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| Deinde considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad iniustam accusationem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. | We must now consider matters pertaining to unjust accusation. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum homo accusare teneatur. | (1) Whether a man is bound to accuse? |
| Secundo, utrum accusatio sit facienda in scriptis. | (2) Whether the accusation should be made in writing? |
| Tertio, quomodo accusatio sit vitiosa. | (3) How is an accusation vitiated? |
| Quarto, qualiter male accusantes sint puniendi. | (4) How should those be punished who have accused a man wrongfully? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non teneatur accusare. Nullus enim excusatur ab impletione divini praecepti propter peccatum, quia iam ex suo peccato commodum reportaret. Sed aliqui propter peccatum redduntur inhabiles ad accusandum, sicut excommunicati, infames, et illi qui sunt de maioribus criminibus accusati prius quam innoxii demonstrentur. Ergo homo non tenetur ex praecepto divino ad accusandum. | Objection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to accuse. For no man is excused on account of sin from fulfilling a Divine precept, since he would thus profit by his sin. Yet on account of sin some are disqualified from accusing, such as those who are excommunicate or of evil fame, or who are accused of grievous crimes and are not yet proved to be innocent [*1 Tim. 1:5]. Therefore a man is not bound by a Divine precept to accuse. |
| Praeterea, omne debitum ex caritate dependet, quae est finis praecepti, unde dicitur Rom. XIII, nemini quidquam debeatis, nisi ut invicem diligatis. Sed illud quod est caritatis homo debet omnibus, maioribus et minoribus, subditis et praelatis. Cum igitur subditi non debeant praelatos accusare, nec minores suos maiores, ut per plura capitula probatur II, qu. VII; videtur quod nullus ex debito teneatur accusare. |
Objection 2: Further, every duty depends on charity which is "the end of the precept" [*Can. Definimus, caus. iv, qu. 1; caus. vi, qu. 1]: wherefore it is written (Rm. 13:8): "Owe no man anything, but to love one another." Now that which belongs to charity is a duty that man owes to all both of high and of low degree, both superiors and inferiors. Since therefore subjects should not accuse their superiors, nor persons of lower degree, those of a higher degree, as shown in several chapters (Decret. II, qu. vii), it seems that it is no man's duty to accuse. |
| Praeterea, nullus tenetur contra fidelitatem agere quam debet amico, quia non debet alteri facere quod sibi non vult fieri. Sed accusare aliquem quandoque est contra fidelitatem quam quis debet amico, dicitur enim Prov. XI, qui ambulat fraudulenter revelat arcana, qui autem fidelis est celat amici commissum. Ergo homo non tenetur ad accusandum. |
Objection 3: Further, no man is bound to act against the fidelity which he owes his friend; because he ought not to do to another what he would not have others do to him. Now to accuse anyone is sometimes contrary to the fidelity that one owes a friend; for it is written (Prov. 11:13): "He that walketh deceitfully, revealeth secrets; but he that is faithful, concealeth the thing committed to him by his friend." Therefore a man is not bound to accuse. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Levit. V, si peccaverit anima, et audierit vocem iurantis, testisque fuerit quod aut ipse vidit aut conscius est, nisi indicaverit, portabit iniquitatem suam. | On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 5:1): "If any one sin, and hear the voice of one swearing, and is a witness either because he himself hath seen, or is privy to it: if he do not utter it, he shall bear his iniquity." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, haec est differentia inter denuntiationem et accusationem, quod in denuntiatione attenditur emendatio fratris, in accusatione autem attenditur punitio criminis. Poenae autem praesentis vitae non per se expetuntur, quia non est hic ultimum retributionis tempus, sed inquantum sunt medicinales, conferentes vel ad emendationem personae peccantis, vel ad bonum reipublicae, cuius quies procuratur per punitionem peccantium. Quorum primum intenditur in denuntiatione, ut dictum est, secundum autem proprie pertinet ad accusationem. Et ideo si crimen fuerit tale quod vergat in detrimentum reipublicae, tenetur homo ad accusationem, dummodo sufficienter possit probare, quod pertinet ad officium accusatoris, puta cum peccatum alicuius vergit in multitudinis corruptelam corporalem seu spiritualem. Si autem non fuerit tale peccatum quod in multitudinem redundet, vel etiam si sufficientem probationem adhibere non possit, non tenetur ad intentandum accusationem, quia ad hoc nullus tenetur quod non potest debito modo perficere. |
I answer that, As stated above (Question [33], Articles [6],7; Question [67], Article [3], ad 2), the difference between denunciation and accusation is that in denunciation we aim at a brother's amendment, whereas in accusation we intend the punishment of his crime. Now the punishments of this life are sought, not for their own sake, because this is not the final time of retribution, but in their character of medicine, conducing either to the amendment of the sinner, or to the good of the commonwealth whose calm is ensured by the punishment of evil-doers. The former of these is intended in denunciation, as stated, whereas the second regards properly accusation. Hence in the case of a crime that conduces to the injury of the commonwealth, a man is bound to accusation, provided he can offer sufficient proof, since it is the accuser's duty to prove: as, for example, when anyone's sin conduces to the bodily or spiritual corruption of the community. If, however, the sin be not such as to affect the community, or if he cannot offer sufficient proof, a man is not bound to attempt to accuse, since no man is bound to do what he cannot duly accomplish. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet per peccatum reddi aliquem impotentem ad ea quae homines facere tenentur, sicut ad merendum vitam aeternam, et ad assumendum ecclesiastica sacramenta. Nec tamen ex hoc homo reportat commodum, quinimmo deficere ab his quae tenetur facere est gravissima poena, quia virtuosi actus sunt quaedam hominis perfectiones. | Reply to Objection 1: Nothing prevents a man being debarred by sin from doing what men are under an obligation to do: for instance from meriting eternal life, and from receiving the sacraments of the Church. Nor does a man profit by this: indeed it is a most grievous fault to fail to do what one is bound to do, since virtuous acts are perfections of man. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod subditi praelatos suos accusare prohibentur qui non affectione caritatis, sed sua pravitate vitam eorum diffamare et reprehendere quaerunt; vel etiam si subditi accusare volentes, fuerint criminosi; ut habetur II, qu. VII. Alioquin, si fuerint alias idonei ad accusandum, licet subditis ex caritate suos praelatos accusare. | Reply to Objection 2: Subjects are debarred from accusing their superiors, "if it is not the affection of charity but their own wickedness that leads them to defame and disparage the conduct of their superiors" [*Append. Grat. ad can. Sunt nonnulli, caus. ii, qu. 7] —or again if the subject who wishes to accuse his superior is himself guilty of crime [*Decret. II, qu. vii, can. Praesumunt.]. Otherwise, provided they be in other respects qualified to accuse, it is lawful for subjects to accuse their superiors out of charity. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod revelare secreta in malum personae, est contra fidelitatem, non autem si revelentur propter bonum commune, quod semper praeferendum est bono privato. Et ideo contra bonum commune nullum secretum licet recipere. Nec tamen est omnino secretum quod per sufficientes testes potest probari. | Reply to Objection 3: It is contrary to fidelity to make known secrets to the injury of a person; but not if they be revealed for the good of the community, which should always be preferred to a private good. Hence it is unlawful to receive any secret in detriment to the common good: and yet a thing is scarcely a secret when there are sufficient witnesses to prove it. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit necessarium accusationem in scriptis fieri. Scriptura enim adinventa est ad subveniendum humanae memoriae circa praeterita. Sed accusatio in praesenti agitur. Ergo accusatio Scriptura non indiget. | Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary for the accusation to be made in writing. For writing was devised as an aid to the human memory of the past. But an accusation is made in the present. Therefore the accusation needs not to be made in writing. |
| Praeterea, II, qu. VIII, dicitur, nullus absens accusare potest, nec ab aliquo accusari. Sed Scriptura ad hoc videtur esse utilis ut absentibus aliquid significetur, ut patet per Augustinum, X de Trin. Ergo in accusatione non est necessaria Scriptura, praesertim cum canon dicat quod per scripta nullius accusatio suscipiatur. | Objection 2: Further, it is laid down (Decret. II, qu. viii, can. Per scripta) that "no man may accuse or be accused in his absence." Now writing seems to be useful in the fact that it is a means of notifying something to one who is absent, as Augustine declares (De Trin. x, 1). Therefore the accusation need not be in writing: and all the more that the canon declares that "no accusation in writing should be accepted." |
| Praeterea, sicut crimen alicuius manifestatur per accusationem, ita per denuntiationem. Sed in denuntiatione non est Scriptura necessaria. Ergo videtur quod neque etiam in accusatione. | Objection 3: Further, a man's crime is made known by denunciation, even as by accusation. Now writing is unnecessary in denunciation. Therefore it is seemingly unnecessary in accusation. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur II, qu. VIII, accusatorum personae sine scripto nunquam recipiantur. | On the contrary, It is laid down (Decret. II, qu. viii, can. Accusatorum) that "the role of accuser must never be sanctioned without the accusation be in writing." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, quando in criminibus per modum accusationis agitur, accusator constituitur pars, ita quod iudex inter accusatorem et eum qui accusatur medius constituitur ad examen iustitiae, in quo oportet, quantum possibile est, secundum certitudinem procedere. Quia vero ea quae verbotenus dicuntur facile labuntur a memoria, non posset iudici esse certum quid et qualiter dictum sit, cum debet proferre sententiam, nisi esset in scriptis redactum. Et ideo rationabiliter institutum est ut accusatio, sicut et alia quae in iudicio aguntur, redigantur in scriptis. |
I answer that, As stated above (Question [67], Article [3]), when the process in a criminal case goes by way of accusation, the accuser is in the position of a party, so that the judge stands between the accuser and the accused for the purpose of the trial of justice, wherein it behooves one to proceed on certainties, as far as possible. Since however verbal utterances are apt to escape one's memory, the judge would be unable to know for certain what had been said and with what qualifications, when he comes to pronounce sentence, unless it were drawn up in writing. Hence it has with reason been established that the accusation, as well as other parts of the judicial procedure, should be put into writing. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod difficile est singula verba, propter eorum multitudinem et varietatem, retinere, cuius signum est quod multi, eadem verba audientes, si interrogentur, non referent ea similiter etiam post modicum tempus. Et tamen modica verborum differentia sensum variat. Et ideo, etiam si post modicum tempus debeat iudicis sententia promulgari, expedit tamen ad certitudinem iudicii ut accusatio redigatur in scriptis. | Reply to Objection 1: Words are so many and so various that it is difficult to remember each one. A proof of this is the fact that if a number of people who have heard the same words be asked what was said, they will not agree in repeating them, even after a short time. And since a slight difference of words changes the sense, even though the judge's sentence may have to be pronounced soon afterwards, the certainty of judgment requires that the accusation be drawn up in writing. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod Scriptura non solum necessaria est propter absentiam personae quae significat vel cui est aliquid significandum, sed etiam propter dilationem temporis, ut dictum est. Et ideo cum dicit canon, per scripta nullius accusatio suscipiatur, intelligendum est ab absente, qui per epistolam accusationem mittat. Non tamen excluditur quin, si praesens fuerit, necessaria sit Scriptura. | Reply to Objection 2: Writing is needed not only on account of the absence of the person who has something to notify, or of the person to whom something is notified, but also on account of the delay of time as stated above (ad 1). Hence when the canon says, "Let no accusation be accepted in writing" it refers to the sending of an accusation by one who is absent: but it does not exclude the necessity of writing when the accuser is present. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod denuntiator non obligat se ad probandum, unde nec punitur si probare nequiverit. Et propter hoc in denuntiatione non est necessaria Scriptura, sed sufficit si aliquis verbo denuntiet Ecclesiae, quae ex officio suo procedet ad fratris emendationem. | Reply to Objection 3: The denouncer does not bind himself to give proofs: wherefore he is not punished if he is unable to prove. For this reason writing is unnecessary in a denunciation: and it suffices that the denunciation be made verbally to the Church, who will proceed, in virtue of her office, to the correction of the brother. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod accusatio non reddatur iniusta per calumniam, praevaricationem et tergiversationem. Quia sicut dicitur II, qu. III, calumniari est falsa crimina intendere. Sed quandoque aliquis alteri falsum crimen obiicit ex ignorantia facti, quae excusat. Ergo videtur quod non semper reddatur iniusta accusatio si sit calumniosa. | Objection 1: It would seem that an accusation is not rendered unjust by calumny, collusion or evasion. For according to Decret. II, qu. iii [*Append. Grat. ad can. Si quem poenituerit.], "calumny consists in falsely charging a person with a crime." Now sometimes one man falsely accuses another of a crime through ignorance of fact which excuses him. Therefore it seems that an accusation is not always rendered unjust through being slanderous. |
| Praeterea, ibidem dicitur quod praevaricari est vera crimina abscondere. Sed hoc non videtur esse illicitum, quia homo non tenetur ad omnia crimina detegenda, ut supra dictum est. Ergo videtur quod accusatio non reddatur iniusta ex praevaricatione. |
Objection 2: Further, it is stated by the same authority that "collusion consists in hiding the truth about a crime." But seemingly this is not unlawful, because one is not bound to disclose every crime, as stated above (Article [1]; Question [33], Article [7]). Therefore it seems that an accusation is not rendered unjust by collusion. |
| Praeterea, sicut ibidem dicitur, tergiversari est in universo ab accusatione desistere. Sed hoc absque iniustitia fieri potest, dicitur enim ibidem, si quem poenituerit criminaliter accusationem et inscriptionem fecisse de eo quod probare non potuerit, si ei cum accusato innocente convenerit, invicem se absolvant. Ergo accusatio non redditur iniusta per tergiversationem. | Objection 3: Further, it is stated by the same authority that "evasion consists in withdrawing altogether from an accusation." But this can be done without injustice: for it is stated there also: "If a man repent of having made a wicked accusation and inscription* in a matter which he cannot prove, and come to an understanding with the innocent party whom he has accused, let them acquit one another." [*The accuser was bound by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the writ of accusation. The effect of this endorsement or inscription was that the accuser bound himself, if he failed to prove the accusation, to suffer the same punishment as the accused would have to suffer if proved guilty.] Therefore evasion does not render an accusation unjust. |
| Sed contra est quod ibidem dicitur, accusatorum temeritas tribus modis detegitur, aut enim calumniantur, aut praevaricantur, aut tergiversantur. | On the contrary, It is stated by the same authority: "The rashness of accusers shows itself in three ways. For they are guilty either of calumny, or of collusion, or of evasion." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, accusatio ordinatur ad bonum commune, quod intenditur per cognitionem criminis. Nullus autem debet alicui nocere iniuste ut bonum commune promoveat. Et ideo in accusatione duplici ratione contingit esse peccatum. Uno modo, ex eo quod iniuste agit contra eum qui accusatur, falsa crimina ei imponendo, quod est calumniari. Alio modo, ex parte reipublicae, cuius bonum principaliter intenditur in accusatione, dum aliquis impedit malitiose punitionem peccati. Quod iterum dupliciter contingit. Uno modo, fraudem in accusatione adhibendo. Et hoc pertinet ad praevaricationem, nam praevaricator est quasi varicator, qui adversam partem adiuvat, prodita causa sua. Alio modo, totaliter ab accusatione desistendo. Quod est tergiversari, in hoc enim quod desistit ab hoc quod coeperat, quasi tergum vertere videtur. |
I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]), accusation is ordered for the common good which it aims at procuring by means of knowledge of the crime. Now no man ought to injure a person unjustly, in order to promote the common good. Wherefore a man may sin in two ways when making an accusation: first through acting unjustly against the accused, by charging him falsely with the commission of a crime, i.e. by calumniating him; secondly, on the part of the commonwealth, whose good is intended chiefly in an accusation, when anyone with wicked intent hinders a sin being punished. This again happens in two ways: first by having recourse to fraud in making the accusation. This belongs to collusion [prevaricatio] for "he that is guilty of collusion is like one who rides astraddle [varicator], because he helps the other party, and betrays his own side" [*Append. Grat. ad can. Si quem poenituerit.]. Secondly by withdrawing altogether from the accusation. This is evasion [tergiversatio] for by desisting from what he had begun he seems to turn his back [tergum vertere]. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo non debet ad accusationem procedere nisi de re sibi omnino certa, in quo ignorantia facti locum non habeat. Nec tamen qui falsum crimen alicui imponit calumniatur, sed solum qui ex malitia in falsam accusationem prorumpit. Contingit enim quandoque ex animi levitate ad accusationem procedere, quia scilicet aliquis nimis faciliter credit quod audivit, et hoc temeritatis est. Aliquando autem ex iusto errore movetur aliquis ad accusandum. Quae omnia secundum prudentiam iudicis debent discerni, ut non prorumpat eum calumniatum fuisse qui vel ex levitate animi vel ex iusto errore in falsam accusationem prorupit. | Reply to Objection 1: A man ought not to proceed to accuse except of what he is quite certain about, wherein ignorance of fact has no place. Yet he who falsely charges another with a crime is not a calumniator unless he gives utterance to false accusations out of malice. For it happens sometimes that a man through levity of mind proceeds to accuse someone, because he believes too readily what he hears, and this pertains to rashness; while, on the other hand sometimes a man is led to make an accusation on account of an error for which he is not to blame. All these things must be weighed according to the judge's prudence, lest he should declare a man to have been guilty of calumny, who through levity of mind or an error for which he is not to be blamed has uttered a false accusation. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod non quicumque abscondit vera crimina praevaricatur, sed solum si fraudulenter abscondit ea de quibus accusationem proponit, colludens cum reo, proprias probationes dissimulando, et falsas excusationes admittendo. | Reply to Objection 2: Not everyone who hides the truth about a crime is guilty of collusion, but only he who deceitfully hides the matter about which he makes the accusation, by collusion with the defendant, dissembling his proofs, and admitting false excuses. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod tergiversari est ab accusatione desistere omnino animum accusandi deponendo, non qualitercumque, sed inordinate. Contingit autem aliquem ab accusatione desistere ordinate absque vitio, dupliciter. Uno modo, si in ipso accusationis processu cognoverit falsum esse id de quo accusabat, et si pari consensu se absolvunt accusator et reus. Alio modo, si princeps, ad quem pertinet cura boni communis, quod per accusationem intenditur, accusationem aboleverit. | Reply to Objection 3: Evasion consists in withdrawing altogether from the accusation, by renouncing the intention of accusing, not anyhow, but inordinately. There are two ways, however, in which a man may rightly desist from accusing without committing a sin —in one way, in the very process of accusation, if it come to his knowledge that the matter of his accusation is false, and then by mutual consent the accuser and the defendant acquit one another—in another way, if the accusation be quashed by the sovereign to whom belongs the care of the common good, which it is intended to procure by the accusation. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod accusator qui in probatione defecerit non teneatur ad poenam talionis. Contingit enim quandoque aliquem ex iusto errore ad accusationem procedere, in quo casu iudex accusatorem absolvit, ut dicitur II, qu. III. Non ergo accusator qui in probatione defecerit tenetur ad poenam talionis. | Objection 1: It would seem that the accuser who fails to prove his indictment is not bound to the punishment of retaliation. For sometimes a man is led by a just error to make an accusation, in which case the judge acquit the accuser, as stated in Decret. II, qu. iii. [*Append. Grat., ad can. Si quem poenituerit.] Therefore the accuser who fails to prove his indictment is not bound to the punishment of retaliation. |
| Praeterea, si poena talionis ei qui iniuste accusat sit iniungenda, hoc erit propter iniuriam in aliquem commissam. Sed non propter iniuriam commissam in personam accusati, quia sic princeps non posset hanc poenam remittere. Nec etiam propter iniuriam illatam in rempublicam, quia sic accusatus non posset eum absolvere. Ergo poena talionis non debetur ei qui in accusatione defecerit. | Objection 2: Further, if the punishment of retaliation ought to be inflicted on one who has accused unjustly, this will be on account of the injury he has done to someone—but not on account of any injury done to the person of the accused, for in that case the sovereign could not remit this punishment, nor on account of an injury to the commonwealth, because then the accused could not acquit him. Therefore the punishment of retaliation is not due to one who has failed to prove his accusation. |
| Praeterea, eidem peccato non debetur duplex poena, secundum illud Nahum I, non iudicabit Deus bis in idipsum. Sed ille qui in probatione deficit incurrit poenam infamiae, quam etiam Papa non videtur posse remittere, secundum illud Gelasii Papae, quanquam animas per poenitentiam salvare possimus, infamiam tamen abolere non possumus. Non ergo tenetur ad poenam talionis. | Objection 3: Further, the one same sin does not deserve a twofold punishment, according to Nahum 1:9 [*Septuagint version]: "God shall not judge the same thing a second time." But he who fails to prove his accusation, incurs the punishment due to defamation [*Can. Infames, caus. vi, qu. 1], which punishment even the Pope seemingly cannot remit, according to a statement of Pope Gelasius [*Callist. I, Epist. ad omn. Gall. episc.]: "Although we are able to save souls by Penance, we are unable to remove the defamation." Therefore he is not bound to suffer the punishment of retaliation. |
| Sed contra est quod Hadrianus Papa dicit, qui non probaverit quod obiecit, poenam quam intulerit ipse patiatur. | On the contrary, Pope Hadrian I says (Cap. lii): "He that fails to prove his accusation, must himself suffer the punishment which his accusation inferred." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, accusator in causa accusationis constituitur pars intendens ad poenam accusati. Ad iudicem autem pertinet ut inter eos iustitiae aequalitatem constituat. Iustitiae autem aequalitas hoc requirit, ut nocumentum quod quis alteri intentat, ipse patiatur, secundum illud Exod. XXI, oculum pro oculo, dentem pro dente. Et ideo iustum est ut ille qui per accusationem aliquem in periculum gravis poenae inducit, ipse etiam similem poenam patiatur. |
I answer that, As stated above (Article [2]), in a case, where the procedure is by way of accusation, the accuser holds the position of a party aiming at the punishment of the accused. Now the duty of the judge is to establish the equality of justice between them: and the equality of justice requires that a man should himself suffer whatever harm he has intended to be inflicted on another, according to Ex. 21:24, "Eye for eye, tooth for tooth." Consequently it is just that he who by accusing a man has put him in danger of being punished severely, should himself suffer a like punishment. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., in iustitia non semper competit contrapassum simpliciter, quia multum differt an aliquis voluntarie an involuntarie alium laedat. Voluntarium autem meretur poenam, sed involuntario debetur venia. Et ideo quando iudex cognoverit aliquem de falso accusasse non voluntate nocendi, sed involuntarie propter ignorantiam ex iusto errore, non imponit poenam talionis. | Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5) justice does not always require counterpassion, because it matters considerably whether a man injures another voluntarily or not. Voluntary injury deserves punishment, involuntary deserves forgiveness. Hence when the judge becomes aware that a man has made a false accusation, not with a mind to do harm, but involuntarily through ignorance or a just error, he does not impose the punishment of retaliation. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ille qui male accusat peccat et contra personam accusati, et contra rempublicam. Unde propter utrumque punitur. Et hoc est quod dicitur Deut. XIX, cumque, diligentissime perscrutantes, invenerint falsum testem dixisse contra fratrem suum mendacium, reddent ei sicut fratri suo facere cogitavit, quod pertinet ad iniuriam personae, et postea, quantum ad iniuriam reipublicae, subditur, et auferes malum de medio tui, ut audientes ceteri timorem habeant, et nequaquam talia audeant facere. Specialiter tamen personae accusati facit iniuriam si de falso accuset, et ideo accusatus, si innocens fuerit, potest ei iniuriam suam remittere; maxime si non calumniose accusaverit, sed ex animi levitate. Si vero ab accusatione innocentis desistat propter aliquam collusionem cum adversario, facit iniuriam reipublicae, et hoc non potest ei remitti ab eo qui accusatur, sed potest ei remitti per principem, qui curam reipublicae gerit. |
Reply to Objection 2: He who accuses wrongfully sins both against the person of the accused and against the commonwealth; wherefore he is punished on both counts. This is the meaning of what is written (Dt. 19:18-20): "And when after most diligent inquisition, they shall find that the false witness hath told a lie against his brother: then shall render to him as he meant to do to his brother," and this refers to the injury done to the person: and afterwards, referring to the injury done to the commonwealth, the text continues: "And thou shalt take away the evil out of the midst of thee, that others hearing may fear, and may not dare to do such things." Specially, however, does he injure the person of the accused, if he accuse him falsely. Wherefore the accused, if innocent, may condone the injury done to himself, particularly if the accusation were made not calumniously but out of levity of mind. But if the accuser desist from accusing an innocent man, through collusion with the latter's adversary, he inflicts an injury on the commonwealth: and this cannot be condoned by the accused, although it can be remitted by the sovereign, who has charge of the commonwealth. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod poenam talionis meretur accusator in recompensationem nocumenti quod proximo inferre intentat, sed poena infamiae ei debetur propter malitiam ex qua calumniose alium accusat. Et quandoque quidem princeps remittit poenam, et non abolet infamiam, quandoque autem etiam infamiam abolet. Unde et Papa potest huiusmodi infamiam abolere, et quod dicit Papa Gelasius, infamiam abolere non possumus, intelligendum est vel de infamia facti, vel quia eam abolere aliquando non expedit. Vel etiam loquitur de infamia irrogata per iudicem civilem, sicut dicit Gratianus. | Reply to Objection 3: The accuser deserves the punishment of retaliation in compensation for the harm he attempts to inflict on his neighbor: but the punishment of disgrace is due to him for his wickedness in accusing another man calumniously. Sometimes the sovereign remits the punishment, and not the disgrace, and sometimes he removes the disgrace also: wherefore the Pope also can remove this disgrace. When Pope Gelasius says: "We cannot remove the disgrace," he may mean either the disgrace attaching to the deed [infamia facti], or that sometimes it is not expedient to remove it, or again he may be referring to the disgrace inflicted by the civil judge, as Gratian states (Callist. I, Epist. ad omn. Gall. episc.). |