profitable to some one and harmful to none. Now the remission of his punishment profits the guilty man and harms nobody. Therefore the judge can lawfully loose a guilty man from his punishment.
Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. XIII de eo qui persuadet servire diis alienis, non parcat ei oculus tuus ut miserearis et occultes eum, sed statim interficies eum. Et de homicida dicitur Deut. XIX, morietur, nec misereberis eius. On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 13:8,9) concerning anyone who would persuade a man to serve strange gods: "Neither let thy eye spare him to pity and conceal him, but thou shalt presently put him to death": and of the murderer it is written (Dt. 19:12,13): "He shall die. Thou shalt not pity him."
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, duo sunt, quantum ad propositum pertinet, circa iudicem consideranda, quorum unum est quod ipse habet iudicare inter accusatorem et reum; aliud autem est quod ipse non fert iudicii sententiam quasi ex propria, sed quasi ex publica potestate. Duplici ergo ratione impeditur iudex ne reum a poena absolvere possit. Primo quidem, ex parte accusatoris, ad cuius ius quandoque pertinet ut reus puniatur, puta propter aliquam iniuriam in ipsum commissam, cuius relaxatio non est in arbitrio alicuius iudicis, quia quilibet iudex tenetur ius suum reddere unicuique. Alio modo impeditur ex parte reipublicae, cuius potestate fungitur, ad cuius bonum pertinet quod malefactores puniantur. I answer that, As may be gathered from what has been said (Articles [2],3), with regard to the question in point, two things may be observed in connection with a judge. One is that he has to judge between accuser and defendant, while the other is that he pronounces the judicial sentence, in virtue of his power, not as a private individual but as a public person. Accordingly on two counts a judge is hindered from loosing a guilty person from his punishment. First on the part of the accuser, whose right it sometimes is that the guilty party should be punished—for instance on account of some injury committed against the accuser—because it is not in the power of a judge to remit such punishment, since every judge is bound to give each man his right. Secondly, he finds a hindrance on the part of the commonwealth, whose power he exercises, and to whose good it belongs that evil-doers should be punished.
Sed tamen quantum ad hoc differt inter inferiores iudices et supremum iudicem, scilicet principem, cui est plenarie potestas publica commissa. Iudex enim inferior non habet potestatem absolvendi reum a poena, contra leges a superiore sibi impositas. Unde super illud Ioan. XIX, non haberes adversum me potestatem ullam, dicit Augustinus, talem Deus dederat Pilato potestatem ut esset sub Caesaris potestate, ne ei omnino liberum esset accusatum absolvere. Sed princeps, qui habet plenariam potestatem in republica, si ille qui passus est iniuriam velit eam remittere, poterit reum licite absolvere, si hoc publicae utilitati viderit non esse nocivum. Nevertheless in this respect there is a difference between judges of lower degree and the supreme judge, i.e. the sovereign, to whom the entire public authority is entrusted. For the inferior judge has no power to exempt a guilty man from punishment against the laws imposed on him by his superior. Wherefore Augustine in commenting on John 19:11, "Thou shouldst not have any power against Me," says (Tract. cxvi in Joan.): "The power which God gave Pilate was such that he was under the power of Caesar, so that he was by no means free to acquit the person accused." On the other hand the sovereign who has full authority in the commonwealth, can lawfully remit the punishment to a guilty person, provided the injured party consent to the remission, and that this do not seem detrimental to the public good.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod misericordia iudicis habet locum in his quae arbitrio iudicis relinquuntur, in quibus boni viri est ut sit diminutivus poenarum, sicut philosophus dicit, in V Ethic. In his autem quae sunt determinata secundum legem divinam vel humanam, non est suum misericordiam facere. Reply to Objection 1: There is a place for the judge's mercy in matters that are left to the judge's discretion, because in like matters a good man is slow to punish as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10). But in matters that are determined in accordance with Divine or human laws, it is not left to him to show mercy.
Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus habet supremam potestatem iudicandi, et ad ipsum pertinet quidquid contra aliquem peccatur. Et ideo liberum est ei poenam remittere, praecipue cum peccato ex hoc poena maxime debeatur quod est contra ipsum. Non tamen remittit poenam nisi secundum quod decet suam bonitatem, quae est omnium legum radix. Reply to Objection 2: God has supreme power of judging, and it concerns Him whatever is done sinfully against anyone. Therefore He is free to remit the punishment, especially since punishment is due to sin chiefly because it is done against Him. He does not, however, remit the punishment, except in so far as it becomes His goodness, which is the source of all laws.
Ad tertium dicendum quod iudex, si inordinate poenam remitteret, nocumentum inferret et communitati, cui expedit ut maleficia puniantur, ad hoc quod peccata vitentur, unde Deut. XIII, post poenam seductoris, subditur, ut omnis Israel, audiens, timeat, et nequaquam ultra faciat quispiam huius rei simile. Nocet etiam personae cui est illata iniuria, quae recompensationem accipit per quandam restitutionem honoris in poena iniuriantis. Reply to Objection 3: If the judge were to remit punishment inordinately, he would inflict an injury on the community, for whose good it behooves ill-deeds to be punished, in order that. men may avoid sin. Hence the text, after appointing the punishment of the seducer, adds (Dt. 13:11): "That all Israel hearing may fear, and may do no more anything like this." He would also inflict harm on the injured person; who is compensated by having his honor restored in the punishment of the man who has injured him.

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