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| Deinde considerandum est de poenitentia secundum quod est virtus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. | We must now consider penance as a virtue, under which head there are six points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum poenitentia sit virtus. | (1) Whether penance is a virtue? |
| Secundo, utrum sit virtus specialis. | (2) Whether it is a special virtue? |
| Tertio, sub qua specie virtutis contineatur. | (3) To what species of virtue does it belong? |
| Quarto, de subiecto eius. | (4) Of its subject; |
| Quinto, de causa ipsius. | (5) Of its cause; |
| Sexto, de ordine eius ad alias virtutes. | (6) Of its relation to the other virtues. |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod poenitentia non sit virtus. Poenitentia enim est quoddam sacramentum aliis sacramentis connumeratum, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed nullum aliud sacramentorum est virtus. Ergo neque poenitentia est virtus. |
Objection 1: It would seem that penance is not a virtue. For penance is a sacrament numbered among the other sacraments, as was shown above (Question [84], Article [1]; Question [65], Article [1]). Now no other sacrament is a virtue. Therefore neither is penance a virtue. |
| Praeterea, secundum philosophum, in IV Ethic., verecundia non est virtus, tum quia est passio habens corporalem immutationem; tum etiam quia non est dispositio perfecti, cum sit de turpi acto, quod non habet locum in homine virtuoso. Sed similiter poenitentia est quaedam passio habens corporalem immutationem, scilicet ploratum, sicut Gregorius dicit quod poenitere est peccata praeterita plangere. Est etiam de turpibus factis, scilicet de peccatis, quae non habent locum in homine virtuoso. Ergo poenitentia non est virtus. | Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9), "shame is not a virtue," both because it is a passion accompanied by a bodily alteration, and because it is not the disposition of a perfect thing, since it is about an evil act, so that it has no place in a virtuous man. Now, in like manner, penance is a passion accompanied by a bodily alteration, viz. tears, according to Gregory, who says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.) that "penance consists in deploring past sins": moreover it is about evil deeds, viz. sins, which have no place in a virtuous man. Therefore penance is not a virtue. |
| Praeterea, secundum philosophum, in IV Ethic., nullus est stultus eorum qui sunt secundum virtutem. Sed stultum videtur dolere de commisso praeterito, quod non potest non esse, quod tamen pertinet ad poenitentiam. Ergo poenitentia non est virtus. | Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), "no virtuous man is foolish." But it seems foolish to deplore what has been done in the past, since it cannot be otherwise, and yet this is what we understand by penance. Therefore penance is not a virtue. |
| Sed contra est quod praecepta legis dantur de actibus virtutum, quia legislator intendit cives facere virtuosos, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed praeceptum divinae legis est de poenitentia, secundum illud Matth. III, poenitentiam agite, et cetera. Ergo poenitentia est virtus. | On the contrary, The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue, because "a lawgiver intends to make the citizens virtuous" (Ethic. ii, 1). But there is a precept about penance in the Divine law, according to Mt. 4:17: "Do penance," etc. Therefore penance is a virtue. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, poenitere est de aliquo a se prius facto dolere. Dictum est autem supra quod dolor vel tristitia dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, secundum quod est passio quaedam appetitus sensitivi. Et quantum ad hoc, poenitentia non est virtus, sed passio alio modo, secundum quod consistit in voluntate. Et hoc modo est cum quadam electione. Quae quidem si sit recta, necesse est quod sit actus virtutis, dicitur enim in II Ethic. quod virtus est habitus electivus secundum rationem rectam. Pertinet autem ad rationem rectam quod aliquis doleat de quo dolendum est. Quod quidem observatur in poenitentia de qua nunc loquimur, nam poenitens assumit moderatum dolorem de peccatis praeteritis, cum intentione removendi ea. Unde manifestum est quod poenitentia de qua nunc loquimur, vel est virtus, vel actus virtutis. |
I answer that, As stated above (Objection [2]; Question [84], Article [10], ad 4), to repent is to deplore something one has done. Now it has been stated above (Question [84], Article [9]) that sorrow or sadness is twofold. First, it denotes a passion of the sensitive appetite, and in this sense penance is not a virtue, but a passion. Secondly, it denotes an act of the will, and in this way it implies choice, and if this be right, it must, of necessity, be an act of virtue. For it is stated in Ethic. ii, 6 that virtue is a habit of choosing according to right reason. Now it belongs to right reason than one should grieve for a proper object of grief as one ought to grieve, and for an end for which one ought to grieve. And this is observed in the penance of which we are speaking now; since the penitent assumes a moderated grief for his past sins, with the intention of removing them. Hence it is evident that the penance of which we are speaking now, is either a virtue or the act of a virtue. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, in sacramento poenitentiae materialiter se habent actus humani, quod non contingit in Baptismo vel confirmatione. Et ideo, cum virtus sit principium alicuius actus, potius poenitentia est virtus, vel cum virtute, quam Baptismus vel confirmatio. |
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Question [84], Article [1], ad 1; Articles [2],3), in the sacrament of Penance, human acts take the place of matter, which is not the case in Baptism and Confirmation. Wherefore, since virtue is a principle of an act, penance is either a virtue or accompanies a virtue, rather than Baptism or Confirmation. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod poenitentia, secundum quod est passio, non est virtus, ut dictum est. Sic autem habet corporalem transmutationem adiunctam. Est autem virtus secundum quod habet ex parte voluntatis electionem rectam. Quod tamen magis potest dici de poenitentia quam de verecundia. Nam verecundia respicit turpe factum ut praesens, poenitentia vero respicit turpe factum ut praeteritum. Est autem contra perfectionem virtutis quod aliquis in praesenti habeat turpe factum, de quo oporteat eum verecundari. Non autem est contra perfectionem virtutis quod aliquis prius commiserit turpia facta, de quibus oporteat eum poenitere, cum ex vitioso fiat aliquis virtuosus. | Reply to Objection 2: Penance, considered as a passion, is not a virtue, as stated above, and it is thus that it is accompanied by a bodily alteration. On the other hand, it is a virtue, according as it includes a right choice on the part of the will; which, however, applies to penance rather than to shame. Because shame regards the evil deed as present, whereas penance regards the evil deed as past. Now it is contrary to the perfection of virtue that one should have an evil deed actually present, of which one ought to be ashamed; whereas it is not contrary to the perfection of virtue that we should have previously committed evil deeds, of which it behooves us to repent, since a man from being wicked becomes virtuous. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod dolere de eo quod prius factum est cum hac intentione conandi ad hoc quod factum non fuerit, esset stultum. Hoc autem non intendit poenitens, sed dolor eius est displicentia seu reprobatio facti praeteriti cum intentione removendi sequelam ipsius, scilicet offensam Dei et reatum poenae. Et hoc non est stultum. | Reply to Objection 3: It would indeed be foolish to grieve for what has already been done, with the intention of trying to make it not done. But the penitent does not intend this: for his sorrow is displeasure or disapproval with regard to the past deed, with the intention of removing its result, viz. the anger of God and the debt of punishment: and this is not foolish. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod poenitentia non sit specialis virtus. Eiusdem enim rationis videtur esse gaudere de bonis prius actis, et dolere de malis perpetratis. Sed gaudium de bono prius facto non est specialis virtus, sed est quidam affectus laudabilis ex caritate proveniens, ut patet per Augustinum, XIV de Civ. Dei, unde et apostolus, I Cor. XIII, dicit quod caritas non gaudet super iniquitate, congaudet autem veritati. Ergo pari ratione poenitentia, quae est dolor de peccatis praeteritis, non est specialis virtus, sed est quidam affectus ex caritate proveniens. |
Objection 1: It would seem that penance is not a special virtue. For it seems that to rejoice at the good one has done, and to grieve for the evil one has done are acts of the same nature. But joy for the good one has done is not a special virtue, but is a praiseworthy emotion proceeding from charity, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,8,9): wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:6) that charity "rejoiceth not at iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth." Therefore, in like manner, neither is penance, which is sorrow for past sins, a special virtue, but an emotion resulting from charity. |
| Praeterea, quaelibet virtus specialis habet materiam specialem, quia habitus distinguuntur per actus, et actus per obiecta. Sed poenitentia non habet materiam specialem, sunt enim eius materia peccata praeterita circa quamcumque materiam. Ergo poenitentia non est specialis virtus. | Objection 2: Further, every special virtue has its special matter, because habits are distinguished by their acts, and acts by their objects. But penance has no special matter, because its matter is past sins in any matter whatever. Therefore penance is not a special virtue. |
| Praeterea, nihil expellitur nisi a suo contrario. Sed poenitentia expellit omnia peccata. Ergo contrariatur omnibus peccatis. Non est ergo specialis virtus. | Objection 3: Further, nothing is removed except by its contrary. But penance removes all sins. Therefore it is contrary to all sins, and consequently is not a special virtue. |
| Sed contra est quod de ea datur speciale legis praeceptum, ut supra habitum est. |
On the contrary, The Law has a special precept about penance, as stated above (Question [84], Articles [5],7). |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in secunda parte habitum est, species habituum distinguuntur secundum species actuum, et ideo ubi occurrit specialis actus laudabilis, ibi necesse est ponere specialem habitum virtutis. Manifestum est autem quod in poenitentia invenitur specialis ratio actus laudabilis, scilicet operari ad destructionem peccati praeteriti inquantum est Dei offensa, quod non pertinet ad rationem alterius virtutis. Unde necesse est ponere quod poenitentia sit specialis virtus. | I answer that, As stated in the FS, Question [54], Article [1], ad 1, Article [2], habits are specifically distinguished according to the species of their acts, so that whenever an act has a special reason for being praiseworthy, there must needs be a special habit. Now it is evident that there is a special reason for praising the act of penance, because it aims at the destruction of past sin, considered as an offense against God, which does not apply to any other virtue. We must therefore conclude that penance is a special virtue. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod a caritate derivatur aliquis actus dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut ab ea elicitus. Et talis actus virtuosus non requirit aliam virtutem praeter caritatem, sicut diligere bonum et gaudere de eo, et tristari de opposito. Alio modo aliquis actus a caritate procedit quasi a caritate imperatus. Et sic, quia ipsa imperat omnibus virtutibus, utpote ordinans eas ad finem suum, actus a caritate procedens potest etiam ad aliam virtutem specialem pertinere. Si ergo in actu poenitentis consideretur sola displicentia peccati praeteriti, hoc immediate ad caritatem pertinet, sicut et gaudere de bonis praeteritis. Sed intentio operandi ad deletionem peccati praeteriti requirit specialem virtutem sub caritate. | Reply to Objection 1: An act springs from charity in two ways: first as being elicited by charity, and a like virtuous act requires no other virtue than charity, e.g. to love the good, to rejoice therein, and to grieve for what is opposed to it. Secondly, an act springs from charity, being, so to speak, commanded by charity; and thus, since charity commands all the virtues, inasmuch as it directs them to its own end, an act springing from charity may belong even to another special virtue. Accordingly, if in the act of the penitent we consider the mere displeasure in the past sin, it belongs to charity immediately, in the same way as joy for past good acts; but the intention to aim at the destruction of past sin requires a special virtue subordinate to charity. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod poenitentia habet quidem realiter generalem materiam, inquantum respicit omnia peccata, sed tamen sub ratione speciali, inquantum sunt emendabilia per actum hominis cooperantis Deo ad suam iustificationem. | Reply to Objection 2: In point of fact, penance has indeed a general matter, inasmuch as it regards all sins; but it does so under a special aspect, inasmuch as they can be remedied by an act of man in co-operating with God for his justification. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod quaelibet virtus specialis expellit habitum vitii oppositi, sicut albedo expellit nigredinem ab eodem subiecto. Sed poenitentia expellit omne peccatum effective, inquantum operatur ad destructionem peccati, prout est remissibile ex divina gratia homine cooperante. Unde non sequitur quod sit virtus generalis. | Reply to Objection 3: Every special virtue removes formally the habit of the opposite vice, just as whiteness removes blackness from the same subject: but penance removes every sin effectively, inasmuch as it works for the destruction of sins, according as they are pardonable through the grace of God if man co-operate therewith. Wherefore it does not follow that it is a general virtue. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus poenitentiae non sit species iustitiae. Iustitia enim non est virtus theologica sed moralis, ut in secunda parte patet. Poenitentia autem videtur virtus esse theologica, quia habet Deum pro obiecto, satisfacit enim Deo, cui etiam reconciliat peccatorem. Ergo videtur quod poenitentia non sit pars iustitiae. | Objection 1: It would seem that the virtue of penance is not a species of justice. For justice is not a theological but a moral virtue, as was shown in the SS, Question [62], Article [3]. But penance seems to be a theological virtue, since God is its object, for it makes satisfaction to God, to Whom, moreover, it reconciles the sinner. Therefore it seems that penance is not a species of justice. |
| Praeterea, iustitia, cum sit virtus moralis, consistit in medio. Sed poenitentia non consistit in medio, sed in quodam excessu, secundum illud Ierem. VI, luctum unigeniti fac tibi, planctum amarum. Ergo poenitentia non est species iustitiae. | Objection 2: Further, since justice is a moral virtue it observes the mean. Now penance does not observe the mean, but rather goes to the extreme, according to Jer. 6:26: "Make thee mourning as for an only son, a bitter lamentation." Therefore penance is not a species of justice. |
| Praeterea, duae sunt species iustitiae, ut dicitur in V Ethic., scilicet distributiva et commutativa. Sed sub neutra videtur poenitentia contineri. Ergo videtur quod poenitentia non sit species iustitiae. | Objection 3: Further, there are two species of justice, as stated in Ethic. v, 4, viz. "distributive" and "commutative." But penance does not seem to be contained under either of them. Therefore it seems that penance is not a species of justice. |
| Praeterea, super illud Luc. VI, beati qui nunc fletis, dicit Glossa, ecce prudentia, per quam ostenditur quam haec terrena sint misera, et quam beata caelestia. Sed flere est actus poenitentiae. Ergo poenitentia magis est prudentiae quam iustitiae. | Objection 4: Further, a gloss on Lk. 6:21, "Blessed are ye that weep now," says: "It is prudence that teaches us the unhappiness of earthly things and the happiness of heavenly things." But weeping is an act of penance. Therefore penance is a species of prudence rather than of justice. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de poenitentia, poenitentia est quaedam dolentis vindicta, semper puniens in se quod dolet se commisisse. Sed facere vindictam pertinet ad iustitiam, unde Tullius, in sua rhetorica, ponit vindicativam unam speciem iustitiae. Ergo videtur quod poenitentia sit species iustitiae. | On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: "Penance is the vengeance of the sorrowful, ever punishing in them what they are sorry for having done." But to take vengeance is an act of justice, wherefore Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that one kind of justice is called vindictive. Therefore it seems that penance is a species of justice. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, poenitentia non habet quod sit virtus specialis ex hoc solo quod dolet de malo perpetrato, ad hoc enim sufficeret caritas, sed ex eo quod poenitens dolet de peccato commisso inquantum est offensa Dei, cum emendationis proposito. Emendatio autem offensae contra aliquem commissae fit non per solam cessationem offensae, sed exigitur ulterius quaedam recompensatio, quae habet locum in offensis in alterum commissis sicut et retributio, nisi quod recompensatio est ex parte eius qui offendit, ut puta cum satisfactione; retributio autem est ex parte eius in quem fuit offensa commissa. Utrumque autem ad materiam iustitiae pertinet, quia utrumque est commutatio quaedam. Unde manifestum est quod poenitentia, secundum quod est virtus, est pars iustitiae. |
I answer that, As stated above (Article [1], ad 2) penance is a special virtue not merely because it sorrows for evil done (since charity would suffice for that), but also because the penitent grieves for the sin he has committed, inasmuch as it is an offense against God, and purposes to amend. Now amendment for an offense committed against anyone is not made by merely ceasing to offend, but it is necessary to make some kind of compensation, which obtains in offenses committed against another, just as retribution does, only that compensation is on the part of the offender, as when he makes satisfaction, whereas retribution is on the part of the person offended against. Each of these belongs to the matter of justice, because each is a kind of commutation. Wherefore it is evident that penance, as a virtue, is a part of justice. |
| Sciendum tamen quod, secundum philosophum, in V Ethic., dupliciter dicitur iustum, scilicet simpliciter, et secundum quid. Simpliciter quidem iustum est inter aequales, eo quod iustitia est aequalitas quaedam. Quod ipse vocat iustum politicum vel civile, eo quod omnes cives aequales sunt, quantum ad hoc quod immediate sunt sub principe, sicut liberi existentes. Iustum autem secundum quid dicitur quod est inter illos quorum unus est sub potestate alterius, sicut servus sub domino, filius sub patre, uxor sub viro. Et tale iustum consideratur in poenitentia. Unde poenitens recurrit ad Deum, cum emendationis proposito, sicut servus ad dominum, secundum illud Psalmi, sicut oculi servorum in manibus dominorum suorum, ita oculi nostri ad dominum Deum nostrum, donec misereatur nostri; et sicut filius ad patrem, secundum illud Luc. XV, pater, peccavi in caelum et coram te; et sicut uxor ad virum, secundum illud Ierem. III, fornicata es cum amatoribus multis, tamen revertere ad me, dicit dominus. | It must be observed, however, that according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) a thing is said to be just in two ways, simply and relatively. A thing is just simply when it is between equals, since justice is a kind of equality, and he calls this the politic or civil just, because all citizens are equal, in the point of being immediately under the ruler, retaining their freedom. But a thing is just relatively when it is between parties of whom one is subject to the other, as a servant under his master, a son under his father, a wife under her husband. It is this kind of just that we consider in penance. Wherefore the penitent has recourse to God with a purpose of amendment, as a servant to his master, according to Ps. 122:2: "Behold, as the eyes of servants are on the hands of their masters... so are our eyes unto the Lord our God, until He have mercy on us"; and as a son to his father, according to Lk. 15:21: "Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee"; and as a wife to her husband, according to Jer. 3:1: "Thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers; nevertheless return to Me, saith the Lord." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut in V Ethic. dicitur, iustitia est ad alterum. Ille autem ad quem est iustitia, non dicitur esse materia iustitiae, sed magis res quae distribuuntur vel commutantur. Unde et materia poenitentiae non est Deus, sed actus humani quibus Deus offenditur vel placatur, sed Deus se habet sicut ille ad quem est iustitia. Ex quo patet quod poenitentia non est virtus theologica, quia non habet Deum pro materia vel pro obiecto. | Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Ethic. v, 1, justice is a virtue towards another person, and the matter of justice is not so much the person to whom justice is due as the thing which is the subject of distribution or commutation. Hence the matter of penance is not God, but human acts, whereby God is offended or appeased; whereas God is as one to whom justice is due. Wherefore it is evident that penance is not a theological virtue, because God is not its matter or object. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod medium iustitiae est aequalitas quae constituitur inter illos inter quos est iustitia, ut dicitur in V Ethic. In quibusdam autem non potest perfecta aequalitas constitui, propter alterius excellentiam, sicut inter filium et patrem, inter hominem et Deum, ut philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic. Unde in talibus ille qui est deficiens, debet facere quidquid potest, nec tamen hoc erit sufficiens, sed solum secundum acceptationem superioris. Et hoc significatur per excessum qui attribuitur poenitentiae. | Reply to Objection 2: The mean of justice is the equality that is established between those between whom justice is, as stated in Ethic. v. But in certain cases perfect equality cannot be established, on account of the excellence of one, as between father and son, God and man, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14), wherefore in such cases, he that falls short of the other must do whatever he can. Yet this will not be sufficient simply, but only according to the acceptance of the higher one; and this is what is meant by ascribing excess to penance. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut est commutatio quaedam in beneficiis, cum scilicet aliquis pro beneficio recepto gratiam rependit, ita etiam est commutatio in offensis, cum aliquis pro offensa in alterum commissa vel invitus punitur, quod pertinet ad vindicativam iustitiam; vel voluntarie recompensat emendam, quod pertinet ad poenitentiam, quae respicit personam peccatoris sicut iustitia vindicativa personam iudicis. Unde manifestum est quod utraque sub iustitia commutativa continetur. | Reply to Objection 3: As there is a kind of commutation in favors, when, to wit, a man gives thanks for a favor received, so also is there commutation in the matter of offenses, when, on account of an offense committed against another, a man is either punished against his will, which pertains to vindictive justice, or makes amends of his own accord, which belongs to penance, which regards the person of the sinner, just as vindictive justice regards the person of the judge. Therefore it is evident that both are comprised under commutative justice. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod poenitentia, licet directe sit species iustitiae, comprehendit tamen quodammodo ea quae pertinent ad omnes virtutes. Inquantum enim est iustitia quaedam hominis ad Deum, oportet quod participet ea quae sunt virtutum theologicarum, quae habent Deum pro obiecto. Unde poenitentia est cum fide passionis Christi, per quam iustificamur a peccatis; et cum spe veniae; et cum odio vitiorum, quod pertinet ad caritatem inquantum vero est virtus moralis, participat aliquid prudentiae, quae est directiva omnium virtutum moralium. Sed ex ipsa ratione iustitiae non solum habet id quod iustitiae est, sed etiam ea quae sunt temperantiae et fortitudinis, inquantum scilicet ea quae delectationem causant ad temperantiam pertinentem, vel terrorem incutiunt, quem fortitudo moderatur, in commutationem iustitiae veniunt. Et secundum hoc ad iustitiam pertinet et abstinere a delectabilibus, quod pertinet ad temperantiam; et sustinere dura, quod pertinet ad fortitudinem. | Reply to Objection 4: Although penance is directly a species of justice, yet, in a fashion, it comprises things pertaining to all the virtues; for inasmuch as there is a justice of man towards God, it must have a share in matter pertaining to the theological virtues, the object of which is God. Consequently penance comprises faith in Christ's Passion, whereby we are cleansed of our sins, hope for pardon, and hatred of vice, which pertains to charity. Inasmuch as it is a moral virtue, it has a share of prudence, which directs all the moral virtues: but from the very nature of justice, it has not only something belonging to justice, but also something belonging to temperance and fortitude, inasmuch as those things which cause pleasure, and which pertain to temperance, and those which cause terror, which fortitude moderates, are objects of commutative justice. Accordingly it belongs to justice both to abstain from pleasure, which belongs to temperance, and to bear with hardships, which belongs to fortitude. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod subiectum poenitentiae non sit proprie voluntas. Poenitentia enim est tristitiae species. Sed tristitia est in concupiscibili, sicut et gaudium. Ergo poenitentia est in concupiscibili. | Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of penance is not properly the will. For penance is a species of sorrow. But sorrow is in the concupiscible part, even as joy is. Therefore penance is in the concupiscible faculty. |
| Praeterea, poenitentia est vindicta quaedam, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de poenitentia. Sed vindicta videtur ad irascibilem pertinere, quia ira est appetitus vindictae. Ergo videtur quod poenitentia sit in irascibili. | Objection 2: Further, penance is a kind of vengeance, as Augustine states in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]. But vengeance seems to regard the irascible faculty, since anger is the desire for vengeance. Therefore it seems that penance is in the irascible part. |
| Praeterea, praeteritum est proprium obiectum memoriae, secundum philosophum, in libro de memoria. Sed poenitentia est de praeterito, ut dictum est. Ergo poenitentia est in memoria sicuti in subiecto. |
Objection 3: Further, the past is the proper object of the memory, according to the Philosopher (De Memoria i). Now penance regards the past, as stated above (Article [1], ad 2, ad 3). Therefore penance is subjected in the memory. |
| Praeterea, nihil agit ubi non est. Sed poenitentia excludit peccata ab omnibus viribus animae. Ergo poenitentia est in qualibet vi animae, et non in voluntate tantum. | Objection 4: Further, nothing acts where it is not. Now penance removes sin from all the powers of the soul. Therefore penance is in every power of the soul, and not only in the will. |
| Sed contra, poenitentia est sacrificium quoddam, secundum illud Psalmi, sacrificium Deo spiritus contribulatus. Sed offerre sacrificium est actus voluntatis, secundum illud Psalmi, voluntarie sacrificabo tibi. Ergo poenitentia est in voluntate. | On the contrary, Penance is a kind of sacrifice, according to Ps. 50:19: "A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit." But to offer a sacrifice is an act of the will, according to Ps. 53:8: "I will freely sacrifice to Thee." Therefore penance is in the will. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod de poenitentia dupliciter loqui possumus. Uno modo, secundum quod est passio quaedam. Et sic, cum sit species tristitiae, est in concupiscibili sicut in subiecto. Alio modo, secundum quod est virtus. Et sic, sicut dictum est, est species iustitiae. Iustitia autem, ut in secunda parte dictum est, habet pro subiecto appetitum rationis, qui est voluntas. Unde manifestum est quod poenitentia, secundum quod est virtus, est in voluntate sicut in subiecto. Et proprius eius actus est propositum emendandi Deo quod contra eum commissum est. |
I answer that, We can speak of penance in two ways: first, in so far as it is a passion, and thus, since it is a kind of sorrow, it is in the concupiscible part as its subject; secondly, in so far as it is a virtue, and thus, as stated above (Article [3]), it is a species of justice. Now justice, as stated in the FS, Question [56], Article [6], is subjected in the rational appetite which is the will. Therefore it is evident that penance, in so far as it is a virtue, is subjected in the will, and its proper act is the purpose of amending what was committed against God. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de poenitentia secundum quod est passio. | Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers penance as a passion. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod vindictam expetere ex passione de alio pertinet ad irascibilem. Sed appetere vel facere vindictam ex ratione de se vel de alio, pertinet ad voluntatem. | Reply to Objection 2: To desire vengeance on another, through passion, belongs to the irascible appetite, but to desire or take vengeance on oneself or on another, through reason, belongs to the will. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod memoria est vis apprehensiva praeteriti. Poenitentia autem non pertinet ad vim apprehensivam, sed ad appetitivam, quae praesupponit actum apprehensivae. Unde poenitentia non est in memoria, sed supponit eam. | Reply to Objection 3: The memory is a power that apprehends the past. But penance belongs not to the apprehensive but to the appetitive power, which presupposes an act of the apprehension. Wherefore penance is not in the memory, but presupposes it. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod voluntas, sicut in prima parte habitum est, movet omnes alias potentias animae. Et ideo non est inconveniens si poenitentia, in voluntate existens, aliquid in singulis potentiis animae operatur. |
Reply to Objection 4: The will, as stated above (FP, Question [82], Article [4]; FS, Question [9], Article [1]), moves all the other powers of the soul; so that it is not unreasonable for penance to be subjected in the will, and to produce an effect in each power of the soul. |
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| Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod principium poenitentiae non sit ex timore. Poenitentia enim incipit in displicentia peccatorum. Sed hoc pertinet ad caritatem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo poenitentia magis oritur ex amore quam ex timore. |
Objection 1: It would seem that penance does not originate from fear. For penance originates in displeasure at sin. But this belongs to charity, as stated above (Article [3]). Therefore penance originates from love rather than fear. |
| Praeterea, ad poenitentiam homines provocantur per expectationem regni caelestis, secundum illud Matth. IV, poenitentiam agite, appropinquabit enim regnum caelorum. Sed regnum caelorum est obiectum spei. Ergo poenitentia magis procedit ex spe quam ex timore. | Objection 2: Further, men are induced to do penance, through the expectation of the heavenly kingdom, according to Mt. 3:2 and Mt. 4:17: "Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." Now the kingdom of heaven is the object of hope. Therefore penance results from hope rather than from fear. |
| Praeterea, timor est interior actus hominis. Poenitentia autem non videtur esse ex opere hominis, sed ex opere Dei, secundum illud Ierem. XXXI, postquam convertisti me, egi poenitentiam. Ergo poenitentia non procedit ex timore. | Objection 3: Further, fear is an internal act of man. But penance does not seem to arise in us through any work of man, but through the operation of God, according to Jer. 31:19: "After Thou didst convert me I did penance." Therefore penance does not result from fear. |
| Sed contra est quod Isaiae XXVI dicitur, sicut quae concipit, cum appropinquaverit ad partum, dolens clamat in doloribus suis, sic facti sumus, scilicet per poenitentiam, et postea subditur, secundum aliam litteram, a timore tuo, domine, concepimus, et parturivimus, et peperimus spiritum salutis, idest poenitentiae salutaris, ut per praemissa patet. Ergo poenitentia procedit ex timore. |
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 26:17): "As a woman with child, when she draweth near the time of her delivery, is in pain, and crieth out in her pangs, so ere we become," by penance, to wit; and according to another [*The Septuagint] version the text continues: "Through fear of Thee, O Lord, we have conceived, and been as it were in labor, and have brought forth the spirit of salvation," i.e. of salutary penance, as is clear from what precedes. Therefore penance results from fear. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod de poenitentia loqui possumus dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad habitum. Et sic immediate a Deo infunditur, sine nobis principaliter operantibus, non tamen sine nobis dispositive cooperantibus per aliquos actus. Alio modo possumus loqui de poenitentia quantum ad actus quibus Deo operanti in poenitentia cooperamur. Quorum actuum primum principium est Dei operatio convertentis cor, secundum illud Thren. ult., converte nos, domine, ad te, et convertemur. Secundus actus est motus fidei. Tertius actus est motus timoris servilis, quo quis timore suppliciorum a peccatis retrahitur. Quartus actus est motus spei, quo quis, sub spe veniae consequendae, assumit propositum emendandi. Quintus actus est motus caritatis, quo alicui peccatum displicet secundum seipsum, et non iam propter supplicia. Sextus actus est motus timoris filialis, quo, propter reverentiam Dei, aliquis emendam Deo voluntarius offert. | I answer that, We may speak of penance in two ways: first, as to the habit, and then it is infused by God immediately without our operating as principal agents, but not without our co-operating dispositively by certain acts. Secondly, we may speak of penance, with regard to the acts whereby in penance we co-operate with God operating, the first principle [*Cf. FS, Question [113]] of which acts is the operation of God in turning the heart, according to Lam. 5:21: "Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted"; the second, an act of faith; the third, a movement of servile fear, whereby a man is withdrawn from sin through fear of punishment; the fourth, a movement of hope, whereby a man makes a purpose of amendment, in the hope of obtaining pardon; the fifth, a movement of charity, whereby sin is displeasing to man for its own sake and no longer for the sake of the punishment; the sixth, a movement of filial fear whereby a man, of his own accord, offers to make amends to God through fear of Him. |
| Sic igitur patet quod actus poenitentiae a timore servili procedit sicut a primo motu affectus ad hoc ordinante, a timore autem filiali sicut ab immediato et proximo principio. | Accordingly it is evident that the act of penance results from servile fear as from the first movement of the appetite in this direction and from filial fear as from its immediate and proper principle. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod peccatum prius incipit homini displicere, maxime peccatori, propter supplicia, quae respicit timor servilis, quam propter Dei offensam vel peccati turpitudinem, quod pertinet ad caritatem. | Reply to Objection 1: Sin begins to displease a man, especially a sinner, on account of the punishments which servile fear regards, before it displeases him on account of its being an offense against God, or on account of its wickedness, which pertains to charity. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod in regno caelorum appropinquante intelligitur adventus regis non solum praemiantis, sed etiam punientis. Unde et, Matth. III, Ioannes Baptista dicebat, progenies viperarum, quis demonstravit vobis fugere a ventura ira? |
Reply to Objection 2: When the kingdom of heaven is said to be at hand, we are to understand that the king is on his way, not only to reward but also to punish. Wherefore John the Baptist said (Mt. 3:7): "Ye brood of vipers, who hath showed you to flee from the wrath to come?" |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam ipse motus timoris procedit ex actu Dei convertentis cor, unde dicitur Deuteron. V, quis det eos talem habere mentem ut timeant me? Et ideo per hoc quod poenitentia a timore procedit, non excluditur quin procedat ex actu Dei convertentis cor. |
Reply to Objection 3: Even the movement of fear proceeds from God's act in turning the heart; wherefore it is written (Dt. 5:29): "Who shall give them to have such a mind, to fear Me?" And so the fact that penance results from fear does not hinder its resulting from the act of God in turning the heart. |
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| Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod poenitentia sit prima virtutum. Quia super illud Matth. III, poenitentiam agite, dicit Glossa, prima virtus est per poenitentiam punire veterem hominem et vitia odire. | Objection 1: It would seem that penance is the first of the virtues. Because, on Mt. 3:2, "Do penance," etc., a gloss says: "The first virtue is to destroy the old man, and hate sin by means of penance." |
| Praeterea, recedere a termino prius esse videtur quam accedere ad terminum. Sed omnes aliae virtutes pertinere videntur ad accessum ad terminum, quia per omnes homo ordinatur ad bonum agendum. Poenitentia autem videtur ordinari ad recessum a malo. Ergo poenitentia videtur prior esse omnibus aliis virtutibus. | Objection 2: Further, withdrawal from one extreme seems to precede approach to the other. Now all the other virtues seem to regard approach to a term, because they all direct man to do good; whereas penance seems to direct him to withdraw from evil. Therefore it seems that penance precedes all the other virtues. |
| Praeterea, ante poenitentiam est peccatum in anima. Sed simul cum peccato nulla virtus animae inest. Ergo nulla virtus est ante poenitentiam, sed ipsa videtur esse prima, quae aliis aditum aperit excludendo peccatum. | Objection 3: Further, before penance, there is sin in the soul. Now no virtue is compatible with sin in the soul. Therefore no virtue precedes penance, which is itself the first of all and opens the door to the others by expelling sin. |
| Sed contra est quod poenitentia procedit ex fide, spe et caritate, sicut iam dictum est. Non ergo poenitentia est prima virtutum. |
On the contrary, Penance results from faith, hope, and charity, as already stated (Articles [2],5). Therefore penance is not the first of the virtues. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod in virtutibus non attenditur ordo temporis quantum ad habitus, quia, cum virtutes sint connexae, ut in secunda parte habitum est, omnes simul incipiunt esse in anima. Sed dicitur una earum esse prior altera ordine naturae, qui consideratur ex ordine actuum, secundum scilicet quod actus unius virtutis praesupponit actum alterius virtutis. Secundum hoc ergo dicendum est quod actus quidam laudabiles etiam tempore praecedere possunt actum et habitum poenitentiae, sicut actus fidei et spei informium, et actus timoris servilis. Actus autem et habitus caritatis simul sunt tempore cum actu et habitu poenitentiae, et cum habitibus aliarum virtutum, nam, sicut in secunda parte habitum est, in iustificatione impii simul est motus liberi arbitrii in Deum, qui est actus fidei per caritatem formatus, et motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum, qui est actus poenitentiae. Horum tamen duorum actuum primus naturaliter praecedit secundum, nam actus poenitentiae virtutis est contra peccatum ex amore Dei, unde primus actus est ratio et causa secundi. | I answer that, In speaking of the virtues, we do not consider the order of time with regard to the habits, because, since the virtues are connected with one another, as stated in the FS, Question [65], Article [1], they all begin at the same time to be in the soul; but one is said to precede the other in the order of nature, which order depends on the order of their acts, in so far as the act of one virtue presupposes the act of another. Accordingly, then, one must say that, even in the order of time, certain praiseworthy acts can precede the act and the habit of penance, e.g. acts of dead faith and hope, and an act of servile fear; while the act and habit of charity are, in point of time, simultaneous with the act and habit of penance, and with the habits of the other virtues. For, as was stated in the FS, Question [113], Articles [7],8, in the justification of the ungodly, the movement of the free-will towards God, which is an act of faith quickened by charity, and the movement of the free-will towards sin, which is the act of penance, are simultaneous. Yet of these two acts, the former naturally precedes the latter, because the act of the virtue of penance is directed against sin, through love of God; where the first-mentioned act is the reason and cause of the second. |
| Sic igitur poenitentia non est simpliciter prima virtutum, nec ordine temporis nec ordine naturae, quia ordine naturae simpliciter praecedunt ipsam virtutes theologicae. Sed quantum ad aliquid est prima inter ceteras virtutes ordine temporis, quantum ad actum eius qui primus occurrit in iustificatione impii. Sed ordine naturae videntur esse aliae virtutes priores, sicut quod est per se prius est eo quod est per accidens, nam aliae virtutes per se videntur esse necessariae ad bonum hominis, poenitentia autem supposito quodam, scilicet peccato praeexistenti; sicut etiam dictum est circa ordinem sacramenti poenitentiae ad alia sacramenta praedicta. |
Consequently penance is not simply the first of the virtues, either in the order of time, or in the order of nature, because, in the order of nature, the theological virtues precede it simply. Nevertheless, in a certain respect, it is the first of the other virtues in the order of time, as regards its act, because this act is the first in the justification of the ungodly; whereas in the order of nature, the other virtues seem to precede, as that which is natural precedes that which is accidental; because the other virtues seem to be necessary for man's good, by reason of their very nature, whereas penance is only necessary if something, viz. sin, be presupposed, as stated above (Question [55], Article [2]), when we spoke of the relation of the sacrament of penance to the other sacraments aforesaid. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Glossa illa loquitur quantum ad hoc quod actus poenitentiae primus est tempore inter actus aliarum virtutum. | Reply to Objection 1: This gloss is to be taken as meaning that the act of penance is the first in point of time, in comparison with the acts of the other virtues. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod in motibus successivis recedere a termino est prius tempore quam pervenire ad terminum; et prius natura quantum est ex parte subiecti, sive secundum ordinem causae materialis. Sed secundum ordinem causae agentis et finalis, prius est pervenire ad terminum, hoc enim est quod primo agens intendit. Et hic ordo praecipue attenditur in actibus animae, ut dicitur in II physicorum. | Reply to Objection 2: In successive movements withdrawal from one extreme precedes approach to the other, in point of time; and also in the order of nature, if we consider the subject, i.e. the order of the material cause; but if we consider the order of the efficient and final causes, approach to the end is first, for it is this that the efficient cause intends first of all: and it is this order which we consider chiefly in the acts of the soul, as stated in Phys. ii. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod poenitentia aperit aditum virtutibus expellendo peccatum per virtutem fidei et caritatis, quae sunt naturaliter priores. Ita tamen aperit eis aditum quod ipsae simul intrant cum ipsa, nam in iustificatione impii simul cum motu liberi arbitrii in Deum et in peccatum, est remissio culpae et infusio gratiae, cum qua simul infunduntur omnes virtutes, ut in secunda parte habitum est. | Reply to Objection 3: Penance opens the door to the other virtues, because it expels sin by the virtues of faith, hope and charity, which precede it in the order of nature; yet it so opens the door to them that they enter at the same time as it: because, in the justification of the ungodly, at the same time as the free-will is moved towards God and against sin, the sin is pardoned and grace infused, and with grace all the virtues, as stated in the FS, Question [65], Articles [3],5. |