"At the end of our life, we shall all be judged by charity." —St. John of the Cross

QuoteSymbolically and elegantly, R. Abraham ben Ezra notes that in the word isscha there is contained the contracted name of God, Yah, who is the author of marriage; and as long as this name remains in the marriage (and it remains as long as the spouses fear God and love one another), for so long God is present at and blesses the union. But if they hate each other and forget God, then the spouses cast away that name; and thus when the yod and he, which form Yah, are removed, all that remains from isch and isscha, that is from man and woman, is esh esh, that is fire and fire -- namely the fire of quarrels and trouble in this life, and in the next life, eternal fire.to:
Quote from: Craig R. Toth, Commentary on Genesis 1-3, p. 148 on October 01, 2019, 07:00:00 AMSymbolically and elegantly, Rabbi Abraham ben Ezra notes that the contracted name of God, הי, iāh [or yāh] is contained in the word השא, 'iššāh [woman]. God is the founder of marriage, and as long as His name remains in marriage — and it remains as long as spouses fear God and mutually love each other — God will be present in and bless the marriage. But if they hate one another and forget God, then the spouses will cast away that name. Therefore, with the Hebrew letters yod [י] and he [ה] removed, of which the word הי is composed, all that remains of שיא, 'îš, and השא, 'iššāh, i.e. all that remains of the of the Hebrew words for "man" and "woman," is שא שא, êš êš, i.e., "fire and fire," the fire of quarrels and trouble in this life, but eternal fire in the next.
QuoteAll content is an experiment using the AI "Claude" to translate latin texts (sometimes not available in translation) into public domain english. This seems to do a pretty good job, but it is certainly possible that there are errors caused by the OCR process or translating itself.
I know this is a little technical but if you do find errors the best way to let me know is probably to create an "Issue" at https://github.com/farant/lapide where all the content for the site is located.
God bless you and I hope you find these translations useful!
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QuoteBaltasara Petronila Arce y Suárez published a treatise in logic in the 17th century Salamanca; she was part of the Scotist school.source: this answer to the HSM StackExachange qusetion "Who was the first major female logician?"Abstract:
- Panzone, Lelio Paolo. "The Debut of a Woman in the History of Logic: Baltasara Petronila Arce y Suárez's Tractatus Logicæ Parvæ Iuxta Mentem Scoti." Journal of the History of Women Philosophers and Scientists 4, no. 1 (2025): 66–82. DOI: 10.1163/2666318X-bja00033.
QuoteIn 1692, the Spanish noblewoman Baltasara Petronila Arce y Suárez published her Tractatus logicae parvae iuxta mentem Scoti in Salamanca. She thus became, according to some historians of philosophy, the first woman logician. This paper constitutes a short introduction to the study of Baltasara's work, which has been neglected by scholarly research so far. The exposition is divided into three parts. First, Baltasara's biography is outlined, with special emphasis on the crucial issue of her education. An overview of the historical-philosophical context follows, with a focus on the logical trend to which Baltasara belongs, namely, logic in the medieval tradition. The third section offers a general analysis of the Tractatus, presenting the structure and contents of the treatise and addressing the complex question of its sources. Some concluding remarks assess the originality and philosophical interest of the Tractatus. The purpose of the paper is to encourage further research on Baltasara and her work.This other source:says (p.53):
- J. Schmutz, L'héritage des subtils cartographie du scotisme de l'âge classique, Les études philosophiques 60.1 (2002): 51-81.
Quoteles scotistes peuvent sans doute s'enorgueillir de compter la première femme logicienne parmi leur rangs, une noble dame espagnole qui s'était piquée de subtilités scolastiques et avait composé un traité de logique selon l'esprit de Duns Scot.Quote[DeepL transl.:] Scotists can undoubtedly take pride in counting the first female logician among their ranks—a noble Spanish lady who had taken a keen interest in scholastic subtleties and had written a treatise on logic in the spirit of Duns Scotus.The book is written by her, published by a woman and dedicated to the Duchess of Pastrana. As for the contents, Georgina Rabassó, "Women in Logic: Baltasara Petronia Arce Suárez and her Tractatus logicæ parvæ" in The XVIIIth Symposium of the International Association of Women Philosophers p. 165 writes:QuoteArce begins by scrutinising and defining the concept of the "sign" and ends with an analysis of the structure of the syllogism, explaining the fundamentals of logic and addressing the three operations of the intellect, and basing herself on Aristotle and Duns Scotus.
- Forlivesi, Marco. "Materiali per una descrizione della disputa e dell'esame di laurea in età moderna." Divus Thomas 103, no. 3 (2000): 252–79, p. 264 (DeepL transl.):
QuoteBoth her husband and Baltasara Petronila herself were grandchildren of Diego Arce y Reinoso, General Inquisitor during the second phase of Philip IV's reign. [...] Diego Arce y Reinoso was not only a Dominican, but was also politically close to João Poinsot (John of St. Thomas), an orthodox Thomist and "assistant" confessor to Philip IV in 1643–44. One might therefore wonder why Baltasara Petronila wrote (or rather dictated, as stated on the title page) a treatise on logic iuxta mentem doctoris Ioannis Duns Scoti.Ibid. pp. 265-6 gives the bibliographical description of her work and an excerpt:Quote[1] Although this chapter does not pertain to the completeness of the treatise on minor logic, since it is useful for beginners to have a complete understanding of the procedure to be observed before a dispute, which is common in all schools; Therefore, it seemed to me to present it so that they may know it with greater ease: and since a dispute can only be between two people, one of whom will be the proponent and the other the respondent, and for this reason there will be a conversation between them.
If, however, he is to give an answer, he must, before he proceeds to his question, first uncover his head, and seek permission first from the presiding officer, then from the reader, and so on with the others, according to their rank. Then he should say: The question which now presents itself for discussion inquires this, or that; around which the opinion is divided in a threefold, or fourfold manner, the first of which is as follows. Here he should state the foundation of the opinion, and its arguments, and proceed in the same way with each opinion, until he comes to his own, which he defends, and then state the second, or third, etc. He affirms the opposite of what I am defending and presents it briefly, with all the charm and formality he can muster, giving precedence to the authorities of the saints over the arguments of Aristotle and others. When he has finished, he says: This is my conclusion: If any of you wishes to rise in opposition, I am ready to answer him under the patronage of my superior: and whatever I have said, or shall say, in my reply, I humbly submit to the feet of the Holy Roman Church, and to your censure.
The proponent, however, should take the same approach, and then say: "Against your conclusion, in which you defend this, or this twofold point, as is customary, I will argue in the middle." He first argued against the first conclusion, or the third, and he should present a syllogism against the aforementioned conclusion, and, having done so, proceed to the main conclusion he defends, and say: He will then argue against such a conclusion, in which you defend this or that, and present his affirmative reasoning, and say: "Against this I argue by authority or by reason," and having laid down his argument, he will conclude: "By these and other considerations, you will easily satisfy me of the keenness of your mind."
The respondent, however, should carefully grasp the syllogism of each conclusion, and after he has reported it: To what? and the respondent will answer the proposer on the second point, understanding that the proposer must attend to the second middle term, and then see whether it is a syllogism or an enthymeme, and faithfully summarize what it was, and follow it, first looking to the major premise, then to the minor, then to the conclusion, and if he finds any doubt in either of the premises, he must distinguish it: if true, he concedes it; if false, he denies it; if irrelevant, he says it is to be passed over.
If it is an axiom, he should say: "I grant the axiom," or "I deny it." If it is the authority of some saint, or of Aristotle, he should answer: "I grant the authority," or "I deny it." If, however, the word 'Therefore' is introduced, he should say: "I distinguish the consequent, not the consequence." If a syllogism has assumed something false, he should say: "Deny the assumption of the major, or the minor, or the consequence." And this is sufficient to briefly understand the method of arguing in the dispute of the letters, and we will begin to explain the first book of the Summulæ.
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