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| Deinde considerandum est de unitate quantum ad voluntatem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. | We must now consider unity as regards the will; and under this head there are six points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum in Christo sit alia voluntas divina, et alia humana. | (1) Whether the Divine will and the human are distinct in Christ? |
| Secundo, utrum in humana natura Christi sit alia voluntas sensualitatis, et alia rationis. |
(2) Whether in Christ's human nature the will of sensuality is distinct from the will of reason? |
| Tertio, utrum in Christo fuerint ex parte rationis plures voluntates. | (3) Whether as regards the reason there were several wills in Christ? |
| Quarto, utrum in Christo fuerit liberum arbitrium. | (4) Whether there was free-will in Christ? |
| Quinto, utrum humana voluntas Christi fuerit omnino conformis divinae voluntati in volito. |
(5) Whether Christ's human will was always conformed to the Divine will in the thing willed? |
| Sexto, utrum in Christo fuerit aliqua contrarietas voluntatum. | (6) Whether there was any contrariety of wills in Christ? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non sint duae voluntates, una divina et alia humana. Voluntas enim est primum movens et imperans in unoquoque volente. Sed in Christo primum movens et imperans fuit voluntas divina, quia omnia humana in Christo movebantur secundum voluntatem divinam. Ergo videtur quod in Christo non fuerit nisi una voluntas, scilicet divina. | Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there are not two wills, one Divine, the other human. For the will is the first mover and first commander in whoever wills. But in Christ the first mover and commander was the Divine will, since in Christ everything human was moved by the Divine will. Hence it seems that in Christ there was only one will, viz. the Divine. |
| Praeterea, instrumentum non movetur propria voluntate, sed voluntate moventis. Sed natura humana in Christo fuit instrumentum divinitatis eius. Ergo natura humana in Christo non movebatur propria voluntate, sed divina. | Objection 2: Further, an instrument is not moved by its own will but by the will of its mover. Now the human nature of Christ was the instrument of His Godhead. Hence the human nature of Christ was not moved by its own will, but by the Divine will. |
| Praeterea, illud solum multiplicatur in Christo quod pertinet ad naturam. Voluntas autem non videtur ad naturam pertinere, quia ea quae sunt naturalia, sunt ex necessitate; quod autem est voluntarium, non est necessarium. Ergo voluntas est una tantum in Christo. | Objection 3: Further, that alone is multiplied in Christ which belongs to the nature. But the will does not seem to pertain to nature: for natural things are of necessity; whereas what is voluntary is not of necessity. Therefore there is but one will in Christ. |
| Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod aliqualiter velle non est naturae, sed nostrae intelligentiae scilicet personalis. Sed omnis voluntas est aliqualis voluntas, quia non est in genere quod non est in aliqua eius specie. Ergo omnis voluntas ad personam pertinet. Sed in Christo fuit tantum et est una persona. Ergo in Christo est tantum una voluntas. | Objection 4: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) that "to will in this or that way belongs not to our nature but to our intellect," i.e. our personal intellect. But every will is this or that will, since there is nothing in a genus which is not at the same time in some one of its species. Therefore all will belongs to the person. But in Christ there was and is but one person. Therefore in Christ there is only one will. |
| Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Luc. XXII, pater, si vis, transfer calicem istum a me. Veruntamen non mea voluntas, sed tua fiat. Quod inducens Ambrosius, in libro ad Gratianum imperatorem, dicit, sicut susceperat voluntatem meam, suscepit tristitiam meam. Et, super Lucam, dicit, voluntatem suam ad hominem retulit, patris, ad divinitatem. Voluntas enim hominis est temporalis, voluntas divinitatis aeterna. |
On the contrary, our Lord says (Lk. 22:42): "Father, if Thou wilt, remove this chalice from Me. But yet not My will but Thine be done." And Ambrose, quoting this to the Emperor Gratian (De Fide ii, 7) says: "As He assumed my will, He assumed my sorrow;" and on Lk. 22:42 he says: "His will, He refers to the Man---the Father's, to the Godhead. For the will of man is temporal, and the will of the Godhead eternal." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt in Christo esse unam solam voluntatem, sed ad hoc ponendum diversimode moti esse videntur. Apollinaris enim non posuit animam intellectualem in Christo, sed quod verbum esset loco animae, vel etiam loco intellectus. Unde, cum voluntas sit in ratione, ut philosophus dicit, in III de anima, sequebatur quod in Christo non esset voluntas humana, et ita in eo non esset nisi una voluntas. Et similiter Eutyches, et omnes qui posuerunt unam naturam compositam in Christo, cogebantur ponere unam voluntatem in eo. Nestorius etiam, qui posuit unionem Dei et hominis esse factam solum secundum affectum et voluntatem, posuit unam voluntatem in Christo. Postmodum vero Macarius Antiochenus patriarcha, et Cyrus Alexandrinus, et Sergius Constantinopolitanus, et quidam eorum sequaces, posuerunt in Christo unam voluntatem, quamvis ponerent duas naturas in Christo secundum hypostasim unitas, quia opinabantur quod humana natura in Christo nunquam movebatur proprio motu, sed solum secundum quod erat mota a divinitate, ut patet in epistola synodica Agathonis Papae. | I answer that, Some placed only one will in Christ; but they seem to have had different motives for holding this. For Apollinaris did not hold an intellectual soul in Christ, but maintained that the Word was in place of the soul, or even in place of the intellect. Hence since "the will is in the reason," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 9), it followed that in Christ there was no human will; and thus there was only one will in Him. So, too, Eutyches and all who held one composite nature in Christ were forced to place one will in Him. Nestorius, too, who maintained that the union of God and man was one of affection and will, held only one will in Christ. But later on, Macarius, Patriarch of Antioch, Cyrus of Alexandria, and Sergius of Constantinople and some of their followers, held that there is one will in Christ, although they held that in Christ there are two natures united in a hypostasis; because they believed that Christ's human nature never moved with its own motion, but only inasmuch as it was moved by the Godhead, as is plain from the synodical letter of Pope Agatho [*Third Council of Constantinople, Act. 4]. |
| Et ideo in sexta synodo, apud Constantinopolim celebrata, determinatum est oportere dici quod in Christo sint duae voluntates, ubi sic legitur, iuxta quod olim prophetae de Christo, et ipse nos erudivit, et sanctorum patrum nobis tradidit symbolum, duas voluntates naturales in eo, et duas naturales operationes praedicamus. Et hoc necessarium fuit dici. Manifestum est enim quod filius Dei assumpsit humanam naturam perfectam, ut supra ostensum est. Ad perfectionem autem humanae naturae pertinet voluntas, quae est naturalis eius potentia, sicut et intellectus, ut patet ex his quae in prima parte dicta sunt. Unde necesse est dicere quod filius Dei humanam voluntatem assumpserit in natura humana. Per assumptionem autem humanae naturae nullam diminutionem passus est filius Dei in his quae pertinent ad divinam naturam, cui competit voluntatem habere, ut in prima parte habitum est. Unde necesse est dicere quod in Christo sint duae voluntates, una scilicet divina et alia humana. |
And hence in the sixth Council held at Constantinople [*Act. 18] it was decreed that it must be said that there are two wills in Christ, in the following passage: "In accordance with what the Prophets of old taught us concerning Christ, and as He taught us Himself, and the Symbol of the Holy Fathers has handed down to us, we confess two natural wills in Him and two natural operations." And this much it was necessary to say. For it is manifest that the Son of God assumed a perfect human nature, as was shown above (Question [5]; Question [9], Article [1]). Now the will pertains to the perfection of human nature, being one of its natural powers, even as the intellect, as was stated in the FP, Questions [79],80. Hence we must say that the Son of God assumed a human will, together with human nature. Now by the assumption of human nature the Son of God suffered no diminution of what pertains to His Divine Nature, to which it belongs to have a will, as was said in the FP, Question [19], Article [1]. Hence it must be said that there are two wills in Christ, i.e. one human, the other Divine. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quidquid fuit in humana natura Christi, movebatur nutu divinae voluntatis, non tamen sequitur quod in Christo non fuerit motus voluntatis proprius naturae humanae. Quia etiam aliorum sanctorum piae voluntates moventur secundum voluntatem Dei, quae operatur in eis et velle et perficere, ut dicitur Philipp. II. Licet enim voluntas non possit interius moveri ab aliqua creatura, interius tamen movetur a Deo, ut in prima parte dictum est. Et sic etiam Christus secundum voluntatem humanam sequebatur voluntatem divinam, secundum illud Psalmi, ut facerem voluntatem tuam, Deus meus, volui. Unde Augustinus dicit, contra Maximinum, ubi dixit filius patri, non quod ego volo, sed quod tu vis, quid te adiuvat quod tua verba subiungis, et dicis, ostendit vere suam voluntatem subiectam suo genitori, quasi nos negemus hominis voluntatem voluntati Dei debere esse subiectam? | Reply to Objection 1: Whatever was in the human nature of Christ was moved at the bidding of the Divine will; yet it does not follow that in Christ there was no movement of the will proper to human nature, for the good wills of other saints are moved by God's will, "Who worketh" in them "both to will and to accomplish," as is written Phil. 2:13. For although the will cannot be inwardly moved by any creature, yet it can be moved inwardly by God, as was said in the FP, Question [105], Article [4]. And thus, too, Christ by His human will followed the Divine will according to Ps. 39:9; "That I should do Thy will, O my God, I have desired it." Hence Augustine says (Contra Maxim. ii, 20): "Where the Son says to the Father, 'Not what I will, but what Thou willest,' what do you gain by adding your own words and saying 'He shows that His will was truly subject to His Father,' as if we denied that man's will ought to be subject to God's will?" |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod proprium est instrumenti quod moveatur a principali agente, diversimode tamen, secundum proprietatem naturae ipsius. Nam instrumentum inanimatum, sicut securis aut serra, movetur ab artifice per motum solum corporalem. Instrumentum vero animatum anima sensibili movetur per appetitum sensitivum, sicut equus a sessore. Instrumentum vero animatum anima rationali movetur per voluntatem eius, sicut per imperium domini movetur servus ad aliquid agendum, qui quidem servus est sicut instrumentum animatum, ut philosophus dicit, in I Politic. Sic ergo natura humana in Christo fuit instrumentum divinitatis ut moveretur per propriam voluntatem. | Reply to Objection 2: It is proper to an instrument to be moved by the principal agent, yet diversely, according to the property of its nature. For an inanimate instrument, as an axe or a saw, is moved by the craftsman with only a corporeal movement; but an instrument animated by a sensitive soul is moved by the sensitive appetite, as a horse by its rider; and an instrument animated with a rational soul is moved by its will, as by the command of his lord the servant is moved to act, the servant being like an animate instrument, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2,4; Ethic. viii, 11). And hence it was in this manner that the human nature of Christ was the instrument of the Godhead, and was moved by its own will. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod ipsa potentia voluntatis est naturalis, et consequitur naturam ex necessitate. Sed motus vel actus potentiae, qui etiam voluntas dicitur, quandoque quidem est naturalis et necessarius, puta respectu felicitatis; quandoque autem ex libero arbitrio rationis proveniens, et non necessarius neque naturalis; sicut patet ex his quae in secunda parte dicta sunt. Et tamen etiam ipsa ratio, quae est principium huius motus, est naturalis. Et ideo, praeter voluntatem divinam, oportet in Christo ponere voluntatem humanam, non solum prout est potentia naturalis, aut prout est motus naturalis, sed etiam prout est motus rationalis. | Reply to Objection 3: The power of the will is natural, and necessarily follows upon the nature; but the movement or act of this power---which is also called will---is sometimes natural and necessary, e.g. with respect to beatitude; and sometimes springs from free-will and is neither necessary nor natural, as is plain from what has been stated in the FS, Question [10], Articles [1],[2] [*Cf. FP, Question [82], Article [2]]. And yet even reason itself, which is the principle of this movement, is natural. Hence besides the Divine will it is necessary to place in Christ a human will, not merely as a natural power, or a natural movement, but even as a rational movement. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod per hoc quod dicitur aliqualiter velle, designatur determinatus modus volendi. Determinatus autem modus ponitur circa ipsam rem cuius est modus. Unde, cum voluntas pertineat ad naturam, ipsum etiam quod est aliqualiter velle, pertinet ad naturam, non secundum quod est absolute considerata, sed secundum quod est in tali hypostasi. Unde etiam voluntas humana Christi habuit quendam determinatum modum ex eo quod fuit in hypostasi divina, ut scilicet moveretur semper secundum nutum divinae voluntatis. | Reply to Objection 4: When we say "to will in a certain way," we signify a determinate mode of willing. Now a determinate mode regards the thing of which it is the mode. Hence since the will pertains to the nature, "to will in a certain way" belongs to the nature, not indeed considered absolutely, but as it is in the hypostasis. Hence the human will of Christ had a determinate mode from the fact of being in a Divine hypostasis, i.e. it was always moved in accordance with the bidding of the Divine will. |
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Article: 2 [ << | >> ]
| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerit aliqua voluntas sensualitatis, praeter rationis voluntatem. Dicit enim philosophus, in III de anima, quod voluntas in ratione est, in sensitivo autem appetitu est irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Sed sensualitas significat appetitum sensitivum. Ergo non fuit in Christo voluntas sensualitatis. | Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no will of sensuality besides the will of reason. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42) that "the will is in the reason, and in the sensitive appetite are the irascible and concupiscible parts." Now sensuality signifies the sensitive appetite. Hence in Christ there was no will of sensuality. |
| Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, XII de Trin., sensualitas significatur per serpentem. Sed nihil serpentinum fuit in Christo, habuit enim similitudinem animalis venenosi sine veneno, ut dicit Augustinus, super illud Ioan. III, sicut exaltavit Moyses serpentem in deserto. Ergo in Christo non fuit voluntas sensualitatis. | Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12,13) the sensuality is signified by the serpent. But there was nothing serpent-like in Christ; for He had the likeness of a venomous animal without the venom, as Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 32). Hence in Christ there was no will of sensuality. |
| Praeterea, voluntas sequitur naturam, ut dictum est. Sed in Christo non fuit nisi una natura praeter divinam. Ergo in Christo non fuit nisi una voluntas humana. |
Objection 3: Further, will is consequent upon nature, as was said (Article [1]). But in Christ there was only one nature besides the Divine. Hence in Christ there was only one human will. |
| Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit, in II ad Gratianum imperatorem, mea est voluntas quam suam dixit, quia, ut homo, suscepit tristitiam meam, ex quo datur intelligi quod tristitia pertineat ad humanam voluntatem in Christo. Sed tristitia pertinet ad sensualitatem, ut in secunda parte habitum est. Ergo videtur quod in Christo sit voluntas sensualitatis, praeter voluntatem rationis. | On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 7): "Mine is the will which He calls His own; because as Man He assumed my sorrow." From this we are given to understand that sorrow pertains to the human will of Christ. Now sorrow pertains to the sensuality, as was said in the FS, Question [23], Article [1]; FS, Question [25], Article [1]. Therefore, seemingly, in Christ there is a will of sensuality besides the will of reason. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, filius Dei humanam naturam assumpsit cum omnibus quae pertinent ad perfectionem ipsius naturae. In humana autem natura includitur etiam natura animalis, sicut in specie includitur genus. Unde oportet quod filius Dei cum humana natura assumpserit etiam ea quae pertinent ad perfectionem naturae animalis. Inter quae est appetitus sensitivus, qui sensualitas dicitur. Et ideo oportet dicere quod in Christo fuit sensualis appetitus, sive sensualitas. Sciendum est autem quod sensualitas, sive sensualis appetitus, inquantum est natus obedire rationi, dicitur rationale per participationem, ut patet per philosophum, in I Ethic. Et quia voluntas est in ratione, ut dictum est, pari ratione potest dici quod sensualitas sit voluntas per participationem. |
I answer that, As was said (Question [9], Article [1]), the Son of God assumed human nature together with everything pertaining to the perfection of human nature. Now in human nature is included animal nature, as the genus in its species. Hence the Son of God must have assumed together with the human nature whatever belongs to animal nature; one of which things is the sensitive appetite, which is called the sensuality. Consequently it must be allowed that in Christ there was a sensual appetite, or sensuality. But it must be borne in mind that sensuality or the sensual appetite, inasmuch as it naturally obeys reason, is said to be "rational by participation," as is clear from the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13). And because "the will is in the reason," as stated above, it may equally be said that the sensuality is "a will by participation." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de voluntate essentialiter dicta, quae non est nisi in parte intellectiva. Sed voluntas participative dicta potest esse in parte sensitiva, inquantum obedit rationi. | Reply to Objection 1: This argument is based on the will, essentially so called, which is only in the intellectual part; but the will by participation can be in the sensitive part, inasmuch as it obeys reason. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod sensualitas significatur per serpentem, non quantum ad naturam sensualitatis, quam Christus assumpsit, sed quantum ad corruptionem fomitis, quae in Christo non fuit. | Reply to Objection 2: The sensuality is signified by the serpent---not as regards the nature of the sensuality, which Christ assumed, but as regards the corruption of the "fomes," which was not in Christ. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, ubi est unum propter alterum, ibi tantum unum esse videtur, sicut superficies, quae est visibilis per colorem, est unum visibile cum colore. Et similiter, quia sensualitas non dicitur voluntas nisi quia participat voluntatem rationis, sicut est una natura humana in Christo, ita etiam ponitur una voluntas humana in Christo. | Reply to Objection 3: "Where there is one thing on account of another, there seems to be only one" (Aristotle, Topic. iii); thus a surface which is visible by color is one visible thing with the color. So, too, because the sensuality is called the will, only because it partakes of the rational will, there is said to be but one human will in Christ, even as there is but one human nature. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo fuerunt duae voluntates quantum ad rationem. Dicit enim Damascenus, in II libro, quod duplex est hominis voluntas, naturalis, quae vocatur thelesis; et rationalis, quae vocatur bulesis. Sed Christus in humana natura habuit quidquid ad perfectionem humanae naturae pertinet. Ergo utraque praedictarum voluntatum fuit in Christo. | Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there were two wills as regards the reason. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that there is a double will in man, viz. the natural will which is called {thelesis}, and the rational will which is called {boulesis}. Now Christ in His human nature had whatever belongs to the perfection of human nature. Hence both the foregoing wills were in Christ. |
| Praeterea, vis appetitiva diversificatur in homine secundum diversitatem virtutis apprehensivae, et ideo, secundum differentiam sensus et intellectus, diversificatur in homine appetitus sensitivus et intellectivus. Sed similiter quantum ad apprehensionem hominis ponitur differentia rationis et intellectus, quorum utrumque fuit in Christo. Ergo fuit in eo duplex voluntas, una intellectualis, et alia rationalis. | Objection 2: Further, the appetitive power is diversified in man by the difference of the apprehensive power, and hence according to the difference of sense and intellect is the difference of sensitive and intellective appetite in man. But in the same way as regards man's apprehension, we hold the difference of reason and intellect; both of which were in Christ. Therefore there was a double will in Him, one intellectual and the other rational. |
| Praeterea, a quibusdam ponitur in Christo voluntas pietatis. Quae non potest poni nisi ex parte rationis. Ergo in Christo ex parte rationis sunt plures voluntates. | Objection 3: Further, some [*Hugh of St. Victor, De Quat. Volunt. Christ.] ascribe to Christ "a will of piety," which can only be on the part of reason. Therefore in Christ on the part of reason there are several wills. |
| Sed contra est quod in quolibet ordine est unum primum movens. Sed voluntas est primum movens in genere humanorum actuum. Ergo in uno homine non est nisi una voluntas proprie dicta, quae est voluntas rationis. Christus autem est unus homo. Ergo in Christo est tantum una voluntas humana. | On the contrary, In every order there is one first mover. But the will is the first mover in the genus of human acts. Therefore in one man there is only one will, properly speaking, which is the will of reason. But Christ is one man. Therefore in Christ there is only one human will. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, voluntas quandoque accipitur pro potentia, et quandoque pro actu. Si ergo voluntas accipiatur pro actu, sic oportet in Christo ex parte rationis ponere duas voluntates, idest, duas species actuum voluntatis. Voluntas enim, ut in secunda parte dictum est, et est finis, et est eorum quae sunt ad finem, et alio modo fertur in utrumque. Nam in finem fertur simpliciter et absolute, sicut in id quod est secundum se bonum, in id autem quod est ad finem, fertur cum quadam comparatione, secundum quod habet bonitatem ex ordine ad aliud. Et ideo alterius rationis est actus voluntatis secundum quod fertur in aliquid secundum se volitum, ut sanitas, quod a Damasceno vocatur thelesis, idest simplex voluntas, et a magistris vocatur voluntas ut natura, et alterius rationis est actus voluntatis secundum quod fertur in aliquid quod est volitum solum ex ordine ad alterum, sicut est sumptio medicinae, quem quidem voluntatis actum Damascenus vocat bulesim, idest consiliativam voluntatem, a magistris autem vocatur voluntas ut ratio. Haec autem diversitas actus non diversificat potentiam, quia uterque actus attenditur ad unam rationem communem obiecti, quod est bonum. Et ideo dicendum est quod, si loquamur de potentia voluntatis, in Christo est una sola voluntas humana essentialiter et non participative dicta. Si vero loquamur de voluntate quae est actus, sic distinguitur in Christo voluntas quae est ut natura, quae dicitur thelesis; et voluntas ut ratio, quae dicitur bulesis. |
I answer that, As stated above (Article [1], ad 3), the will is sometimes taken for the power, and sometimes for the act. Hence if the will is taken for the act, it is necessary to place two wills, i.e. two species of acts of the will in Christ on the part of the reason. For the will, as was said in the FS, Question [8], Articles [2],3, regards both the end and the means; and is affected differently towards both. For towards the end it is borne simply and absolutely, as towards what is good in itself; but towards the means it is borne under a certain relation, as the goodness of the means depends on something else. Hence the act of the will, inasmuch as it is drawn to anything desired of itself, as health, which act is called by Damascene {thelesis}---i.e. simple will, and by the masters "will as nature," is different from the act of the will as it is drawn to anything that is desired only in order to something else, as to take medicine; and this act of the will Damascene calls {boulesis}---i.e. counseling will, and the masters, "will as reason." But this diversity of acts does not diversify the power, since both acts regard the one common ratio of the object, which is goodness. Hence we must say that if we are speaking of the power of the will, in Christ there is but one human will, essentially so called and not by participation; but if we are speaking of the will as an act, we thus distinguish in Christ a will as nature, which is called {thelesis}, and a will as reason, which is called {boulesis}. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illae voluntates non diversificantur secundum potentiam, sed solum secundum differentiam actus, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 1: These two wills do not diversify the power but only the act, as we have said. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam intellectus et ratio non sunt diversae potentiae, ut in prima parte dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2: The intellect and the reason are not distinct powers, as was said in the FP, Question [79], Article [8]. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod voluntas pietatis non videtur esse aliud quam voluntas quae consideratur ut natura, inquantum scilicet refugit alienum malum absolute consideratum. | Reply to Objection 3: The "will of piety" would not seem to be distinct from the will considered as nature, inasmuch as it shrinks from another's evil, absolutely considered. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerit liberum arbitrium. Dicit enim Damascenus, in III libro, gnomen autem (idest sententiam, vel mentem, vel cogitationem) et proaeresin (idest electionem) in domino dicere impossibile est, si proprie loqui volumus. Maxime autem in his quae sunt fidei est proprie loquendum. Ergo in Christo non fuit electio. Et per consequens nec liberum arbitrium, cuius actus est electio. | Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no free-will. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) that {gnome}, i.e. opinion, thinking or cogitation, and {proairesis}, i.e. choice, "cannot possibly be attributed to our Lord, if we wish to speak with propriety." But in the things of faith especially we must speak with propriety. Therefore there was no choice in Christ and consequently no free-will, of which choice is the act. |
| Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod electio est appetitus praeconsiliati. Sed consilium non videtur fuisse in Christo, quia non consiliamur de quibus certi sumus; Christus autem certitudinem habuit de omnibus. Ergo in Christo non fuit electio. Et sic, nec liberum arbitrium. | Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that choice is "a desire of something after taking counsel." Now counsel does not appear to be in Christ, because we do not take counsel concerning such things as we are certain of. But Christ was certain of everything. Hence there was no counsel and consequently no free-will in Christ. |
| Praeterea, liberum arbitrium se habet ad utrumque. Sed voluntas Christi fuit determinata ad bonum, quia non potuit peccare, sicut supra dictum est. Ergo in Christo non fuit liberum arbitrium. | Objection 3: Further, free-will is indifferent. But Christ's will was determined to good, since He could not sin; as stated above (Question [15], Articles [1],2). Hence there was no free-will in Christ. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae VII, butyrum et mel comedet, ut sciat reprobare malum et eligere bonum, quod est actus liberi arbitrii. Ergo in Christo fuit liberum arbitrium. |
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 7:15): "He shall eat butter and honey, that He may know to refuse the evil and to choose the good," which is an act of the free-will. Therefore there was free-will in Christ. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in Christo fuit duplex actus voluntatis, unus quidem quo eius voluntas ferebatur in aliquid sicut secundum se volitum, quod pertinet ad rationem finis; alius autem secundum quem eius voluntas ferebatur in aliquid per ordinem ad aliud, quod pertinet ad rationem eius quod est ad finem. Differt autem, ut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., electio a voluntate in hoc, quod voluntas, per se loquendo, est ipsius finis; electio autem eorum quae sunt ad finem. Et sic simplex voluntas est idem quod voluntas ut natura, electio autem est idem quod voluntas ut ratio, et est proprius actus liberi arbitrii, ut in prima parte dictum est. Et ideo, cum in Christo ponatur voluntas ut ratio, necesse est ibi ponere electionem, et per consequens liberum arbitrium, cuius actus est electio, ut in prima parte habitum est. |
I answer that, As was said above (Article [3]), there was a twofold act of the will in Christ; one whereby He was drawn to anything willed in itself, which implies the nature of an end; the other whereby His will was drawn to anything willed on account of its being ordained to another---which pertains to the nature of means. Now, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) choice differs from will in this, that will of itself regards the end, while choice regards the means. And thus simple will is the same as the "will as nature"; but choice is the same as the "will as reason," and is the proper act of free-will, as was said in the FP, Question [83], Article [3]. Hence, since "will as reason" is placed in Christ, we must also place choice, and consequently free-will, whose act is choice, as was said in the FP, Question [83], Article [3]; FS, Question [13], Article [1]. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Damascenus excludit a Christo electionem secundum quod intelligit in nomine electionis importari dubitationem. Sed tamen dubitatio non est de necessitate electionis, quia etiam Deo competit eligere, secundum illud Ephes. I, elegit nos in ipso ante mundi constitutionem; cum tamen in Deo nulla sit dubitatio. Accidit autem dubitatio electioni, inquantum est in natura ignorante. Et idem dicendum est de aliis de quibus fit mentio in auctoritate praedicta. | Reply to Objection 1: Damascene excludes choice from Christ, in so far as he considers that doubt is implied in the word choice. Nevertheless doubt is not necessary to choice, since it belongs even to God Himself to choose, according to Eph. 1:4: "He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world," although in God there is no doubt. Yet doubt is accidental to choice when it is in an ignorant nature. We may also say the same of whatever else is mentioned in the passage quoted. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod electio praesupponit consilium, non tamen sequitur ex consilio nisi iam determinato per iudicium; illud enim quod iudicamus agendum post inquisitionem consilii, eligimus, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Et ideo, si aliquid iudicetur ut agendum absque dubitatione et inquisitione praecedente, hoc sufficit ad electionem. Et sic patet quod dubitatio, sive inquisitio, non per se pertinet ad electionem, sed solum secundum quod est in natura ignorante. | Reply to Objection 2: Choice presupposes counsel; yet it follows counsel only as determined by judgment. For what we judge to be done, we choose, after the inquiry of counsel, as is stated (Ethic. iii, 2,3). Hence if anything is judged necessary to be done, without any preceding doubt or inquiry, this suffices for choice. Therefore it is plain that doubt or inquiry belong to choice not essentially, but only when it is in an ignorant nature. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod voluntas Christi, licet sit determinata ad bonum, non tamen est determinata ad hoc vel illud bonum. Et ideo pertinebat ad Christum eligere per liberum arbitrium confirmatum in bono, sicut ad beatos. | Reply to Objection 3: The will of Christ, though determined to good, is not determined to this or that good. Hence it pertains to Christ, even as to the blessed, to choose with a free-will confirmed in good. |
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| Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas humana in Christo non voluerit aliud quam quod Deus vult. Dicitur enim in Psalmo, ex persona Christi, ut facerem voluntatem tuam, Deus meus, volui. Sed ille qui vult voluntatem alicuius facere, vult quod ille vult. Ergo videtur quod voluntas humana Christi nihil aliud voluerit quam voluntas ipsius divina. |
Objection 1: It would seem that the human will in Christ did not will anything except what God willed. For it is written (Ps. 39:9) in the person of Christ: "That I should do Thy will: O my God, I have desired it." Now he who desires to do another's will, wills what the other wills. Hence it seems that Christ's human will willed nothing but what was willed by His Divine will. |
| Praeterea, anima Christi habuit perfectissimam caritatem, quae etiam comprehensionem nostrae scientiae excedit, secundum illud Ephes. III, supereminentem scientiae caritatem Christi. Sed caritatis est facere quod homo idem velit quod Deus, unde et philosophus, in IX Ethic., dicit quod unum de amicabilibus est eadem velle et eligere. Ergo voluntas humana in Christo nihil aliud voluit quam divina. | Objection 2: Further, Christ's soul had most perfect charity, which, indeed, surpasses the comprehension of all our knowledge, according to Eph. 3:19, "the charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge." Now charity makes men will what God wills; hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4) that one mark of friendship is "to will and choose the same." Therefore the human will in Christ willed nothing else than was willed by His Divine will. |
| Praeterea, Christus fuit verus comprehensor. Sed sancti qui sunt comprehensores in patria, nihil aliud volunt quam quod Deus vult. Alioquin, non essent beati, quia non haberent quidquid vellent, beatus enim est qui habet quidquid vult et nihil mali vult, ut dicit Augustinus, in libro de Trin. Ergo Christus nihil aliud voluit secundum voluntatem humanam quam quod voluit voluntas divina. | Objection 3: Further, Christ was a true comprehensor. But the Saints who are comprehensors in heaven will only what God wills, otherwise they would not be happy, because they would not obtain whatever they will, for "blessed is he who has what he wills, and wills nothing amiss," as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5). Hence in His human will Christ wills nothing else than does the Divine will. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, contra Maximinum, in hoc quod Christus ait, non quod ego volo, sed quod tu, aliud se ostendit voluisse quam pater. Quod nisi humano corde non posset, cum infirmitatem nostram in suum, non divinum, sed humanum transfiguraret affectum. | On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. ii, 20): "When Christ says 'Not what I will, but what Thou wilt' He shows Himself to have willed something else than did His Father; and this could only have been by His human heart, since He did not transfigure our weakness into His Divine but into His human will." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod sicut dictum est, in Christo secundum humanam naturam ponitur multiplex voluntas, scilicet voluntas sensualitatis, quae participative voluntas dicitur; et voluntas rationalis, sive consideretur per modum naturae, sive per modum rationis. Dictum est autem supra quod, ex quadam dispensatione, filius Dei, ante suam passionem, permittebat carni agere et pati quae sunt ei propria. Et similiter permittebat omnibus viribus animae agere quae propria. Manifestum est autem quod voluntas sensualitatis refugit naturaliter dolores sensibiles et corporis laesionem. Similiter etiam voluntas ut natura repudiat ea quae naturae sunt contraria, et quae sunt secundum se mala, puta mortem et alia huiusmodi. Haec tamen quandoque voluntas per modum rationis eligere potest ex ordine ad finem, sicut etiam in aliquo puro homine sensualitas eius, et etiam voluntas absolute considerata, refugit ustionem, quam voluntas secundum rationem elegit propter finem sanitatis. Voluntas autem Dei erat ut Christus dolores et passiones et mortem pateretur, non quod ista essent a Deo volita secundum se, sed ex ordine ad finem humanae salutis. Unde patet quod Christus, secundum voluntatem sensualitatis, et secundum voluntatem rationis quae consideratur per modum naturae, aliud poterat velle quam Deus. Sed secundum voluntatem quae est per modum rationis, semper idem volebat quod Deus. Quod patet ex hoc ipso quod dicit, non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu. Volebat enim, secundum rationis voluntatem, divinam voluntatem impleri, quamvis aliud dicat se velle secundum aliam eius voluntatem. |
I answer that, As was said (Articles [2],3), in Christ according to His human nature there is a twofold will, viz. the will of sensuality, which is called will by participation, and the rational will, whether considered after the manner of nature, or after the manner of reason. Now it was said above (Question [13], Article [3], ad 1; Question [14], Article [1], ad 2) that by a certain dispensation the Son of God before His Passion "allowed His flesh to do and suffer what belonged to it." And in like manner He allowed all the powers of His soul to do what belonged to them. Now it is clear that the will of sensuality naturally shrinks from sensible pains and bodily hurt. In like manner, the will as nature turns from what is against nature and what is evil in itself, as death and the like; yet the will as reason may at time choose these things in relation to an end, as in a mere man the sensuality and the will absolutely considered shrink from burning, which, nevertheless, the will as reason may choose for the sake of health. Now it was the will of God that Christ should undergo pain, suffering, and death, not that these of themselves were willed by God, but for the sake of man's salvation. Hence it is plain that in His will of sensuality and in His rational will considered as nature, Christ could will what God did not; but in His will as reason He always willed the same as God, which appears from what He says (Mt. 26:39): "Not as I will, but as Thou wilt." For He willed in His reason that the Divine will should be fulfilled although He said that He willed something else by another will. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus volebat ut voluntas patris impleretur, non autem secundum voluntatem sensualitatis cuius motus non se extendit usque ad voluntatem Dei; neque per voluntatem quae consideratur per modum naturae, quae fertur in aliqua obiecta absolute considerata, et non in ordine ad divinam voluntatem. | Reply to Objection 1: By His rational will Christ willed the Divine will to be fulfilled; but not by His will of sensuality, the movement of which does not extend to the will of God---nor by His will considered as nature which regards things absolutely considered and not in relation to the Divine will. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod conformitas voluntatis humanae ad voluntatem divinam attenditur secundum voluntatem rationis, secundum quam etiam voluntates amicorum concordant, inquantum scilicet ratio considerat aliquod volitum in ordine ad voluntatem amici. | Reply to Objection 2: The conformity of the human will to the Divine regards the will of reason: according to which the wills even of friends agree, inasmuch as reason considers something willed in its relation to the will of a friend. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus simul fuit comprehensor et viator, inquantum scilicet per mentem fruebatur Deo, et habebat carnem passibilem. Et ideo ex parte carnis passibilis poterat in eo aliquid accidere quod repugnaret naturali voluntati ipsius, et etiam appetitui sensitivo. | Reply to Objection 3: Christ was at once comprehensor and wayfarer, inasmuch as He was enjoying God in His mind and had a passible body. Hence things repugnant to His natural will and to His sensitive appetite could happen to Him in His passible flesh. |
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| Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo fuerit contrarietas voluntatum. Contrarietas enim voluntatum attenditur secundum contrarietatem obiectorum, sicut et contrarietas motuum attenditur secundum contrarietatem terminorum, ut patet per philosophum, in V Physic. Sed Christus secundum diversas voluntates contraria volebat, nam secundum voluntatem divinam volebat mortem, quam refugiebat secundum voluntatem humanam. Unde Athanasius dicit, in libro adversus Apollinarium, quando Christus dixit, pater si possibile est, transeat a me calix iste, et tamen non mea, sed tua voluntas fiat, et iterum, spiritus promptus est, caro autem infirma, duas voluntates hic ostendit, humanam, quae propter infirmitatem carnis refugiebat passionem; et divinam eius, promptam ad passionem. Ergo in Christo fuit contrarietas voluntatum. | Objection 1: It would seem that there was contrariety of wills in Christ. For contrariety of wills regards contrariety of objects, as contrariety of movements springs from contrariety of termini, as is plain from the Philosopher (Phys. v, text. 49, seq.). Now Christ in His different wills wished contrary things. For in His Divine will He wished for death, from which He shrank in His human will, hence Athanasius says [*De Incarnat. et Cont. Arianos, written against Apollinarius]: "When Christ says 'Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pass from Me; yet not My will, but Thine be done,' and again, 'The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh weak,' He denotes two wills---the human, which through the weakness of the flesh shrank from the passion---and His Divine will eager for the passion." Hence there was contrariety of wills in Christ. |
| Praeterea, Galat. V dicitur quod caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem. Est igitur contrarietas voluntatum quando spiritus concupiscit unum, et caro aliud. Sed hoc fuit in Christo, nam per voluntatem caritatis, quam spiritus sanctus in eius mente faciebat, volebat passionem, secundum illud Isaiae LIII, oblatus est quia ipse voluit; secundum autem carnem, passionem refugiebat. Ergo erat in eo contrarietas voluntatum. |
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Gal. 5:17) that "the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh." Now when the spirit desires one thing, and the flesh another, there is contrariety of wills. But this was in Christ; for by the will of charity which the Holy Spirit was causing in His mind, He willed the passion, according to Is. 53:7: "He was offered because it was His own will," yet in His flesh He shrank from the passion. Therefore there was contrariety of wills in Him. |
| Praeterea, Luc. XXII dicitur quod, factus in agonia, prolixius orabat. Sed agonia videtur importare quandam impugnationem animi in contraria tendentis. Ergo videtur quod in Christo fuerit contrarietas voluntatis. |
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Lk. 22:43) that "being in an agony, He prayed the longer." Now agony seems to imply a certain struggle [*Greek, {agonia}] in a soul drawn to contrary things. Hence it seems that there was contrariety of will in Christ. |
| Sed contra est quod in determinatione sextae synodi dicitur, praedicamus duas naturales voluntates, non contrarias, iuxta quod impii asserunt haeretici; sed sequentem humanam eius voluntatem, et non resistentem vel reluctantem, sed potius subiectam divinae eius atque omnipotenti voluntati. | On the contrary, In the decisions of the Sixth Council [*Third Council of Constantinople, Act. 18] it is said: "We confess two natural wills, not in opposition, as evil-minded heretics assert, but following His human will, and neither withstanding nor striving against, but rather being subject to, His Divine and omnipotent will." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod contrarietas non potest esse nisi oppositio attendatur in eodem et secundum idem. Si autem secundum diversa, et in diversis existat diversitas, non sufficit hoc ad rationem contrarietatis, sicut nec ad rationem contradictionis, puta quod homo sit pulcher aut sanus secundum manum, et non secundum pedem. Ad hoc igitur quod sit contrarietas voluntatum in aliquo, requiritur, primo quidem, quod secundum idem attendatur diversitas voluntatum. Si enim unius voluntas sit de aliquo fiendo secundum quandam rationem universalem, et alterius voluntas sit de eodem non fiendo secundum quandam rationem particularem, non est omnino contrarietas voluntatum. Puta, si rex vult suspendi latronem in bonum reipublicae, et aliquis eius consanguineus velit eum non suspendi propter amorem privatum, non erit contrarietas voluntatis, nisi forte se in tantum extendat voluntas boni privati ut bonum publicum velit impedire ut conservetur bonum privatum; tunc enim secundum idem attenderetur repugnantia voluntatum. | I answer that, Contrariety can exist only where there is opposition in the same and as regards the same. For if the diversity exists as regards diverse things, and in diverse subjects, this would not suffice for the nature of contrariety, nor even for the nature of contradiction, e.g. if a man were well formed or healthy as regards his hand, but not as regards his foot. Hence for there to be contrariety of wills in anyone it is necessary, first, that the diversity of wills should regard the same. For if the will of one regards the doing of something with reference to some universal reason, and the will of another regards the not doing the same with reference to some particular reason, there is not complete contrariety of will, e.g. when a judge wishes a brigand to be hanged for the good of the commonwealth, and one of the latter's kindred wishes him not to be hanged on account of a private love, there is no contrariety of wills; unless, indeed, the desire of the private good went so far as to wish to hinder the public good for the private good---in that case the opposition of wills would regard the same. |
| Secundo autem requiritur ad contrarietatem voluntatis, quod sit circa eandem voluntatem. Si enim homo vult unum secundum appetitum intellectus, et aliud secundum appetitum sensitivum, non est hic aliqua contrarietas, nisi forte appetitus sensitivus in tantum praevaleat quod vel immutet vel saltem retardet appetitum rationis; sic enim iam ad ipsam voluntatem rationis perveniet aliquid de motu contrario appetitus sensitivi. | Secondly, for contrariety of wills it is necessary that it should be in the same will. For if a man wishes one thing with his rational appetite, and wishes another thing with his sensitive appetite, there is no contrariety, unless the sensitive appetite so far prevailed as to change or at least keep back the rational appetite; for in this case something of the contrary movement of the sensitive appetite would reach the rational will. |
| Sic igitur dicendum est quod, licet voluntas naturalis et voluntas sensualitatis in Christo aliquid aliud voluerit quam divina voluntas et voluntas rationis ipsius, non tamen fuit ibi aliqua contrarietas voluntatum. Primo quidem, quia neque voluntas eius naturalis, neque voluntas sensualitatis, repudiabat illam rationem secundum quam divina voluntas, et voluntas rationis humanae in Christo, passionem volebant. Volebat enim voluntas absoluta in Christo salutem humani generis, sed eius non erat velle hoc in ordine ad aliud. Motus autem sensualitatis ad hoc se extendere non valebat. Secundo, quia neque voluntas divina, neque voluntas rationis in Christo, impediebatur aut retardabatur per voluntatem naturalem, aut per appetitum sensualitatis. Similiter autem nec e converso voluntas divina, vel voluntas rationis in Christo, refugiebat aut retardabat motum voluntatis naturalis humanae, et motum sensualitatis in Christo. Placebat enim Christo secundum voluntatem divinam, et secundum voluntatem rationis, ut voluntas naturalis in ipso et voluntas sensualitatis secundum ordinem suae naturae moverentur. Unde patet quod in Christo nulla fuerit repugnantia vel contrarietas voluntatum. | And hence it must be said that although the natural and the sensitive will in Christ wished what the Divine will did not wish, yet there was no contrariety of wills in Him. First, because neither the natural will nor the will of sensuality rejected the reason for which the Divine will and the will of the human reason in Christ wished the passion. For the absolute will of Christ wished the salvation of the human race, although it did not pertain to it to will this for the sake of something further; but the movement of sensuality could nowise extend so far. Secondly, because neither the Divine will nor the will of reason in Christ was impeded or retarded by the natural will or the appetite of sensuality. So, too, on the other hand, neither the Divine will nor the will of reason in Christ shrank from or retarded the movement of the natural human will and the movement of the sensuality in Christ. For it pleased Christ, in His Divine will, and in His will of reason, that His natural will and will of sensuality should be moved according to the order of their nature. Hence it is clear that in Christ there was no opposition or contrariety of wills. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod aliqua voluntas humana in Christo aliud volebat quam eius voluntas divina, procedebat ex ipsa voluntate divina, cuius beneplacito natura humana propriis motibus movebatur in Christo, ut Damascenus dicit. | Reply to Objection 1: The fact of any will in Christ willing something else than did the Divine will, proceeded from the Divine will, by whose permission the human nature in Christ was moved by its proper movements, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15,18,19). |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod in nobis per concupiscentiam carnis impeditur aut retardatur concupiscentia spiritus, quod in Christo non fuit. Et ideo in Christo non fuit contrarietas carnis ad spiritum, sicut in nobis. | Reply to Objection 2: In us the desires of the spirit are impeded or retarded by the desires of the flesh: this did not occur in Christ. Hence in Christ there was no contrariety of flesh and spirit, as in us. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod agonia non fuit in Christo quantum ad partem animae rationalem, secundum quod importat concertationem voluntatum ex diversitate rationum procedentem, puta cum aliquis secundum quod ratio considerat unum, vult hoc, et secundum quod considerat aliud, vult contrarium. Hoc enim contingit propter debilitatem rationis, quae non potest diiudicare quid sit simpliciter melius. Quod in Christo non fuit, quia per suam rationem iudicabat simpliciter esse melius quod per eius passionem impleretur voluntas divina circa salutem generis humani. Fuit tamen in Christo agonia quantum ad partem sensitivam, secundum quod importat timorem infortunii imminentis, ut dicit Damascenus, in III libro. | Reply to Objection 3: The agony in Christ was not in the rational soul, in as far as it implies a struggle in the will arising from a diversity of motives, as when anyone, on his reason considering one, wishes one thing, and on its considering another, wishes the contrary. For this springs from the weakness of the reason, which is unable to judge which is the best simply. Now this did not occur in Christ, since by His reason He judged it best that the Divine will regarding the salvation of the human race should be fulfilled by His passion. Nevertheless, there was an agony in Christ as regards the sensitive part, inasmuch as it implied a dread of coming trial, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15; iii, 18,23). |