| Prooemium
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PROLOGUE
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| Sicut docet philosophus in
politicis suis, quando aliqua plura ordinantur ad unum, oportet unum
eorum esse regulans, sive regens, et alia regulata, sive recta. Quod
quidem patet in unione animae et corporis; nam anima naturaliter
imperat, et corpus obedit. Similiter etiam inter animae vires:
irascibilis enim et concupiscibilis naturali ordine per rationem
reguntur. Omnes autem scientiae et artes ordinantur in unum, scilicet ad
hominis perfectionem, quae est eius beatitudo. Unde necesse est, quod
una earum sit aliarum omnium rectrix, quae nomen sapientiae recte
vindicat. Nam sapientis est alios ordinare.
| When several things are
ordained to one thing, one of them must rule or govern and the rest be
ruled or governed, as the Philosopher, teaches in the Politics.
This is evident in the union of soul and body, for the soul naturally
commands and the body obeys. The same thing is true of the soul’s
powers, for the concupiscible and irascible appetites are ruled in a
natural order by reason. Now all the sciences and arts are ordained to
one thing, namely, to man’s perfection, which is happiness. Hence one of
these sciences and arts must be the mistress of all the others, and
this rightly lays claim to the name wisdom; for it is the office of the wise man to direct others.
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| Quae autem sit haec scientia,
et circa qualia, considerari potest, si diligenter respiciatur quomodo
est aliquis idoneus ad regendum. Sicut enim, ut in libro praedicto
philosophus dicit, homines intellectu vigentes, naturaliter aliorum
rectores et domini sunt: homines vero qui sunt robusti corpore,
intellectu vero deficientes, sunt naturaliter servi: ita scientia debet
esse naturaliter aliarum regulatrix, quae maxime intellectualis est.
Haec autem est, quae circa maxime intelligibilia versatur.
| We can discover which
science this is and the sort of things with which it deals by carefully
examining the qualities of a good ruler; for just as men of superior
intelligence are naturally the rulers and masters of others, whereas
those of great physical strength and little intelligence are naturally
slaves, as the Philosopher says in the aforementioned book in a similar
way that science which is intellectual in the highest degree should be
naturally the ruler of the others. This science is the one which treats
of the most intelligible objects.
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| Maxime autem intelligibilia
tripliciter accipere possumus. Primo quidem ex ordine intelligendi. Nam
ex quibus intellectus certitudinem accipit, videntur esse intelligibilia
magis. Unde, cum certitudo scientiae per intellectum acquiratur ex
causis, causarum cognitio maxime intellectualis esse videtur. Unde et
illa scientia, quae primas causas considerat, videtur esse maxime
aliarum regulatrix.
| Now the phrase “most
intelligible objects” can be understood in three ways. First, from the
viewpoint of the order of knowing; for those things from which the
intellect derives certitude seem to be more intelligible. Therefore,
since the certitude of science is acquired by the intellect knowing
causes, a knowledge of causes seems to be intellectual in the highest
degree. Hence that science which considers first causes also seems to be
the ruler of the others in the highest degree.
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| Secundo ex comparatione
intellectus ad sensum. Nam, cum sensus sit cognitio particularium,
intellectus per hoc ab ipso differre videtur, quod universalia
comprehendit. Unde et illa scientia maxime est intellectualis, quae
circa principia maxime universalia versatur. Quae quidem sunt ens, et ea
quae consequuntur ens, ut unum et multa, potentia et actus. Huiusmodi
autem non debent omnino indeterminata remanere, cum sine his completa
cognitio de his, quae sunt propria alicui generi vel speciei, haberi non
possit. Nec iterum in una aliqua particulari scientia tractari debent:
quia cum his unumquodque genus entium ad sui cognitionem indigeat, pari
ratione in qualibet particulari scientia tractarentur. Unde restat quod
in una communi scientia huiusmodi tractentur; quae cum maxime
intellectualis sit, est aliarum regulatrix.
| Second, this phrase can be
understood by comparing the intellect with the senses; for while
sensory perception is a knowledge of particulars, the intellect seems to
differ from sense by reason of the fact that it comprehends universals.
Hence that science is pre-eminently intellectual which deals with the
most universal principles. These principles are being and those things
which naturally accompany being, such as unity and plurality, potency
and act. Now such principles should not remain entirely undetermined,
since without them complete knowledge of the principles which are proper
to any genus or species cannot be had. Nor again should they be dealt
with in any one particular science, for, since a knowledge of each class
of beings stands in need if such principles, they would with equal
reason be investigated in every particular science. It follows, then,
that such principles should be treated by one common science, which,
since it is intellectual in the highest degree, is the mistress of the
others.
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| Tertio ex ipsa cognitione
intellectus. Nam cum unaquaeque res ex hoc ipso vim intellectivam
habeat, quod est a materia immunis, oportet illa esse maxime
intelligibilia, quae sunt maxime a materia separata. Intelligibile enim
et intellectum oportet proportionata esse, et unius generis, cum
intellectus et intelligibile in actu sint unum. Ea vero sunt maxime a
materia separata, quae non tantum a signata materia abstrahunt, sicut
formae naturales in universali acceptae, de quibus tractat scientia
naturalis, sed omnino a materia sensibili. Et non solum secundum
rationem, sicut mathematica, sed etiam secundum esse, sicut Deus et
intelligentiae. Unde scientia, quae de istis rebus considerat, maxime
videtur esse intellectualis, et aliarum princeps sive domina.
| Third, this phrase can be
understood from the viewpoint of the intellect’s own knowledge. For
since each thing has intellective power by virtue of being free from
matter, those things must be intelligible in the highest degree which
are altogether separate, from matter. For the intellect and the
intelligible object must be proportionate to each other and must belong
to the same genus, since the intellect and the intelligible object are
one in act. Now those things are separate from matter in the highest
degree which abstract not only from signate matter (as the natural forms
taken universally of which the philosophy of nature treats) but from
sensible matter altogether; and these are separate from matter not only
in their intelligible constitution (ratio), as the objects of mathematics, but also in being (esse),
as God and the intelligences. Therefore the science which considers
such things seems to be the most intellectual and the ruler or mistress
of the others.
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| Haec autem triplex
consideratio, non diversis, sed uni scientiae attribui debet. Nam
praedictae substantiae separatae sunt universales et primae causae
essendi. Eiusdem autem scientiae est considerare causas proprias
alicuius generis et genus ipsum: sicut naturalis considerat principia
corporis naturalis. Unde oportet quod ad eamdem scientiam pertineat
considerare substantias separatas, et ens commune, quod est genus, cuius
sunt praedictae substantiae communes et universales causae.
| Now this threefold
consideration should be assigned to one and the same science and not to
different sciences, because the aforementioned separate substances are
the universal and first causes of being. Moreover, it pertains to one
and the same science to consider both the proper causes of some genus
and the genus itself; for example, the philosophy of nature considers
the principles of a natural body. Therefore, it must be the office of
one and the same science to consider the separate substances and being
in general (ens commune), which is the genus of which the aforementioned substances are the common and universal causes.
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| Ex quo apparet, quod quamvis
ista scientia praedicta tria consideret, non tamen considerat quodlibet
eorum ut subiectum, sed ipsum solum ens commune. Hoc enim est subiectum
in scientia, cuius causas et passiones quaerimus, non autem ipsae causae
alicuius generis quaesiti. Nam cognitio causarum alicuius generis, est
finis ad quem consideratio scientiae pertingit. Quamvis autem subiectum
huius scientiae sit ens commune, dicitur tamen tota de his quae sunt
separata a materia secundum esse et rationem. Quia secundum esse et
rationem separari dicuntur, non solum illa quae nunquam in materia esse
possunt, sicut Deus et intellectuales substantiae, sed etiam illa quae
possunt sine materia esse, sicut ens commune. Hoc tamen non contingeret,
si a materia secundum esse dependerent.
| From this it is evident
that, although this science (metaphysics or first philosophy) studies
the three things mentioned above, it does not investigate any one of
them as its subject, but only being in general. For the subject of a
science is the genus whose causes and properties we seek, and not the
causes themselves of the particular genus studied; for a knowledge of
the causes of some genus is the goal to which the investigation of a
science attains. Now although the subject of this science is being in
general, the whole of it is predicated of those things which are
separate from matter both in their intelligible constitution and in
being. For it is not only those things which can never exist in matter
that are said to be separate from matter in their intelligible
constitution and being, such as God and the intellectual substances, but
also those which can exist without matter, as being in general. This
could not be the case, however, if their being depended on matter.
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| Secundum igitur tria praedicta,
ex quibus perfectio huius scientiae attenditur, sortitur tria nomina.
Dicitur enim scientia divina sive theologia, inquantum praedictas
substantias considerat. Metaphysica, inquantum considerat ens et ea quae
consequuntur ipsum. Haec enim transphysica inveniuntur in via
resolutionis, sicut magis communia post minus communia. Dicitur autem
prima philosophia, inquantum primas rerum causas considerat. Sic igitur
patet quid sit subiectum huius scientiae, et qualiter se habeat ad alias
scientias, et quo nomine nominetur.
| Therefore in accordance
with the three things mentioned above from which this science derives
its perfection, three names arise. It is called divine science or
theology inasmuch as it considers the aforementioned substances. It is
called metaphysics inasmuch as it considers being and the attributes
which naturally accompany being (for things which transcend the physical
order are discovered by the process of analysis, as the more common are
discovered after the less common). And it is called first philosophy
inasmuch as it considers the first causes of things. Therefore it is
evident what the subject of this science is, and how it is related to
the other sciences, and by what names it is designated.
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