St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica

(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

Index [<<� | >>]
Second Part of the Second Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 185 [ << | >> ]

OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE EPISCOPAL STATE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Deinde considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad statum episcoporum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. We must now consider things pertaining to the episcopal state. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
Primo, utrum liceat episcopatum appetere. (1) Whether it is lawful to desire the office of a bishop?
Secundo, utrum liceat episcopatum finaliter recusare. (2) Whether it is lawful to refuse the office of bishop definitively?
Tertio, utrum oporteat ad episcopatum eligere meliorem. (3) Whether the better man should be chosen for the episcopal office?
Quarto, utrum episcopus possit ad religionem transire. (4) Whether a bishop may pass over to the religious state?
Quinto, utrum liceat ei corporaliter suos subditos deserere. (5) Whether he may lawfully abandon his subjects in a bodily manner?
Sexto, utrum possit habere proprium. (6) Whether he can have anything of his own?
Septimo, utrum peccet mortaliter bona ecclesiastica pauperibus non erogando. (7) Whether he sins mortally by not distributing ecclesiastical goods to the poor?
Octavo, utrum religiosi qui ad episcopatum assumuntur, teneantur ad observantias regulares. (8) Whether religious who are appointed to the episcopal office are bound to religious observances?

Index [<<� | >>]
Second Part of the Second Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 185 [ << | >> ]
Article: 1  [ << | >> ]

Whether it is lawful to desire the office of a bishop?

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod liceat episcopatum appetere. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Tim. III, qui episcopatum desiderat, bonum opus desiderat. Sed licitum et laudabile est bonum opus desiderare. Ergo etiam laudabile est desiderare episcopatum. Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to desire the office of a bishop. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:1): "He that desires [Vulg.: 'If a man desire'] the office of a bishop, he desireth a good work." Now it is lawful and praiseworthy to desire a good work. Therefore it is even praiseworthy to desire the office of a bishop.
Praeterea, status episcoporum est perfectior quam status religiosorum, ut supra habitum est. Sed laudabile est quod aliquis desideret ad statum religionis transire. Ergo etiam laudabile est quod aliquis appetat ad episcopatum promoveri. Objection 2: Further, the episcopal state is more perfect than the religious, as we have said above (Question [184], Article [7]). But it is praiseworthy to desire to enter the religious state. Therefore it is also praiseworthy to desire promotion to the episcopal state.
Praeterea, Prov. XI dicitur, qui abscondit frumenta, maledicetur in populis, benedictio autem super caput vendentium. Sed ille qui est idoneus et vita et scientia ad episcopatum, videtur frumenta spiritualia abscondere si se ab episcopatu subtrahat, per hoc autem quod episcopatum accipit, ponitur in statu frumenta spiritualia dispensandi. Ergo videtur quod laudabile sit episcopatum appetere, et vituperabile ipsum refugere. Objection 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 11:26): "He that hideth up corn shall be cursed among the people; but a blessing upon the head of them that sell." Now a man who is apt, both in manner of life and by knowledge, for the episcopal office, would seem to hide up the spiritual corn, if he shun the episcopal state, whereas by accepting the episcopal office he enters the state of a dispenser of spiritual corn. Therefore it would seem praiseworthy to desire the office of a bishop, and blameworthy to refuse it.
Praeterea, facta sanctorum quae in Scriptura narrantur, proponuntur nobis in exemplum, secundum illud Rom. XV, quaecumque scripta sunt, ad nostram doctrinam scripta sunt. Sed legitur Isaiae VI, quod Isaias se obtulit ad officium praedicationis, quae praecipue competit episcopis. Ergo videtur quod appetere episcopatum sit laudabile. Objection 4: Further, the deeds of the saints related in Holy Writ are set before us as an example, according to Rm. 15:4, "What things soever were written, were written for our learning." Now we read (Is. 6:8) that Isaias offered himself for the office of preacher, which belongs chiefly to bishops. Therefore it would seem praiseworthy to desire the office of a bishop.
Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, locus superior, sine quo populus regi non potest, etsi administretur ut decet, tamen indecenter appetitur. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): "The higher place, without which the people cannot be ruled, though it be filled becomingly, is unbecomingly desired."
Respondeo dicendum quod in episcopatu tria possunt considerari. Quorum unum est principale et finale, scilicet episcopalis operatio, per quam utilitati proximorum intendit, secundum illud Ioan. ult., pasce oves meas. Aliud autem est altitudo gradus, quia episcopus super alios constituitur, secundum illud Matth. XXIV, fidelis servus et prudens, quem constituit dominus super familiam suam. Tertium autem est quod consequenter se habet ad ista, scilicet reverentia et honor, et sufficientia temporalium, secundum illud I ad Tim. V, qui bene praesunt presbyteri, duplici honore digni habeantur. Appetere igitur episcopatum ratione huiusmodi circumstantium bonorum, manifestum est quod est illicitum, et pertinet ad cupiditatem vel ambitionem. Unde contra Pharisaeos dominus dicit, Matth. XXIII, amant primos accubitus in cenis et primas cathedras in synagogis, salutationes in foro, et vocari ab hominibus, Rabbi. Quantum autem ad secundum, scilicet ad celsitudinem gradus, appetere episcopatum est praesumptuosum. Unde dominus, Matth. XX, arguit discipulos primatum quaerentes, dicens, scitis quia principes gentium dominantur eorum, ubi Chrysostomus dicit quod per hoc ostendit quod gentile est primatus cupere; et sic gentium comparatione eorum animam aestuantem convertit. I answer that, Three things may be considered in the episcopal office. One is principal and final, namely the bishop's work, whereby the good of our neighbor is intended, according to Jn. 21:17, "Feed My sheep." Another thing is the height of degree, for a bishop is placed above others, according to Mt. 24:45, "A faithful and a wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family." The third is something resulting from these, namely reverence, honor, and a sufficiency of temporalities, according to 1 Tim. 5:17, "Let the priests that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honor." Accordingly, to desire the episcopal office on account of these incidental goods is manifestly unlawful, and pertains to covetousness or ambition. Wherefore our Lord said against the Pharisees (Mt. 23:6,7): "They love the first places at feasts, and the first chairs in the synagogues, and salutations in the market-place, and to be called by men, Rabbi." As regards the second, namely the height of degree, it is presumptuous to desire the episcopal office. Hence our Lord reproved His disciples for seeking precedence, by saying to them (Mt. 20:25): "You know that the princes of the gentiles lord it over them." Here Chrysostom says (Hom. lxv in Matth.) that in these words "He points out that it is heathenish to seek precedence; and thus by comparing them to the gentiles He converted their impetuous soul."
Sed appetere proximis prodesse est secundum se laudabile et virtuosum. Verum quia, prout est episcopalis actus, habet annexam gradus celsitudinem, praesumptuosum videtur quod aliquis praeesse appetat ad hoc quod subditis prosit, nisi manifesta necessitate imminente, sicut Gregorius dicit, in Pastoral., quod tunc laudabile erat episcopatum quaerere, quando per hunc quemque dubium non erat ad supplicia graviora pervenire, unde non de facili inveniebatur qui hoc onus assumeret; praesertim cum aliquis caritatis zelo divinitus ad hoc incitatur, sicut Gregorius dicit, in Pastoral., quod Isaias, prodesse proximis cupiens, laudabiliter officium praedicationis appetiit. On the other hand, to desire to do good to one's neighbor is in itself praiseworthy, and virtuous. Nevertheless, since considered as an episcopal act it has the height of degree attached to it, it would seem that, unless there be manifest and urgent reason for it, it would be presumptuous for any man to desire to be set over others in order to do them good. Thus Gregory says (Pastor. i, 8) that "it was praiseworthy to seek the office of a bishop when it was certain to bring one into graver dangers." Wherefore it was not easy to find a person to accept this burden, especially seeing that it is through the zeal of charity that one divinely instigated to do so, according to Gregory, who says (Pastor. i, 7) that "Isaias being desirous of profiting his neighbor, commendably desired the office of preacher."
Potest tamen absque praesumptione quilibet appetere talia opera facere, si eum contingeret in tali officio esse; vel etiam se esse dignum ad talia opera exequenda, ita quod opus bonum cadat sub desiderio, non autem primatus dignitatis. Unde Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., opus quidem desiderare bonum, bonum est, primatum autem honoris concupiscere vanitas est. Primatus enim fugientem se desiderat, desiderantem se horret. Nevertheless, anyone may, without presumption, desire to do such like works if he should happen to be in that office, or to be worthy of doing them; so that the object of his desire is the good work and not the precedence in dignity. Hence Chrysostom* says: "It is indeed good to desire a good work, but to desire the primacy of honor is vanity. For primacy seeks one that shuns it, and abhors one that desires it." [*The quotation is from the Opus Imperfectum in Matth. (Hom. xxxv), falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom.]
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Gregorius dicit, in Pastoral., illo tempore hoc dixit apostolus quo ille qui plebibus praeerat, primus ad martyrii tormenta ducebatur, et sic nihil aliud erat quod in episcopatu appeti posset nisi bonum opus. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, quod apostolus dicens, qui episcopatum desiderat, bonum opus desiderat, exponere voluit quid sit episcopatus, quia nomen operis est, non honoris. Scopos quidem intentio est. Ergo episcopein, si velimus Latine superintendere possumus dicere, ut intelligat non se esse episcopum qui praeesse dilexerit, non prodesse. In actione enim, ut parum ante praemittit, non amandus est honor in hac vita sive potentia, quoniam omnia vana sunt sub sole, sed opus ipsum quod per eundem honorem vel potentiam fit. Et tamen, ut Gregorius dicit, in Pastoral., laudans desiderium, scilicet boni operis, in pavorem vertit protinus quod laudavit, cum subiungit, oportet autem episcopum irreprehensibilem esse, quasi dicat, laudo quod quaeritis, sed discite quid quaeratis. Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says (Pastor. i, 8), "when the Apostle said this he who was set over the people was the first to be dragged to the torments of martyrdom," so that there was nothing to be desired in the episcopal office, save the good work. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that when the Apostle said, "'Whoever desireth the office of bishop, desireth a good work,' he wished to explain what the episcopacy is: for it denotes work and not honor: since {skopos} signifies 'watching.' Wherefore if we like we may render {episkopein} by the Latin 'superintendere' [to watch over]: thus a man may know himself to be no bishop if he loves to precede rather than to profit others." For, as he observed shortly before, "in our actions we should seek, not honor nor power in this life, since all things beneath the sun are vanity, but the work itself which that honor or power enables us to do." Nevertheless, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 8), "while praising the desire" (namely of the good work) "he forthwith turns this object of praise into one of fear, when he adds: It behooveth... a bishop to be blameless," as though to say: "I praise what you seek, but learn first what it is you seek."
Ad secundum dicendum quod non est eadem ratio de statu religionis et statu episcopali, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia ad statum episcopalem praeexigitur vitae perfectio, ut patet per hoc quod dominus a Petro exquisivit si plus eum ceteris diligeret, antequam ei committeret pastorale officium. Sed ad statum religionis non praeexigitur perfectio, sed est via in perfectionem unde et dominus, Matth. XIX, non dixit, si es perfectus, vade et vende omnia quae habes, sed, si vis esse perfectus. Et huius differentiae ratio est quia, secundum Dionysium, perfectio pertinet active ad episcopum, sicut ad perfectorem, ad monachum autem passive, sicut ad perfectum. Requiritur autem quod sit perfectus aliquis ad hoc quod possit alios ad perfectionem adducere, quod non praeexigitur ab eo qui debet ad perfectionem adduci. Est autem praesumptuosum quod aliquis perfectum se reputet, non autem quod aliquis ad perfectionem tendat. Secundo, quia ille qui statum religionis assumit, se aliis subiicit ad spiritualia capienda, et hoc cuilibet licet. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, a studio cognoscendae veritatis nemo prohibetur, quod ad laudabile pertinet otium. Sed ille qui transit ad statum episcopalem, sublimatur ad hoc quod aliis provideat. Et hanc sublimationem nullus debet sibi assumere, secundum illud Heb. V, nemo assumit sibi honorem, sed qui vocatur a Deo. Et Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., primatum Ecclesiae concupiscere neque iustum est neque utile. Quis enim sapiens vult ultro se subiicere servituti et periculo tali ut det rationem pro omni Ecclesia, nisi forte qui non timet Dei iudicium, abutens primatu ecclesiastico saeculariter, ut scilicet convertat ipsum in saecularem? Reply to Objection 2: There is no parity between the religious and the episcopal state, for two reasons. First, because perfection of life is a prerequisite of the episcopal state, as appears from our Lord asking Peter if he loved Him more than the others, before committing the pastoral office to him, whereas perfection is not a prerequisite of the religious state, since the latter is the way to perfection. Hence our Lord did not say (Mt. 19:21): "If thou art perfect, go, sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast," but "If thou wilt be perfect." The reason for this difference is because, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. vi), perfection pertains actively to the bishop, as the "perfecter," but to the monk passively as one who is "perfected": and one needs to be perfect in order to bring others to perfection, but not in order to be brought to perfection. Now it is presumptuous to think oneself perfect, but it is not presumptuous to tend to perfection. Secondly, because he who enters the religious state subjects himself to others for the sake of a spiritual profit, and anyone may lawfully do this. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): "No man is debarred from striving for the knowledge of truth, since this pertains to a praiseworthy ease." On the other hand, he who enters the episcopal state is raised up in order to watch over others, and no man should seek to be raised thus, according to Heb. 5:4, "Neither doth any man take the honor to himself, but he that is called by God": and Chrysostom says: "To desire supremacy in the Church is neither just nor useful. For what wise man seeks of his own accord to submit to such servitude and peril, as to have to render an account of the whole Church? None save him who fears not God's judgment, and makes a secular abuse of his ecclesiastical authority, by turning it to secular uses."
Ad tertium dicendum quod dispensatio spiritualium frumentorum non est facienda secundum arbitrium cuiuslibet, sed principaliter quidem secundum arbitrium et dispositionem Dei; secundario autem secundum arbitrium superiorum praelatorum, ex quorum persona dicitur, I ad Cor. IV, sic nos existimet homo ut ministros Christi, et dispensatores mysteriorum Dei. Et ideo non intelligitur ille abscondere frumenta spiritualia cui non competit ex officio, nec ei a superiori iniungitur, si ab aliorum correctione aut gubernatione desistat, sed solum tunc intelligitur abscondere, si dispensationem negligat cum ei ex officio incumbat, vel si officium, cum ei iniungitur, pertinaciter recipere renuat. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, otium sanctum quaerit caritas veritatis, negotium iustum suscipit necessitas caritatis. Quam sarcinam si nullus imponit, percipiendae atque intuendae vacandum est veritati. Si autem imponitur, suscipienda est, propter caritatis necessitatem. Reply to Objection 3: The dispensing of spiritual corn is not to be carried on in an arbitrary fashion, but chiefly according to the appointment and disposition of God, and in the second place according to the appointment of the higher prelates, in whose person it is said (1 Cor. 4:1): "Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries of God." Wherefore a man is not deemed to hide spiritual corn if he avoids governing or correcting others, and is not competent to do so, neither in virtue of his office nor of his superior's command; thus alone is he deemed to hide it, when he neglects to dispense it while under obligation to do so in virtue of his office, or obstinately refuses to accept the office when it is imposed on him. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): "The love of truth seeks a holy leisure, the demands of charity undertake an honest labor. If no one imposes this burden upon us, we must devote ourselves to the research and contemplation of truth, but if it be imposed on us, we must bear it because charity demands it of us."
Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Gregorius dicit, in Pastoral., Isaias, qui mitti voluit, ante se per altaris calculum purgatum vidit, ne non purgatus adire quisque sacra ministeria audeat. Quia ergo valde difficile est purgatum se quemlibet posse cognoscere, praedicationis officium tutius declinatur. Reply to Objection 4: As Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7), "Isaias, who wishing to be sent, knew himself to be already cleansed by the live coal taken from the altar, shows us that no one should dare uncleansed to approach the sacred ministry. Since, then, it is very difficult for anyone to be able to know that he is cleansed, it is safer to decline the office of preacher."

Index [<<� | >>]
Second Part of the Second Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 185 [ << | >> ]
Article: 2  [ << | >> ]

Whether it is lawful for a man to refuse absolutely an appointment to the episcopate?

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod liceat episcopatum iniunctum omnino recusare. Ut enim Gregorius dicit, in Pastoral., per activam vitam prodesse proximis cupiens Isaias, officium praedicationis appetit, per contemplationem vero Ieremias amori conditoris sedulo inhaerere desiderans, ne mitti ad praedicandum debeat, contradicit. Nullus autem peccat si meliora nolit deserere ut minus bonis inhaereat. Cum ergo amor Dei praeemineat dilectioni proximi, et vita contemplativa praeferatur vitae activae, ut ex supra dictis patet, videtur quod non peccat ille qui omnino episcopatum recusat. Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to refuse absolutely an appointment to the episcopate. For as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7), "Isaias wishing to be of profit to his neighbor by means of the active life, desired the office of preaching, whereas Jeremias who was fain to hold fast to the love of his Creator by contemplation exclaimed against being sent to preach." Now no man sins by being unwilling to forgo better things in order to adhere to things that are not so good. Since then the love of God surpasses the love of our neighbor, and the contemplative life is preferable to the active, as shown above (Question [25], Article [1]; Question [26], Article [2]; Question [182], Article [1]) it would seem that a man sins not if he refuse absolutely the episcopal office.
Praeterea, sicut Gregorius dicit, valde difficile est ut aliquis se purgatum possit cognoscere, nec debet aliquis non purgatus sacra ministeria adire. Si ergo aliquis se non sentiat esse purgatum, quantumcumque sibi episcopale iniungatur officium, non debet illud suscipere. Objection 2: Further, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7), "it is very difficult for anyone to be able to know that he is cleansed: nor should anyone uncleansed approach the sacred ministry." Therefore if a man perceives that he is not cleansed, however urgently the episcopal office be enjoined him, he ought not to accept it.
Praeterea, de beato Marco Hieronymus dicit, in prologo super Marcum, quod amputasse sibi post fidem pollicem dicitur, ut sacerdotio reprobus haberetur. Et similiter aliqui votum emittunt ut nunquam episcopatum accipiant. Sed eiusdem rationis est ponere impedimentum ad aliquid, et omnino recusare illud. Ergo videtur quod absque peccato possit aliquis omnino episcopatum recusare. Objection 3: Further, Jerome (Prologue, super Marc.) says that "it is related of the Blessed Mark* that after receiving the faith he cut off his thumb that he might be excluded from the priesthood." [*This prologue was falsely ascribed to St. Jerome, and the passage quoted refers, not to St. Mark the Evangelist, but to a hermit of that name. (Cf. Baronius, Anno Christi, 45, num. XLIV)] Likewise some take a vow never to accept a bishopric. Now to place an obstacle to a thing amounts to the same as refusing it altogether. Therefore it would seem that one may, without sin, refuse the episcopal office absolutely.
Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, ad Eudoxium, si qua opera vestra mater Ecclesia desideraverit, nec elatione avida suscipiatis, nec blandiente desidia respuatis. Postea subdit, neque otium vestrum necessitatibus Ecclesiae praeponatis, cui parturienti si nulli boni ministrare vellent, quomodo nasceremini non inveniretis. On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. xlviii ad Eudox.): "If Mother Church requires your service, neither accept with greedy conceit, nor refuse with fawning indolence"; and afterwards he adds: "Nor prefer your ease to the needs of the Church: for if no good men were willing to assist her in her labor, you would seek in vain how we could be born of her."
Respondeo dicendum quod in assumptione episcopatus duo sunt consideranda, primo quidem, quid deceat hominem appetere secundum propriam voluntatem; secundo, quid hominem deceat facere ad voluntatem alterius. Quantum igitur ad propriam voluntatem, convenit homini principaliter insistere propriae saluti, sed quod aliorum saluti intendat, hoc convenit homini ex dispositione alterius potestatem habentis, sicut ex supra dictis patet. Unde sicut ad inordinationem voluntatis pertinet quod aliquis proprio motu feratur in hoc quod aliorum gubernationi praeficiatur; ita etiam ad inordinationem voluntatis pertinet quod aliquis omnino, contra superioris iniunctionem, praedictum gubernationis officium finaliter recuset, propter duo. I answer that, Two things have to be considered in the acceptance of the episcopal office: first, what a man may fittingly desire according to his own will; secondly, what it behooves a man to do according to the will of another. As regards his own will it becomes a man to look chiefly to his own spiritual welfare, whereas that he look to the spiritual welfare of others becomes a man according to the appointment of another having authority, as stated above (Article [1], ad 3). Hence just as it is a mark of an inordinate will that a man of his own choice incline to be appointed to the government of others, so too it indicates an inordinate will if a man definitively refuse the aforesaid office of government in direct opposition to the appointment of his superior: and this for two reasons.
Primo quidem, quia hoc repugnat caritati proximorum, quorum utilitati se aliquis debet exponere pro loco et tempore. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, quod negotium iustum suscipit necessitas caritatis. First, because this is contrary to the love of our neighbor, for whose good a man should offer himself according as place and time demand: hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "the demands of charity undertake an honest labor."
Secundo, quia hoc repugnat humilitati, per quam aliquis superiorum mandatis se subiicit. Unde Gregorius dicit, in Pastoral., quod tunc ante Dei oculos vera est humilitas, cum ad respuendum hoc quod utiliter subire praecipitur, pertinax non est. Secondly, because this is contrary to humility, whereby a man submits to his superior's commands: hence Gregory says (Pastor. i, 6): "In God's sight humility is genuine when it does not obstinately refuse to submit to what is usefully prescribed."
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quamvis, simpliciter et absolute loquendo, vita contemplativa potior sit quam activa, et amor Dei quam dilectio proximi; tamen ex alia parte bonum multitudinis praeferendum est bono unius. Unde Augustinus dicit, in verbis praemissis, neque otium vestrum necessitatibus Ecclesiae praeponatis. Praesertim quia et hoc ipsum ad dilectionem Dei pertinet quod aliquis ovibus Christi curam pastoralem impendat. Unde super illud Ioan. ult., pasce oves meas, dicit Augustinus, sit amoris officium pascere dominicum gregem, sicut fuit timoris indicium negare pastorem. Reply to Objection 1: Although simply and absolutely speaking the contemplative life is more excellent than the active, and the love of God better than the love of our neighbor, yet, on the other hand, the good of the many should be preferred to the good of the individual. Wherefore Augustine says in the passage quoted above: "Nor prefer your own ease to the needs of the Church," and all the more since it belongs to the love of God that a man undertake the pastoral care of Christ's sheep. Hence Augustine, commenting on Jn. 21:17, "Feed My sheep," says (Tract. cxxiii in Joan.): "Be it the task of love to feed the Lord's flock, even as it was the mark of fear to deny the Shepherd."
Similiter etiam praelati non sic transferuntur ad vitam activam ut contemplativam deserant. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, quod, si imponatur sarcina pastoralis officii, nec sic deserenda est delectatio veritatis, quae scilicet in contemplatione habetur. Moreover prelates are not transferred to the active life, so as to forsake the contemplative; wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "if the burden of the pastoral office be imposed, we must not abandon the delights of truth," which are derived from contemplation.
Ad secundum dicendum quod nullus tenetur obedire praelato ad aliquod illicitum, sicut patet ex his quae supra dicta sunt de obedientia. Potest ergo contingere quod ille cui iniungitur praelationis officium, in se aliquid sentiat per quod non liceat ei praelationem accipere. Hoc autem impedimentum quandoque quidem removeri potest per ipsummet cui pastoralis cura iniungitur, puta si habeat peccandi propositum, quod potest deserere. Et propter hoc non excusatur quin finaliter teneatur obedire praelato iniungenti. Quandoque vero impedimentum ex quo fit ei illicitum pastorale officium, non potest ipse removere, sed praelatus qui iniungit, puta si sit irregularis vel excommunicatus. Et tunc debet defectum suum praelato iniungenti ostendere, qui si impedimentum removere voluerit, tenetur humiliter obedire. Unde Exodi IV, cum Moyses dixisset, obsecro, domine, non sum eloquens ab heri et nudius tertius, dominus respondit ad eum, ego ero in ore tuo, doceboque te quid loquaris. Quandoque vero non potest removeri impedimentum nec per iniungentem nec per eum cui iniungitur, sicut si archiepiscopus non possit super irregularitate dispensare. Unde subditus non tenetur ei obedire ad suscipiendum episcopatum, vel etiam sacros ordines, si sit irregularis. Reply to Objection 2: No one is bound to obey his superior by doing what is unlawful, as appears from what was said above concerning obedience (Question [104], Article [5]). Accordingly it may happen that he who is appointed to the office of prelate perceive something in himself on account of which it is unlawful for him to accept a prelacy. But this obstacle may sometimes be removed by the very person who is appointed to the pastoral cure—for instance, if he have a purpose to sin, he may abandon it—and for this reason he is not excused from being bound to obey definitely the superior who has appointed him. Sometimes, however, he is unable himself to remove the impediment that makes the pastoral office unlawful to him, yet the prelate who appoints him can do so—for instance, if he be irregular or excommunicate. In such a case he ought to make known his defect to the prelate who has appointed him; and if the latter be willing to remove the impediment, he is bound humbly to obey. Hence when Moses had said (Ex. 4:10): "I beseech thee, Lord, I am not eloquent from yesterday, and the day before," the Lord answered (Ex. 4:12): "I will be in thy mouth, and I will teach thee what thou shalt speak." At other times the impediment cannot be removed, neither by the person appointing nor by the one appointed—for instance, if an archbishop be unable to dispense from an irregularity; wherefore a subject, if irregular, would not be bound to obey him by accepting the episcopate or even sacred orders.
Ad tertium dicendum quod accipere episcopatum non est de se necessarium ad salutem, sed fit necessarium ex superioris praecepto. His autem quae sic sunt necessaria ad salutem, potest aliquis impedimentum licite apponere antequam fiat praeceptum, alioquin, non liceret alicui transire ad secundas nuptias, ne per hoc impediretur a susceptione episcopatus vel sacri ordinis. Non autem hoc liceret in his quae per se sunt de necessitate salutis. Unde beatus Marcus non contra praeceptum egit sibi digitum amputando, quamvis credibile sit ex instinctu spiritus sancti hoc fecisse, sine quo non licet alicui sibi manus iniicere. Qui autem votum emittit de non suscipiendo episcopatum, si per hoc intendat se obligare ad hoc quod nec per obedientiam superioris praelati accipiat, illicite vovet. Si autem intendit ad hoc se obligare ut, quantum est de se, episcopatum non quaerat; nec suscipiat, nisi necessitate imminente, licitum est votum, quia vovet se facturum id quod hominem facere decet. Reply to Objection 3: It is not in itself necessary for salvation to accept the episcopal office, but it becomes necessary by reason of the superior's command. Now one may lawfully place an obstacle to things thus necessary for salvation, before the command is given; else it would not be lawful to marry a second time, lest one should thus incur an impediment to the episcopate or holy orders. But this would not be lawful in things necessary for salvation. Hence the Blessed Mark did not act against a precept by cutting off his finger, although it is credible that he did this by the instigation of the Holy Ghost, without which it would be unlawful for anyone to lay hands on himself. If a man take a vow not to accept the bishop's office, and by this intend to bind himself not even to accept it in obedience to his superior prelate, his vow is unlawful; but if he intend to bind himself, so far as it lies with him, not to seek the episcopal office, nor to accept it except under urgent necessity, his vow is lawful, because he vows to do what it becomes a man to do.

Index [<<� | >>]
Second Part of the Second Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 185 [ << | >> ]
Article: 3  [ << | >> ]

Whether he that is appointed to the episcopate ought to be better than others?

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod oporteat eum qui ad episcopatum assumitur, esse ceteris meliorem. Dominus enim Petrum, cui commissurus erat pastorale officium, examinavit si se diligeret plus ceteris. Sed ex hoc aliquis melior est quod Deum plus diligit. Ergo videtur quod ad episcopatum non sit assumendus nisi ille qui est ceteris melior. Objection 1: It would seem that one who is appointed to the episcopate ought to be better than others. For our Lord, when about to commit the pastoral office to Peter, asked him if he loved Him more than the others. Now a man is the better through loving God the more. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to be appointed to the episcopal office except he be better than others.
Praeterea, Symmachus Papa dicit, vilissimus computandus est, nisi scientia et sanctitate praecellat, qui est dignitate praestantior. Sed ille qui praecellit scientia et sanctitate, est melior. Ergo non debet aliquis ad episcopatum assumi nisi sit ceteris melior. Objection 2: Further, Pope Symmachus says (can. Vilissimus I, qu. 1): "A man is of very little worth who though excelling in dignity, excels not in knowledge and holiness." Now he who excels in knowledge and holiness is better. Therefore a man ought not to be appointed to the episcopate unless he be better than others.
Praeterea, in quolibet genere minora per maiora reguntur, sicut corporalia reguntur per spiritualia, et inferiora corpora per superiora, ut Augustinus dicit, in III de Trin. Sed episcopus assumitur ad regimen aliorum. Ergo debet esse ceteris melior. Objection 3: Further, in every genus the lesser are governed by the greater, as corporeal things are governed by things spiritual, and the lower bodies by the higher, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 3). Now a bishop is appointed to govern others. Therefore he should be better than others.
Sed contra est quod decretalis dicit quod sufficit eligere bonum, nec oportet eligere meliorem. On the contrary, The Decretal [*Can. Cum dilectus, de Electione] says that "it suffices to choose a good man, nor is it necessary to choose the better man."
Respondeo dicendum quod circa assumptionem alicuius ad episcopatum, aliquid est considerandum ex parte eius qui assumitur, et aliquid ex parte eius qui assumit. Ex parte enim eius qui assumit, vel eligendo vel providendo, requiritur quod fideliter divina ministeria dispenset. Quae quidem dispensari debent ad utilitatem Ecclesiae, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIV, ad aedificationem Ecclesiae quaerite ut abundetis, non autem ministeria divina hominibus committuntur propter eorum remunerationem, quam expectare debent in futuro. Et ideo ille qui debet aliquem eligere in episcopum, vel de eo providere, non tenetur assumere meliorem simpliciter, quod est secundum caritatem, sed meliorem quoad regimen Ecclesiae, qui scilicet possit Ecclesiam et instruere et defendere et pacifice gubernare. Unde contra quosdam Hieronymus dicit quod quidam non quaerunt eos in Ecclesia columnas erigere quos plus cognoscant Ecclesiae prodesse, sed quos vel ipsi amant, vel quorum sunt obsequiis deliniti, vel pro quibus maiorum quispiam rogaverit, et, ut deteriora taceam, qui ut clerici fierent muneribus impetrarunt. I answer that, In designating a man for the episcopal office, something has to be considered on the part of the person designate, and something on the part of the designator. For on the part of the designator, whether by election or by appointment, it is required that he choose such a one as will dispense the divine mysteries faithfully. These should be dispensed for the good of the Church, according to 1 Cor. 14:12, "Seek to abound unto the edifying of the Church"; and the divine mysteries are not committed to men for their own meed, which they should await in the life to come. Consequently he who has to choose or appoint one for a bishop is not bound to take one who is best simply, i.e. according to charity, but one who is best for governing the Church, one namely who is able to instruct, defend, and govern the Church peacefully. Hence Jerome, commenting on Titus 1:5, says against certain persons that "some seek to erect as pillars of the Church, not those whom they know to be more useful to the Church, but those whom they love more, or those by whose obsequiousness they have been cajoled or undone, or for whom some person in authority has spoken, and, not to say worse than this, have succeeded by means of gifts in being made clerics."
Hoc autem pertinet ad acceptionem personarum, quae in talibus est grave peccatum. Unde super illud Iac. II, fratres mei, nolite in personarum acceptione etc., dicit Glossa Augustini, si hanc distantiam sedendi et standi ad honores ecclesiasticos referamus, non est putandum leve esse peccatum in personarum acceptione habere fidem domini gloriae. Quis enim ferat eligi divitem ad sedem honoris Ecclesiae, contempto paupere instructiore et sanctiore? Now this pertains to the respect of persons, which in such matters is a grave sin. Wherefore a gloss of Augustine [*Ep. clxvii ad Hieron.] on James 2:1, "Brethren, have not... with respect of persons," says: "If this distinction of sitting and standing be referred to ecclesiastical honors, we must not deem it a slight sin to 'have the faith of the Lord of glory with respect of persons.' For who would suffer a rich man to be chosen for the Church's seat of honor, in despite of a poor man who is better instructed and holier?"
Ex parte autem eius qui assumitur, non requiritur quod reputet se aliis meliorem, hoc enim esset superbum et praesumptuosum, sed sufficit quod nihil in se inveniat per quod illicitum ei reddatur assumere praelationis officium. Unde licet Petrus interrogatus esset an dominum plus ceteris diligeret, in sua responsione non se praetulit ceteris, sed respondit simpliciter quod Christum amaret. On the part of the person appointed, it is not required that he esteem himself better than others, for this would be proud and presumptuous; but it suffices that he perceive nothing in himself which would make it unlawful for him to take up the office of prelate. Hence although Peter was asked by our Lord if he loved Him more than the others, he did not, in his reply, set himself before the others, but answered simply that he loved Christ.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus in Petro sciebat ex suo munere esse idoneitatem etiam quantum ad alia, Ecclesiam gubernandi. Et ideo eum de ampliori dilectione examinavit ad ostendendum quod, ubi alias invenitur homo idoneus ad Ecclesiae regimen, praecipue attendi debet in ipso eminentia divinae dilectionis. Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord knew that, by His own bestowal, Peter was in other respects fitted to govern the Church: wherefore He questioned him about his greater love, to show that when we find a man otherwise fitted for the government of the Church, we must look chiefly to his pre-eminence in the love of God.
Ad secundum dicendum quod auctoritas illa est intelligenda quantum ad studium illius qui in dignitate est constitutus, debet enim ad hoc intendere ut talem se exhibeat ut ceteros et scientia et sanctitate praecellat. Unde Gregorius dicit, in Pastoral., tantum debet actionem populi actio transcendere praesulis, quantum distare solet a grege vita pastoris. Non autem sibi imputandum est si ante praelationem excellentior non fuit, ut ex hoc debeat vilissimus reputari. Reply to Objection 2: This statement refers to the pursuits of the man who is placed in authority. For he should aim at showing himself to be more excellent than others in both knowledge and holiness. Wherefore Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 1) "the occupations of a prelate ought to excel those of the people, as much as the shepherd's life excels that of his flock." But he is not to be blamed and looked upon as worthless if he excelled not before being raised to the prelacy.
Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dicitur I ad Cor. XII, divisiones gratiarum et ministrationum et operationum sunt. Unde nihil prohibet aliquem esse magis idoneum ad officium regiminis qui tamen non excellit in gratia sanctitatis. Secus autem est in regimine ordinis naturalis, in quo id quod est superius naturae ordine, ex hoc ipso habet maiorem idoneitatem ad hoc quod inferiora disponat. Reply to Objection 3: According to 1 Cor. 12:4 seqq., "there are diversities of graces... and... of ministries... and... of operations." Hence nothing hinders one from being more fitted for the office of governing, who does not excel in the grace of holiness. It is otherwise in the government of the natural order, where that which is higher in the natural order is for that very reason more fitted to dispose of those that are lower.

Index [<<� | >>]
Second Part of the Second Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 185 [ << | >> ]
Article: 4  [ << | >> ]

Whether a bishop may lawfully forsake the episcopal cure, in order to enter religion?

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod episcopus non possit licite curam episcopalem deserere, ut ad religionem se transferat. Nulli enim de statu perfectiori licet ad minus perfectum statum transire, hoc enim est respicere retro, quod est damnabile, secundum domini sententiam dicentis, Luc. IX, nemo mittens manum ad aratrum et aspiciens retro, aptus est regno Dei. Sed status episcopalis est perfectior quam status religionis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo, sicut non licet de statu religionis redire ad saeculum, ita non licet de statu episcopali ad religionem transire. Objection 1: It seems that a bishop cannot lawfully forsake his episcopal cure in order to enter religion. For no one can lawfully pass from a more perfect to a less perfect state; since this is "to look back," which is condemned by the words of our Lord (Lk. 9:62), "No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God." Now the episcopal state is more perfect than the religious, as shown above (Question [184], Article [7]). Therefore just as it is unlawful to return to the world from the religious state, so is it unlawful to pass from the episcopal to the religious state.
Praeterea, ordo gratiae est decentior quam ordo naturae. Sed secundum naturam, non movetur idem ad contraria, puta, si lapis naturaliter deorsum movetur, non potest naturaliter a deorsum redire in sursum. Sed secundum ordinem gratiae, licet transire de statu religionis ad statum episcopalem. Ergo non licet e converso de statu episcopali redire ad statum religionis. Objection 2: Further, the order of grace is more congruous than the order of nature. Now according to nature a thing is not moved in contrary directions; thus if a stone be naturally moved downwards, it cannot naturally return upwards from below. But according to the order of grace it is lawful to pass from the religious to the episcopal state. Therefore it is not lawful to pass contrariwise from the episcopal to the religious state.
Praeterea, nihil in operibus gratiae debet esse otiosum. Sed ille qui est semel in episcopum consecratus, perpetuo retinet spiritualem potestatem conferendi ordines, et alia huiusmodi faciendi quae ad episcopale officium pertinent, quae quidem potestas otiosa remanere videtur in eo qui curam episcopalem dimittit. Ergo videtur quod episcopus non possit curam episcopalem dimittere et ad religionem transire. Objection 3: Further, in the works of grace nothing should be inoperative. Now when once a man is consecrated bishop he retains in perpetuity the spiritual power of giving orders and doing like things that pertain to the episcopal office: and this power would seemingly remain inoperative in one who gives up the episcopal cure. Therefore it would seem that a bishop may not forsake the episcopal cure and enter religion.
Sed contra, nullus cogitur ad id quod est secundum se illicitum. Sed illi qui petunt cessionem a cura episcopali, ad cedendum compelluntur, ut patet extra, de Renunt., cap. quidam. Ergo videtur quod deserere curam episcopalem non sit illicitum. On the contrary, No man is compelled to do what is in itself unlawful. Now those who seek to resign their episcopal cure are compelled to resign (Extra, de Renunt. cap. Quidam). Therefore apparently it is not unlawful to give up the episcopal cure.
Respondeo dicendum quod perfectio episcopalis status in hoc consistit quod aliquis ex divina dilectione se obligat ad hoc quod saluti proximorum insistat. Et ideo tandiu obligatur ad hoc quod curam pastoralem retineat, quandiu potest subditis sibi commissis proficere ad salutem. Quam quidem negligere non debet, neque propter divinae contemplationis quietem, cum apostolus propter necessitatem subditorum etiam a contemplatione futurae vitae se differri patienter toleraret; secundum illud Philipp. I, ecce, quid eligam ignoro. Coarctor enim e duobus, desiderium habens dissolvi et esse cum Christo, multo magis melius est; permanere autem in carne est necessarium propter vos. Et hoc confidens, scio quia manebo. Neque etiam propter quaecumque adversa vitanda vel lucra conquirenda, quia, sicut dicitur Ioan. X, bonus pastor animam suam ponit pro ovibus suis. I answer that, The perfection of the episcopal state consists in this that for love of God a man binds himself to work for the salvation of his neighbor, wherefore he is bound to retain the pastoral cure so long as he is able to procure the spiritual welfare of the subjects entrusted to his care: a matter which he must not neglect—neither for the sake of the quiet of divine contemplation, since the Apostle, on account of the needs of his subjects, suffered patiently to be delayed even from the contemplation of the life to come, according to Phil. 1:22-25, "What I shall choose I know not, but I am straitened between two, having a desire to be dissolved, and to be with Christ, a thing by far better. But to abide still in the flesh is needful for you. And having this confidence, I know that I shall abide"; nor for the sake of avoiding any hardships or of acquiring any gain whatsoever, because as it is written (Jn. 10:11), "the good shepherd giveth his life for his sheep."
Contingit tamen quandoque quod episcopus impeditur procurare subditorum salutem, multipliciter. Quandoque quidem propter proprium defectum, vel conscientiae, sicut si sit homicida vel simoniacus; vel etiam corporis, puta si sit senex vel infirmus; vel etiam scientiae quae sufficiat ad curam regiminis; vel etiam irregularitatis, puta si sit bigamus. Quandoque autem propter defectum subditorum, in quibus non potest proficere. Unde Gregorius dicit, in II Dialog., ibi aequanimiter portandi sunt mali, ubi inveniuntur aliqui qui adiuventur boni. Ubi autem omnimodo fructus de bonis deest, fit aliquando de malis labor supervacuus. Unde saepe agitur in animo perfectorum quod, cum laborem suum sine fructu esse considerant, in loco alio ad laborem cum fructu migrant. Quandoque autem contingit ex parte aliorum, puta cum de praelatione alicuius grave scandalum suscitatur. Nam, ut apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. VIII, si esca scandalizat fratrem meum, non manducabo carnes in aeternum. Dum tamen scandalum non oriatur ex malitia aliquorum volentium fidem aut iustitiam Ecclesiae conculcare. Propter huiusmodi enim scandalum non est cura pastoralis dimittenda, secundum illud Matth. XV, sinite illos, scilicet qui scandalizabantur de veritate doctrinae Christi, caeci sunt duces caecorum. At times, however, it happens in several ways that a bishop is hindered from procuring the spiritual welfare of his subjects. Sometimes on account of his own defect, either of conscience (for instance if he be guilty of murder or simony), or of body (for example if he be old or infirm), or of irregularity arising, for instance, from bigamy. Sometimes he is hindered through some defect in his subjects, whom he is unable to profit. Hence Gregory says (Dial. ii, 3): "The wicked must be borne patiently, when there are some good who can be succored, but when there is no profit at all for the good, it is sometimes useless to labor for the wicked. Wherefore the perfect when they find that they labor in vain are often minded to go elsewhere in order to labor with fruit." Sometimes again this hindrance arises on the part of others, as when scandal results from a certain person being in authority: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 8:13): "If meat scandalize my brother, I will never eat flesh": provided, however, the scandal is not caused by the wickedness of persons desirous of subverting the faith or the righteousness of the Church; because the pastoral cure is not to be laid aside on account of scandal of this kind, according to Mt. 15:14, "Let them alone," those namely who were scandalized at the truth of Christ's teaching, "they are blind, and leaders of the blind."
Oportet tamen quod, sicut curam regiminis assumit aliquis per providentiam superioris praelati, ita etiam per eius auctoritatem, ex causis praedictis, deserat susceptam. Unde extra, de Renunt., dicit Innocentius III, si pennas habeas quibus satagas in solitudinem avolare, ita tamen adstrictae sunt nexibus praeceptorum ut liberum non habeas, absque nostra permissione, volatum. Soli enim Papae licet dispensare in voto perpetuo, quo quis se ad curam subditorum adstrinxit episcopatum suscipiens. Nevertheless just as a man takes upon himself the charge of authority at the appointment of a higher superior, so too it behooves him to be subject to the latter's authority in laying aside the accepted charge for the reasons given above. Hence Innocent III says (Extra, de Renunt., cap. Nisi cum pridem): "Though thou hast wings wherewith thou art anxious to fly away into solitude, they are so tied by the bonds of authority, that thou art not free to fly without our permission." For the Pope alone can dispense from the perpetual vow, by which a man binds himself to the care of his subjects, when he took upon himself the episcopal office.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod perfectio religiosorum et episcoporum secundum diversa attenditur. Nam ad perfectionem religionis pertinet studium quod quis adhibet ad propriam salutem. Ad perfectionem autem episcopalis status pertinet adhibere studium ad proximorum salutem. Et ideo, quandiu potest esse aliquis utilis proximorum saluti, retrocederet si ad statum religionis vellet transire, ut solum suae saluti insisteret, qui se obligavit ad hoc quod non solum suam salutem, sed etiam aliorum procuraret. Unde Innocentius III dicit, in decretali praedicta, quod facilius indulgetur ut monachus ad praesulatum ascendat, quam praesul ad monachatum descendat, sed si salutem aliorum procurare non possit, conveniens est ut suae saluti intendat. Reply to Objection 1: The perfection of religious and that of bishops are regarded from different standpoints. For it belongs to the perfection of a religious to occupy oneself in working out one's own salvation, whereas it belongs to the perfection of a bishop to occupy oneself in working for the salvation of others. Hence so long as a man can be useful to the salvation of his neighbor, he would be going back, if he wished to pass to the religious state, to busy himself only with his own salvation, since he has bound himself to work not only for his own but also for others' salvation. Wherefore Innocent III says in the Decretal quoted above that "it is more easily allowable for a monk to ascend to the episcopacy, than for a bishop to descend to the monastic life. If, however, he be unable to procure the salvation of others it is meet he should seek his own."
Ad secundum dicendum quod propter nullum impedimentum debet homo praetermittere studium suae salutis, quod pertinet ad religionis statum. Potest autem esse aliquod impedimentum procurandae salutis alienae. Et ideo monachus potest ad statum episcopatus assumi, in quo etiam suae salutis curam agere potest. Potest etiam episcopus, si impedimentum alienae salutis procurandae interveniat, ad religionem transire. Et impedimento cessante, potest iterato ad episcopatum assumi, puta per correctionem subditorum, vel per sedationem scandali, vel per curationem infirmitatis, aut depulsa ignorantia per instructionem sufficientem. Vel etiam, si simoniace sit promotus eo ignorante, si se ad regularem vitam, episcopatu dimisso, transtulerit, poterit iterato ad alium episcopatum promoveri. Si vero aliquis propter culpam sit ab episcopatu depositus, et in monasterium detrusus ad poenitentiam peragendam, non potest iterato ad episcopatum revocari. Unde dicitur VII, qu. I, praecipit sancta synodus ut quicumque de pontificali dignitate ad monachorum vitam et poenitentiae descenderit locum, nequaquam ad pontificatum resurgat. Reply to Objection 2: On account of no obstacle should a man forego the work of his own salvation, which pertains to the religious state. But there may be an obstacle to the procuring of another's salvation; wherefore a monk may be raised to the episcopal state wherein he is able also to work out his own salvation. And a bishop, if he be hindered from procuring the salvation of others, may enter the religious life, and may return to his bishopric should the obstacle cease, for instance by the correction of his subjects, cessation of the scandal, healing of his infirmity, removal of his ignorance by sufficient instruction. Again, if he owed his promotion to simony of which he was in ignorance, and resigning his episcopate entered the religious life, he can be reappointed to another bishopric [*Cap. Post translat., de Renunt.]. On the other hand, if a man be deposed from the episcopal office for some sin, and confined in a monastery that he may do penance, he cannot be reappointed to a bishopric. Hence it is stated (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): "The holy synod orders that any man who has been degraded from the episcopal dignity to the monastic life and a place of repentance, should by no means rise again to the episcopate."
Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam in rebus naturalibus, propter impedimentum superveniens potentia remanet absque actu, sicut propter infirmitatem oculi cessat actus visionis. Et ita etiam non est inconveniens si, propter exterius impedimentum superveniens, potestas episcopalis remaneat absque actu. Reply to Objection 3: Even in natural things power remains inactive on account of a supervening obstacle, for instance the act of sight ceases through an affliction of the eye. So neither is it unreasonable if, through the occurrence of some obstacle from without, the episcopal power remain without the exercise of its act.

Index [<<� | >>]
Second Part of the Second Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 185 [ << | >> ]
Article: 5  [ << | >> ]

Whether it is lawful for a bishop on account of bodily persecution to abandon the flock committed to his care?

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non liceat episcopo, propter aliquam persecutionem, corporaliter deserere gregem sibi commissum. Dicit enim dominus, Ioan. X, quod ille est mercenarius, et non vere pastor, qui videt lupum venientem, et dimittit oves et fugit. Dicit autem Gregorius, in homilia, quod lupus super oves venit, cum quilibet iniustus et raptor fideles quosque atque humiles opprimit. Si ergo propter persecutionem alicuius tyranni, episcopus gregem sibi commissum corporaliter deserat, videtur quod sit mercenarius, et non pastor. Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful for a bishop, on account of some temporal persecution, to withdraw his bodily presence from the flock committed to his care. For our Lord said (Jn. 10:12) that he is a hireling and no true shepherd, who "seeth the wolf coming, and leaveth the sheep and flieth": and Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ev.) that "the wolf comes upon the sheep when any man by his injustice and robbery oppresses the faithful and the humble." Therefore if, on account of the persecution of a tyrant, a bishop withdraws his bodily presence from the flock entrusted to his care, it would seem that he is a hireling and not a shepherd.
Praeterea, Prov. VI dicitur, fili, si sponderis pro amico tuo, defixisti apud extraneum manum tuam, et postea subdit, discurre, festina, suscita amicum tuum. Quod exponens Gregorius, in Pastoral., dicit, spondere pro amico est animam alienam in periculo suae conversationis accipere. Quisquis autem ad vivendum aliis in exemplum praeponitur, non solum ut ipse vigilet, sed etiam ut amicum suscitet, admonetur. Sed hoc non potest facere si corporaliter deserat gregem. Ergo videtur quod episcopus non debeat, causa persecutionis, corporaliter suum gregem deserere. Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 6:1): "My son, if thou be surety for thy friend, thou hast engaged fast thy hand to a stranger," and afterwards (Prov. 6:3): "Run about, make haste, stir up thy friend." Gregory expounds these words and says (Pastor. iii, 4): "To be surety for a friend, is to vouch for his good conduct by engaging oneself to a stranger. And whoever is put forward as an example to the lives of others, is warned not only to watch but even to rouse his friend." Now he cannot do this if he withdraw his bodily presence from his flock. Therefore it would seem that a bishop should not on account of persecution withdraw his bodily presence from his flock.
Praeterea, ad perfectionem episcopalis status pertinet quod proximis curam impendat. Sed non licet ei qui est statum perfectionis professus, ut omnino deserat ea quae sunt perfectionis. Ergo videtur quod non licet episcopo se corporaliter subtrahere ab executione sui officii, nisi forte ut operibus perfectionis in monasterio vacet. Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the perfection of the bishop's state that he devote himself to the care of his neighbor. Now it is unlawful for one who has professed the state of perfection to forsake altogether the things that pertain to perfection. Therefore it would seem unlawful for a bishop to withdraw his bodily presence from the execution of his office, except perhaps for the purpose of devoting himself to works of perfection in a monastery.
Sed contra est quod dominus apostolis, quorum successores sunt episcopi, mandavit, Matth. X, si vos persecuti fuerint in una civitate, fugite in aliam. On the contrary, our Lord commanded the apostles, whose successors bishops are (Mt. 10:23): "When they shall persecute you in this city, flee into another."
Respondeo dicendum quod in qualibet obligatione praecipue attendi debet obligationis finis. Obligant autem se episcopi ad exequendum pastorale officium propter subditorum salutem. Et ideo, ubi subditorum salus exigit personae pastoris praesentiam, non debet pastor personaliter suum gregem deserere, neque propter aliquod commodum temporale, neque etiam propter aliquod personale periculum imminens, cum bonus pastor animam suam ponere teneatur pro ovibus suis. I answer that, In any obligation the chief thing to be considered is the end of the obligation. Now bishops bind themselves to fulfil the pastoral office for the sake of the salvation of their subjects. Consequently when the salvation of his subjects demands the personal presence of the pastor, the pastor should not withdraw his personal presence from his flock, neither for the sake of some temporal advantage, nor even on account of some impending danger to his person, since the good shepherd is bound to lay down his life for his sheep.
Si vero subditorum saluti possit sufficienter in absentia pastoris per alium provideri, tunc licet pastori, vel propter aliquod Ecclesiae commodum, vel propter personae periculum, corporaliter gregem deserere. Unde Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Honoratum, fugiant de civitate in civitatem servi Christi, quando eorum quisque specialiter a persecutoribus quaeritur, ut ab aliis, qui non ita quaeruntur, non deseratur Ecclesia. Cum autem omnium est commune periculum, hi qui aliis indigent, non deserantur ab his quibus indigent. Si enim perniciosum est nautam in tranquillitate navem deserere, quanto magis in fluctibus, ut dicit Nicolaus Papa, et habetur VII, qu. I. On the other hand, if the salvation of his subjects can be sufficiently provided for by another person in the absence of the pastor, it is lawful for the pastor to withdraw his bodily presence from his flock, either for the sake of some advantage to the Church, or on account of some danger to his person. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ccxxviii ad Honorat.): "Christ's servants may flee from one city to another, when one of them is specially sought out by persecutors: in order that the Church be not abandoned by others who are not so sought for. When, however, the same danger threatens all, those who stand in need of others must not be abandoned by those whom they need." For "if it is dangerous for the helmsman to leave the ship when the sea is calm, how much more so when it is stormy," as Pope Nicholas I says (cf. VII, qu. i, can. Sciscitaris).
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ille tanquam mercenarius fugit qui commodum temporale, vel etiam salutem corporalem, spirituali saluti proximorum praeponit. Unde Gregorius dicit, in homilia, stare in periculo ovium non potest qui in eo quod ovibus praeest, non oves diligit, sed lucrum terrenum quaerit, et ideo opponere se contra periculum trepidat, ne hoc quod diligit amittat. Ille autem qui ad evitandum periculum recedit absque detrimento gregis, non tanquam mercenarius fugit. Reply to Objection 1: To flee as a hireling is to prefer temporal advantage or one's bodily welfare to the spiritual welfare of one's neighbor. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ev.): "A man cannot endanger himself for the sake of his sheep, if he uses his authority over them not through love of them but for the sake of earthly gain: wherefore he fears to stand in the way of danger lest he lose what he loves." But he who, in order to avoid danger, leaves the flock without endangering the flock, does not flee as a hireling.
Ad secundum dicendum quod ille qui spondet pro aliquo, si per se implere non possit, sufficit ut per alium impleat. Unde praelatus, si habet impedimentum propter quod non possit personaliter curae subditorum intendere, suae sponsioni satisfacit si per alium provideat. Reply to Objection 2: If he who is surety for another be unable to fulfil his engagement, it suffices that he fulfil it through another. Hence if a superior is hindered from attending personally to the care of his subjects, he fulfils his obligation if he do so through another.
Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui ad episcopatum assumitur, assumit statum perfectionis secundum aliquod perfectionis genus, a quo si impediatur, ad aliud genus perfectionis non tenetur, ut scilicet necesse sit eum ad statum religionis transire. Imminet tamen sibi necessitas ut animum retineat intendendi proximorum saluti si opportunitas adsit et necessitas requirat. Reply to Objection 3: When a man is appointed to a bishopric, he embraces the state of perfection as regards one kind of perfection; and if he be hindered from the practice thereof, he is not bound to another kind of perfection, so as to be obliged to enter the religious state. Yet he is under the obligation of retaining the intention of devoting himself to his neighbor's salvation, should an opportunity offer, and necessity require it of him.

Index [<<� | >>]
Second Part of the Second Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 185 [ << | >> ]
Article: 6  [ << | >> ]

Whether it is lawful for a bishop to have property of his own?

Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod episcopo non liceat aliquid proprium possidere. Dominus enim dicit, Matth. XIX, si vis perfectus esse, vade et vende omnia quae habes et da pauperibus, et veni, sequere me, ex quo videtur quod voluntaria paupertas ad perfectionem requiratur. Sed episcopi assumuntur ad statum perfectionis. Ergo videtur quod non liceat eis proprium possidere. Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful for a bishop to have property of his own. For our Lord said (Mt. 19:21): "If thou wilt be perfect, go sell all [Vulg.: 'what] thou hast, and give to the poor... and come, follow Me"; whence it would seem to follow that voluntary poverty is requisite for perfection. Now bishops are in the state of perfection. Therefore it would seem unlawful for them to possess anything as their own.
Praeterea, episcopi in Ecclesia tenent locum apostolorum, ut dicit Glossa, Luc. X. Sed apostolis dominus praecepit ut nihil proprium possiderent, secundum illud Matth. X, nolite possidere aurum neque argentum, neque pecuniam in zonis vestris. Unde et Petrus, pro se et pro aliis apostolis, dicit, ecce, nos reliquimus omnia et secuti sumus te, Matth. XIX. Ergo videtur quod episcopi teneantur ad huius mandati observantiam, ut nihil proprium possideant. Objection 2: Further, bishops take the place of the apostles in the Church, according to a gloss on Lk. 10:1. Now our Lord commanded the apostles to possess nothing of their own, according to Mt. 10:9, "Do not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses"; wherefore Peter said for himself and the other apostles (Mt. 19:27): "Behold we have left all things and have followed Thee." Therefore it would seem that bishops are bound to keep this command, and to possess nothing of their own.
Praeterea, Hieronymus dicit, ad Nepotianum, cleros Graece, Latine sors appellatur. Propterea clerici dicuntur, quia de sorte domini sunt, vel quia ipse dominus sors, idest pars, clericorum est. Qui autem dominum possidet, nihil extra Deum habere potest. Si autem aurum, si argentum, si possessiones, si variam supellectilem habet, cum istis partibus non dignatur dominus fieri pars eius. Ergo videtur quod non solum episcopi, sed etiam clerici debeant proprio carere. Objection 3: Further, Jerome says (Ep. lii ad Nepotian.): "The Greek {kleros} denotes the Latin 'sors.' Hence clerics are so called either because they are of the Lord's estate, or because the Lord Himself is the estate, i.e. portion of clerics. Now he that possesses the Lord, can have nothing besides God; and if he have gold and silver, possessions, and chattels of all kinds, with such a portion the Lord does not vouchsafe to be his portion also." Therefore it would seem that not only bishops but even clerics should have nothing of their own.
Sed contra est quod dicitur XII, qu. I, episcopus de rebus propriis vel acquisitis, vel quidquid de proprio habet, heredibus suis derelinquat. On the contrary, It is stated (XII, qu. i, can. Episcopi de rebus): "Bishops, if they wish, may bequeath to their heirs their personal or acquired property, and whatever belongs to them personally."
Respondeo dicendum quod ad ea quae sunt supererogationis nullus tenetur, nisi se specialiter ad illud voto adstringat. Unde Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Paulinam et Armentarium, quia iam vovisti, iam te obstrinxisti, aliud tibi facere non licet. Priusquam esses voti reus, liberum fuit quod esses inferior. Manifestum est autem quod vivere absque proprio supererogationis est, non enim cadit sub praecepto, sed sub consilio. Unde cum, Matth. XIX, dixisset dominus adolescenti, si vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata, postea superaddendo subdidit, si vis perfectus esse, vade et vende omnia quae habes et da pauperibus. Non autem episcopi in sua ordinatione ad hoc se obligant ut absque proprio vivant, nec etiam vivere absque proprio ex necessitate requiritur ad pastorale officium, ad quod se obligant. Et ideo non tenentur episcopi ad hoc quod sine proprio vivant. I answer that, No one is bound to works of supererogation, unless he binds himself specially thereto by vow. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii ad Paulin. et Arment.): "Since you have taken the vow, you have already bound yourself, you can no longer do otherwise. Before you were bound by the vow, you were free to submit." Now it is evident that to live without possessing anything is a work of supererogation, for it is a matter not of precept but of counsel. Wherefore our Lord after saying to the young man: "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments," said afterwards by way of addition: "If thou wilt be perfect go sell" all "that thou hast, and give to the poor" (Mt. 19:17,21). Bishops, however, do not bind themselves at their ordination to live without possessions of their own; nor indeed does the pastoral office, to which they bind themselves, make it necessary for them to live without anything of their own. Therefore bishops are not bound to live without possessions of their own.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra habitum est, perfectio Christianae vitae non consistit essentialiter in voluntaria paupertate, sed voluntaria paupertas instrumentaliter operatur ad perfectionem vitae. Unde non oportet quod ubi est maior paupertas, ibi sit maior perfectio. Quinimmo potest esse summa perfectio cum magna opulentia, nam Abraham, cui dictum est, Gen. XVII, ambula coram me et esto perfectus, legitur dives fuisse. Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Question [184], Article [3], ad 1) the perfection of the Christian life does not essentially consist in voluntary poverty, but voluntary poverty conduces instrumentally to the perfection of life. Hence it does not follow that where there is greater poverty there is greater perfection; indeed the highest perfection is compatible with great wealth, since Abraham, to whom it was said (Gn. 17:1): "Walk before Me and be perfect," is stated to have been rich (Gn. 13:2).
Ad secundum dicendum quod verba illa domini tripliciter possunt intelligi. Uno modo, mystice, ut non possideamus aurum neque argentum, idest, ut praedicatores non innitantur principaliter sapientiae et eloquentiae temporali; ut Hieronymus exponit. Reply to Objection 2: This saying of our Lord can be understood in three ways. First, mystically, that we should possess neither gold nor silver means that the preacher should not rely chiefly on temporal wisdom and eloquence; thus Jerome expounds the passage.
Alio modo, sicut Augustinus exponit, in libro de consensu Evangelist., ut intelligatur hoc dominum non praecipiendo, sed magis permittendo dixisse. Permisit enim eis ut absque auro et argento et aliis sumptibus ad praedicandum irent, accepturi sumptus vitae ab his quibus praedicabant. Unde subdit, dignus est enim operarius cibo suo. Ita tamen quod, si aliquis propriis sumptibus uteretur in praedicatione Evangelii, ad supererogationem pertineret, sicut Paulus de seipso dicit, I ad Cor. IX. Secondly, according to Augustine's explanation (De Consens. Ev. ii, 30), we are to understand that our Lord said this not in command but in permission. For he permitted them to go preaching without gold or silver or other means, since they were to receive the means of livelihood from those to whom they preached; wherefore He added: "For the workman is worthy of his meat." And yet if anyone were to use his own means in preaching the Gospel, this would be a work of supererogation, as Paul says in reference to himself (1 Cor. 9:12,15).
Tertio modo, secundum quod Chrysostomus exponit, ut intelligatur illa dominum discipulis praecepisse quantum ad illam missionem qua mittebantur ad praedicandum Iudaeis, ut per hoc exercerentur ad confidendum de virtute ipsius, qui eis absque sumptibus provideret. Ex quo tamen non obligabantur ipsi, vel successores eorum, ut absque propriis sumptibus Evangelium praedicarent. Nam et de Paulo legitur, II ad Cor. XI, quod ab aliis Ecclesiis stipendium accipiebat ad praedicandum Corinthiis, et sic patet quod aliquid possidebat ab aliis sibi missum. Stultum autem videtur dicere quod tot sancti pontifices, sicut Athanasius, Ambrosius, Augustinus, illa praecepta transgressi fuissent, si ad ea observanda se crederent obligari. Thirdly, according to the exposition of Chrysostom [*Hom. ii in Rom. xvi, 3], we are to understand that our Lord laid these commands on His disciples in reference to the mission on which they were sent to preach to the Jews, so that they might be encouraged to trust in His power, seeing that He provided for their wants without their having means of their own. But it does not follow from this that they, or their successors, were obliged to preach the Gospel without having means of their own: since we read of Paul (2 Cor. 11:8) that he "received wages" of other churches for preaching to the Corinthians, wherefore it is clear that he possessed something sent to him by others. And it seems foolish to say that so many holy bishops as Athanasius, Ambrose, and Augustine would have disobeyed these commandments if they believed themselves bound to observe them.
Ad tertium dicendum quod omnis pars est minor toto. Ille ergo cum Deo alias partes habet, cuius studium diminuitur circa ea quae sunt Dei, dum intendit his quae sunt mundi. Sic autem non debent nec episcopi nec clerici proprium possidere, ut, dum curant propria, defectum faciant in his quae pertinent ad cultum divinum. Reply to Objection 3: Every part is less than the whole. Accordingly a man has other portions together with God, if he becomes less intent on things pertaining to God by occupying himself with things of the world. Now neither bishops nor clerics ought thus to possess means of their own, that while busy with their own they neglect those that concern the worship of God.

Index [<<� | >>]
Second Part of the Second Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 185 [ << | >> ]
Article: 7  [ << | >> ]

Whether bishops sin mortally if they distribute not to the poor the ecclesiastical goods which accrue to them?

Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod episcopi mortaliter peccent si bona ecclesiastica quae procurant, pauperibus non largiantur. Dicit enim Ambrosius, exponens illud Luc. XII, hominis cuiusdam divitis uberes fructus ager attulit, nemo proprium dicat quod est commune, plus quam sufficiat sumptui, violenter obtentum est. Et postea subdit, neque minus est criminis habenti tollere quam, cum possis et abundas, denegare indigentibus. Sed violenter tollere alienum est peccatum mortale. Ergo episcopi mortaliter peccant si ea quae eis supersunt, pauperibus non largiantur. Objection 1: It would seem that bishops sin mortally if they distribute not to the poor the ecclesiastical goods which they acquire. For Ambrose [*Basil, Serm. lxiv, de Temp., among the supposititious works of St. Jerome] expounding Lk. 12:16, "The land of a certain... man brought forth plenty of fruits," says: "Let no man claim as his own that which he has taken and obtained by violence from the common property in excess of his requirements"; and afterwards he adds: "It is not less criminal to take from him who has, than, when you are able and have plenty to refuse him who has not." Now it is a mortal sin to take another's property by violence. Therefore bishops sin mortally if they give not to the poor that which they have in excess.
Praeterea, Isaiae III, super illud, rapina pauperum in domo vestra, dicit Glossa Hieronymi quod bona ecclesiastica sunt pauperum. Sed quicumque id quod est alterius sibi reservat aut aliis dat, peccat mortaliter et tenetur ad restitutionem. Ergo, si episcopi bona ecclesiastica quae eis superfluunt, sibi retineant vel consanguineis vel amicis largiantur, videtur quod teneantur ad restitutionem. Objection 2: Further, a gloss of Jerome on Is. 3:14, "The spoil of the poor is in your house," says that "ecclesiastical goods belong to the poor." Now whoever keeps for himself or gives to others that which belongs to another, sins mortally and is bound to restitution. Therefore if bishops keep for themselves, or give to their relations or friends, their surplus of ecclesiastical goods, it would seem that they are bound to restitution.
Praeterea, multo magis aliquis potest de rebus Ecclesiae ea quae sunt sibi necessaria accipere, quam superflua congregare. Sed Hieronymus dicit, in epistola ad Damasum Papam, clericos illos convenit Ecclesiae stipendiis sustentari quibus parentum et propinquorum nulli suffragantur, qui autem bonis parentum et opibus sustentari possunt, si quod pauperum est accipiunt, sacrilegium incurrunt. Unde et apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. V, si quis fidelis habet viduas, subministret illis, et non gravetur Ecclesia, ut his quae vere viduae sunt sufficiat. Ergo multo magis episcopi mortaliter peccant si ea quae eis superfluunt de bonis ecclesiasticis, pauperibus non largiantur. Objection 3: Further, much more may one take what is necessary for oneself from the goods of the Church, than accumulate a surplus therefrom. Yet Jerome says in a letter to Pope Damasus [*Cf. Can. Clericos, cause. i, qu. 2; Can. Quoniam; cause. xvi, qu. 1; Regul. Monach. iv, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome]: "It is right that those clerics who receive no goods from their parents and relations should be supported from the funds of the Church. But those who have sufficient income from their parents and their own possessions, if they take what belongs to the poor, they commit and incur the guilt of sacrilege." Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:16): "If any of the faithful have widows, let him minister to them, and let not the Church be charged, that there may be sufficient for them that are widows indeed." Much more therefore do bishops sin mortally if they give not to the poor the surplus of their ecclesiastical goods.
Sed contra est quod plures episcopi ea quae supersunt non largiuntur pauperibus, sed expendere videntur laudabiliter ad reditus Ecclesiae ampliandos. On the contrary, Many bishops do not give their surplus to the poor, but would seem commendably to lay it out so as to increase the revenue of the Church.
Respondeo dicendum quod aliter est dicendum de propriis bonis, quae episcopi possidere possunt, et de bonis ecclesiasticis. Nam propriorum bonorum verum dominium habent. Unde ex ipsa rerum conditione non obligantur ut eas aliis conferant, sed possunt vel sibi retinere, vel aliis pro libitu elargiri. Possunt tamen in earum dispensatione peccare, vel propter inordinationem affectus, per quam contingit quod vel sibi plura conferant quam oporteat; vel etiam aliis non subveniant secundum quod requirit debitum caritatis. Non tamen tenetur ad restitutionem, quia huiusmodi res sunt eius dominio deputatae. I answer that, The same is not to be said of their own goods which bishops may possess, and of ecclesiastical goods. For they have real dominion over their own goods; wherefore from the very nature of the case they are not bound to give these things to others, and may either keep them for themselves or bestow them on others at will. Nevertheless they may sin in this disposal by inordinate affection, which leads them either to accumulate more than they should, or not to assist others, in accordance with the demands of charity; yet they are not bound to restitution, because such things are entrusted to their ownership.
Sed ecclesiasticorum bonorum sunt dispensatores vel procuratores, dicit enim Augustinus, ad Bonifacium, si privatum possidemus quod nobis sufficiat, non illa nostra sunt, sed illorum quorum procurationem gerimus, non proprietatem nobis usurpatione damnabili vindicemus. Ad dispensatorem autem requiritur bona fides, secundum illud I ad Cor. IV, hic iam quaeritur inter dispensatores ut fidelis quis inveniatur. Sunt autem bona ecclesiastica non solum in usus pauperum, sed etiam ad cultum divinum et necessitates ministrorum expendenda. Unde dicitur XII, qu. II, de reditibus Ecclesiae vel oblatione fidelium, sola episcopo ex his una portio emittatur; duae ecclesiasticis fabricis et erogationi pauperum profuturae a presbytero, sub periculo sui ordinis, ministrentur; ultima clericis, pro singulorum meritis, dividatur. Si ergo distincta sint bona quae debent in usum episcopi cedere, ab his quae sunt pauperibus et ministris et cultui Ecclesiae eroganda; et aliquid sibi retinuerit episcopus de his quae sunt pauperibus eroganda, vel in usum ministrorum aut in cultum divinum expendenda, non est dubium quod contra fidem dispensationis agit, et mortaliter peccat, et ad restitutionem tenetur. On the other hand, they hold ecclesiastical goods as dispensers or trustees. For Augustine says (Ep. clxxxv ad Bonif.): "If we possess privately what is enough for us, other things belong not to us but to the poor, and we have the dispensing of them; but we can claim ownership of them only by wicked theft." Now dispensing requires good faith, according to 1 Cor. 4:2, "Here now it is required among the dispensers that a man be found faithful." Moreover ecclesiastical goods are to be applied not only to the good of the poor, but also to the divine worship and the needs of its ministers. Hence it is said (XII, qu. ii, can. de reditibus): "Of the Church's revenues or the offerings of the faithful only one part is to be assigned to the bishop, two parts are to be used by the priest, under pain of suspension, for the ecclesiastical fabric, and for the benefit of the poor; the remaining part is to be divided among the clergy according to their respective merits." Accordingly if the goods which are assigned to the use of the bishop are distinct from those which are appointed for the use of the poor, or the ministers, or for the ecclesiastical worship, and if the bishop keeps back for himself part of that which should be given to the poor, or to the ministers for their use, or expended on the divine worship, without doubt he is an unfaithful dispenser, sins mortally, and is bound to restitution.
De his autem quae sunt specialiter suo usui deputata, videtur esse eadem ratio quae est de propriis bonis, ut scilicet propter immoderatum affectum et usum peccet quidem, si immoderata sibi retineat, et aliis non subveniat sicut requirit debitum caritatis. But as regards those goods which are deputed to his private use, the same apparently applies as to his own property, namely that he sins through immoderate attachment thereto or use thereof, if he exceeds moderation in what he keeps for himself, and fails to assist others according to the demands of charity.
Si vero non sint praedicta bona distincta, eorum distributio fidei eius committitur. Et si quidem in modico deficiat vel superabundet, potest hoc fieri absque bonae fidei detrimento, quia non potest homo in talibus punctaliter accipere illud quod fieri oportet. Si vero sit multus excessus, non potest latere, unde videtur bonae fidei repugnare. Et ideo non est absque peccato mortali, dicitur enim Matth. XXIV, quod, si dixerit malus servus in corde suo, moram facit dominus meus venire, quod pertinet ad divini iudicii contemptum; et coeperit percutere conservos suos, quod pertinet ad superbiam; manducet autem et bibat cum ebriosis, quod pertinet ad luxuriam, veniet dominus servi illius in die qua non sperat, et dividet eum, scilicet a societate bonorum, et partem eius ponet cum hypocritis, scilicet in Inferno. On the other hand, if no distinction is made in the aforesaid goods, their distribution is entrusted to his good faith; and if he fail or exceed in a slight degree, this may happen without prejudice to his good faith, because in such matters a man cannot possibly decide precisely what ought to be done. On the other hand, if the excess be very great he cannot be ignorant of the fact; consequently he would seem to be lacking in good faith, and is guilty of mortal sin. For it is written (Mt. 24:48-51) that "if that evil servant shall say in his heart: My lord is long a-coming," which shows contempt of God's judgment, "and shall begin to strike his fellow-servants," which is a sign of pride, "and shall eat and drink with drunkards," which proceeds from lust, "the lord of that servant shall come in a day that he hopeth not... and shall separate him," namely from the fellowship of good men, "and appoint his portion with hypocrites," namely in hell.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum illud Ambrosii non solum est referendum ad dispensationem ecclesiasticarum rerum, sed quorumcumque bonorum ex quibus tenetur aliquis, debito caritatis, providere necessitatem patientibus. Non tamen potest determinari quando sit ista necessitas quae ad peccatum mortale obliget, sicut nec cetera particularia quae in humanis actibus considerantur. Horum enim determinatio relinquitur humanae prudentiae. Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Ambrose refers to the administration not only of ecclesiastical things but also of any goods whatever from which a man is bound, as a duty of charity, to provide for those who are in need. But it is not possible to state definitely when this need is such as to impose an obligation under pain of mortal sin, as is the case in other points of detail that have to be considered in human acts: for the decision in such matters is left to human prudence.
Ad secundum dicendum quod bona Ecclesiarum non sunt solum expendenda in usus pauperum, sed etiam in alios usus, ut dictum est. Et ideo si de eo quod usui episcopi vel alicuius clerici est deputatum, velit aliquis sibi subtrahere et consanguineis vel aliis dare, non peccat, dummodo id faciat moderate, idest, ut non indigeant, non autem ut ditiores inde fiant. Unde Ambrosius dicit, in libro de Offic., est approbanda liberalitas, ut proximos seminis tui ne despicias, si egere cognoscas, non tamen ut illi ditiores fieri velint ex eo quod tu potes conferre inopibus. Reply to Objection 2: As stated above the goods of the Church have to be employed not only for the use of the poor, but also for other purposes. Hence if a bishop or cleric wish to deprive himself of that which is assigned to his own use, and give it to his relations or others, he sins not so long as he observes moderation, so, to wit, that they cease to be in want without becoming the richer thereby. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 30): "It is a commendable liberality if you overlook not your kindred when you know them to be in want; yet not so as to wish to make them rich with what you can give to the poor."
Ad tertium dicendum quod non omnia bona Ecclesiarum sunt pauperibus largienda, nisi forte in articulo necessitatis, in quo etiam, pro redemptione captivorum et aliis necessitatibus pauperum, vasa cultui divino dicata distrahuntur, ut Ambrosius dicit. Et in tali necessitate peccaret clericus si vellet de rebus Ecclesiae vivere, dummodo haberet patrimonialia bona, de quibus vivere possit. Reply to Objection 3: The goods of churches should not all be given to the poor, except in a case of necessity: for then, as Ambrose says (De Offic. ii, 28), even the vessels consecrated to the divine worship are to be sold for the ransom of prisoners, and other needs of the poor. In such a case of necessity a cleric would sin if he chose to maintain himself on the goods of the Church, always supposing him to have a patrimony of his own on which to support himself.
Ad quartum dicendum quod bona Ecclesiarum usibus pauperum deservire debent. Et ideo si quis, necessitate non imminente providendi pauperibus, de his quae superfluunt ex proventibus Ecclesiae possessiones emat, vel in thesauro reponat in futurum utilitati Ecclesiae et necessitatibus pauperum, laudabiliter facit. Si vero necessitas immineat pauperibus erogandi, superflua cura est et inordinata ut aliquis in futurum conservet, quod dominus prohibet, Matth. VI, dicens, nolite solliciti esse in crastinum. Reply to Objection 4: The goods of the churches should be employed for the good of the poor. Consequently a man is to be commended if, there being no present necessity for helping the poor, he spends the surplus from the Church revenue, in buying property, or lays it by for some future use connected with the Church or the needs of the poor. But if there be a pressing need for helping the poor, to lay by for the future is a superfluous and inordinate saving, and is forbidden by our Lord Who said (Mt. 6:34): "Be... not solicitous for the morrow."

Index [<<� | >>]
Second Part of the Second Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 185 [ << | >> ]
Article: 8  [ << | >> ]

Whether religious who are raised to the episcopate are bound to religious observances?

Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod religiosi qui promoventur in episcopos, non teneantur ad observantias regulares. Dicitur enim XVIII, qu. I, quod monachum canonica electio a iugo regulae monasticae professionis absolvit, et sacra ordinatio de monacho episcopum facit. Sed observantiae regulares pertinent ad iugum regulae. Ergo religiosi qui in episcopum assumuntur, non tenentur ad observantias regulares. Objection 1: It would seem that religious who are raised to the episcopate are not bound to religious observances. For it is said (XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that a "canonical election loosens a monk from the yoke imposed by the rule of the monastic profession, and the holy ordination makes of a monk a bishop." Now the regular observances pertain to the yoke of the rule. Therefore religious who are appointed bishops are not bound to religious observances.
Praeterea, ille qui ab inferiori ad superiorem gradum ascendit, non videtur teneri ad ea quae sunt inferioris gradus, sicut supra dictum est quod religiosus non tenetur ad observanda vota quae in saeculo fecit. Sed religiosus qui assumitur ad episcopatum, ascendit ad aliquid maius, ut supra habitum est. Ergo videtur quod non obligetur episcopus ad ea quae tenebatur observare in statu religionis. Objection 2: Further, he who ascends from a lower to a higher degree is seemingly not bound to those things which pertain to the lower degree: thus it was stated above (Question [88], Article [12], ad 1) that a religious is not bound to keep the vows he made in the world. But a religious who is appointed to the episcopate ascends to something greater, as stated above (Question [84], Article [7]). Therefore it would seem that a bishop is not bound to those things whereto he was bound in the state of religion.
Praeterea, maxime religiosi obligari videntur ad obedientiam, et ad hoc quod sine proprio vivant. Sed religiosi qui assumuntur ad episcopatum, non tenentur obedire praelatis suarum religionum, quia sunt eis superiores. Nec etiam videntur teneri ad paupertatem, quia, sicut in decreto supra inducto dicitur, quem sacra ordinatio de monacho episcopum facit, velut legitimus heres, paternam sibi hereditatem iure vindicandi potestatem habeat. Interdum etiam conceditur eis testamenta conficere. Ergo multo minus tenentur ad alias observantias regulares. Objection 3: Further, religious would seem to be bound above all to obedience, and to live without property of their own. But religious who are appointed bishops, are not bound to obey the superiors of their order, since they are above them; nor apparently are they bound to poverty, since according to the decree quoted above (Objection [1]) "when the holy ordination has made of a monk a bishop he enjoys the right, as the lawful heir, of claiming his paternal inheritance." Moreover they are sometimes allowed to make a will. Much less therefore are they bound to other regular observances.
Sed contra est quod dicitur in decretis, XVI, qu. I, de monachis qui diu morantes in monasteriis, si postea ad clericatus ordines pervenerint, statuimus non debere eos a priori proposito discedere. On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (XVI, qu. i, can. De Monachis): "With regard to those who after long residence in a monastery attain to the order of clerics, we bid them not to lay aside their former purpose."
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, status religionis ad perfectionem pertinet quasi quaedam via in perfectionem tendendi, status autem episcopalis ad perfectionem pertinet tanquam quoddam perfectionis magisterium. Unde status religionis comparatur ad statum episcopalem sicut disciplina ad magisterium, et dispositio ad perfectionem. Dispositio autem non tollitur, perfectione adveniente, nisi forte quantum ad id in quo perfectioni repugnat; quantum autem ad id quod perfectioni congruit, magis confirmatur. Sicut discipulo, cum ad magisterium pervenerit, non congruit quod sit auditor, congruit tamen sibi quod legat et meditetur, etiam magis quam ante. Sic igitur dicendum est quod, si qua sunt in regularibus observantiis quae non impediant pontificale officium, sed magis valeant ad perfectionis custodiam, sicut est continentia, paupertas et alia huiusmodi, ad haec remanet religiosus, etiam factus episcopus, obligatus; et per consequens, ad portandum habitum suae religionis, qui est huius obligationis signum. I answer that, As stated above (Article [1], ad 2) the religious state pertains to perfection, as a way of tending to perfection, while the episcopal state pertains to perfection, as a professorship of perfection. Hence the religious state is compared to the episcopal state, as the school to the professorial chair, and as disposition to perfection. Now the disposition is not voided at the advent of perfection, except as regards what perchance is incompatible with perfection, whereas as to that wherein it is in accord with perfection, it is confirmed the more. Thus when the scholar has become a professor it no longer becomes him to be a listener, but it becomes him to read and meditate even more than before. Accordingly we must assert that if there be among religious observances any that instead of being an obstacle to the episcopal office, are a safeguard of perfection, such as continence, poverty, and so forth, a religious, even after he has been made a bishop, remains bound to observe these, and consequently to wear the habit of his order, which is a sign of this obligation.
Si qua vero sunt in observantiis regularibus quae officio pontificali repugnent, sicut est solitudo, silentium, et aliquae abstinentiae vel vigiliae graves, ex quibus impotens corpore redderetur ad exequendum pontificale officium, ad huiusmodi observanda non tenetur. In aliis tamen potest dispensatione uti, secundum quod requirit necessitas personae vel officii, vel conditio hominum cum quibus vivit, per modum quo etiam praelati religionum in talibus secum dispensant. On the other hand, a man is not bound to keep such religious observances as may be incompatible with the episcopal office, for instance solitude, silence, and certain severe abstinences or watchings and such as would render him bodily unable to exercise the episcopal office. For the rest he may dispense himself from them, according to the needs of his person or office, and the manner of life of those among whom he dwells, in the same way as religious superiors dispense themselves in such matters.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ille qui fit de monacho episcopus, absolvitur a iugo monasticae professionis, non quantum ad omnia, sed quantum ad illa quae officio pontificali repugnant, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 1: He who from being a monk becomes a bishop is loosened from the yoke of the monastic profession, not in everything, but in those that are incompatible with the episcopal office, as stated above.
Ad secundum dicendum quod vota saecularis vitae se habent ad vota religionis sicut particulare ad universale, ut supra habitum est. Sed vota religionis se habent ad pontificalem dignitatem sicut dispositio ad perfectionem. Particulare autem superfluit, habito universali, sed dispositio adhuc necessaria est, perfectione obtenta. Reply to Objection 2: The vows of those who are living in the world are compared to the vows of religion as the particular to the universal, as stated above (Question [88], Article [12], ad 1). But the vows of religion are compared to the episcopal dignity as disposition to perfection. Now the particular is superfluous when one has the universal, whereas the disposition is still necessary when perfection has been attained.
Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc est per accidens quod episcopi religiosi obedire praelatis suarum religionum non tenentur, quia sibi subditi esse desierunt, sicut et ipsi praelati religionum. Manet tamen adhuc obligatio voti virtualiter, ita scilicet quod, si eis legitime aliquis praeficeretur, obedire tenerentur, inquantum tenentur obedire statutis regulae per modum praedictum, et suis superioribus, si quos habent. Reply to Objection 3: It is accidental that religious who are bishops are not bound to obey the superiors of their order, because, to wit, they have ceased to be their subjects; even as those same religious superiors. Nevertheless the obligation of the vow remains virtually, so that if any person be lawfully set above them, they would be bound to obey them, inasmuch as they are bound to obey both the statutes of their rule in the way mentioned above, and their superiors if they have any.
Proprium autem nullo modo habere possunt. Non enim hereditatem paternam vindicant quasi propriam, sed quasi Ecclesiae debitam. Unde ibidem subditur quod, postquam episcopus ordinatur, ad altare ad quod sanctificatur, quod acquirere potuit restituat. As to property they can nowise have it. For they claim their paternal inheritance not as their own, but as due to the Church. Hence it is added (XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that after he has been ordained bishop at the altar to which he is consecrated and appointed according to the holy canons, he must restore whatever he may acquire.
Testamentum autem nullo modo facere potest, quia sola dispensatio ei committitur rerum ecclesiasticarum, quae morte finitur, ex qua incipit testamentum valere, ut apostolus dicit, ad Heb. IX. Si tamen ex concessione Papae testamentum faciat, non intelligitur ex proprio facere testamentum, sed apostolica auctoritate intelligitur esse ampliata potestas suae dispensationis, ut eius dispensatio possit valere post mortem. Nor can he make any testament at all, because he is entrusted with the sole administration of things ecclesiastical, and this ends with his death, after which a testament comes into force according to the Apostle (Heb. 9:17). If, however, by the Pope's permission he make a will, he is not to be understood to bequeath property of his own, but we are to understand that by apostolic authority the power of his administration has been prolonged so as to remain in force after his death.

This document converted to HTML on Fri Jan 02 19:10:36 1998.