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| Deinde considerandum est de vita contemplativa. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. | We must now consider the contemplative life, under which head there are eight points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum vita contemplativa pertineat tantum ad intellectum, an consistat etiam in affectu. |
(1) Whether the contemplative life pertains to the intellect only, or also to the affections? |
| Secundo, utrum ad vitam contemplativam pertineant virtutes morales. | (2) Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life? |
| Tertio, utrum vita contemplativa consistat solum in uno actu, aut in pluribus. | (3) Whether the contemplative life consists in one action or in several? |
| Quarto, utrum ad vitam contemplativam pertineat consideratio cuiuscumque veritatis. |
(4) Whether the consideration of any truth whatever pertains to the contemplative life? |
| Quinto, utrum vita contemplativa hominis in hoc statu possit elevari usque ad Dei visionem. |
(5) Whether the contemplative life of man in this state can arise to the vision of God? |
| Sexto, de motibus contemplationis quos Dionysius assignat, quarto capitulo de divinis nominibus. |
(6) Of the movements of contemplation assigned by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv); |
| Septimo, de delectatione contemplationis. | (7) Of the pleasure of contemplation; |
| Octavo, de duratione contemplationis. |
(8) Of the duration of contemplation. |
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Question: 180 [ << | >> ]
Article: 1 [ << | >> ]
| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vita contemplativa nihil habeat in affectu, sed totum in intellectu. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Metaphys., quod finis contemplationis est veritas. Veritas autem pertinet ad intellectum totaliter. Ergo videtur quod vita contemplativa totaliter in intellectu consistat. | Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to do with the affections and pertains wholly to the intellect. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, text. 3 [*Ed Did. ia, 1]) that "the end of contemplation is truth." Now truth pertains wholly to the intellect. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life wholly regards the intellect. |
| Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral., quod Rachel, quae interpretatur visum principium, vitam contemplativam significat. Sed visio principii pertinet proprie ad intellectum. Ergo vita contemplativa proprie ad intellectum pertinet. | Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37; Hom. xix in Ezech.) that "Rachel, which is interpreted 'vision of the principle' [*Or rather, 'One seeing the principle,' if derived from {rah} and {irzn}; Cf. Jerome, De Nom. Hebr.], signifies the contemplative life." Now the vision of a principle belongs properly to the intellect. Therefore the contemplative life belongs properly to the intellect. |
| Praeterea, Gregorius dicit. Super Ezech. Quod ad vitam contemplativam pertinet ab exteriori actione quiescere. Sed vis affectiva sive appetitiva inclinat ad exteriores actiones. Ergo videtur quod vita contemplativa non pertineat aliquo modo ad vim appetitivam. | Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that it belongs to the contemplative life, "to rest from external action." Now the affective or appetitive power inclines to external actions. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to do with the appetitive power. |
| Sed contra est quod Gregorius ibidem dicit, quod contemplativa vita est caritatem Dei et proximi tota mente retinere, et soli desiderio conditoris inhaerere. Sed desiderium et amor ad vim affectivam sive appetitivam pertinet, ut supra habitum est. Ergo etiam vita contemplativa habet aliquid in vi affectiva sive appetitiva. | On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the contemplative life is to cling with our whole mind to the love of God and our neighbor, and to desire nothing beside our Creator." Now desire and love pertain to the affective or appetitive power, as stated above (FS, Question [25], Article [2]; FS, Question [26], Article [2]). Therefore the contemplative life has also something to do with the affective or appetitive power. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, vita contemplativa illorum esse dicitur qui principaliter intendunt ad contemplationem veritatis. Intentio autem est actus voluntatis, ut supra habitum est, quia intentio est de fine, qui est voluntatis obiectum. Et ideo vita contemplativa, quantum ad ipsam essentiam actionis, pertinet ad intellectum, quantum autem ad id quod movet ad exercendum talem operationem, pertinet ad voluntatem, quae movet omnes alias potentias, et etiam intellectum, ad suum actum, ut supra dictum est. | I answer that, As stated above (Question [179], Article [1]) theirs is said to be the contemplative who are chiefly intent on the contemplation of truth. Now intention is an act of the will, as stated above (FS, Question [12], Article [1]), because intention is of the end which is the object of the will. Consequently the contemplative life, as regards the essence of the action, pertains to the intellect, but as regards the motive cause of the exercise of that action it belongs to the will, which moves all the other powers, even the intellect, to their actions, as stated above (FP, Question [82], Article [4]; FS, Question [9], Article [1]). |
| Movet autem vis appetitiva ad aliquid inspiciendum, vel sensibiliter vel intelligibiliter, quandoque quidem propter amorem rei visae, quia, ut dicitur Matth. VI, ubi est thesaurus tuus, ibi est et cor tuum, quandoque autem propter amorem ipsius cognitionis quam quis ex inspectione consequitur. Et propter hoc Gregorius constituit vitam contemplativam in caritate Dei, inquantum scilicet aliquis ex dilectione Dei inardescit ad eius pulchritudinem conspiciendam. Et quia unusquisque delectatur cum adeptus fuerit id quod amat, ideo vita contemplativa terminatur ad delectationem, quae est in affectu, ex qua etiam amor intenditur. | Now the appetitive power moves one to observe things either with the senses or with the intellect, sometimes for love of the thing seen because, as it is written (Mt. 6:21), "where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also," sometimes for love of the very knowledge that one acquires by observation. Wherefore Gregory makes the contemplative life to consist in the "love of God," inasmuch as through loving God we are aflame to gaze on His beauty. And since everyone delights when he obtains what he loves, it follows that the contemplative life terminates in delight, which is seated in the affective power, the result being that love also becomes more intense. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod veritas est finis contemplationis, habet rationem boni appetibilis et amabilis et delectantis. Et secundum hoc pertinet ad vim appetitivam. | Reply to Objection 1: From the very fact that truth is the end of contemplation, it has the aspect of an appetible good, both lovable and delightful, and in this respect it pertains to the appetitive power. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ad ipsam visionem primi principii, scilicet Dei, incitat amor ipsius. Unde Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod vita contemplativa, calcatis curis omnibus, ad videndam faciem sui creatoris inardescit. | Reply to Objection 2: We are urged to the vision of the first principle, namely God, by the love thereof; wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the contemplative life tramples on all cares and longs to see the face of its Creator." |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod vis appetitiva movet non solum membra corporalia ad exteriores actiones exercendas, sed etiam intellectum ad exercendum operationem contemplationis, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 3: The appetitive power moves not only the bodily members to perform external actions, but also the intellect to practice the act of contemplation, as stated above. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales pertineant ad vitam contemplativam. Dicit enim Gregorius, super Ezech., quod contemplativa vita est caritatem quidem Dei et proximi tota mente retinere. Sed omnes virtutes morales, de quarum actibus dantur praecepta legis, reducuntur ad dilectionem Dei et proximi, quia plenitudo legis est dilectio, ut dicitur Rom. XIII. Ergo videtur quod virtutes morales pertineant ad vitam contemplativam. |
Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the contemplative life is to cling to the love of God and our neighbor with the whole mind." Now all the moral virtues, since their acts are prescribed by the precepts of the Law, are reducible to the love of God and of our neighbor, for "love... is the fulfilling of the Law" (Rm. 13:10). Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues belong to the contemplative life. |
| Praeterea, contemplativa vita praecipue ordinatur ad Dei contemplationem, dicit enim Gregorius, super Ezech., quod, calcatis curis omnibus, ad videndum faciem sui creatoris inardescit. Sed ad hoc nullus potest pervenire nisi per munditiam, quam causat virtus moralis, dicitur enim Matth. V, beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt; et Heb. XII, pacem sequimini cum omnibus, et sanctimoniam, sine qua nemo videbit Deum. Ergo videtur quod virtutes morales pertineant ad vitam contemplativam. |
Objection 2: Further, the contemplative life is chiefly directed to the contemplation of God; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the mind tramples on all cares and longs to gaze on the face of its Creator." Now no one can accomplish this without cleanness of heart, which is a result of moral virtue [*Cf. Question [8], Article [7]]. For it is written (Mt. 5:8): "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God": and (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see God." Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life. |
| Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod contemplativa vita speciosa est in animo unde significatur per Rachelem, de qua dicitur, Gen. XXIX, quod erat pulchra facie. Sed pulchritudo animi attenditur secundum virtutes morales, et praecipue secundum temperantiam, ut Ambrosius dicit, in I de Offic. Ergo videtur quod virtutes morales pertineant ad vitam contemplativam. |
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the contemplative life gives beauty to the soul," wherefore it is signified by Rachel, of whom it is said (Gn. 29:17) that she was "of a beautiful countenance." Now the beauty of the soul consists in the moral virtues, especially temperance, as Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43,45,46). Therefore it seems that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life. |
| Sed contra est quod virtutes morales ordinantur ad exteriores actiones. Sed Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral., quod ad contemplativam vitam pertinet ab exteriori actione quiescere. Ergo virtutes morales non pertinent ad vitam contemplativam. |
On the contrary, The moral virtues are directed to external actions. Now Gregory says (Moral. vi [*Hom. xiv in Ezech.; Cf. Article [1], Objection [3]]) that it belongs to the contemplative life "to rest from external action." Therefore the moral virtues do not pertain to the contemplative life. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod ad vitam contemplativam potest aliquid pertinere dupliciter, uno modo, essentialiter; alio modo, dispositive. Essentialiter quidem virtutes morales non pertinent ad vitam contemplativam. Quia finis contemplativae vitae est consideratio veritatis. Ad virtutes autem morales scire quidem, quod pertinet ad considerationem veritatis, parvam potestatem habet, ut philosophus dicit, in II Ethic. Unde et ipse, in X Ethic., virtutes morales dicit pertinere ad felicitatem activam, non autem ad contemplativam. | I answer that, A thing may belong to the contemplative life in two ways, essentially or dispositively. The moral virtues do not belong to the contemplative life essentially, because the end of the contemplative life is the consideration of truth: and as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4), "knowledge," which pertains to the consideration of truth, "has little influence on the moral virtues": wherefore he declares (Ethic. x, 8) that the moral virtues pertain to active but not to contemplative happiness. |
| Dispositive autem virtutes morales pertinent ad vitam contemplativam. Impeditur enim actus contemplationis, in quo essentialiter consistit vita contemplativa, et per vehementiam passionum, per quam abstrahitur intentio animae ab intelligibilibus ad sensibilia; et per tumultus exteriores. Virtutes autem morales impediunt vehementiam passionum, et sedant exteriorum occupationum tumultus. Et ideo virtutes morales dispositive ad vitam contemplativam pertinent. | On the other hand, the moral virtues belong to the contemplative life dispositively. For the act of contemplation, wherein the contemplative life essentially consists, is hindered both by the impetuosity of the passions which withdraw the soul's intention from intelligible to sensible things, and by outward disturbances. Now the moral virtues curb the impetuosity of the passions, and quell the disturbance of outward occupations. Hence moral virtues belong dispositively to the contemplative life. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, vita contemplativa habet motivum ex parte affectus, et secundum hoc dilectio Dei et proximi requiritur ad vitam contemplativam. Causae autem moventes non intrant essentiam rei, sed disponunt et perficiunt rem. Unde non sequitur quod virtutes morales essentialiter pertineant ad vitam contemplativam. |
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Article [1]), the contemplative life has its motive cause on the part of the affections, and in this respect the love of God and our neighbor is requisite to the contemplative life. Now motive causes do not enter into the essence of a thing, but dispose and perfect it. Wherefore it does not follow that the moral virtues belong essentially to the contemplative life. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod sanctimonia, idest munditia, causatur ex virtutibus quae sunt circa passiones impedientes puritatem rationis. Pax autem causatur ex iustitia, quae est circa operationes, secundum illud Isaiae XXXII, opus iustitiae pax, inquantum scilicet ille qui ab iniuriis aliorum abstinet, subtrahit litigiorum et tumultuum occasiones. Et sic virtutes morales disponunt ad vitam contemplativam, inquantum causant pacem et munditiam. | Reply to Objection 2: Holiness or cleanness of heart is caused by the virtues that are concerned with the passions which hinder the purity of the reason; and peace is caused by justice which is about operations, according to Is. 32:17, "The work of justice shall be peace": since he who refrains from wronging others lessens the occasions of quarrels and disturbances. Hence the moral virtues dispose one to the contemplative life by causing peace and cleanness of heart. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod pulchritudo, sicut supra dictum est, consistit in quadam claritate et debita proportione. Utrumque autem horum radicaliter in ratione invenitur, ad quam pertinet et lumen manifestans, et proportionem debitam in aliis ordinare. Et ideo in vita contemplativa, quae consistit in actu rationis, per se et essentialiter invenitur pulchritudo. Unde Sap. VIII de contemplatione sapientiae dicitur, amator factus sum formae illius. |
Reply to Objection 3: Beauty, as stated above (Question [145], Article [2]), consists in a certain clarity and due proportion. Now each of these is found radically in the reason; because both the light that makes beauty seen, and the establishing of due proportion among things belong to reason. Hence since the contemplative life consists in an act of the reason, there is beauty in it by its very nature and essence; wherefore it is written (Wis. 8:2) of the contemplation of wisdom: "I became a lover of her beauty." |
| In virtutibus autem moralibus invenitur pulchritudo participative, inquantum scilicet participant ordinem rationis, et praecipue in temperantia, quae reprimit concupiscentias maxime lumen rationis obscurantes. Et inde est quod virtus castitatis maxime reddit hominem aptum ad contemplationem, inquantum delectationes venereae maxime deprimunt mentem ad sensibilia, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro Soliloquiorum. | On the other hand, beauty is in the moral virtues by participation, in so far as they participate in the order of reason; and especially is it in temperance, which restrains the concupiscences which especially darken the light of reason. Hence it is that the virtue of chastity most of all makes man apt for contemplation, since venereal pleasures most of all weigh the mind down to sensible objects, as Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10). |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad vitam contemplativam pertineant diversi actus. Richardus enim de sancto Victore distinguit inter contemplationem, meditationem et cogitationem. Sed omnia ista videntur ad vitam contemplativam pertinere. Ergo videtur quod vitae contemplativae sint diversi actus. | Objection 1: It would seem that there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life. For Richard of St. Victor [*De Grat. Contempl. i, 3,4] distinguishes between "contemplation," "meditation," and "cogitation." Yet all these apparently pertain to contemplation. Therefore it would seem that there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life. |
| Praeterea, apostolus, II ad Cor. III, dicit, nos autem, revelata facie gloriam domini speculantes, transformamur in eandem claritatem. Sed hoc pertinet ad vitam contemplativam. Ergo, praeter tria praedicta, etiam speculatio ad vitam contemplativam pertinet. |
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:18): "But we... beholding [speculantes] the glory of the Lord with open face, are transformed into the same clarity [*Vulg.: 'into the same image from glory to glory.']." Now this belongs to the contemplative life. Therefore in addition to the three aforesaid, vision [speculatio] belongs to the contemplative life. |
| Praeterea, Bernardus dicit, in libro de Consid., quod prima et maxima contemplatio est admiratio maiestatis. Sed admiratio, secundum Damascenum, ponitur species timoris. Ergo videtur quod plures actus ad vitam contemplativam requirantur. | Objection 3: Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) that "the first and greatest contemplation is admiration of the Majesty." Now according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) admiration is a kind of fear. Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for the contemplative life. |
| Praeterea, ad vitam contemplativam pertinere dicuntur oratio, lectio et meditatio. Pertinet etiam ad vitam contemplativam auditus, nam de Maria, per quam vita contemplativa significatur, dicitur, Luc. X, quod sedens secus pedes domini, audiebat verba illius. Ergo videtur quod plures actus ad vitam contemplativam requirantur. |
Objection 4: Further, "Prayer," "reading," and "meditation" [*Hugh of St. Victor, Alleg. in N.T. iii, 4] are said to belong to the contemplative life. Again, "hearing" belongs to the contemplative life: since it is stated that Mary (by whom the contemplative life is signified) "sitting... at the Lord's feet, heard His word" (Lk. 10:39). Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for the contemplative life. |
| Sed contra est quod vita hic dicitur operatio cui homo principaliter intendit. Si igitur sunt plures operationes vitae contemplativae, non erit una vita contemplativa, sed plures. | On the contrary, Life signifies here the operation on which a man is chiefly intent. Wherefore if there are several operations of the contemplative life, there will be, not one, but several contemplative lives. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod de vita contemplativa nunc loquimur secundum quod ad hominem pertinet. Haec est autem differentia inter hominem et Angelum, ut patet per Dionysium, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod Angelus simplici apprehensione veritatem intuetur, homo autem quodam processu ex multis pertingit ad intuitum simplicis veritatis. Sic igitur vita contemplativa unum quidem actum habet in quo finaliter perficitur, scilicet contemplationem veritatis, a quo habet unitatem, habet autem multos actus quibus pervenit ad hunc actum finalem. Quorum quidam pertinent ad acceptionem principiorum, ex quibus procedit ad contemplationem veritatis; alii autem pertinent ad deductionem principiorum in veritatem cuius cognitio inquiritur; ultimus autem completivus actus est ipsa contemplatio veritatis. | I answer that, We are now speaking of the contemplative life as applicable to man. Now according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) between man and angel there is this difference, that an angel perceives the truth by simple apprehension, whereas man arrives at the perception of a simple truth by a process from several premises. Accordingly, then, the contemplative life has one act wherein it is finally completed, namely the contemplation of truth, and from this act it derives its unity. Yet it has many acts whereby it arrives at this final act. Some of these pertain to the reception of principles, from which it proceeds to the contemplation of truth; others are concerned with deducing from the principles, the truth, the knowledge of which is sought; and the last and crowning act is the contemplation itself of the truth. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod cogitatio, secundum Richardum de sancto Victore, pertinere videtur ad multorum inspectionem, ex quibus aliquis colligere intendit unam simplicem veritatem. Unde sub cogitatione comprehendi possunt et perceptiones sensuum, ad cognoscendum aliquos effectus; et imaginationes; et discursus rationis circa diversa signa, vel quaecumque perducentia in cognitionem veritatis intentae. Quamvis secundum Augustinum, XIV de Trin., cogitatio dici possit omnis actualis operatio intellectus. Meditatio vero pertinere videtur ad processum rationis ex principiis aliquibus pertingentis ad veritatis alicuius contemplationem. Et ad idem pertinet consideratio, secundum Bernardum. Quamvis secundum philosophum, in II de anima, omnis operatio intellectus consideratio dicatur. Sed contemplatio pertinet ad ipsum simplicem intuitum veritatis. Unde idem Richardus dicit quod contemplatio est perspicax et liber animi contuitus in res perspiciendas; meditatio autem est intuitus animi in veritatis inquisitione occupatus; cogitatio autem est animi respectus ad evagationem pronus. | Reply to Objection 1: According to Richard of St. Victor "cogitation" would seem to regard the consideration of the many things from which a person intends to gather one simple truth. Hence cogitation may comprise not only the perceptions of the senses in taking cognizance of certain effects, but also the imaginations. and again the reason's discussion of the various signs or of anything that conduces to the truth in view: although, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7), cogitation may signify any actual operation of the intellect. "Meditation" would seem to be the process of reason from certain principles that lead to the contemplation of some truth: and "consideration" has the same meaning, according to Bernard (De Consid. ii, 2), although, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1), every operation of the intellect may be called "consideration." But "contemplation" regards the simple act of gazing on the truth; wherefore Richard says again (De Grat. Contempl. i, 4) that "contemplation is the soul's clear and free dwelling upon the object of its gaze; meditation is the survey of the mind while occupied in searching for the truth: and cogitation is the mind's glance which is prone to wander." |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Glossa Augustini ibidem, speculantes dicit a speculo, non a specula. Videre autem aliquid per speculum est videre causam per effectum, in quo eius similitudo relucet. Unde speculatio ad meditationem reduci videtur. | Reply to Objection 2: According to a gloss [*Cf. De Trin. xv, 8] of Augustine on this passage, "beholding" [speculatio] denotes "seeing in a mirror [speculo], not from a watch-tower [specula]." Now to see a thing in a mirror is to see a cause in its effect wherein its likeness is reflected. Hence "beholding" would seem to be reducible to meditation. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod admiratio est species timoris consequens apprehensionem alicuius rei excedentis nostram facultatem. Unde admiratio est actus consequens contemplationem sublimis veritatis. Dictum est enim quod contemplatio in affectu terminatur. |
Reply to Objection 3: Admiration is a kind of fear resulting from the apprehension of a thing that surpasses our faculties: hence it results from the contemplation of the sublime truth. For it was stated above (Article [1]) that contemplation terminates in the affections. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod homo ad cognitionem veritatis pertingit dupliciter. Uno modo, per ea quae ab alio accipit. Et sic quidem, quantum ad ea quae homo a Deo accipit, necessaria est oratio, secundum illud Sap. VII, invocavi, et venit in me spiritus sapientiae. Quantum vero ad ea quae accipit ab homine, necessarius est auditus, secundum quod accipit ex voce loquentis; et lectio, secundum quod accipit ex eo quod per Scripturam est traditum. Alio modo, necessarium est quod adhibeat proprium studium. Et sic requiritur meditatio. | Reply to Objection 4: Man reaches the knowledge of truth in two ways. First, by means of things received from another. In this way, as regards the things he receives from God, he needs "prayer," according to Wis. 7:7, "I called upon" God, "and the spirit of wisdom came upon me": while as regards the things he receives from man, he needs "hearing," in so far as he receives from the spoken word, and "reading," in so far as he receives from the tradition of Holy Writ. Secondly, he needs to apply himself by his personal study, and thus he requires "meditation." |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vita contemplativa non solum consistat in contemplatione Dei, sed etiam in consideratione cuiuscumque veritatis. Dicitur enim in Psalmo, mirabilia opera tua, et anima mea cognoscet nimis. Sed cognitio divinorum operum fit per aliquam veritatis contemplationem. Ergo videtur quod ad vitam contemplativam pertineat non solum divinam veritatem, sed etiam quamlibet aliam contemplari. |
Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life consists not only in the contemplation of God, but also in the consideration of any truth. For it is written (Ps. 138:14): "Wonderful are Thy works, and my soul knoweth right well." Now the knowledge of God's works is effected by any contemplation of the truth. Therefore it would seem that it pertains to the contemplative life to contemplate not only the divine truth, but also any other. |
| Praeterea, Bernardus, in libro de Consid., dicit quod prima contemplatio est admiratio maiestatis; secunda est iudiciorum Dei; tertia est beneficiorum ipsius; quarta est promissorum. Sed inter haec quatuor solum primum pertinet ad divinam veritatem, alia vero tria pertinent ad effectus ipsius. Ergo vita contemplativa non solum consistit in consideratione divinae veritatis, sed etiam in consideratione veritatis circa divinos effectus. | Objection 2: Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) that "contemplation consists in admiration first of God's majesty, secondly of His judgments, thirdly of His benefits, fourthly of His promises." Now of these four the first alone regards the divine truth, and the other three pertain to His effects. Therefore the contemplative life consists not only in the contemplation of the divine truth, but also in the consideration of truth regarding the divine effects. |
| Praeterea Richardus de sancto Victore distinguit sex species contemplationum, quarum prima est secundum solam imaginationem, dum attendimus res corporales; secunda autem est in imaginatione secundum rationem, prout scilicet sensibilium ordinem et dispositionem consideramus; tertia est in ratione secundum imaginationem, quando scilicet per inspectionem rerum visibilium ad invisibilia sublevamur; quarta autem est in ratione secundum rationem, quando scilicet animus intendit invisibilibus, quae imaginatio non novit; quinta autem est supra rationem, quando ex divina revelatione cognoscimus quae humana ratione comprehendi non possunt; sexta autem est supra rationem et praeter rationem, quando scilicet ex divina illuminatione cognoscimus ea quae humanae rationi repugnare videntur, sicut ea quae dicuntur de mysterio Trinitatis. Sed solum ultimum videtur ad divinam veritatem pertinere. Ergo contemplatio non solum respicit divinam veritatem, sed etiam eam quae in creaturis consideratur. | Objection 3: Further, Richard of St. Victor [*De Grat. Contempl. i, 6] distinguishes six species of contemplation. The first belongs to "the imagination alone," and consists in thinking of corporeal things. The second is in "the imagination guided by reason," and consists in considering the order and disposition of sensible objects. The third is in "the reason based on the imagination"; when, to wit, from the consideration of the visible we rise to the invisible. The fourth is in "the reason and conducted by the reason," when the mind is intent on things invisible of which the imagination has no cognizance. The fifth is "above the reason," but not contrary to reason, when by divine revelation we become cognizant of things that cannot be comprehended by the human reason. The sixth is "above reason and contrary to reason"; when, to wit, by the divine enlightening we know things that seem contrary to human reason, such as the doctrine of the mystery of the Trinity. Now only the last of these would seem to pertain to the divine truth. Therefore the contemplation of truth regards not only the divine truth, but also that which is considered in creatures. |
| Praeterea, in vita contemplativa quaeritur contemplatio veritatis inquantum est perfectio hominis. Sed quaelibet veritas est perfectio humani intellectus. Ergo in qualibet contemplatione veritatis consistit vita contemplativa. | Objection 4: Further, in the contemplative life the contemplation of truth is sought as being the perfection of man. Now any truth is a perfection of the human intellect. Therefore the contemplative life consists in the contemplation of any truth. |
| Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral., quod in contemplatione principium, quod Deus est, quaeritur. | On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "in contemplation we seek the principle which is God." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, ad vitam contemplativam pertinet aliquid dupliciter, uno modo, principaliter; alio modo, secundario vel dispositive. Principaliter quidem ad vitam contemplativam pertinet contemplatio divinae veritatis, quia huiusmodi contemplatio est finis totius humanae vitae. Unde Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., quod contemplatio Dei promittitur nobis actionum omnium finis, atque aeterna perfectio gaudiorum. Quae quidem in futura vita erit perfecta, quando videbimus eum facie ad faciem, unde et perfecte beatos faciet. Nunc autem contemplatio divinae veritatis competit nobis imperfecte, videlicet per speculum et in aenigmate, unde per eam fit nobis quaedam inchoatio beatitudinis, quae hic incipit ut in futuro terminetur. Unde et philosophus, in X Ethic., in contemplatione optimi intelligibilis ponit ultimam felicitatem hominis. |
I answer that, As stated above (Article [2]), a thing may belong to the contemplative life in two ways: principally, and secondarily, or dispositively. That which belongs principally to the contemplative life is the contemplation of the divine truth, because this contemplation is the end of the whole human life. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "the contemplation of God is promised us as being the goal of all our actions and the everlasting perfection of our joys." This contemplation will be perfect in the life to come, when we shall see God face to face, wherefore it will make us perfectly happy: whereas now the contemplation of the divine truth is competent to us imperfectly, namely "through a glass" and "in a dark manner" (1 Cor. 13:12). Hence it bestows on us a certain inchoate beatitude, which begins now and will be continued in the life to come; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 7) places man's ultimate happiness in the contemplation of the supreme intelligible good. |
| Sed quia per divinos effectus in Dei contemplationem manuducimur, secundum illud Rom. I, invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur, inde est quod etiam contemplatio divinorum effectuum secundario ad vitam contemplativam pertinet, prout scilicet ex hoc manuducitur homo in Dei cognitionem. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera Relig., quod in creaturarum consideratione non vana et peritura curiositas est exercenda, sed gradus ad immortalia et semper manentia faciendus. | Since, however, God's effects show us the way to the contemplation of God Himself, according to Rm. 1:20, "The invisible things of God... are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made," it follows that the contemplation of the divine effects also belongs to the contemplative life, inasmuch as man is guided thereby to the knowledge of God. Hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxix) that "in the study of creatures we must not exercise an empty and futile curiosity, but should make them the stepping-stone to things unperishable and everlasting." |
| Sic igitur ex praemissis patet quod ordine quodam quatuor ad vitam contemplativam pertinent, primo quidem, virtutes morales; secundo autem, alii actus praeter contemplationem; tertio vero, contemplatio divinorum effectuum; quarto vero completivum est ipsa contemplatio divinae veritatis. |
Accordingly it is clear from what has been said (Articles [1],2,3) that four things pertain, in a certain order, to the contemplative life; first, the moral virtues; secondly, other acts exclusive of contemplation; thirdly, contemplation of the divine effects; fourthly, the complement of all which is the contemplation of the divine truth itself. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod David cognitionem operum Dei quaerebat ut ex hoc manuduceretur in Deum. Unde alibi dicit, meditabor in omnibus operibus tuis, et in factis manuum tuarum meditabor, expandi manus meas ad te. |
Reply to Objection 1: David sought the knowledge of God's works, so that he might be led by them to God; wherefore he says elsewhere (Ps. 142:5,6): "I meditated on all Thy works: I meditated upon the works of Thy hands: I stretched forth my hands to Thee." |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ex consideratione divinorum iudiciorum manuducitur homo in contemplationem divinae iustitiae, ex consideratione autem divinorum beneficiorum et promissorum, manuducitur homo in cognitionem divinae misericordiae seu bonitatis, quasi per effectus exhibitos vel exhibendos. | Reply to Objection 2: By considering the divine judgments man is guided to the consideration of the divine justice; and by considering the divine benefits and promises, man is led to the knowledge of God's mercy or goodness, as by effects already manifested or yet to be vouchsafed. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod per illa sex designantur gradus quibus per creaturas in Dei contemplationem ascenditur. Nam in primo gradu ponitur perceptio ipsorum sensibilium; in secundo vero gradu ponitur progressus a sensibilibus ad intelligibilia; in tertio vero gradu ponitur diiudicatio sensibilium secundum intelligibilia; in quarto vero gradu ponitur absoluta consideratio intelligibilium in quae per sensibilia pervenitur; in quinto vero gradu ponitur contemplatio intelligibilium quae per sensibilia inveniri non possunt, sed per rationem capi possunt; in sexto gradu ponitur consideratio intelligibilium quae ratio nec invenire nec capere potest, quae scilicet pertinent ad sublimem contemplationem divinae veritatis, in qua finaliter contemplatio perficitur. | Reply to Objection 3: These six denote the steps whereby we ascend by means of creatures to the contemplation of God. For the first step consists in the mere consideration of sensible objects; the second step consists in going forward from sensible to intelligible objects; the third step is to judge of sensible objects according to intelligible things; the fourth is the absolute consideration of the intelligible objects to which one has attained by means of sensibles; the fifth is the contemplation of those intelligible objects that are unattainable by means of sensibles, but which the reason is able to grasp; the sixth step is the consideration of such intelligible things as the reason can neither discover nor grasp, which pertain to the sublime contemplation of divine truth, wherein contemplation is ultimately perfected. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod ultima perfectio humani intellectus est veritas divina, aliae autem veritates perficiunt intellectum in ordine ad veritatem divinam. | Reply to Objection 4: The ultimate perfection of the human intellect is the divine truth: and other truths perfect the intellect in relation to the divine truth. |
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| Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vita contemplativa, secundum statum huius vitae, possit pertingere ad visionem divinae essentiae. Quia, ut habetur Gen. XXXII, Iacob dixit, vidi Deum facie ad faciem, et salva facta est anima mea. Sed visio faciei est visio divinae essentiae. Ergo videtur quod aliquis per contemplationem in praesenti vita possit se extendere ad videndum Deum per essentiam. | Objection 1: It would seem that in the present state of life the contemplative life can reach to the vision of the Divine essence. For, as stated in Gn. 32:30, Jacob said: "I have seen God face to face, and my soul has been saved." Now the vision of God's face is the vision of the Divine essence. Therefore it would seem that in the present life one may come, by means of contemplation, to see God in His essence. |
| Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral., quod viri contemplativi ad semetipsos introrsus redeunt, in eo quod spiritualia rimantur, et nequaquam secum rerum corporalium umbras trahunt, vel fortasse tractas manu discretionis abigunt, sed incircumscriptum lumen videre cupientes, cunctas circumscriptionis suae imagines deprimunt, et in eo quod super se contingere appetunt, vincunt quod sunt. Sed homo non impeditur a visione divinae essentiae, quae est lumen incircumscriptum, nisi per hoc quod necesse habet intendere corporalibus phantasmatibus. Ergo videtur quod contemplatio praesentis vitae potest se extendere ad videndum incircumscriptum lumen per essentiam. | Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "contemplative men withdraw within themselves in order to explore spiritual things, nor do they ever carry with them the shadows of things corporeal, or if these follow them they prudently drive them away: but being desirous of seeing the incomprehensible light, they suppress all the images of their limited comprehension, and through longing to reach what is above them, they overcome that which they are." Now man is not hindered from seeing the Divine essence, which is the incomprehensible light, save by the necessity of turning to corporeal phantasms. Therefore it would seem that the contemplation of the present life can extend to the vision of the incomprehensible light in its essence. |
| Praeterea, Gregorius, in II Dialog., dicit, animae videnti creatorem angusta est omnis creatura. Vir ergo Dei, scilicet beatus Benedictus, qui in turri globum igneum, Angelos quoque ad caelos redeuntes videbat, haec procul dubio cernere non nisi in Dei lumine poterat. Sed beatus Benedictus adhuc praesenti vita vivebat. Ergo contemplatio praesentis vitae potest se extendere ad videndam Dei essentiam. | Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 35): "All creatures are small to the soul that sees its Creator: wherefore when the man of God," the blessed Benedict, to wit, "saw a fiery globe in the tower and angels returning to heaven, without doubt he could only see such things by the light of God." Now the blessed Benedict was still in this life. Therefore the contemplation of the present life can extend to the vision of the essence of God. |
| Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quandiu in hac mortali carne vivitur, nullus ita in contemplationis virtute proficit ut in ipso incircumscripti luminis radio mentis oculos infigat. | On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "As long as we live in this mortal flesh, no one reaches such a height of contemplation as to fix the eyes of his mind on the ray itself of incomprehensible light." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., nemo videns Deum vivit ista vita qua mortaliter vivitur in istis sensibus corporis, sed nisi ab hac vita quisque quodammodo moriatur, sive omnino exiens de corpore sive alienatus a carnalibus sensibus, in illam non subvehitur visionem. Quae supra diligentius pertractata sunt, ubi dictum est de raptu; et in primo, ubi actum est de Dei visione. |
I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27), "no one seeing God lives this mortal life wherein the bodily senses have their play: and unless in some way he depart this life, whether by going altogether out of his body, or by withdrawing from his carnal senses, he is not caught up into that vision." This has been carefully discussed above (Question [175], Articles [4],5), where we spoke of rapture, and in the FP, Question [12], Article [2], where we treated of the vision of God. |
| Sic igitur dicendum est quod in hac vita potest esse aliquis dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum actum, inquantum scilicet actualiter utitur sensibus corporis. Et sic nullo modo contemplatio praesentis vitae potest pertingere ad videndum Dei essentiam. Alio modo potest esse aliquis in hac vita potentialiter, et non secundum actum, inquantum scilicet anima eius est corpori mortali coniuncta ut forma, ita tamen quod non utatur corporis sensibus, aut etiam imaginatione, sicut accidit in raptu. Et sic potest contemplatio huius vitae pertingere ad visionem divinae essentiae. Unde supremus gradus contemplationis praesentis vitae est qualem habuit Paulus in raptu, secundum quem fuit medio modo se habens inter statum praesentis vitae et futurae. | Accordingly we must state that one may be in this life in two ways. First, with regard to act, that is to say by actually making use of the bodily senses, and thus contemplation in the present life can nowise attain to the vision of God's essence. Secondly, one may be in this life potentially and not with regard to act, that is to say, when the soul is united to the mortal body as its form, yet so as to make use neither of the bodily senses, nor even of the imagination, as happens in rapture; and in this way the contemplation of the present life can attain to the vision of the Divine essence. Consequently the highest degree of contemplation in the present life is that which Paul had in rapture, whereby he was in a middle state between the present life and the life to come. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Dionysius, in epistola ad Caium monachum, dicit, si aliquis videns Deum intellexit quod vidit, non ipsum vidit, sed aliquid eorum quae sunt eius. Et Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod nequaquam omnipotens Deus iam in sua claritate conspicitur, sed quiddam sub illa speculatur anima, unde recta proficiat, et post ad visionis eius gloriam pertingat. Per hoc ergo quod Iacob dixit, vidi Deum facie ad faciem, non est intelligendum quod Dei essentiam viderit, sed quod formam, scilicet imaginariam, vidit in qua Deus locutus est ei. Vel, quia per faciem quemlibet agnoscimus, cognitionem Dei faciem eius vocavit, sicut Glossa Gregorii ibidem dicit. | Reply to Objection 1: As Dionysius says (Ep. i ad Caium. Monach.), "if anyone seeing God, understood what he saw, he saw not God Himself, but something belonging to God." And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "By no means is God seen now in His glory; but the soul sees something of lower degree, and is thereby refreshed so that afterwards it may attain to the glory of vision." Accordingly the words of Jacob, "I saw God face to face" do not imply that he saw God's essence, but that he saw some shape [*Cf. FP, Question [12], Article [11], ad 1], imaginary of course, wherein God spoke to him. Or, "since we know a man by his face, by the face of God he signified his knowledge of Him," according to a gloss of Gregory on the same passage. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod contemplatio humana, secundum statum praesentis vitae, non potest esse absque phantasmatibus, quia connaturale est homini ut species intelligibiles in phantasmatibus videat, sicut philosophus dicit, in III de anima. Sed tamen intellectualis cognitio non sistit in ipsis phantasmatibus, sed in eis contemplatur puritatem intelligibilis veritatis. Et hoc non solum in cognitione naturali, sed etiam in eis quae per revelationem cognoscimus, dicit enim Dionysius, I cap. Cael. Hier., quod Angelorum hierarchias manifestat nobis divina claritas in quibusdam symbolis figuratis; ex cuius virtute restituimur in simplum radium, idest in simplicem cognitionem intelligibilis veritatis. Et sic intelligendum est quod Gregorius dicit, quod contemplantes corporalium rerum umbras non secum trahunt, quia videlicet in eis non sistit eorum contemplatio, sed potius in consideratione intelligibilis veritatis. | Reply to Objection 2: In the present state of life human contemplation is impossible without phantasms, because it is connatural to man to see the intelligible species in the phantasms, as the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, 7). Yet intellectual knowledge does not consist in the phantasms themselves, but in our contemplating in them the purity of the intelligible truth: and this not only in natural knowledge, but also in that which we obtain by revelation. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that "the Divine glory shows us the angelic hierarchies under certain symbolic figures, and by its power we are brought back to the single ray of light," i.e. to the simple knowledge of the intelligible truth. It is in this sense that we must understand the statement of Gregory that "contemplatives do not carry along with them the shadows of things corporeal," since their contemplation is not fixed on them, but on the consideration of the intelligible truth. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod ex verbis illis Gregorii non datur intelligi quod beatus Benedictus Deum in illa visione per essentiam viderit, sed vult ostendere quod, quia videnti creatorem angusta est omnis creatura, consequens est quod per illustrationem divini luminis de facili possint quaecumque videri. Unde subdit, quamlibet enim parum de luce creatoris aspexerit, breve ei fit omne quod creatum est. | Reply to Objection 3: By these words Gregory does not imply that the blessed Benedict, in that vision, saw God in His essence, but he wishes to show that because "all creatures are small to him that sees God," it follows that all things can easily be seen through the enlightenment of the Divine light. Wherefore he adds: "For however little he may see of the Creator's light, all created things become petty to him." |
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| Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter operatio contemplationis distinguatur per tres motus, circularem rectum et obliquum, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Contemplatio enim ad quietem pertinet, secundum illud Sap. VIII, intrans in domum meam, conquiescam cum illa. Sed motus quieti opponitur. Non ergo operationes contemplativae vitae per motus designari debent. | Objection 1: It would seem that the operation of contemplation is unfittingly divided into a threefold movement, "circular," "straight," and "oblique" (Div. Nom. iv). For contemplation pertains exclusively to rest, according to Wis. 8:16, "When I go into my house, I shall repose myself with her." Now movement is opposed to rest. Therefore the operations of the contemplative life should not be described as movements. |
| Praeterea, actio contemplativae vitae ad intellectum pertinet, secundum quem homo cum Angelis convenit. Sed in Angelis aliter assignat Dionysius hos motus quam in anima. Dicit enim motum circularem Angeli esse secundum illuminationes pulchri et boni. Motum autem circularem animae secundum plura determinat. Quorum primum est introitus animae ab exterioribus ad seipsam; secundum est quaedam convolutio virtutum ipsius, per quam anima liberatur ab errore et ab exteriori occupatione; tertium autem est unio ad ea quae supra se sunt. Similiter etiam differenter describit motum rectum utriusque. Nam rectum motum Angeli dicit esse secundum quod procedit ad subiectorum providentiam. Motum autem rectum animae ponit in duobus, primo quidem, in hoc quod progreditur ad ea quae sunt circa ipsam; secundo autem, in hoc quod ab exterioribus ad simplices contemplationes elevatur. Sed et motum obliquum diversimode in utrisque determinat. Nam obliquum motum in Angelis assignat ex hoc quod, providendo minus habentibus, manent in identitate circa Deum. Obliquum autem motum animae assignat ex eo quod anima illuminatur divinis cognitionibus rationabiliter et diffuse. Non ergo videntur convenienter assignari operationes contemplationis per modos praedictos. | Objection 2: Further, the action of the contemplative life pertains to the intellect, whereby man is like the angels. Now Dionysius describes these movements as being different in the angels from what they are in the soul. For he says (Div. Nom. iv) that the "circular" movement in the angel is "according to his enlightenment by the beautiful and the good." On the other hand, he assigns the circular movement of the soul to several things: the first of which is the "withdrawal of the soul into itself from externals"; the second is "a certain concentration of its powers, whereby it is rendered free of error and of outward occupation"; and the third is "union with those things that are above it." Again, he describes differently their respective straight movements. For he says that the straight movement of the angel is that by which he proceeds to the care of those things that are beneath him. On the other hand, he describes the straight movement of the soul as being twofold: first, "its progress towards things that are near it"; secondly, "its uplifting from external things to simple contemplation." Further, he assigns a different oblique movement to each. For he assigns the oblique movement of the angels to the fact that "while providing for those who have less they remain unchanged in relation to God": whereas he assigns the oblique movement of the soul to the fact that "the soul is enlightened in Divine knowledge by reasoning and discoursing." Therefore it would seem that the operations of contemplation are unfittingly assigned according to the ways mentioned above. |
| Praeterea, Richardus de sancto Victore, in libro de Contempl., ponit multas alias differentias motuum, ad similitudinem volatilium caeli. Quarum quaedam nunc ad altiora se attollunt, nunc autem in inferiora demerguntur, et hoc saepius repetere videntur; aliae vero dextrorsum vel sinistrorsum divertunt multoties; quaedam vero moventur in anteriora vel posteriora frequenter; aliae vero quasi in gyrum vertuntur, secundum latiores vel contractiores circuitus; quaedam vero quasi immobiliter suspensae in uno loco manent. Ergo videtur quod non sint solum tres motus contemplationis. | Objection 3: Further, Richard of St. Victor (De Contempl. i, 5) mentions many other different movements in likeness to the birds of the air. "For some of these rise at one time to a great height, at another swoop down to earth, and they do so repeatedly; others fly now to the right, now to the left again and again; others go forwards or lag behind many times; others fly in a circle now more now less extended; and others remain suspended almost immovably in one place." Therefore it would seem that there are only three movements of contemplation. |
| In contrarium est auctoritas Dionysii. | On the contrary, stands the authority of Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, operatio intellectus, in qua contemplatio essentialiter consistit, motus dicitur secundum quod motus est actus perfecti, ut philosophus dicit, in III de anima. Quia enim per sensibilia in cognitionem intelligibilium devenimus, operationes autem sensibiles sine motu non fiunt, inde est quod etiam operationes intelligibiles quasi motus quidam describuntur, et secundum similitudinem diversorum motuum earum differentia assignatur. In motibus autem corporalibus perfectiores et primi sunt locales, ut probatur in VIII Physic. Et ideo sub eorum similitudine potissime operationes intelligibiles describuntur. Quorum quidem sunt tres differentiae, nam quidam est circularis, secundum quem aliquid movetur uniformiter circa idem centrum; alius autem est rectus, secundum quem aliquid procedit ab uno in aliud, tertius autem est obliquus, quasi compositus ex utroque. Et ideo in operationibus intelligibilibus id quod simpliciter habet uniformitatem, attribuitur motui circulari; operatio autem intelligibilis secundum quam proceditur de uno in aliud, attribuitur motui recto; operatio autem intelligibilis habens aliquid uniformitatis simul cum processu ad diversa, attribuitur motui obliquo. |
I answer that, As stated above (Question [119], Article [1], ad 3), the operation of the intellect, wherein contemplation essentially consists, is called a movement, in so far as movement is the act of a perfect thing, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 1). Since, however, it is through sensible objects that we come to the knowledge of intelligible things, and since sensible operations do not take place without movement, the result is that even intelligible operations are described as movements, and are differentiated in likeness to various movements. Now of bodily movements, local movements are the most perfect and come first, as proved in Phys. viii, 7; wherefore the foremost among intelligible operations are described by being likened to them. These movements are of three kinds; for there is the "circular" movement, by which a thing moves uniformly round one point as center, another is the "straight" movement, by which a thing goes from one point to another; the third is "oblique," being composed as it were of both the others. Consequently, in intelligible operations, that which is simply uniform is compared to circular movement; the intelligible operation by which one proceeds from one point to another is compared to the straight movement; while the intelligible operation which unites something of uniformity with progress to various points is compared to the oblique movement. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod motus corporales exteriores opponuntur quieti contemplationis, quae intelligitur esse ab exterioribus occupationibus. Sed motus intelligibilium operationum ad ipsam quietem contemplationis pertinent. | Reply to Objection 1: External bodily movements are opposed to the quiet of contemplation, which consists in rest from outward occupations: but the movements of intellectual operations belong to the quiet of contemplation. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod homo convenit in intellectu cum Angelis in genere, sed vis intellectiva est multo altior in Angelo quam in homine. Et ideo alio modo oportet hos motus in animabus et in Angelis assignare, secundum quod diversimode se habent ad uniformitatem. Intellectus enim Angeli habet cognitionem uniformem secundum duo, primo quidem, quia non acquirit intelligibilem veritatem ex varietate rerum compositarum; secundo, quia non intelligit veritatem intelligibilem discursive, sed simplici intuitu. Intellectus vero animae a sensibilibus rebus accipit intelligibilem veritatem; et cum quodam discursu rationis eam intelligit. | Reply to Objection 2: Man is like the angels in intellect generically, but the intellective power is much higher in the angel than in man. Consequently these movements must be ascribed to souls and angels in different ways, according as they are differently related to uniformity. For the angelic intellect has uniform knowledge in two respects. First, because it does not acquire intelligible truth from the variety of composite objects; secondly, because it understands the truth of intelligible objects not discursively, but by simple intuition. On the other hand, the intellect of the soul acquires intelligible truth from sensible objects, and understands it by a certain discoursing of the reason. |
| Et ideo Dionysius motum circularem in Angelis assignat inquantum uniformiter et indesinenter, absque principio et fine, intuentur Deum, sicut motus circularis, carens principio et fine, uniformiter est circa idem centrum. In anima vero, antequam ad istam uniformitatem perveniatur, exigitur quod duplex eius difformitas amoveatur. Primo quidem, illa quae est ex diversitate exteriorum rerum, prout scilicet relinquit exteriora. Et hoc est quod primo ponit in motu circulari animae introitum ipsius ab exterioribus ad seipsam. Secundo autem oportet quod removeatur secunda difformitas, quae est per discursum rationis. Et hoc idem contingit secundum quod omnes operationes animae reducuntur ad simplicem contemplationem intelligibilis veritatis. Et hoc est quod secundo dicit, quod necessaria est uniformis convolutio intellectualium virtutum ipsius, ut scilicet, cessante discursu, figatur eius intuitus in contemplatione unius simplicis veritatis. Et in hac operatione animae non est error, sicut patet quod circa intellectum primorum principiorum non erratur, quae simplici intuitu cognoscimus. Et tunc, istis duobus praemissis, tertio ponitur uniformitas conformis Angelis, secundum quod, praetermissis omnibus in sola Dei contemplatione persistit. Et hoc est quod dicit, Deinde, sicut uniformis facta, unite, idest conformiter, unitis virtutibus, ad pulchrum et bonum manuducitur. Motus autem rectus in Angelis accipi non potest secundum hoc quod in considerando procedat ab uno in aliud, sed solum secundum ordinem suae providentiae, secundum scilicet quod Angelus superior inferiores illuminat per medios. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod in directum moventur Angeli quando procedunt ad subiectorum providentiam, recta omnia transeuntes, idest, secundum ea quae secundum rectum ordinem disponuntur. Sed rectum motum ponit in anima secundum hoc quod ab exterioribus sensibilibus procedit ad intelligibilium cognitionem. Obliquum autem motum ponit in Angelo, compositum ex recto et circulari, inquantum secundum contemplationem Dei inferioribus provident. In anima autem ponit motum obliquum, similiter ex recto et circulari compositum, prout illuminationibus divinis ratiocinando utitur. | Wherefore Dionysius assigns the "circular" movement of the angels to the fact that their intuition of God is uniform and unceasing, having neither beginning nor end: even as a circular movement having neither beginning nor end is uniformly around the one same center. But on the part of the soul, ere it arrive at this uniformity, its twofold lack of uniformity needs to be removed. First, that which arises from the variety of external things: this is removed by the soul withdrawing from externals, and so the first thing he mentions regarding the circular movement of the soul is "the soul's withdrawal into itself from external objects." Secondly, another lack of uniformity requires to be removed from the soul, and this is owing to the discoursing of reason. This is done by directing all the soul's operations to the simple contemplation of the intelligible truth, and this is indicated by his saying in the second place that "the soul's intellectual powers must be uniformly concentrated," in other words that discoursing must be laid aside and the soul's gaze fixed on the contemplation of the one simple truth. In this operation of the soul there is no error, even as there is clearly no error in the understanding of first principles which we know by simple intuition. Afterwards these two things being done, he mentions thirdly the uniformity which is like that of the angels, for then all things being laid aside, the soul continues in the contemplation of God alone. This he expresses by saying: "Then being thus made uniform unitedly," i.e. conformably, "by the union of its powers, it is conducted to the good and the beautiful." The "straight" movement of the angel cannot apply to his proceeding from one thing to another by considering them, but only to the order of his providence, namely to the fact that the higher angel enlightens the lower angels through the angels that are intermediate. He indicates this when he says: "The angel's movement takes a straight line when he proceeds to the care of things subject to him, taking in his course whatever things are direct," i.e. in keeping with the dispositions of the direct order. Whereas he ascribes the "straight" movement in the soul to the soul's proceeding from exterior sensibles to the knowledge of intelligible objects. The "oblique" movement in the angels he describes as being composed of the straight and circular movements, inasmuch as their care for those beneath them is in accordance with their contemplation of God: while the "oblique" movement in the soul he also declares to be partly straight and partly circular, in so far as in reasoning it makes use of the light received from God. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod illae diversitates motuum quae accipiuntur secundum differentiam eius quod est sursum et deorsum, dextrorsum et sinistrorsum, ante et retro, et secundum diversos circuitus, omnes continentur sub motu recto vel obliquo. Nam per omnes designatur discursus rationis. Qui quidem si sit a genere ad speciem, vel a toto ad partem, erit, ut ipse exponit, secundum sursum et deorsum. Si vero sit ab uno oppositorum in aliud, erit secundum dextrorsum et sinistrorsum. Si vero sit a causis in effectus, erit ante et retro. Si vero sit secundum accidentia quae circumstant rem, propinqua vel remota, erit circuitus. Discursus autem rationis, quando est a sensibilibus ad intelligibilia secundum ordinem naturalis rationis, pertinet ad motum rectum; quando autem est secundum illuminationes divinas, pertinet ad motum obliquum; ut ex dictis patet. Sola autem immobilitas quam ponit, pertinet ad motum circularem. | Reply to Objection 3: These varieties of movement that are taken from the distinction between above and below, right and left, forwards and backwards, and from varying circles, are all comprised under either straight and oblique movement, because they all denote discursions of reason. For if the reason pass from the genus to the species, or from the part to the whole, it will be, as he explains, from above to below: if from one opposite to another, it will be from right to left; if from the cause to the effect, it will be backwards and forwards; if it be about accidents that surround a thing near at hand or far remote, the movement will be circular. The discoursing of reason from sensible to intelligible objects, if it be according to the order of natural reason, belongs to the straight movement; but if it be according to the Divine enlightenment, it will belong to the oblique movement as explained above (ad 2). That alone which he describes as immobility belongs to the circular movement. |
| Unde patet quod Dionysius multo sufficientius et subtilius motus contemplationis describit. | Wherefore it is evident that Dionysius describes the movement of contemplation with much greater fulness and depth. |
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| Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod contemplatio delectationem non habeat. Delectatio enim ad vim appetitivam pertinet. Sed contemplatio principaliter consistit in intellectu. Ergo videtur quod delectatio non pertineat ad contemplationem. | Objection 1: It would seem that there is no delight in contemplation. For delight belongs to the appetitive power; whereas contemplation resides chiefly in the intellect. Therefore it would seem that there is no delight in contemplation. |
| Praeterea, omnis contentio et omne certamen impedit delectationem. Sed in contemplatione est contentio et certamen, dicit enim Gregorius, super Ezech., quod anima, cum contemplari Deum nititur, velut in quodam certamine posita, modo quasi exsuperat, quia intelligendo et sentiendo, de incircumscripto lumine aliquid degustat, modo succumbit, quia degustando iterum deficit. Ergo vita contemplativa non habet delectationem. | Objection 2: Further, all strife and struggle is a hindrance to delight. Now there is strife and struggle in contemplation. For Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "when the soul strives to contemplate God, it is in a state of struggle; at one time it almost overcomes, because by understanding and feeling it tastes something of the incomprehensible light, and at another time it almost succumbs, because even while tasting, it fails." Therefore there is no delight in contemplation. |
| Praeterea, delectatio sequitur operationem perfectam, ut dicitur in X Ethic. Sed contemplatio viae est imperfecta, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIII, videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate. Ergo videtur quod vita contemplativa delectationem non habeat. | Objection 3: Further, delight is the result of a perfect operation, as stated in Ethic. x, 4. Now the contemplation of wayfarers is imperfect, according to 1 Cor. 13:12, "We see now through a glass in a dark manner." Therefore seemingly there is no delight in the contemplative life. |
| Praeterea, laesio corporalis delectationem impedit. Sed contemplatio inducit laesionem corporalem, unde Gen. XXXII dicitur quod Iacob, postquam dixerat, vidi dominum facie ad faciem, claudicabat pede, eo quod tetigerit nervum femoris eius et obstupuerit. Ergo videtur quod in vita contemplativa non sit delectatio. |
Objection 4: Further, a lesion of the body is an obstacle to delight. Now contemplation causes a lesion of the body; wherefore it is stated (Gn. 32) that after Jacob had said (Gn. 32:30), "'I have seen God face to face'... he halted on his foot (Gn. 32:31)... because he touched the sinew of his thigh and it shrank" (Gn. 32:32). Therefore seemingly there is no delight in contemplation. |
| Sed contra est quod de contemplatione sapientiae dicitur, Sap. VIII, non habet amaritudinem conversatio illius, nec taedium convictus eius, sed laetitiam et gaudium. Et Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod contemplativa vita amabilis valde dulcedo est. | On the contrary, It is written of the contemplation of wisdom (Wis. 8:16): "Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness": and Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly lovable." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod aliqua contemplatio potest esse delectabilis dupliciter. Uno modo, ratione ipsius operationis, quia unicuique delectabilis est operatio sibi conveniens secundum propriam naturam vel habitum. Contemplatio autem veritatis competit homini secundum suam naturam, prout est animal rationale. Ex quo contingit quod omnes homines ex natura scire desiderant, et per consequens in cognitione veritatis delectantur. Et adhuc magis fit hoc delectabile habenti habitum sapientiae et scientiae, ex quo accidit quod sine difficultate aliquis contemplatur. Alio modo contemplatio redditur delectabilis ex parte obiecti, inquantum scilicet aliquis rem amatam contemplatur, sicut etiam accidit in visione corporali quod delectabilis redditur non solum ex eo quod ipsum videre est delectabile, sed ex eo etiam quod videt quis personam amatam. Quia ergo vita contemplativa praecipue consistit in contemplatione Dei, ad quam movet caritas, ut dictum est; inde est quod in vita contemplativa non solum est delectatio ratione ipsius contemplationis, sed ratione ipsius divini amoris. |
I answer that, There may be delight in any particular contemplation in two ways. First by reason of the operation itself [*Cf. FS, Question [3], Article [5]], because each individual delights in the operation which befits him according to his own nature or habit. Now contemplation of the truth befits a man according to his nature as a rational animal: the result being that "all men naturally desire to know," so that consequently they delight in the knowledge of truth. And more delightful still does this become to one who has the habit of wisdom and knowledge, the result of which is that he contemplates without difficulty. Secondly, contemplation may be delightful on the part of its object, in so far as one contemplates that which one loves; even as bodily vision gives pleasure, not only because to see is pleasurable in itself, but because one sees a person whom one loves. Since, then, the contemplative life consists chiefly in the contemplation of God, of which charity is the motive, as stated above (Articles [1],2, ad 1), it follows that there is delight in the contemplative life, not only by reason of the contemplation itself, but also by reason of the Divine love. |
| Et quantum ad utrumque eius delectatio omnem delectationem humanam excedit. Nam et delectatio spiritualis potior est quam carnalis, ut supra habitum est, cum de passionibus ageretur, et ipse amor quo ex caritate Deus diligitur, omnem amorem excedit. Unde et in Psalmo dicitur, gustate, et videte quoniam suavis est dominus. |
In both respects the delight thereof surpasses all human delight, both because spiritual delight is greater than carnal pleasure, as stated above (FS, Question [31], Article [5]), when we were treating of the passions, and because the love whereby God is loved out of charity surpasses all love. Hence it is written (Ps. 33:9): "O taste and see that the Lord is sweet." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vita contemplativa, licet essentialiter consistat in intellectu, principium tamen habet in affectu, inquantum videlicet aliquis ex caritate ad Dei contemplationem incitatur. Et quia finis respondet principio inde est quod etiam terminus et finis contemplativae vitae habetur in affectu, dum scilicet aliquis in visione rei amatae delectatur, et ipsa delectatio rei visae amplius excitat amorem. Unde Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod cum quis ipsum quem amat viderit, in amorem ipsius amplius ignescit. Et haec est ultima perfectio contemplativae vitae, ut scilicet non solum divina veritas videatur, sed etiam ut ametur. | Reply to Objection 1: Although the contemplative life consists chiefly in an act of the intellect, it has its beginning in the appetite, since it is through charity that one is urged to the contemplation of God. And since the end corresponds to the beginning, it follows that the term also and the end of the contemplative life has its being in the appetite, since one delights in seeing the object loved, and the very delight in the object seen arouses a yet greater love. Wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "when we see one whom we love, we are so aflame as to love him more." And this is the ultimate perfection of the contemplative life, namely that the Divine truth be not only seen but also loved. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod contentio vel certamen quod provenit ex contrarietate exterioris rei, impedit illius rei delectationem, non enim aliquis delectatur in re contra quam pugnat. Sed in re pro qua quis pugnat, cum eam homo adeptus fuerit, ceteris paribus, magis in ea delectatur, sicut Augustinus dicit, in VIII Confess., quod quanto fuit maius periculum in praelio, tanto maius est gaudium in triumpho. Non est autem in contemplatione contentio et certamen ex contrarietate veritatis quam contemplamur, sed ex defectu nostri intellectus, et ex corruptibili corpore, quod nos ad inferiora retrahit, secundum illud Sap. IX, corpus, quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam, et deprimit terrena inhabitatio sensum multa cogitantem. Et inde est quod quando homo pertingit ad contemplationem veritatis, ardentius eam amat, sed magis odit proprium defectum a gravitate corruptibilis corporis, ut dicat cum apostolo, infelix ego homo. Quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? Unde et Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., cum Deus iam per desiderium et intellectum cognoscitur, omnem voluptatem carnis arefacit. |
Reply to Objection 2: Strife or struggle arising from the opposition of an external thing, hinders delight in that thing. For a man delights not in a thing against which he strives: but in that for which he strives; when he has obtained it, other things being equal, he delights yet more: wherefore Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3) that "the more peril there was in the battle, the greater the joy in the triumph." But there is no strife or struggle in contemplation on the part of the truth which we contemplate, though there is on the part of our defective understanding and our corruptible body which drags us down to lower things, according to Wis. 9:15, "The corruptible body ss a load upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that museth upon many things." Hence it is that when man attains to the contemplation of truth, he loves it yet more, while he hates the more his own deficiency and the weight of his corruptible body, so as to say with the Apostle (Rm. 7:24): "Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" Wherefore Gregory say (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "When God is once known by desire and understanding, He withers all carnal pleasure in us." |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod contemplatio Dei in hac vita imperfecta est respectu contemplationis patriae, et similiter delectatio contemplationis viae est imperfecta respectu delectationis contemplationis patriae, de qua dicitur in Psalmo, de torrente voluptatis tuae potabis eos. Sed contemplatio divinorum quae habetur in via, etsi sit imperfecta, est tamen delectabilior omni alia contemplatione quantumcumque perfecta, propter excellentiam rei contemplatae. Unde philosophus dicit, in I de partibus Animal., accidit circa illas honorabiles existentes et divinas substantias minores nobis existere theorias. Sed etsi secundum modicum attingamus eas, tamen, propter honorabilitatem cognoscendi, delectabilius aliquid habent quam quae apud nos omnia. Et hoc est etiam quod Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., contemplativa vita amabilis valde dulcedo est, quae super semetipsam animam rapit, caelestia aperit, spiritualia mentis oculis patefacit. |
Reply to Objection 3: The contemplation of God in this life is imperfect in comparison with the contemplation in heaven; and in like manner the delight of the wayfarer's contemplation is imperfect as compared with the delight of contemplation in heaven, of which it is written (Ps. 35:9): "Thou shalt make them drink of the torrent of Thy pleasure." Yet, though the contemplation of Divine things which is to be had by wayfarers is imperfect, it is more delightful than all other contemplation however perfect, on account of the excellence of that which is contemplated. Hence the Philosopher says (De Part. Animal. i, 5): "We may happen to have our own little theories about those sublime beings and godlike substances, and though we grasp them but feebly, nevertheless so elevating is the knowledge that they give us more delight than any of those things that are round about us": and Gregory says in the same sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly lovable; for it carries the soul away above itself, it opens heaven and discovers the spiritual world to the eyes of the mind." |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod Iacob post contemplationem uno pede claudicabat, quia necesse est ut, debilitato amore saeculi, convalescat aliquis ad amorem Dei, ut Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., et ideo, post agnitionem suavitatis Dei, unus in nobis sanus pes remanet, atque alius claudicat. Omnis enim qui uno pede claudicat, solum illi pedi innititur quem sanum habet. | Reply to Objection 4: After contemplation Jacob halted with one foot, "because we need to grow weak in the love of the world ere we wax strong in the love of God," as Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.). "Thus when we have known the sweetness of God, we have one foot sound while the other halts; since every one who halts on one foot leans only on that foot which is sound." |
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| Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vita contemplativa non sit diuturna. Vita enim contemplativa essentialiter consistit in his quae ad intellectum pertinent. Sed omnes intellectivae perfectiones huius vitae evacuantur, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIII, sive prophetiae evacuabuntur, sive linguae cessabunt, sive scientia destruetur. Ergo vita contemplativa evacuatur. | Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life is not continuous. For the contemplative life consists essentially in things pertaining to the intellect. Now all the intellectual perfections of this life will be made void, according to 1 Cor. 13:8, "Whether prophecies shall be made void, or tongues shall cease, or knowledge shall be destroyed." Therefore the contemplative life is made void. |
| Praeterea, dulcedinem contemplationis aliquis homo raptim et pertranseunter degustat. Unde Augustinus dicit, in X Confess., intromittis me in affectum multum inusitatum introrsus ad nescio quam dulcedinem, sed redeo in haec aerumnosis ponderibus. Gregorius etiam dicit, in V Moral., exponens illud Iob IV, cum spiritus me praesente transiret, in suavitate, inquit, contemplationis intimae non diu mens figitur, quia ad semetipsam, ipsa immensitate luminis reverberata, revocatur. Ergo vita contemplativa non est diuturna. | Objection 2: Further, a man tastes the sweetness of contemplation by snatches and for a short time only: wherefore Augustine says (Confess. x, 40), "Thou admittest me to a most unwonted affection in my inmost soul, to a strange sweetness... yet through my grievous weight I sink down again." Again, Gregory commenting on the words of Job 4:15, "When a spirit passed before me," says (Moral. v, 33): "The mind does not remain long at rest in the sweetness of inward contemplation, for it is recalled to itself and beaten back by the very immensity of the light." Therefore the contemplative life is not continuous. |
| Praeterea, illud quod non est homini connaturale, non potest esse diuturnum. Vita autem contemplativa est melior quam secundum hominem, ut philosophus dicit, in X Ethic. Ergo videtur quod vita contemplativa non sit diuturna. | Objection 3: Further, that which is not connatural to man cannot be continuous. Now the contemplative life, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 7), "is better than the life which is according to man." Therefore seemingly the contemplative life is not continuous. |
| Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Luc. X, Maria optimam partem elegit, quae non auferetur ab ea. Quia, ut Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., contemplativa hic incipitur, ut in caelesti patria perficiatur. |
On the contrary, our Lord said (Lk. 10:42): "Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her," since as Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.), "the contemplative life begins here so that it may be perfected in our heavenly home." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid potest dici diuturnum dupliciter, uno modo, secundum suam naturam; alio modo, quoad nos. Secundum se quidem manifestum est quod vita contemplativa diuturna est, dupliciter. Uno modo, eo quod versatur circa incorruptibilia et immobilia. Alio modo, quia non habet contrarietatem, delectationi enim quae est in considerando, nihil est contrarium, ut dicitur in I Topic. Sed quoad nos etiam vita contemplativa diuturna est. Tum quia competit nobis secundum actionem incorruptibilis partis animae, scilicet secundum intellectum, unde potest post hanc vitam durare. Alio modo, quia in operibus contemplativae corporaliter non laboramus, unde magis in huiusmodi operibus continue persistere possumus, sicut philosophus dicit, in X Ethic. | I answer that, A thing may be described as continuous in two ways: first, in regard to its nature; secondly, in regard to us. It is evident that in regard to itself contemplative life is continuous for two reasons: first, because it is about incorruptible and unchangeable things; secondly, because it has no contrary, for there is nothing contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, as stated in Topic. i, 13. But even in our regard contemplative life is continuous—both because it is competent to us in respect of the incorruptible part of the soul, namely the intellect, wherefore it can endure after this life—and because in the works of the contemplative life we work not with our bodies, so that we are the more able to persevere in the works thereof, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. x, 7). |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod modus contemplandi non est idem hic et in patria; sed vita contemplativa dicitur manere ratione caritatis, in qua habet et principium et finem. Et hoc est quod Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., contemplativa hic incipit, ut in caelesti patria perficiatur, quia amoris ignis, qui hic ardere inchoat, cum ipsum quem amat viderit, in amore ipsius amplius ignescit. | Reply to Objection 1: The manner of contemplation is not the same here as in heaven: yet the contemplative life is said to remain by reason of charity, wherein it has both its beginning and its end. Gregory speaks in this sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The contemplative life begins here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home, because the fire of love which begins to burn here is aflame with a yet greater love when we see Him Whom we love." |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod nulla actio potest diu durare in sui summo. Summum autem contemplationis est ut attingat ad uniformitatem divinae contemplationis, ut dicit Dionysius, sicut supra positum est. Unde etsi quantum ad hoc contemplatio diu durare non possit, tamen quantum ad alios contemplationis actus potest diu durare. |
Reply to Objection 2: No action can last long at its highest pitch. Now the highest point of contemplation is to reach the uniformity of Divine contemplation, according to Dionysius [*Cf. Coel. Hier. iii], and as we have stated above (Article [6], ad 2). Hence although contemplation cannot last long in this respect, it can be of long duration as regards the other contemplative acts. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod philosophus dicit vitam contemplativam esse supra hominem, quia competit nobis secundum hoc quod aliquid divinum est in nobis, scilicet intellectus. Qui est incorruptibilis et impassibilis secundum se, et ideo actio eius potest esse diuturnior. | Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher declares the contemplative life to be above man, because it befits us "so far as there is in us something divine" (Ethic. x, 7), namely the intellect, which is incorruptible and impassible in itself, wherefore its act can endure longer. |